International Affairs: A Survey

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M.A.

The last survey of international affairs was made a few days before the meeting of the Berlin Conference. This survey is being made a few days before the meeting of the equally well-advertised Geneva Conference. During this interval the world has witnessed two more explosions of the Hydrogen bomb in the Pacific under the auspices of the Government of the United States; moves by the same Government to forge a new instrument for the purpose of putting an end to the expansion of Chinese and Soviet Communism in South-East Asia; internal turmoils in Egypt and in the politics of the Middle East; and the crystallisation of the Ceylon Premier’s proposals for a conference of some of the Asian Premiers at Colombo. One has to ask oneself whether these happenings have brought peace nearer to the world or increased the chances of war. No issue has become more important in the international world today than this of peace or war.

The two explosions of the Hydrogen bomb undertaken by the Government of the United States have created panic among most of the rulers of the world. But panic never solves a problem, and much less a problem of the magnitude of peace or war. What is needed is a calm consideration of the root causes that have led to the manufacture of the Hydrogen bomb with all its terrific possibilities. Every one realises that, if it is ever used, it will mean the destruction of civilisation as it is understood today and the heaping up of unbearable suffering on the remnants of humanity which may chance to survive after its use. It has therefore been proposed that there should be a stand still agreement between the two ‘World’ powers–the United States and Soviet Russia–that they will not manufacture any more Hydrogen bombs, and that discussions must be resumed for the international control of Atomic energy and some solution arrived at regarding the various controversies that have gathered round this subject in the course of the last six years. High level talks among the rulers of the United States, Soviet Russia and Britain are considered to have great value in solving the question of Hydrogen and Atom bombs.

Are such discussions and talks going to deter the United States and Soviet Russia from manufacturing and stock-piling these bombs? Let it be noted clearly and at the outset that it is not only the United States but also Soviet Russia that is now engaged in the manufacture of these nefarious weapons of destruction. It may be that the United States has a lead over her rival at present but there is no guarantee that she will not be overtaken by her rival in the near future. If the manufacture of these bombs is a matter which demands condemnation, this condemnation has to be extended to Soviet Russia as much as to the United States. This point is usually lost sight of. The statesmen and the publicists who have spoken recently on the subject stem to think that the United States is more to blame than Soviet Russia. This is not however a correct view. The world does not know what is happening behind the iron curtain.

The United States is busy manufacturing the Hydrogen bomb because of the suspicion that Soviet Russia is determined on pursuing a policy of aggression and expanding her power and influence throughout the world. In a world which has become so interdependent as the modern world has become, no State–and much less a State of such world-wide interests like the United States–can look with equanimity at a process which enables Soviet Russia to exercise a dominating influence over countries from which the United States has to get her supplies of raw materials or with which she has large trade and economic connections. The same is the case with Britain. Similarly Soviet Russia suspects the bonafides of the United States and thinks that the expansion of American influence and power in the South-West Pacific, in South-East Asia, in the Middle East, and in Western Europe is a serious obstacle in the way of her economic prosperity and political stability. It is this mutual suspicion that has created the tension between the two great powers and created also the atmosphere of cold war between them.

The one problem therefore for the United States in the post-war period has been how to stop the aggression of Soviet Russia. The method of conferences was tried in the years immediately following the Second World War but it did not yield any substantial results. The method of re-armament was thereupon resorted to and the Hydrogen bomb is the result of the use of this method. The United States is now convinced–and this conviction is shared by her allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Pacific Pact–that, if Soviet Russia has not engaged in any aggressive campaign in Europe after the Berlin blockade, and if she has agreed to the Korean armistice, it is due to her realisation that victory might not be hers in a war with the United States, with her (the United States) increasing pile of Atomic and Hydrogen bombs. The panic-stricken statesmen of the present day should therefore aim at removing (or reducing) the tension between the United States and Soviet Russia before calling upon them not to manufacture any more bombs. If they cannot do this they will not succeed in their attempts to bring pressure upon the two powers to suspend their manufacture. If after the death of Stalin the Soviet leaders seem to be less aggressive than before, the United States and her allies have the conviction that this is due to the Soviet realisation of the growing military strength of her rivals.

