Problems of Democracy in India

BY PROF. N. SRINIVASAN ¹

(Andhra University, Waltair)

(Continued)

PARTY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

It is maintained by Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar that a party system leads to the neglect of the public interest. "Parties," he tells us, "generally, if not invariably, look at problems from the stand-point of the party." They seek power and not service. Their interests are selfish. This raises a vital issue as the very raison d'etre of representative government is the belief that they realize the public interest better than any other form of government. If parties were seeking merely their own selfish ends, it is obvious that a democracy run by parties will fail to achieve its purpose.

It is undeniable that parties seek power, and the fact does not need any apology. They seek power not for its own sake but for the opportunities its possession brings, to realize the objects that are desired by them. The question is what determines these purposes and how far do these purposes themselves constitute what may appropriately be termed the public interest. To determine what constitutes the public interest is by no means an easy task. We have to know, as in the similar case of public opinion, what is an interest and when it becomes public.² The public interest can only be a complex of individual interests. Any policy or act that contributes to the public interest must mean the benefit of the whole community or at least that of the majority of the citizens in the State. In the latter case the minority should not be prejudicially affected. There are certain interests which are obviously of this character, such as education, public health, defence and internal order. On matters of this kind there is hardly a party in the world which takes anything like a partisan attitude, at least outwardly. In general it is not in this field that we have to seek the questions on which partisanship prevails in the attitude of the different parties. There are innumerable other interests which do not possess this character of an obvious public interest. Can it be said, for instance, that the 1sh. 6d. or 1sh. 4d. ratio for the rupee, or free trade or protection, constitute the better method of achieving the public interest? In the case of economic problems like these with which modern governments are preoccupied for the greater part, and on which parties put forward divergent programmes, it is difficult to determine what is the true public interest, and we cannot condemn party programmes without deep scrutiny as not in the public interest. The fact that, normally, governmental action does not touch the fundamental ways of living in a society, that governmental action effects vital changes only piece-meal and gradually, as well as the fact that partisan differences among parties are on comparatively less important matters, makes alternative party rule both possible and not calamitous, Therefore, by these very limitations, party rule cannot be nearly as dangerous as one might fear.

How are the programmes of parties made up? It is claimed by the theory of party that party programmes represent alternative interpretations of the public interest. The claim is true only in some degree. Programmes are in fact practicable compromises of differing and conflicting interests intended to win and to retain the support of as large a part of the electorate as possible. In this, parties try to anticipate the desires of the public; but they also attempt to create preferences among people. It may be said that in the main the programme of a party reflects the concrete material interests of its adherents and followers. In their composition, parties are groups of men usually drawn from the same social strata and with similar interests and like view points. Their approach to problems is therefore uniform. A synthesis of interests is arrived at under the competing pressures of conflicting groups and interests. While the pressure of a group of textile mill-owners might dispose a party to advocate a policy of high duties on imported textiles, the pressure of a consumer group such as the agriculturists might lead to a compromise, so as to retain the support of either group. In the recent past in Europe, party differences have tended to follow to a greater extent differences of class rather than differing interpretations of the public interest.

This does not necessarily involve the sacrifice of the public interest. When parties are divided on the basis of class, the party representative of the largest class must be held to represent the public interest, if, in its programmes, it shows a consideration for the interests of other social classes, that assures to them rights that are at least equal to those claimed for its own adherents. A majority interest, in other words, is the public interest if it does not involve the sacrifice of the equal interests of minorities. These observations would be true whether we are dealing with social, economic and political or religious or other types of minorities. No one can afford to forget the rights of majorities while one must certainly be solicitous of the rights of minorities. An attack onprivilege of any sort can never be an infringement of the public interest.

It must be obvious from the foregoing that no general statement that parties tend to neglect the public interest would be a fair statement of the complex reality of everyday politics. The problem is difficult and general statements do not help to enlighten us. The conclusion of this discussion is that parties and individuals tend to equate their own interests or what they conceive to be the public interest with the true public interest. Only approximations to the ideal public interest are possible in our imperfect world. Where party systems are accused ofendangering the public interest, an alternative way of realizing it must be pointed out. Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar does not forget this, and offers us his Non-Party and National Government. This will be considered in a later section.

CHARGE OF CORRUPTION

Insincerity and hollowness are bred by a party system. Its propaganda and intrigue keep the best men out of politics. It corrupts the Press and it facilitates and aggravates nepotism and jobbery, and tends to lower administrative standards. (58) "Party is itself a licensing of corruption in many ways." (53)

There is no system of government which is entirely free of corruption; certainly democracy is not. But is corruption the result only of the operation of the party system? Have the character of the people and the standards of morality, individual and public, nothing to do with it? The answer certainly is that the latter are the deep causes of corruption in any form; it has not much to do with the form of government or with the system of parties. The corruption of autocratic regimes is notorious. Under democracies operated by parties, corruption suffers under a serious handicap, since there exist greater opportunities for its detection and punishment. An illustration may be given. The histories of the administration under the non-party regime of the Second Empire and the administration under the party-system of the Third Republic in France may be compared. The former was honey-combed with corruption while the latter has been comparatively free from it, though there have been some scandals.³ In the former regime, under a facade of uprightness, the administration from the top to the bottom was corrupt; in the latter the corruption of the administration is rare. In the former there was no searchlight of criticism by opponents to be turned on the practice of corruption; in the latter there is a constant vigilance to discover instances and punish them. The corruption of those in power is checked only by the vigilance of the public, and the party system can play a significant part in it.

