International Affairs: A Survey

DR. R. V. R. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO

Continuing Crisis in South-East Asia

The news of President Nixon’s action in sending American troops to destroy the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia, following the ouster of Prince Sihanouk from the Prime Ministership of Camhodia, dominated the events of the last four months. Both within and outside the United States its impact has been momentous. It constitutes a reversal of the Nixon doctrine of withdrawal from Asia and of the policy of Vietnamisation of the war in South-East Asia. This new and sudden change in American policy amounted to a deliberate act of escalation of the Vietnam War, carrying with it the danger of bringing U. S./Soviet relations to an all time low since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Events in Laos too made the situation worse. Just a few weeks prior to Nixon’s decision, the North Vietnamese overran the Plain of Jars in Laos and this meant that the North Vietnamese had consolidated further their hold over the areas bordering Laos and South Vietnam, much to their strategic advantage. An American retaliation was feared. But the bigger and more far-reaching decision in Cambodia soon eclipsed the Laotian events.

The Cambodian Crisis

            The ground: To have a proper perspective on the ouster of Prince Sihanouk and the later momentous developments it is essential to recapture the nature of Cambodian neutrality and the stresses to which it had been subject from the start.

Prince Sihanouk was thrown out of power in March while on a visit to the Soviet Union. His erstwhile colleagues, led by the Prime Minister Gen. Lon Nol, staged a coup d’etat. The General, and the Vice-Premier, Prince Sirik Matak, were both staunch pro- Americans. The coup was not an overnight plot, but confirms a trend that had been marked for some months. Sihanouk’s inability to check the North Vietnamese infiltrations coupled with his refusal to have anything to do with the Western powers even in tackling this problem only increased the discontent within the regime. It was estimated that 40,000 North Vietnamese had infiltrated, garrisoning military bases on the borders between Cambodia and South Vietnam. It is ironical that the coup should occur when the Prince was on a mission to Moscow and Peking to persuade them to put pressure on Hanoi to withdraw from Cambodian soil. Regarded as deeply committed to genuine neutralism, the prince, partly because of his flamboyant and egotistic temperament and partly because of the constant pin-pricks from American-pampered Thailand and South Vietnam, at one time almost landed in the Chinese lap. Yet he managed to recover his neutralist postures, though never again could he hit it well with the Americans. It is this ground that made many doubt whether the coup was not CIA inspired. The coup did have the immediate effect of bringing the deposed Head of State close to Moscow and Peking. The prince announced that he would certainly return to his land soon.

A brief note on the unique nature of Cambodian neutrality may be appropriate. Cambodian neutrality was subsumed to be one of the props of the whole arrangement arrived at Geneva in 1954. It was universally recognised, then, that Cambodian neutrality was far more naturally securable than that of Laos. In fact, in 1954, communist penetration was insignificant in Cambodia and such was the vehemence of Cambodian neutralist stances at Geneva that even this insignificant North Vietnamese influence was promptly withdrawn. The fact that Cambodia does not border on China–whereas Laos does–can also be held as a crucial factor contributing to Cambodian neutrality. Further, while in 1962 Laotian neutrality necessitated a second Geneva Conference, the Cambodian question was left out of its purview obviously because it presented no problems. Speaking as late as 1966, Lord Avon (the former Sir Anthony Eden), no friend of the Left, has this to say of Prince Sihanouk and of Cambodian neutrality: “...he (Sihanouk) pursued a course so devious as to perplex and sometimes to exasperate his foreign well-wishers. Through these twists and turns, more leftward than rightward, Sihanouk preserved two articles of faith intact. First, his country was to be truly neutral like Sweden or Switzerland, never to form part of a so-called neutralist bloc like Indonesia or Egypt; secondly, a neutrality guaranteed by the Geneva powers of 1954 held, in his conviction, the most hopeful promise for his people and his neighbours. It is still the best hope for peace, for all nations, that his faith should be fulfilled.” (Lord Avon: Towards Peace in Indo-China) Later Communist presence increased and the Vietnam War further augmented this trend. By the beginning of this year it assumed to a serious dimension that even Sihanouk got panicky and had to rush to Moscow to plead moderation with Hanoi for his sake. The record thus clearly shows North Vietnamese violation of Cambodian neutrality. It was for his inability to restrain this that Sihanouk was ousted. Whether the new government at Phnom Penh, in its anxiety to stem the communist advances, would invite American intervention was the big question immediately after the coup.