The United States will be convinced of the peaceful intentions of Soviet Russia if the latter withdraws from the States of Central and Eastern Europe which are today its satellites, if it dissolves the Cominform and completely abandons its policy of being the patron of the Communist parties in all the non-Communist States, and if it withdraws from its alliance with the People’s republic of China. But is there any prospect of Soviet Russia being persuaded by the pressure of world public opinion to do all this? And is there a sufficiently strong public opinion which advocates a policy like this? Soviet Russia will in the same manner be convinced of the peaceful attitude of the United States, if the latter dissolves the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, the Pacific Pact, the military and economic pacts it has entered into with the countries of Western Europe, with Pakistan, with the Philippines and with Formosa, South Korea and Japan. It is only when Soviet Russia limits itself to its frontiers as they existed in 1924, and when the United States gets to its old policy of complete isolationism, that the two powers will be convinced of each other’s peaceful designs. But it will be a miracle if all this can be brought about by a policy of voluntary self-abnegation or by the weight of world opinion. The age of miracles is past and it cannot be revived.

The United Nations Organisation was created with a view to reduce tensions like these and reduce in consequence the huge expenditure on armaments. But the mutual suspicion referred to above has prevented the organisation from fulfilling its primary objectives. If aggression is being stopped today it is therefore due not so much to the efforts of the U.N.O. as to the programme of re-armament and military alliances concluded by the United States. The Hydrogen bomb really serves as a deterrent of war–if war can be effectively deterred at all by any weapon forged by man. The bomb is only a symptom of the tension among the great powers. There is no use of attacking the symptom as long as the tension continues. This should not be regarded as a commendation of the Hydrogen bomb. No sane man will commend it. But it is a deplorable necessity in a world in which there is lust of power, mutual hatred of a fierce character, and resort to war for settling international disputes. It is like the Brahma Astra referred to in ancient Indian books.

Many have expressed the view that the Hydrogen bomb is unlike all other weapons of warfare and that its use will destroy civilisation itself. There are however two fallacies in this view. The possession of the bomb does not necessarily mean its use. It is perhaps the only effective instrument for preventing the outbreak of a war, and if there is no war there will be no occasion for its use. The other point is whether a civilisation of which the Hydrogen bomb is an integral part–as it has become the integral part of modern civilisation–is worth preservation at all! Is it not better–if terms like good and bad can at all be used legitimately in a context like this–that such a civilisation undergoes destruction and that a new and better civilisation takes its place? So many civilisations have disappeared in the past after having flourished for ages. But this did not mean the end of all progress. The cosmic process is shrouded in mystery and it may be a characteristic of this process that one civilisation should give place to another. The world is in need of a civilisation in which the Hydrogen bomb and other weapons of universal destruction have no place. Perhaps the present civilisation has to be destroyed before the new one can be reared. There has to be a deluge (pralaya) before creation (srishti) starts afresh;

The United States stands in mortal fear of Communism. She is prepared to tolerate any other faith except this. If she were given the opportunity to create a new world, it will be a world in which there is no Communism, or anything even remotely like it, that she will create. Gandhiji’s ideal world was a world free from himsaor violence; and, the ideal world of which the United States is dreaming is a world free from Communism. To create such a world she is prepared to sacrifice everything else–including if necessary her cherished traditional ideals of liberty, equality, fraternity and national self-determination. This is the key to her foreign policy today and this is at the basis of her moves for forging a new instrument of policy in respect of Indo-China and South-East Asia.