Corruption, of course, does not mean only the corruption of those in power and of the administration. The corruption of the people through bribes, the corruption of legislators leading to legislation for the benefit of special interests, and jobbery are all various forms of corruption, to some extent peculiar to an electoral system of government. To what extent are these due to parties or are accentuated by the system of parties? No general answer applicable to countries as different as the United States, Switzerland, England and France can be given. These exist in some measure in all countries, but no direct connection can be established between parties and corruption. The dominant interests in any society attempt to use whatever instrument is handy for securing its interests; and the attempts will be there whether there is a party system or not. The remedy for ending corruption lies elsewhere than in the total abolition of the party system.

Our own specific problems must be considered. We have to ask ourselves if corruption has been increased with the advent of the parties in India? Has a spoils system been evolved? Has the purity of the administrative system been destroyed as is alleged? No careful and impartial observer would assert that in these respects we are now worse than we were a decade or two ago. The fact that we have begun to talk of this problem and to criticise officials in high places is due to our democracy, and augurs well for our future. A sense of fairness and proportion would compel anyone to admit that that the much vaunted purity of the administration in the past was greatly exaggerated, and that the lament for its alleged disappearance and the demoralisation of the administration is quite misplaced. At almost every point where the administration touched the poor man, it was and still is heavy and corrupt to a large degree. If any change has occurred in the recent past, it has been a change for the better. The extension of the franchise and the consequent increase in the size of the electorate together with the poverty of the average middle class candidate for electoral honours make it impossible for the majority of candidates to seek electoral support through direct bribes as was not infrequently the case under a more limited franchise, and is still the case in very small constituencies. Parties obviate the need for such buying of support by providing the support for an allegiance to certain principles. The poor man gets an opportunity of serving in the Legislatures by his allegiance to a party. Many an instance could be given of this from the last Provincial elections. Further, it could be shown that, if party facilitates corruption in some ways, in other ways it makes its detection and punishment easier. It could also be shown that corruption would, be greater under a non-party democracy if it were possible, than in one based on party. The practical necessity of obtaining support in a Legislature, whose majority is not bound by a strict party discipline to support the government, makes a Government seek the support it must win by the distribution of favours. That this is not an unfounded fear will be evident to anyone who has watched the working of dyarchy in the Provinces with ill-organised and ill-disciplined groups rather than parties in the Legislature. An organised party makes in unnecessary as well as impossible to seek such support by distributing favours.

DOES PARTY DIVIDE THE NATION?

Finally there is the allegation that party is disruptive of a nation’s unity, that it maintains an unhealthy atmosphere of excitement and tension, and that it constitutes in effect a State within a State challenging the latter’s authority. The essence of party is faction. "A great part of the success of a party in an election is due not to an appreciation of this or that policy or of this or that personality but to the desire to triumph on the part of the crowd animated by partisan spirit." (54) It divides not only the Legislature, but the nation.

Parties normally work within the framework of the constitutional system. One of the greatest services rendered by party is that by tolerating differences it wins loyalty to a common constitutional system. If no opposition were permitted in the open as would almost certainly be the case in a one-party or national system, any opposition would have to be outside the constitution, and would necessarily bear the character of a challenge to the established order. The One-Party State is illuminating on this point. Far from dissolving the unity of a State the normal party system conserves and strengthens it by producing leaders loyal to the system though, in its actions and programmes, only conflict is apparent.

It is not right to regard the tension and emotion, oratory and declamation, the flood of pamphlets and books characteristic of modern elections as dividing a people into hostile camps. These provide the drama of politics. If the fanatical orgies of parties professing to have a mission are to be avoided, the organized and tolerant contests of election fights are essential. The people after all need an outlet for their emotions as well as solid food for thought. Election enthusiasm is the catharsis of emotion that is much needed. ⁴

THE ABOLITION OF PARTY

What is the remedy? It is the heroic one of "ending or mending" the party system "A party should not be recognised by the State as an authority competing with it or controlling it; it should not be an ‘imperium in imperio.’ Accordingly political parties should not be recognised at all in the Legislature or for purposes of election or for running the government. And party organisations and party funds should be prohibited and penalised. If economic corporations or companies can be made illegal there should be no difficulty in banning active political parties which are out to capture power in the State." (59) Political parties should go, lock, stock and barrel. If we desire a democracy, we should bury party a hundred fathoms deep.

But the freedom of association should be retained in its completeness. One may well ask if such a "freedom" will be worth having? British Trade Union history and the story of the French Laws of Associations during the nineteenth century ought to convince anyone that freedom of association permitted in any sphere could not be preserved without a like freedom in the political sphere also and would naturally lead to it. Where it does not, it becomes atrophied and worthless.

Ostrogorski’s recipe of ‘ad hoc’ organisations is served up again by Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar. These will arise–so it is confidently assumed–where there is a need for them; and when their task of education is over, they will dissolve and disappear as the law would prescribe. Formally, of course, they will end their existence. But in reality they will continue and will be revived on the next occasion. They will gradually become permanent organisations as time passes. The history of the party system everywhere is an illustration of this tendency. All political parties have begun as informal gatherings of like-minded men, and the necessity of continued co-operation has made them into permanently organised parties.

The abolition of the party system must be in the Provincial field only in India, and in the All-India field our national parties should continue to function and should be even strengthened to wrest our liberties from our rulers. A party is essential to fight any administration! The following are his words: "The objection to a party system in connection with the running of a Provincial Government does not apply to political parties formed for the purpose of winning Swaraj or complete independence for India or for the upholding of civil liberties against any administration in India. For those purposes the party organization will as before now be absolutely necessary." (59) These words need no comment. They refute the case against the party so laboriously built up.

