On Defence

It is no wonder if the subject of Defence held the field during Sir Stafford Cripps’s visit to Delhi and gripped public attention exclusively. The story of the talks between him and the Working Committee of the Congress in the first and second weeks of April 1942 is really a twice told tale. But there are aspects of the problem which require to be studied by the public, as the literature relating to it is as yet a sealed book to them. The proposals of the British Cabinet, sent up to India for the approval of the parties in the country, did not include the subject of Defence. Nor was it all. Sir Stafford stated in the very first Press Conference held in Delhi that Defence could not be transferred, even if all the parties joined in making a united demand in that behalf. That was clinching. That clinched the decision of the Working Committee of the Congress to reject the Cabinet’s proposals. When this was known through Press forecasts to Sir Stafford, he wrote a polite letter on the 1st of April that he would like the President and Jawaharlal Nehru to see the Commander-in-Chief, and followed it up by another, the same day, to the effect that if they decided to reject the proposals, the rejection should not be published before he had an interview with the President. Earlier, Sir Stafford intimated to the President on the 30th of March that

"the Viceroy would be prepared to consult with Indian leaders on this basis, to see whether it were possible to designate an Indian to some office connected with the Government of India’s Defence responsibilities without in any way impinging upon the functions and duties of the Commander-in-Chief, either in his capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces in India or as the member of the Executive Council in charge of Defence."

Mark the cautious and diplomatic language –a mass of verbiage, –all sound and no substance! Neither the interview between the President and Jawaharlal Nehru on the one side and the Commander-in-chief on the other, nor the one between them and Sir Stafford Cripps produced any results suggesting a change in the decision of the Working Committee. But its resolution was still in abeyance and continued to be so till the 10th of April.

Meanwhile the firm rejection of the Cripps’s proposals by the Working Committee–a fact not yet published in the Press, –produced from Sir Stafford a formula on Defence which was wholly inadequate and which was once again rejected. The details of the formula are embodied in a letter of Sir Stafford’s to the President, dated 7th April, and ran as follows:

(a) The Commander-in-Chief should retain a seat in the Viceroy’s Executive Council as ‘War Member’ and should retain his full control over all the war activities of the armed forces in India, subject to the control of His Majesty’s Government and the War Cabinet, upon which body a representative Indian should sit with equal powers in all matters relating to the Defence of India. Membership of the Pacific Council would likewise be offered to a representative Indian.

(b) An Indian representative member would be added to the Viceroy’s Executive, who would take over those sections of the Department of Defence which can organizationally be separated immediately from the Commander-in-Chief’s War Department and which are specified under head (i) of the annexure. In addition this member would take Over the Defence Co-ordination Department which is at present directly under the Viceroy, and certain other important functions of the Government of India which are directly related to Defence, and which do not fall under any of the other existing departments, and which are specified under head (ii) of the annexure.

Annexure: (i) Matters now dealt with in the Defence Department which would be transferred to a Defence Co-ordination Department:

(a) Public relations.

(b) Demobilization and post-War reconstruction.

(c) Petroleum Officer, whose functions are to calculate the requirements of, and make provision for, all the petroleum products required for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and for the Civil Departments, including storage and distribution.

(d) Indian representation on the Eastern Group Supply Council.

(e) Amenities for, and welfare of, troops and their dependants, including Indian soldiers abroad.

(f) All canteen organizations.

(g) Certain non-technical educational institutions, e.g., Lawrence Schools, K.G.R.I.M. Schools and the Prince of Wales’s Royal Indian Military College.

(h) Stationery, Printing and forms for the Army.

(i) Reception, accommodation and social arrangements for all foreign missions, representatives and officers.

(ii) In addition the Defence Co-ordination Department would take over many major questions bearing directly on Defence, but difficult to locate in any particular existing departments. Examples are:

‘Denial’ policy.
Policy of evacuation from threatened areas.
Signals co-ordination.
Economic warfare.

Second formula for Defence: In amplification of clause (e) of the draft declaration His Majesty’s Government make the following proposition upon the subject matter of the Defence of India:

(a) The Defence Department shall be placed in charge of a representative Indian Member, with the exception of functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member of the Executive Council.

(b) A War Department will be constituted which will take over such functions of the Defence Department as are not retained by the Defence Member. A list of all the retained functions has been agreed to, to which will be added further important responsibilities including the matters now dealt with by the Defence Co-ordination Department and other vital matters related to the Defence of India.

It was after the rejection of these proposals that Col. Johnson intervened with a letter.