For several years there has been a war in Indo-China. It was and is primarily a war against French Colonialism–very similar to the war which the Americans under the leadership of their great George Washington waged against the British between 1776 and 1783, and to the war which we in India waged against the British under the leadership of Gandhiji. It is a phase of the Asian nationalistic movement for liberation from the European yoke. All sections of people in Indo-China are at one in their determination to get complete independence from the French yoke. They do not want to be a part of the so-called French Union. It was the stupidity of the French and their desire to perpetuate their rule that drove Ho Chi Minh into the Communist camp. There was nothing unnatural or unethical in this. The liberation of his country is his aim. He was prepared to negotiate with the French for this purpose. But the French were not honest in their dealings with him. They refused to carry out the agreements into which they entered with him. They set up, when they had no other alternative, an indigenous Government under Bao Dai, but it was a Government without much of independence. His position is not very different from that of any of the Rulers of Indian States in the days of the British. They wanted to deceive the world by giving to the Indo-China war the colour of a civil war between a nationalistic government under Bao Dai and a Communist government under Ho Chi Minh. But the people of Indo-China–and the sensible people in other parts of the world–were not deceived by this. Large sections of the Indo-Chinese are opposed to Bao Dai and to the French and are sympathetic to the cause for which Ho Chi Minh is fighting. This is why the French could not crush him.

Of late he has been in receipt of more substantial help from the Chinese. This help is of the same character as that given by the United States to the French, though in respect of quantity it is not so much. The French are finding it increasingly difficult to wage the war against Ho Chi Minh. They have been completely exhausted and they prefer to come to some understanding with him and with China which is helping him. But the Government of the United States is not in favour of a negotiated peace except under certain conditions. They want a guarantee that Communism will have no footing–not even an inch of space–in Indo-China and for this purpose they are determined to create in South-East-Asia and in South-West-Pacific a military organisation like that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Europe. They want to frighten the Chinese allies of Ho Chi Minh by such an organization and compel them to withdraw from Indo-China and leave Ho Chi Minh to fight single-handed. Ho may find it impossible to continue the fight in such a case. It is the hope of the United States to crush him and leave the government of the country in the hands of the French and their puppets, Bao Dai and the present Rulers of Laos and Cambodia.

It is on this mission that Mr. Dulles went recently to Britain and France and it is reported that both these States are willing to create in S.E. Asia an organisation like that of the NATO in Europe. The purpose of this organisation is to fight Ho Chi Minh and the Chinese in Indo-China and to prevent the spread of Communism in South-East Asia. While the NATO is an organisation of free and independent countries defending themselves against Soviet imperialism, the S.E. Asian Organisation will be an organisation of powers primarily imperialistic and defending their imperialism against Soviet and Chinese imperialism. Why is France in S.E. Asia? Why is Britain there? Why even the United States? It is because the French do not want to give up their hold over Indo-China, and the British over Malaya. And both Malaya and Indo-China are needed by the United States for strategic purposes and for getting a regular flow of tin, rubber and other raw materials which are produced there in plenty, If the United States is really anxious to prevent the spread of Communism in this area, she has to arrange for the peaceful withdrawal of France from Indo-China and establish really independent democratic governments in that area. To the people of Indo-China the foe is not Ho Chi Minh or the Chinese. It is on the other hand the French. What these people want is a national government of their own and not the perpetuation of French rule. The present policy of the United States is a reactionary policy. It strengthens the imperial hold of the French and in proportion to this strength is the strength of Communism. It ought to be the endeavour of all Asian nations to prevent the formation of a league of imperial powers and their satellites in South-East Asia, a league which will be more or less like the Holy Alliance formed in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars.

A free Indo-China, a free Malaya, a free Thailand, a free Indonesia, along with other free nations of South Asia, will be in a position to take all the necessary measures in mutual alliance to safeguard their freedom against any possible attacks from the direction of China or Soviet Russia. Peoples here are not immediately interested in Communism or anti-Communism. Their interest is in political freedom and the present moves of the United States are directed against this interest and they deserve to fail.