THE NECESSITY OF PARTY

It is only necessary to sum up. From the foregoing analysis it must be evident that the party system is both a natural and necessary concomitant of representative government. Without it the representative system simply does not get going. Representative Government, in the words of Dr. Finer, isParty Government.⁵ It is the motive force of its machinery. Undoubtedly there are evils in the system; but evils are found in every human institution. But where the choice is between the greater and the lesser evil we have to choose the lesser. The services of the party are many and should not be forgotten. It educates and guides the electorate by its brokerage of ideas and its men who are loyal to the regime of constitutional government. It provides the drama of politics that is needed as an outlet for the emotions of men. It holds the Legislatures and Governments to programmes for which they have won popular support and thus secures the nearest approach possible to government by the people. In a word, it makes popular government a possibility.

IV. THE PARTY SYSTEM IN INDIA

Under Indian conditions Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar believes that the evils of party will be intensified. Parties will have a communal or religious basis. Our religious traditions militate against the growth of a spirit of tolerance. We possess no "racial identity" and we have no active public opinion as England possesses. The former is in the process of making and the latter is present only where there is no party system! "The common tendency to follow the opinion of a majority party and the dearth or minority courage make it difficult to create or maintain a large middle opinion which would be strong and effective to restrain a majority party from an unfair assertion of its strength heedless of criticism or opposition."

Our conditions are certainly peculiar. The desire for political freedom imposes on us a unity as for instance in the ranks of the Congress. Differences that might legitimately arise on the large questions of economic and social policy are not consequently reflected fully in our political alignments. The freedom and power to propose and carry out broad policies in these fields would tend inevitably to obliterate the political unity and lead to a division of parties based on economic interests.

The minorities in this country unfortunately have shown a tendency to group themselves into exclusive political groups.⁶ Such groupings have been favoured by a number of circumstances. They have been due in the first place to an imperfect appreciation of the material interests of the people of this country and to an exaggerated fear for the future of minorities as distinct cultural units, a fear that is genuine only in a few cases. In the second place, such organisations have been successful in winning for particular groups tangible advantages in the form of separate communal electorates, weightages in representative bodies, representation in the services (a very important matter) and a wealth of other important safeguards. The position of Europeans and Anglo-Indians is a case in point. They have been assured their position in business, in the Services, and in the Legislatures far in excess of their population in this country. All this of course is done in the name of the interests of this country. The net result is the creation of great inequalities. To cite but one instance in the Legislature of Bengal, the second largest community in the Province has suffered almost political annihilation; it has been reduced to less than half in its political importance. In passing, it may be pointed out that separate electorates, at least so far as the inhabitants permanently domiciled in this country are concerned, are a mixed gift. They force a permanent minority status on the smaller religious denominations if they assure also a stated representation all the time. They certainly throw dust into the people’s eyes by concealing their real interests and setting forth the claims of religion as of paramount importance. An essentially unstable and unreal party situation has been the consequence. This makes the talk of democracy under present conditions almost nonsense. In the third place, our strictly political parties have not offered adequate opportunities for leadership to men belonging to the less educated and ward classes in the past. And we see in the combined operation of these factors the creation of numerous irreconcilable minority parties reflecting our differences of race, religion, caste or community, which ought to have been subordinated to the larger interests of the nation. We witness also that special and vested interests that have been created making for increased intransigeance on the part of small sections of the population in the political field. The whole problem of minorities requires a far-sighted and generous settlement which leaves all traces of religious and racial antipathies behind and which assures perfect equality among citizens in the political field. Such a settlement alone will be a lasting basis for democracy among us.

But it must be added that, even when the largest allowances have been made for our racial and religious differences and of the racial and religious compositions of our political parties, it will still have to be admitted that in fundamentals there is a large measure of agreement between our parties, with the exception perhaps of the European groups, which appear to speak from opposite poles. It is a significant fact whose importance seems to have been missed in the recent debate on the subject that the parties which won the greatest successes in the first election under Provincial Autonomy were all non-communal in their appeal: the Congress, the Unionist Party in the Punjab and the Proja Party in Bengal. Their programmes were political and economic, not religious, even if we allow that each of them predominantly represents only one of the religious denominations of the country. That is inevitable under a system of water-tight religious electorates. In the field of Provincial Government we are in fact developing a regime not of religious parties but true political parties. We may confidently expect that, when lasting solutions are applied to our communal and religious problems, a saner politics would take root among us, and our parties would represent only the genuine divergencies of views on our economic and social problems.

In the words we have quoted at the beginning of this section, Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar finds the chief difficulty in creating a large middle opinion in the absence of minority courage. Hardly any words are needed to prove that our minorities have an abundant measure of courage; and to charge them with the lack of it is an insult to them! There is implicit in the argument the assumption that majorities are necessarily wrong and extremist in their views. There is no warrant at all for this in the experience of any country. Majorities, when they make an opinion of their own, are generally found to be conservative, and neither majorities nor minorities are always in the right. Again it is not clear how minorities, with the majorities rigidly excluded from sharing their opinion, as is implied, can create a large middle opinion. The trouble with us is not that our minorities do not or cannot stand up for their opinions against majorities. On the contrary, it is their self-righteousness and intransigence without a readiness to fair compromise that stand in our way. The conclusion is further enforced that we must and should settle our outstanding racial and religious problems to the satisfaction of all concerned before a more fruitful development of the party system can be expected. The average citizen has to be educated to the level that would make him withdraw altogether religion from the purview of politics.