It was indeed feared that the Lon Nol Government might, in all probability, ask for American help in clearing Cambodia of the communist strongholds near Fishook and Parrots Beak. Actually it was even thought that the Americans in their mood to withdraw from Vietnam and avoid further entanglements would feel extremely embarrassed if such a request were to come from Phnom Penh. But, ironically enough, it was the U. S. Government that decided to march into Cambodia even without consulting General Lon Nol. On the last day of April, President Nixon announced his decision to move American troops into Cambodia. That this decision was not in the least known to Phnom Penh, much less appreciated by it, is shown by the languid comment of Lon Nol: “From our point of view, American and South Vietnamese operations are rather like the Viet Cong. They attacked us just like that, without warning.”

It is by now well known that the U. S. action has been condemned as outright aggression in Anti-American quarters and as an unwise and ill-conceived move even by circles not unsympathetic to the U. S. policy in Vietnam.

It should be recognised that a good case exists for the American action. The vacation of the Communist hideouts in Cambodia was wished for even by Prince Sihanouk and further the communist presence there clearly constituted flagrant violation of Cambodian neutrality. Again, these sanctuaries in Fishook and Parrots Beak had become rest and recouperating centres for the North Vietnamese fighting in the South. The American armies fighting in South Vietnam are certainly entitled to demand the destruction of these sanctuaries. In fact, it can be argued, that the destruction of these brings nearer the end of American operations in Vietnam for then, the Americans can with a greater degree of confidence transfer the military role to the South Vietnamese themselves.

But viewedin the context of the changed emphasis of American policy, as contained in the Nixon doctrine announced on May 14, 1969, and the realities of the Cambodian situation, President Nixon’s present action appears as irresponsible and dangerous.

First, it is a retrogade step because it renounces the President’s own declared policy of eschewing a military solution in preference to a political solution to the Vietnam problem. For, when the President now talks of leaving Vietnam after securing a favourable military position on the front, he is, in effect, reverting to the theme of a military solution. In other words, while the Nixon doctrine promised an unconditional but gradual American disengagement, the invasion of Cambodia, howsoever justifiable on military grounds, constitutes a deliberate act of escalation of the war and hence reprehensible.

Second, the fact of continuing North Vietnamese violation of Cambodian neutrality does not in itself exonerate the present violation by the United States. The Americans had all along known about the communist presence in Cambodia and such a presence was acquiesced in by Prince Sihanouk himself. The communists kept their presence at low key. The American action may have brought about the overt confrontation of the outside powers on Cambodian soil. The point is that in both Laos and Cambodia, though neutralisation agreements have been violated regularly by outside powers, still the agreements continued to play a role in preventing the two countries from becoming a focus of overt confrontation among the big powers. This fact has been ably shown in a recent book entitled “Neutralisation and World Politics” edited by Cycril E. Black, Richard A. Falk and others. Thus the American action seemed to have made the threat to Cambodian neutrality qualitatively significant.

Third, the American action is unjustified even when looked at from the point of view of its own short term objectives. The Americans claimed that the eradication of the sanctuaries is strategically essential. But soon a very senior American general in the field said: “The picture of this operation as crucial and decisive was utterly wrong. Any kind of assessment of what it has achieved–even by me–would be sheer speculation.” (Quoted in the Guardian Weekly, week ending June 6, 1970) It may be true that American and South Vietnamese troops had rendered the use of some sanctuaries like Fishhook, useless for the communists. But the American claims to capturing the crucial headquarters of the communist command (known as the Central Office for South Vietnam–COSVN) proved to be baseless. Also, earlier versions of the ‘catch’ of communist weapons and secret documents turned out to be an exaggeration. In fact, an American spokesman conceded that despite of American, Cambodian and South Vietnamese attacks against communist sanctuaries, the communist headquarters got safely and “essentially re-established” elsewhere (International Herald Tribune, May 22, 1970). Further, the prospect of Cambodia as a whole becoming a communist sanctuary has now become imminent. The Guardian Weekly’s correspondent, reporting from Saigon, had put it well: “While it is true that the North Vietnamese have at last been denied the use of the border sanctuaries, it is equally true that in a sense the whole of Cambodia is now their sanctuary. Previously they had been obliged to keep what the Americans call a “low profile” in Cambodia; now they are free to proselytise and build a political base–which amounts to be a far more serious threat.” (The Guardian Weekly, week ending June 6, 1970).