It is in this atmosphere that the Geneva Conference will meet in the last week of April. The Conference meets ostensibly to deal with the question of Korea and Indo-China. It is presumed that China, which will be represented at the Conference, will insist on her recognition by the United States and on her representative being admitted into the organs of the U.N.O. before she grants any concessions in respect of Korea or Indo- China. The present trend however in the United States is not to do either of these. The conference may therefore meet but its results will be more or less similar to those of the Berlin Conference. The Americans have no right to demand the withdrawal of the Chinese from Korea and Indo-China so long as they are committed to and Rhee’s Government in Korea and the French in Indo-China. The withdrawal completely of all foreign forces–including the French forces in Indo-China–from these two countries, and an agreement among the great powers not to intervene in their domestic politics, are essential conditions to be fulfilled if there is to be peace and unity in them.

It is circumstances like these that give significance to the Conference of Asian Premiers–the Premiers of India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia–to be held in Colombo at the end of April. All these are independent, sovereign States which won their freedom from European rule at the end of the Second World War. To them freedom has a meaning which may not be understood by the British, the French or the Americans. They cherish it much more than anything else, They are not prepared to admit European or American influence if it interferes even to the slightest extent with their independence. Four of these States are committed to a policy of non-alignment with either of the two power blocs, and it is their conviction that the enlargement of this area of ‘no-war’ will be an active force in maintaining world peace or preventing the spread of a Soviet-American war into South Asia. The Conference may be expected to go deep into this problem of ‘no-war’ area and see that the South Asian States keep themselves free from Soviet-American entanglements. The reconciliation between this policy and the receiptofmilitary aid by Pakistan is a difficult problem and some solution has to be found for it. The Conference is the first important positive step that the free nations of South Asia are taking to preserve and strengthen their freedom, and the success of the Conference in this direction will go a long way in bringing nearer the solution of the many economic and social problems with which they are all confronted. South Asian unity freed from extraneous influences–European and American–is the need of the hour.

One of the trouble spots of the world today is the Middle East. The trouble is partly internal and partly external. This is best illustrated by the recent happenings in Egypt. Internally Egypt has not yet been able to establish a really stable and strong government, and unless such a government comes into existence her external problems cannot be solved. The leaders in the revolutionary Council which has been in power for the last two years have been quarrelling among themselves as to what should be the constitutional set-up of the State and what economic and social reforms are to be carried out. The Council itself came into power as a result of the entry of the army into civil affairs–thus breaking the normally accepted doctrine and practice that the army should keep aloof from politics and implicitly obey the civilian authority. But the corruption and inefficiency that prevailed in the country under King Farouk reached such heights that it was no longer possible for the younger commanders in the army to keep quiet. They therefore led the revolution and under the leadership of General Neguib they came into power.

But there arose a real difference between General Neguib and General Nasser who was really at the bottom of the revolution of 1952. Neguib has been anxious to restore parliamentary government at as early a date as possible and carry out at a slow and gradual pace the needed reforms. But Nasser was and is of a quite different view. He feels that parliamentary rule will bring into power the various political parties and their selfish and corrupt leaders who did little in the days of their power to improve the economic and the social condition of the people or to settle the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. He thinks that the vigorous Government of the revolutionary Council should continue for some years more until the outstanding questions are solved. The dispute therefore between the two Generals is the dispute between a moderate and a radical. Fortunately it has been settled for the time being and the point of view of General Nasser has been accepted. But how far this will solve the dispute with England remains to be seen. The British are of the view that there is today no Government in Egypt sufficiently stable and strong with which they can enter into an agreement. They are therefore marking time and contributing in their own way to the unstable conditions not only in Egypt but also in other countries of the Middle East. They are not interested in the solution of the political, economic or social problems of the area so much as in creating a defence organisation there against any possible Soviet aggression. Here again there is no prospect of stability until the British and the Americans begin to look at things from the point of view of the people of the area instead of from the distorted angle of Communism versus anti-Communism. The problems and difficulties of the ward and the undeveloped countries of Asia are different from those of Europe and America. It is however the misfortune of the people of these countries that the more powerful nations of the Communist and the non-Communist world look at them as mere instruments for furthering their rival ambitions and policies.

April 15, 1954