Though it is not explicitly stated, it is obvious that the fears of a dictatorship expressed in general terms refer to the growing power of the Indian National Congress. Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar is in the company of Messrs. Jinnah and Langley who openly assert that the Congress Working Committee and its Parliamentary Sub-Committee constitute a sort of Fascist Grand Council, and are an irresponsible caucus that stands outside the Constitution and make use of it.⁷ It is undeniably a fact that the Congress "High Command" has been directing the Provincial Ministries where the Congress has been in office. The discipline of the Congress has also been growing. Its centralisation has increased while a new constitution of the Party has sought to give it a democratic foundation and eliminate the worthless membership. Unified control, discipline and a democratic basis are the key-notes of the new development. One cannot fail to observe that parties other than the Congress have also sought to effect similar changes in their organisations with varying degrees of success. Even the relatively high degree of organisation that has now been achieved by the Indian National Congress is not comparable to the organisation of the parties in the West. We are still as far behind the party organisation of the West as we are in our industrial and material equipment. The development of parties in India, and especially of the Congress, is very far removed from anything that could be described with propriety as a dictatorship.

Before we condemn this movement towards greater discipline and centralisation in the organisation of our parties we must understand its causes. The first and most vital of them is, of course, the need for the preservation of the unity of the National Movement which is essential for its success. In the unity of the National Movement is also involved the cause of national unity in a wider sense, namely, the unity of India. With the acceptance of office under Provincial Autonomy, without a corresponding change in the Government of India as a whole, there was a real danger of centrifugal tendencies asserting themselves and endangering our unity as a people and as a country. If at the very outset of our democratic experiment the Provinces were to set up a tradition of quasi-independence and forget that they were members of a larger whole and should march in unison with other Provinces, the unity that has been a quest through the ages would have been sundered. There was a third cause which is no less urgent. The working out of constructive reform in all the Provinces as sketched out in the manifesto of the Congress issued before the elections and the co-ordination of the reforms undertaken after the party accepted office have necessitated central direction which the Parliamentary Sub-Committee of the Congress Working Committee has given.

It is open to doubt whether the Working Committee or its Parliamentary Sub-Committee ever made a decision affecting the various Provincial Governments without taking the chiefs of the Provincial Ministries into consultation. In times of domestic trouble and in dealing with difficult issues of more than a Provincial character as well as issues of purely internal import to Provinces, the Sub-Committee has helpfully advised Provincial Ministries; and it is not open to doubt that in the day-to-day administration of the Provinces the Sub-Committee has not interfered at all.

When it is sought to determine the character of a party it is necessary that the constitution, structure, social composition and the procedure of the party should be taken into account. The Congress is built upon the widest foundation of any party in this country. It is democratic in structure and is built up by a process of indirect election from the primary unit in the Village and Town Committee, through the Taluk, District and Provincial organisations, to the, All-India Congress Committee and the Working Committee at the top. It has a large membership representing practically all classes and religious denominations in this country. It allows a large freedom of discussion in its councils. Its offices are open to all persons who are its adherents and take an interest in its programmes and work. Finally its leadership has consistently sought to anticipate the needs of the people and incorporate them in its programmes. These characteristics of the Congress do not lend any support to the view that the Congress is tending towards a dictatorship.

The cry of dictatorship then is not true. In the few instances in which the Congress Parliamentary Sub-Committee has acted with vigour, as in the Khare episode and in the dismissal of Mr. Sharif, both in the Central Provinces, it could be shown that not to have acted as it did might have affected all the prestige, strength and the reputation for honesty of the Congress as a great national party. Had not the Congress maintained discipline within its ranks it would have certainly condemned itself to impotence, and would have been less fit to achieve its purpose of winning the freedom of this country than it was at the beginning of its career more than fifty years ago.⁸

V. REFORMS IN THE MECHANISM OF GOVERNMENT

THE ILLUSION OF A NON-PARTY GOVERNMENT

"What we require…is a form of government which, taking hints from both the English and American systems, should avoid their defects and be a distinct improvement upon their best features." "An educated and non-partism democracy" is this improvement. In it lies the remedy for all our evils, those due to party and others as well. (41) "In the circumstances of India, a National Government is clearly indicated as the only possible from which can both be strong and stable. Since a one-party system is even more of a menace to democracy than a system of two or more parties the National Government in India must be a non-party democracy." (64) That is the form of Government which is not merely technically but truly responsible. ⁹

The recent experience of England, according to Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar, is a proof of the merits of a National Government and also of its practicability. It is held that the English party system has disintegrated during the last two decades, and that England has had during this period virtually a National Government enjoying the support of a large majority of the people, including among them the forces of organised Labour. The verdict of the last Provincial elections in India is interpreted as a positive mandate to the Congress "to liquidate all party difference" in the country. It is maintained that there are no substantial differences of opinion on all important questions before the country to serve as the basis of political parties.

The idea of a non-party and national government is to be realized in the Provinces by means of the election of the Provincial Council of Ministers directly by the people or alternatively by the Legislature as is done in Switzerland. The Ministers will have seats in the Legislature and will be collectively responsible to it. They will not have freedom to make any and every question a matter of confidence. They will be bound by the resolutions of the Legislature, but will have the right of referring them to the Legislature for reconsideration. But if the resolutions so returned are passed by the Legislature, the Ministry will be obliged to carry them out. Only by a specific vote of no-confidence passed by a special two-thirds majority will the Legislature have the power of dismissing the Ministry. "The Legislature ought to govern as far as possible." (66)

The interpretation of English party history here advanced will not bear scrutiny. The experience of England does not prove the feasibility of a national government. The National Government in England is national only in name. It is a Conservative Party Government under a helpful camouflage. The strength and stability of the National Government do not lie in the national character of the government but in its predominantly Conservative composition.¹⁰ There has been a certain amount of flux and shuffle in the party positions owing to the economic crisis, but there is certainly no evidence of the disintegration of the party system.