Perhaps the most objectionable aspect of the American action is the fact that Washington got itself tied too fast to Saigon’s strings. Saigon’s propensity to frustrate American attempts at negotiating with the communists are well known and now it can really upset Washington’s schedule of the present military venture. The Cambodians detest the North and South Vietnamese alike and actually during the early days of the present campaign South Vietnamese harshness towards the Cambodians became a real problem for Washington to guard against. Whether America can really underwrite Saigon’s behaviour in Cambodia is the crucial question. The answer seems to be a definite ‘No’. For, when President Nixon, in partial response to the nation’s protest against his action, announced on 5th May, that the American forces in Cambodia would be withdrawn by the end of June, South Vietnam’s Vice-President, Nguyen Cao Ky, stated that the notion that South Vietnamese troops would withdraw from Cambodia when American forces would do so was “a silly argument of silly people” (Quoted in International Herald Tribune, May 22, 1970). Even the American administration has realised that Saigon is undercutting Nixon’s strategy but is helpless in the matter having itself inducted Saigon into Cambodia. Senator Mansfield had warned that Saigon’s real intentions are far from being confined to containing communists in Cambodia and that territorial gain is very much behind Vice-President Ky’s calculations.

It is, no doubt, heartening that President Nixon had announced that Americans would withdraw from Cambodia by the end of June and that he had actually kept to the schedule. Yet this still leaves the question about the future policy of America vis-a-vis Cambodia open. What will U. S. do if the communists reestablish their military position there? The President has given no definite answer. All he did was to announce, on June 3, that “I can report that all our major military objectives have been achieved.” Viewed in the light of the degree of American success in Cambodia during the campaign, it is clear that the President’s announcement of victory was in the nature of a face-saving device to justify withdrawal. Observers are almost unanimous that what was achieved in Cambodia was less than marginal and that the communists will soon be in strength.

Meanwhile the American Senate passed a resolution making it impossible for the President to commit American troops into Cambodia without its consent as was done by the President on April 30. This extraordinary reaction on the part of the legislative wing reflects only a fraction of the intensity of protest that manifested against the Nixon decision in the U.S. The revolt in the university campuses got reactivated resulting in the deaths of quite a few student protestors, the chasm between the youth and the administration got further widened and, in effect, the fissures with in American society as a whole got exposed more prominently than ever before. Even the President’s cabinet did not escape the fissures as is demonstrated by the open dissent of Robert H. Finch, the Secretary of health and Waltair J. Hickel, the Secretary of the Interior. Though these dissents were not specifically over Nixon’s Cambodian policy, it is widely held that the liberals in the President’s cabinet, led by these two, were reacting to the Cambodian decision.

The Sino-Soviet Attitudes to the Event

It is extraordinary that the American action did not generate the type of reaction that one would expect from Russia. By all counts President Nixon’s Cambodian adventure meant punishing not only Hanoi but extending the anti-communist crusade into Cambodia also. And yet Moscow’s response was lukewarm. It should be remembered that Sihanouk was deposed while he was visiting Moscow. Strangely enough, Brezhnev and Kosygin seemed to have advised him to accept the inevitable and keep quiet till, at least, the Vietnam war ended. Far from loudly protesting against the American inspiration behind the coup in Phnom Penh, the Russians saw the Cambodian affair as something irreversible. Later, when with the loud support of Peking, Sihanouk denounced his deposers as ‘bourgeois oppressors’, and ‘robber princes’ and ‘their American boses’, the Russian press did not even see it fit to report the statement. To top it all, while China and some of her Asian friends recognised Sihanouk’s government-in-exile in Peking, the Russians and their European allies did not hasten to do so. And even after the American invasion of Cambodia, the Russian reaction was no more than a feeble denunciation. To be sure, Russia would certainly replenish the stocks of communist armaments lost by the North Vietnamese in their former Cambodian sanctuaries as a consequence of the American invasion. Yet, the point is that the Kremlin so far remained Oblomovesque in its responses to the events in Indo-China. It did not even withdraw from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the U. S. as a gesture of protest against the U. S. action.

Learned Kremlinologists, like K. S. Karol, of the New Statesman, analysed that, strange at it may sound, Moscow has been consistently reticent to react robustly against American moves in Vietnam since 1964. They were more committed to preserving their policy of co-existence and “believed that the war in Vietnam was an accident on the road to co-existence” (New Statesman May 22, 1970) The present Soviet stance only confirms their continued adherence to this logic. But this very commitment to co-existence creates inherent limits to Soviet passivity in Vietnam. For, the Russians fear the emergence of a new Asian communist bloc led by China as not merely detrimental to Soviet interests but to co-existence itself, and American action of the type witnessed in Cambodia tends to forge a pro-Peking Asian-bloc by forcing the revolutionary forces in these areas into Chinese embrace. Again, strangely enough, the stronger these forces grow the stronger does Chinese influence grow. And precisely for this reason Moscow might not be welcoming an outright communist victory in Indo-China.