Col. Johnson had arrived in India on the 3rd of April and it was reliably learnt in Delhi that his very first words at the aerodrome, on alighting from his plane, were "What about Cripps?" This presents Col. Johnson’s arrival in India in a different light to that sought to be associated by Sir Stafford, when later he stated in England that the Colonel’s arrival in India at the head of a Trade Mission was an accidental coincidence. Anyway the fact remained that a new character entered the stage and really captured it. For a week it looked as though the centre of gravity shifted from Cripps to Johnson, from London to New York, from Churchill to Roosevelt. Col. Johnson himself sent word to Jawaharlal Nehru on 7th April that he would like to see him at the latter’s (Jawaharlal’s) residence, but feared that it would get publicity and therefore requested that Jawaharlal might see him at his own (Johnson’s) place. This was done. But Sir Stafford raised a controversy in England by saying that a Congressman first wanted to see Johnson. Why should Jawaharlal single out Col. Johnson from amongst the ten thousand Yankee Tommies then present in Delhi? Cripps’s version has no legs to stand upon. As a matter of fact Col. Johnson himself became a problem until he threw up his hands and said he had done his best. He was gushing and frank in his talks. Jawaharlal stated at the Press Conference in Delhi that he was invited to go to America and see Roosevelt in the fastest plane of the world. The Colonel set at rest all doubts about American designs upon India and repudiated any intention of finding an investment in India for American capital during the war and after it. He was also deeply sorry that Mr. Churchill should have been niggardly in admitting the applicability of the Atlantic Charter to India. Anyway he took the initiative in sending a letter to the Congress President which heralded an amended version of the Defence Formula.

It would be noticed that the scheme of Dyarchy contemplated by Sir Stafford in his formula dated 7th gave place, in the new formula, to the complete transfer of the Defence Department to a representative Indian Member with the exception of functions to be exercised by the Commander-in-Chief as War Member of the Executive Council. It was delegation of functions rather than division. The Working Committee varied this formula in their turn. The chief variations related:

(a) to the term during which this delegation of functions should be operative, and

(b) lists of functions to be retained by the Defence Member and those to be delegated to the Commander-in-Chief as War Member of the Executive Council, being prepared.

The term, which was limited to the duration of the War in the Working Committee’s proposals, was amended by Sir Stafford as "until the new constitution comes into operation" for he said, otherwise, the old arrangement might be restored as soon as the War ended. The second change made by Sir Stafford was rather intriguing and even mystifying. He added the following paragraph anew:

"The War Department, for which the Commander-in-Chief will be Member, will be responsible for the governmental relations of G.H.Q., N.H.Q., and A.H.Q., which include

(1) Examining and sanctioning all proposals emanating from G.H.Q., and A.H.Q.

(2) Representing the policy of Government on all questions connected with the War which originate in or concern G.H.Q., N.H.Q., or A.H.Q.

(3) Acting as the channel of communication between the Government of India and H.M.G. on all such questions.

(4) Acting as liaison between these headquarters and the other Departments of Government and Provincial Governments.

(Note.–G.H.Q. = General Headquarters, N.H.Q. = Navy Headquarters, A.H.Q. = Air Headquarters.)

The term governmental relations was vague and ambiguous and required clarification. It was not clear whether it was meant to describe the powers of the Commander-in-Chief or only that the various; matters mentioned under the four heads were required to go through the channel of the War Department for which the Commander-in-Chief would be Member.

In an interview which sought for clarification, Sir Stafford made it clear that these items represented the powers of the War Department under the Commander-in-Chief and when asked about the lists, referred the President and Jawaharlal, on 10th April, to the earlier lists which had been considered and rejected. This led to the final rejection and the end of the chapter of negotiations.

But there still remains the question as to what the Congress itself would have suggested under division of functions.

There is little doubt that Cripps was trying to be clever. It was clear that the Working Committee rejected the proposals successively on three occasions; first on 2nd April, but Cripps wanted it not to be published in the Press. It was then that he sent a formula on Defence which was again rejected on the 7th–that was the second rejection, –but this time it was asked by Col. Johnson that the rejection should not be published. Then came Col. Johnson with another formula on Defence and this formula, after undergoing several modifications, was finally rejected on 10th April. That was the third and last rejection. From these details it is clear that Defence was the rock on which the frail bark of Cripps’s scheme split. In the face of such a clear position, it was a little too clever on the part of Sir Stafford to have, in receiving the final rejection, stated as follows in his letter dated 11th April to the President:

"Nor need I go into the question of the division of duties between the Defence Minister and the Commander-in-Chief as War Member with which you deal at length. This division allotted to the Defence Minister all functions outside those actually connected with the General Headquarters, Navy Headquarters and Air Headquarters which are under the Commander-in-Chief as head of the fighting forces in India.