The difficulties of the party system in the West arise not from any absence of clear-cut issues dividing the people but from the depth of the fissures that have been caused by the economic crisis. The differences dividing the parties are tending to become fundamental. What Balfour called the "limits of safe bickering" seem to be threatened. Not the party system alone, but the entire democratic system appears to be faced by a grave crisis. Conservative and propertied groups, without a desire for compromise, and determined to maintain the status quo at any cost, and radical or socialist groups, intent upon a fundamental change, stand in acute opposition. There is a tendency for these groups to resort to violence in preference to reason, milking compromise difficult. Would these differences be settled and a new agreement upon fundamentals be arrived at by the contending parties? It is yet to be seen whether democratic government will succeed in bridging the gulf by achieving the new social and economic revolution without violence. Meanwhile the democrat hopes for such a solution and works for it.^l1

Not less mistaken than his interpretation of recent English Party history, but even more imaginary is Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar’s account of our politics. The Congress won its laurels on the concrete issue of freedom and a constructive programme in the fields of education and industry. Its success was due to no small extent to the absence of opposition parties with attractive alternative programmes. The Congress was not opposed by organised parties at all in most of the Provinces but by individual politicians without a definite creed and without even ‘ad hoc’ electoral machines to run the election on their behalf. There is no warrant to speak of a mandate to liquidate other political parties.¹² Everyone hopes that the differences that remain on fundamental issues should disappear. But no one desires that on all issues before the country we should speak with one voice. It is not Dr. Goebbels’s conception of public opinion that we wish to see realised.¹³ There is no monopoly of truth with any party or any individuals.

Let us ask ourselves if what Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar calls a "national or non-party government" is at all practicable under our conditions, and if what is called a national government is not in fact merely another name for the government of a single party that has succeeded in suppressing dissent, in other words, totalitarianism of some sort.

It is of course quite possible to constitute the Provincial Executive by election as suggested, by direct election by the people at large as in the United States or by election by the Legislature as in Switzerland. But neither the United States nor Switzerland has yet been successful in setting up a non-party executive. Even the irresponsible executive of the United States–for, in effect, the separation of powers make them irresponsible in actual fact–cannot be constructed and maintained without the aid of organised parties. Without organisation of some sort extending over the entire State, especially when the State is as large as an Indian Province, it would be impossible for any man to get elected to executive positions, and equally impossible for the electorate to choose. The advantages, if any, of this type of executive are not overwhelmingly in its favour. It is doubtful if Swiss experience can be a precedent to us in this country. Our differences from the Swiss are many.¹⁴ This type of executive does not mean a national or non-party executive.

Combinations of parties may be meant when the words national or non-party are used. This is not the elimination of parties but their unnatural union. Incidentally this is easier in the Parliamentary system than in the Presidential. The amalgamation of the Muslim League and the Congress which is recommended by Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar, Mr. Kari and M. N. Roy among others will be of this character. This will not abolish parties. Coalitions may serve a useful purpose in the grave moments of a nation’s history when a national or popular front is required to defend fundamental liberties as in the case of a great war, or in a fight for national liberation. But they are emergency devices and are necessarily short-lived. The English reception of the idea (of the Patriot King above parties) of Henry St. John Bolingbroke and its practice under George III, the Fox-North Coalition in 1786 are illuminating episodes in English history. The words of an English statesman that England does not like coalitions sum up English experience. French experience with the great Blocs of the Left parties and of the Popular Front are no less illustrative of the thesis that coalitions are inherently unstable. A coalition means the sacrifice of principles and a consequent lack of coherence in policy with all the attendant evils. In trying not to displease anyone, it pleases none. It is inherently weak. Coalitions are, as Mr. Iyengar himself recognises, "wholly unsatisfactory." (56) Nothing else however can be the result of his suggestions. A National and Non-Party Government which is neither a coalition nor a Totalitarian State is a mirage and a mischievous delusion.

DIRECT LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES

We have yet to consider the various suggestions made by Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar for perfecting our democracy. First among these is the adoption of the Referendum to serve as a uniting and healing antidote to our factious political quarrels and party strife in moments of crises. The methods of direct participation of the people in the government of the State are the Referendum, the Initiative and the Recall. The Referendum is a negative instrument enabling the electorate to say "No" to unwanted legislation. The Initiative is positive, and enables the people to suggest legislative measures which the Legislature is for some reason or other unwilling to initiate. The Recall is a provision to enable the people to dismiss legislators and public officials for unsatisfactory conduct, through an election. These devices have been widely adopted in the United States, in the State Governments and more particularly in the institutions of local administration. The Referendum and the Initiative have been in use in several of the Swiss Cantons and in the Federal Government. Australia has made provision for the Referendum in her Federal Constitution as well as in the State Constitutions. Most of the post-war (1914-1918) constitutions of Europe have provided for the Referendum with very interesting variation that deserve close study.¹⁵