The initial Chinese reaction to Sihanouk’s removal had been as unexpected as that of Moscow’s. When Lon Nol and his associates in Cambodia tossed out Prince Sihanouk, it now appears beyond doubt, Peking offered to accept the new Phnom Penh Government if it would continue doing what Sihanouk had been doing but had become restive about allowing the North Vietnamese and Viet-Cong use of the sanctuaries in Cambodia to help carry on the war in South Vietnam. Actually Peking made this offer to Lon Nol. Thus the first Chinese reaction was to protect their own interest which was to help Hanoi drive the Americans out of South-East Asia. However, the Lon Nol regime refused to countenance the continued North Vietnamese use of Cambodian territory. This prompted the Chinese to condemn the new regime and rally round Sihanouk. But, what is important to note is that, Peking did this as a matter of second-choice convenience. Thus it would seem that even Peking did not react as vehemently to the events in Cambodia as one expected. This, however, cannot mean any slackening of China’s primary interest in seeing South-East Asia come under communist orbit. Continued manifestations of the present type of interventions in South-East Asian areas, where revolutionary situations are already present, tend only to make such revolutionary forces identify themselves with Peking and come under its tutelage. In this sense the Cambodian affair is a God sent to the Chinese. Firstly, it makes the North Vietnamese less prone to negotiate with Washington. Secondly it enables Peking to score a point over Moscow in demonstrating its solidarity with the so-called victims of Western aggression. Of course, there is also the possibility that Peking, with its desire to make up with America, may not be all too willing to actively intervene in South-East Asia. In the short run, however, the Chinese can be said to have made further gains in the region, thanks to the American adventure.

The Indian Attitude

The Indian Government’s response was a characteristic mixture of pussilanimity coupled with indecisiveness. When the neighbouring South-East Asian countries like Indonesia and Malasia took initiative and proposed a gathering of important Asian countries to examine and recommend a way out of the situation in Cambodia, New Delhi declined to join the proposed meeting. Perhaps India feared to team up with Indonesia and Malasia, whose present leanings are pro-American. Whether this fear is justified or not, India lost a good opportunity to play a leading role in collaboration with her neighbours. The point is that India did not even attempt to compare the nature of our respective interest and attitudes towards Vietnam with those of our neighbours. A joint attempt on the part of these states may not have produced any ‘solution’, yet by her refusal to collaborate, India retraced her steps from the direction of regional consultation and co-operation which she very much wanted to pursue in order to stake her claim as a South-East Asian power. New Delhi’s vascillation was also evident on the issue of according an invitation to Cambodia to the forthcoming non-aligned summit meeting at Lusaka. New Delhi thought of denying the Lon Nol regime a seat at the summit. Other Asian states cautioned India that the Lon Nol regime is as much sincere to safeguard its neutrality as Sihanouk was and that any attempt to keep it out of the Lusaka meeting may push it into American hands further. Here also one gets the feeling that India is all too inclined to read the Cambodian coup as American instigated. Ironically enough, even China did not really think so as was shown by her initial reactions.

Prospects

The entire situation is so complex that he would be a bold man who could venture to suggest a solution straightway. Certain paradoxes are there to be reckoned with. For example, the American march into Cambodia is both provocative and counter-productive; yet it cannot be denied that “in assessing the Cambodian fiasco the same remorseless ambition on the communist side must be set against the Americans’ sore misjudgment of the effect of their intervention. There can be no question that the North Vietnamese were using Cambodian territory, as they used Laotian, as a supply route into South Vietnam. Yet the effect of the Americans’ attempt to cut this supply route has been to involve most of Cambodia, instead of a small segment in a wider Indo-Chinese war” (The Guardian Weekly, July 4, 1970). Thus the problem cannot be sized up from the point of view of moral ‘essences’. The existential situations alone afford us basis to judge the trends and suggest the direction in which a solution may lie.

It is to be hoped that the American withdrawal from Cambodia would be followed by further withdrawals from South Vietnam too. This might enable Hanoi to settle for a political settlement. In other words, resumption of the Paris talks alone can deliver the goods. For this the status quo ante (as prevailing before the American action in April) must be restored by America. The Russians have shown their willingness to continue negotiations with the Americans over Strategic Arms Limitation and they might probably advise Hanoi not to be over-concerned in exhibiting its indignation over the American action and to come to the Paris table. Unless the North Vietnamese are dragged into the bargain the Cambodian and the Laotian issues are not likely to be settled. It is unlikely that a revival of Geneva type negotiations, under the aegis of the co-chairmen, Britain and Russia, would bear any fruit. The Paris talks, howsoever long-drawn and tortuous they might have been, yielded some hopeful results and a patient effort to make them yield more alone can be the answer. In all this, one banks upon Russia’s readiness to keep up the ‘detente’ with Washington and on the expectation that Moscow would be able to persuade Hanoi to be reasonable. Both these expectations, in their turn, depend partly on the Chinese attitude-which is extremely difficult to prophecy.