In addition to these functions in the narrow field of ‘Defence’ it was suggested that all other portfolios relating to that subject, such as,

Home Department.–Internal order, police, refugees, etc.

Finance Department.–All war finance in India.

Communications Department.–Railways, roads, transport, etc.

Supply Department.–Supplies for all forces and munitions.

Information and Broadcasting Department.–Propaganda, publicity, etc.

Civil Defence Department.–A.R.P. and all forms of Civilian defence.

Legislative Department.–Regulations and orders.

Labour Department.–Man power.

Defence Department.–Administration of Indian personnel, etc. should be put in the hands of representative Indians as members of the Executive Council.

When Sir Stafford speaks of the "narrow field of ‘Defence’ ", there is something pathetically childlike in him. He says that, in addition to it, all other portfolios relating to that subject were to be transferred. Sir Stafford overproves his case, for if by this statement he means Defence alone might have been transferred, then he contemplates the impossible, because during a time of war all portfolios are absorbed in, and subordinated to, that of Defence. But if he wants to satisfy the Indian public by saying that not only Defence but all the rest of the portfolios in the Central Government are transferred, then he is only submitting to the inevitable for the aforesaid reason.

Let us for a moment examine these other portfolios. The Home Department, for instance, is in a time of war constantly engaged in devising new ordinances and rules under the Defence of India is in fact constantly engaged in abrogating Civil Law and replacing it by Military Law. The Military authorities are all the while dictating, the Home Member is directing, and the Law Department is drafting these new Laws. "You shall part with your vehicles, your houses, your lands, your motor-drivers; you shall put out your lights, not step into the street at stated times and provide trenches in your yard. You shall cultivate food crops and reduce cotton and groundnut and jute and tobacco. You shall travel less and pay more. You shall publish this and not that, submit your writing to a censor and obey him. You shall not be cold about the United Nations and warm about the Axis Powers. You shall not dwell upon the deeds or misdeeds of soldiers or the discriminations in evacuation. You shall not say where an alert was given, where a bomb fell, and where a number of casualties occurred." And so on. The Finance Department must bend all finance to the military machine, provide money for the mobilization of troops, compensation for damage in scorched-earth, give subventions to food production. You must coin more money with less silver and nickel, print more currency notes with less of fiduciary reserve, determine favourable exchange rates and prevent the rise of prices of G.P. Notes.

The Commerce Department must regulate exports and imports, balance Ceylon against Burma, Jute against Rice, Rice against Wheat, control against regulation, prices against quantities, deal with America claiming commercial privileges on a par with Britain.

The Revenue, Lands and Health Department must find Sources revenue against the added drainage in the Finance Department, arrange for the loss of 14 lakhs of tons of rice imported from Burma, 9 lakhs of tons of shortage in the growth of rice, and see to the adequate supplies of wheat as well.

The Communications Department is inevitably a hand-maid of the Military. Roads and Railways shall exist primarily for the Army. Bus service is to be regulated. Petrol consumption by the Civil population should be reduced. People should not travel unnecessarily. The supply of wagons should be strictly controlled. The movements of the Military require the maximum for their goods and minimum for the Civil population. The commissariat requires the maximum for itself and minimum for Civil needs. These conflicts have to be carefully attended to and reconciled.

The Posts and Telegraphs Department must subserve Military needs first and foremost. All private telephones shall be accessible to the Military. Telegrams may not go on the wires, but travel part of the way by air. Letters have to be censored and may not be delivered. Telegrams may not be even accepted. Telephones may be cut off altogether.

The Labour Department must give priority to the needs of the Military for constructing and working workshops, canals, bridges and roads. Strikes shall not be easily permitted. Lock-outs are equally to be deprecated. Wages and work have to be regulated with a single eye to the needs of the Army. It need hardly be stated how the Civil Defence, Information and Broadcasting and Defence Departments are, more or less, a pure and unadulterated Military affair.

In effect, then, there is no National Government without transfer of Defence, and Defence means all the rest of the Government of India and the Provincial Governments. To speak then of a National Government without Defence is to play the drama of Hamlet without the ghost.

In the ultimate analysis, it becomes clear that whatever Britain does is for her own defence. There is an obvious conflict between Indian and British conceptions of Defence, as between Indian and British interests. The British Government do not trust the Indians, and maintain an Army which, as Sir Stafford said, is only a British Army in India, while the so-called Indian Army is but an offshoot of it. Indeed he points out that there is no Indian Army, but only an Army in India. So long as this is the case, the policy of mistrust or even distrust must constitute the reason why national Defence is not entrusted to India’s elected representatives.