The experience of these devices is therefore considerable. What does it suggest? Firstly, the merits of these devices are by no means uniform. There has been a more extensive use of the Referendum than of the other devices, and the results have been commendable. The results of the operation of the Initiative, which is less widely used, has not been so very satisfactory. The Initiative both in Switzerland and in the United States has led to some unwise legislation. Legislating in haste and repenting at leisure are not peculiar to representative bodies. The Recall has not been employed in the larger political organisations, and has been confined in the main to the field of municipal administration. Its presence rather than its practical use has served undoubtedly to introduce an element of responsibility in the administration. Secondly, the operation of these devices has been dependent on the existence of the traditional party system or on ‘ad hoc’ formations or groups for special objectives in the municipal field. These have not been immune from exploitation by pressure and interest groups. Thirdly, the questions that could be referred to the people must be susceptible of an "Yes" or "No" answer, and such questions are very few among the problems governments have now to face. In Switzerland, for instance, several questions are withdrawn from the Referendum by being declared to be of an emergent character. This shows less the desire of the Executive to aggrandize, but more the difficulty of applying the Referendum to many questions that modern governments have to solve. Fourthly, the electorate never keeps itself informed on the questions that are submitted to it and goes to the polls with a blank mind and votes. Its interest in the measures submitted to it is lesser than its interest in the men it has to choose. This is clearly shown by the analysis of voting both in the United States and in Switzerland When measures and men are voted for at the same election the electorate not infrequently fails to vote for the measures while it votes for the men. A large number of measures get through only a with small minority of the electorate in its favour because of this. Fifthly, the Legislature is placed in an awkward position if a measure that has been passed by it is negatived at a Referendum. It may be mentioned here that this is solved by the provision for the automatic dissolution of the Legislature in the Estonian Constitution. And finally, the enthusiasm for these measures has steadily dwindled in the countries that have experimented with them, though there is no desire to dispense with them. The benefits appear to be more formal than substantial.

We in this country cannot build any very high hopes on devices which are obviously difficult in their application and whose advantages have not been large enough to be worth the trouble at adopting them. We have further to think of the cost, for our Treasuries are none too full and the tax-payer already justifiably complains of his burdens. His control over the government may be rendered slightly more operative under these devices; but his government’s efficiency would hardly be affected for the better. The problem has to be considered carefully before any device of direct legislation could be adopted by us.

The supreme merit of democracy is a negative one, says Lord Russell. It has to assure that governments shall be less terrible than tigers.¹⁶ For this purpose it may be useful to have the Referendum applied on a few specific questions, e.g., those affecting minority rights which will presumably be written into our future Constitution, and generally changes in the Constitution. But Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar’s suggestion that the Referendum should be at the option of the Legislature, or perhaps when a two-fifths or one-third of its members require one, would be impracticable. This for two reasons. No Legislature would appeal against itself in the first instance. In the second, a minority of members will have a veto on the Government’s policies in regard to the problems to be submitted to the people. The more advantageous method appears to be to lay down in the Constitution the specific cases that ought to go before the people, and these should go automatically before them. In India the application of the Referendum to constitutional questions would seem to be of value. In the National and Provincial spheres of government more than this cannot be adopted with ease or worked to any advantage.

A more fruitful field than these in which the devices of direct democracy could be applied seems to be that of municipal and village administration, where the issues are simple and directly interest the voter. The Town Meeting of the United States is an institution which we might well try. In the constitution of the village and town executives, and for their general guidance and control, the three devices could be employed, at least as an experiment.

Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar omits the whole problem of local government from his survey. Its value as a school for democracy needs no elaboration. The problems that it raises are among the most important for our democracy, and the anti-democratic tendencies manifest in this field in the actions ofour Provincial Government have to be combated. A new, sympathetic, and constructive approach to the solutions of the problem is today a fundamental necessity.

Since the above words were written, Dr. C. R. Reddy has joined the company of the advocates of composite cabinets in the Provinces. In a series of speeches delivered at Madras in November and reported in the ‘Madras Mail’ of the 15th, 16th, 17th November, and in the ‘Twentieth Century’ for December, he argues with his usual brilliance for what he terms a "Cabinet of national concentration" or a Non-party cabinet in the Provinces which till lately were administered by the Congress. The core of his argument is that national unity cannot be preserved by any other means except that of non-party cabinets, which in effect will be Congress-League coalitions, with the Congress ideals thrown overboard. Minority rights are, according to him, best safeguarded by the device of composite cabinets. Representation in the Cabinet, it is argued, is a logical consequence of separate representation in the Legislatures. Where "composite legislatures," a term by which is meant a legislature constituted on a variety of franchises and electorates, as all Indian Legislatures are, have their necessary counterpart in composite cabinets, i.e., cabinets in which all the interests represented in the Legislature are as a matter of right represented. Under the "unitary parliamentary system"–a term by which is meant the present system of party government–the rights of minorities are unsafe. Dr. Reddy holds that the experience of Provincial Autonomy during the last two and a half years has proved that separate electorates and safeguards are useless when a homogeneous party with a majority in the Legislature carries on the government. Safeguards are inoperable in a "unitary system of government." Hence it is argued by Dr. Reddy that cabinets of national concentration and a "new form of democracy" must be adopted by us. It is not the British system which we should attempt slavishly to copy; we should set up the Swiss system as our model. In effect, the solution suggested is the same as Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar’s non-party government.

It must be noted, firstly, that the argument is based on the assumption that our parties will for ever remain divided on the basis of religion or community or caste. In other words, our dignity is fundamental and can never be healed. If the assumption were true, parliamentary government of any type, English or Swiss, will be impossible of realisation in this country. It has been shown above that this is not the case.

Secondly, even if separate electorates were to be admitted as part of the democratic scheme in India, it by no means follows that separate representation in the executive of the interest represented by a special electorate should be accorded from the point of view of democratic theory. For democratic government, if we look at the core of it, is essentially government by the numerical majority. Special representation in the Legislature is accorded to minorities to temper the rule of the majority and to make it reasonable and acceptable to the minority. If on the other hand we were to admit that composite cabinets are the counterpart of composite legislatures it would indeed be impossible to find representation on the executive body for all the multitudinous interests represented in the legislature. Short of making the Legislature itself the Executive there is no way out, both as a matter of logic and as a matter of practical politics. That is clearly an impossible position. It may reasonably be argued however that the major groups, religious, communal and otherwise and territorial interests should normally be represented on a Cabinet. Every Prime Minister who is anxious to have a strong and balanced Cabinet will not fail so to construct his Cabinet as to afford representation to divergent areas, groups and interests. This kind of representation which is the only possible representation for minor group can be had within the framework of the "unitary party" itself and without the necessity of sacrificing the programmes for which a party may stand pledged to the electorate.

Dr. Reddy has argued that in an "unitary parliamentary democracy," i.e., under a homogeneous party government, safeguards are inoperable and separate electorates are useless. The question of the reality of safeguards cannot be discussed without reference to the speeches of Sir Samuel Hoare on their nature during the debates on the India Bill in the Commons in 1935. The verdict that the Swaraj we have is an anna-in-the-rupee kind of Swaraj is not merely a picturesque statement without reality. The fact that Governors never openly interfered to pull up popular ministries in defense of minorities in a spectacular manner does not prove that the safeguards for the minorities are worthless or are inoperable. Ministries were working within the framework of the Government of India Act of 1935, and so long as they were doing it there could be no question of transgressing the limits to their authority laid down in that Act, or of the conscious nullification of the safeguards. The fact appears to be rather that there were so few occasions when these safeguards needed to be invoked by the Governors. The invitation to the Governors to interfere freely to protect the interests of minorities which is said by Sardar Patel to have been made by the Congress Ministries confirms this conclusion. Our experience with Provincial Autonomy during the last two and half years certainly does not prove that safeguards are inoperable under the "unitary system of parliamentary government." Safeguards can be at least as real and effective as any system of fundamental rights inrigid and written constitutions.

In any case the argument that safeguarding of minority rights requires representation onthe Cabinet seems, besides being impracticable and irreconcilable with ordinary conceptions of democracy, to lack force. If separate electorates, weigtages in the legislatures, statutory provision of places in the civil and military services of the State, full safeguards against discrimination and an impartial guardian of a third party in the person of the Governor equipped with almost dictatorial powers to give the safeguards validity have failed to give the minority a sense of security, it is difficult to see how one or a few places to members of the minority communities on the executive body could soothe their fears. The problem would arise of the functions to be assigned to the minister chosen from a minority community. Will he be in charge of a department of State like it other ministers? Or will he be like the Tribune of the plebians in the Roman Republic, solely the custodian of the interests of his community with a right of veto on the actions of the Executive Council in all spheres? That is, will he be concerned with the protection of his particular community’s special interests in all the spheres of the State’s actions? The latter must obviously be envisaged by the advocate of composite cabinets for the protection of minority interests. If so, can any distinction be drawn except in an infinitesimally small number of unimportant cases between the interests of a minority community and those of a majority? The advocacy of composite cabinets for the safeguarding of minority rights is really the admission of our unfitness for the responsibilities of a democratic government in a truly democratic and tolerant spirit.

AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

The most interesting and perhaps the most useful of the suggestions offered is that for the constitution of an independent administrative commission or tribunal composed of retired judges of the High Court, having its own rules of procedure in each Province to deal with all cases of corruption whether of legislators or of administrators. While the existence of such a tribunal may itself decrease the evil of corruption, to have a tribunal exclusively for corruption is both to exaggerate the magnitude of the evil and sometimes even to embarrass the government. What would seem necessary is an administrative tribunal, something in the nature of the French Council of State and its subordinate organisation, with the two-fold objective of assuring promptitude in administrative action and at the same time guaranteeing the civil liberties and private rights of individual citizens against official encroachment. Such a Court might well be entrusted with the task of dealing with official corruption while legislative corruption might be left to be dealt with by the ordinary courts of law. The setting up of such a tribunal would facilitate the separation of the Judiciary from the Executive, which is a necessary reform in our present judicial system.

THE MINOR SUGGESTIONS

We can only make a passing reference to other suggestions contained in Mr. Iyengar’s address. The doubling of the size of the electorate and the equalisation of the franchise between men and women so as approximately to reflect their proportions in the population; the abolition of communal and other special electorates with proper safeguards for minority interests through some form of proportional representation¹⁷; the preference of a territorial before a functional basis for constituting our legislative bodies; the abolition of Second Chambers; and the fixation of a four-year period for the Legislatures are suggestions with which most progressive elements in this country would be found to agree fully with Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar. Or again, the measures he recommends for ending corruption at elections, with a few exceptions, will be found to be acceptable by most. The absence of logic in the age limits for the vote and for membership of legislative bodies will also be admitted. Dr. Finer, it may be noted, is of the same opinion. Again, when it is urged that defence should be a concern of Indian democracy, there can be no dissent. The means suggested, conscription, may not appeal to some; but the vital need for providing for defence, no one will gainsay.

But Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar’s suggestions that a candidate’s term in the legislature should be limited to two terms of four years each, and that the maximum age-limit for a candidate should be fixed at sixty, beyond which he should not be allowed to serve, are of dubious value. The former would render legislatures dangerously amateurish and would deprive democracy of the wisdom that comes with experience; and the latter caricatures the meddlesomeness of old age in our politics and under-estimates its services. His suggestion that election meetings should be limited to two, and the personal canvassing to two visits, is quite unnecessary in this country as the fact is that in most cases the candidate is unable to visit his constituency fully, and in several parts of it no meetings take place. His suggestion that two manifestoes by a candidate may be carried free of postage to each elector has been in force in France for a long time and has been useful. Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar is not on sure ground when he claims to have established a direct connection between the payment of members of the Legislature and their venality and subservience to the Government, and professionalism in politics¹⁸. Altogether an excessive faith in the value of mechanism to solve the problems of democracy seems to characterise the suggestions made, a faith which is belied by the entire history of democracy.

We must now conclude. This has been largely an essay in refutation. Voltaire once said to a friend with whom he disagreed: "I entirely disagree with what you say, but I will defend with my life your right to say it." That represents the true spirit of democracy. It is that spirit that we, as a people, have to cultivate. For it is in the conflict of opposed ideas that the true synthesis emerges and the solution for our difficulties is discovered. Discussion is therefore the very life-breath of the democratic process. Political parties, groups, and individuals have their contributions to make to this discussion. Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar has called our attention to some of our problems and has offered his solutions. We ought to welcome the effort; but we ought also to weigh his words before we accept them. We ought to expose fallacies. That is the duty laid on us by democracy. When every word of criticism has been said, it will be found that there is a substantial unity of purpose between the present critic and the author criticised: it is the search for the ways of building our future democracy on a lasting foundation. Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar’s zeal for democracy ought to inspire hope and a spirit of emulation in every heart. And in such zeal and emulation lie the best safeguards for democracy in this country.

(Concluded)

1 A review of Mr. S. Srinivasa Iyengar’s Address of the above title: Earlier parts of the review appeared in the November and December issues of 1939.

2 Lowell: Public Opinion and Popular Government.

3 Mrs. Webb; My Apprenticeship

4 E. P. Herring: ‘Political Parties’–Essays in Political Science in honour of W.W.Willoughby.

5 Finer: Theory and Practice of Modern Government

6 Dr. Ambedkar’s recent references to minority claims are illuminating.

7 Mr. Jinnah’s recent utterances, especially his reply to Gandhiji’s proposal for an impartial tribunal to enquire into the allegations, made in the Pirpu Report, and his statement to the Manchester Guardian’

Mr. Langley: Speech in the Madras Leg. Assembly, Oct. 26, 1939.

8 Reference may be made to the reply of Mr. Asaf Ali to Mr. Jinnah’s statement to the ‘Manchester Guardian’ and to Dr. Pattabhi Seetharamayya’s speech reported in the ‘Hindu’ of the 2nd Nov. 1939.

It is interesting to note that Professor Rushbrook Williams’ article on Indian Constitutional Problems in the ‘Nineteenth Century’ for April, 1939, lends support to the views stated above. The following are the relevant parts of the article: "An insistence upon the fundamental unity of India among the most deeply rooted assumptions of Indian political thought. At no period has India willingly condoned the absence of an authority extensive enough to coordinate the activities of the semi-autonomous units into which, for many functions of administration, the country is naturally divided." (283) "It may be remarked in passing that the apprehensions which Hindu opinion has expressed regarding the dangers which Provincial Autonomy might present to the continued existence of a strong nationalist movement are by no means without foundation; and if at the moment of writing there are few signs that the influence of the Congress throughout the country has suffered by the dissipation of energies inevitably accompanying acceptance of office in the Provincial Governments, it is because effective steps have been taken to counteract the danger. Much has been written–and not without some justification–adversely concerning the so-called "Congress Dictatorship," but the reasons for its existence are not always understood. In the judgment of Hindu nationalist leaders, the delay which ensued between the institution of Provincial Autonomy and the completion of the Constitutional structure by the inauguration of Federation has made it necessary to institute definite machinery to counteract the centrifugal tendencies developed by the absorption of Provincial Congress leaders in the local problems with which their new responsibilities oblige them to deal. The task which the Congress "High Command" has set itself has been to control, by rigid application of party discipline, the policy of those Provincial Government Cabinets which are staffed by Congress adherents; to maintain at all costs the unity of the Hindu nationalist movement, and to make the approval of the Working Committee of the Congress an essential element in the stability of each Provincial Government....The task has not been accomplished without friction....But despite incidents, which have brought their punishment in strong criticism from the Congress rank and file, it seems certain that if the activities of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee of the Congress had been less effective, the apprehensions expressed by Hindu opinion in the early discussions of the new Constitution would have been justified; and the driving force of the Congress, as the exponent of the most vocal and highly organised section of the Indian Nationalist Movement, being dissipated into purely local channels, would have been diverted from its principal, if self-constituted, task of acquiring complete control over the destinies of the country." (285-286)

9 See also the various statements and speeches which Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar has been making since the present crisis arose, especially the statement on the Resolution of the Congress Working Committee, and the speech before the Presidency College Union reported in ‘The Hindu’ of the 23rd and 24th October.

10 Mr. G. D. H. Cole: The Common People, p. 583, and The People’s Front

11 A. L. Rowse: Politics and the Younger Generation

12 It was the Congress as a Party and not any individual who won the election. Mr.Satyamurthi’s election speeches cannot be considered as the policy on which the Election was determined.

13 Morsten-Marx: Government in the Third Reich

14 The Swiss Executive is a party executive, contrary to Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar’s belief.

15 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences–Lowell: Public Opinion and Popular Government. This was written in 1911 but is still very useful. Also, Rappard: The Government of Switzerland; and Brooks: The Government of Switzerland and Civic Training in Switzerland. The study of the working of the Initiative inthe United States in the August, 1939, American Pol. Science Review, Headlam Morley: The New Democratic Constitutions of Europe.

16 Russel: Power.

17 It may be pointed out that proportional representation, which Mr. Iyengar recommends for solving our communal problem, needs party organisation. Candidates are chosen from lists made by parties under any system of P. R. See Dr. Finer: Theory and Practice of Modern Government. Vol. II., Pp.916 ff.

18 Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar quotes rather incorrectly from the Cambridge Ancient History. Vol. V. in support of his thesis of corruption as due to payment of members. He overlooks the demonstration in the same chapter that the evils complained of relate to democracy at the time of Demosthenes and not to Periclean democracy.