Foreign Affairs

BY ‘DHRUVA’

In Czechoslovakia speculation is rife with regard to the new Nationalities statute which is being drafted and discussed by the Cabinet. No one knows yet to what extent the reform proposals go, but the German minority is not likely to accept them save under great pressure. On the 21st, some of the proposals ‘leaked out,’ and provoked bitter comment in the Sudeten German and the Nazi Press. Four separate parliaments are to be set up in the four provinces: Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, Slovakia, Ruthenia. Complete provincial autonomy is to be granted, state finance, defence and foreign policy being the only matters reserved for the National Assembly. In each of the four diets seats are to be divided according to the strength of the nationalities composing them, and these national blocs are to have charge of affairs specifically concerning them.

These are the lines on which, it is expected, the reforms will be based. But feeling is already running high both among the Czechs and the Germans. The Henleinists are arguing that the new statute merely codifies existing rights and practices and does not grant even their minimum demands. They are circulating reports about troop movements in the border districts of Czechoslovakia, and allege that their crops are being damaged. On the other hand, the recent municipal elections in the State have shown that the Czech people stand to the left of Dr. Hodza and his cabinet, and it is doubtful whether they would approve of any far-reaching concessions to the Germans. They are sternly opposed to any further infiltration of Nazi ideology into the State and to any proposal calculated to undermine their strength or independence. The Sokol festival which was celebrated recently was in fact a great demonstration of Slav solidarity.

But the Sudeten Germans themselves do not seem to be united in their opposition. The clericals and the communists have no desire to join hands with the Sudetendeutschepartei; they will have everything to lose in such a bargain. The Social Democrats, although they do not co-operate with the Czech Government, are not anxious to be swamped by a party which acts on orders from Berlin and will be the first to eliminate them if there were another Anschluss. Even the Henleinists are not easy in mind about the consequences of their agitation. The experience of the Austrian Nazis is having a sobering effect upon them.

Thus it looks as if the Sudeten German problem will be tackled in a more or less peaceful atmosphere or at least be postponed for a while. Unless Germany again precipitates a crisis. But the events of the 21st May have damped down the ardour of the Nazi radicals in Berlin. Herr Hitler is watching and wavering. He has difficulties in Austria; his economic position is complicated by a shortage of labour; and he has not acquired the necessary reserves of war material. His General Staff is for moderation and compromise; and Hitler appears to be more ready to listen to its counsel rather than to the explosive proposals of Herr Von Ribbentrop. On the 19th he sent his aide-de-camp, Capt. Wiedemann, to London to sound the British Government and impress upon them "the urgency of the Czech problem" and the danger of the Czech-Soviet pact to the peace of Europe.

The British Cabinet consequently have taken an important diplomatic step. They have announced their intention of sending Lord Runciman to Prague to report upon the situation and to mediate if possible between Czechs and Germans. Lord Runciman would act ‘independently’ of the British Government and offer his help to all the parties concerned. This constructive proposal has considerably relaxed the tension in Central Europe, but it remains to be seen yet whether Lord Runciman will be able to do much by way of conciliation. The chances are that the Germans will accept the reforms now and agitate for more after the harvest season which threatens to be a bad one. At the same time, there is the danger that the Czechs may be forced by Lord Runciman and the British Government into making concessions which may eventually emasculate the Republic.

Clearly, the National Government appreciate the importance of the problems now distracting Central Europe. Mr. Chamberlain has staked his political reputation on a deal with Mussolini and Hitler, and he is doing his best to bring it off. Simultaneously, he is putting pressure on Mr. Daldier and forming a strong Anglo-French entente with all the implications if not the form of an alliance. He is also consolidating British financial and diplomatic position in Central and Eastern Europe. His Export Credits Department has been increasing the bulk of British interests in Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania. On the 4th, a loan of £16 millions was granted to Turkey to enable her to rearm herself, and the loan was described as ‘a solid basis’ for friendship. British economic influence is on the upgrade in the Balkan countries, raising a barrier to German incursions. On the 16th, the King visited France, and the Entente Cordiale was re-affirmed in the warmest terms. France is apparently towing the line with Britain on almost all the problems of Europe.

It is clear that Mr. Chamberlain is doing much to reinforce the relations between Britain and France. He is also forcing the pace in rearmament and defence. But it is not clear that his objectives are any other than the old objectives of British imperialism. He has not done or said anything which inspires confidence in the idea of collective security or economic appeasement. He has retreated before Fascist aggression not because he is afraid of war, though that is one reason, but because he wants to strengthen his hand and acquire tremendous striking power. His policy seems to be one of short-term cowardice in order to gain ultimate strength. His diplomacy is rapidly reducing Europe to the power-pattern of pre-war times. He is making it increasingly clear that he will not fight for collective security nor for ideals of democracy or peace or international law; but he will pitch the metal and men of Britain into a war for the sake of British imperialism, British power, in the last analysis, for the interest of the British ruling class. He let Austria be swallowed up by Germany; but by the Anglo-German debt settlement he has compelled Germany to acknowledge the greater part of Austrian loans and pay interest on them. He lets democracy and peace go hang in Spain at the cost even of the lives of British sailors; but he has safeguarded British mining and trading interests in rebel areas, and is confident that Franco will soon come to the City for loans.

Mr. Chamberlain’s idea of peace is an Europe dominated by Britain, Germany, France and Italy, with Britain holding the leading-strings. But even the conclusion of this Four Power Pact depends immediately upon the possibility of his Anglo-Italian agreement coming into force, which in turn depends on the Spanish issue. So he is forced to burke that question, play for time and draw up plans in the non-intervention committee which flagrantly disregard the facts of the situation. But every-thing depends on his ability to strike a bargain with Mussolini as early as possible.

Mussolini himself is in a desperate position. Attached to the Axis, his freedom of action is limited; unattached, he will lose German help in Spain and German radio propaganda in Arabia and Palestine. His relations with Germany are none too enviable. Herr Himmler is known to have drawn up a devastating report about Italy’s economic position. On the other hand, the Axis is by no means popular in Italy itself. The Royal family and the majority of the Generals are actively opposed to it and scowl at the Germans on the Brenner. Finally, there are distinct undertones of discontent in the lower middle and working classes because the Spanish adventure has not yet been liquidated and Abyssinia is turning out to be a colossal failure. For the first time Mussolini is in a tight corner and personally unpopular. He is dangerously near a precipice, and his fall would crack up the Fascist system and provoke a terrible social revolution in Italy. He is making strenuous efforts to get out of his financial and diplomatic impasse. On the 18th, he started negotiations with Hungary and Yugoslavia and extended to them the economic advantages of the Rome Protocols with the object of creating an economic bloc attached to Italy. At the same time he has made an ideological concession to the Nazis and is keeping them on the right side. He has discovered that the Italians are of Aryan race and anti-Semitic. He says that "in the matter of racialism Italy will go straight ahead"; while his henchman, Signor Starace, has called the Jews "the general staff of anti-Fascism." But these acrobatics apart, Mussolini’s position depends on his early liquidation of the Spanish affair. On this depends his standing in Berlin and London. To him as well as to Mr. Chamberlain, then, it is of the first importance that the Spanish war should be brought to a quick decision.

But the odds are against them. True, the rebels are advancing down the Sagunto Road widening the breach between Valencia and Barcelona, and, with fresh reinforcements from Italy, are concentrating on the Ebro for a terrible engagement. True also, the Republicans are starved for supplies and have to fight with tighter belts. But, according to all accounts, the morale of the Republican armies is superb. The harvest promises to be good, and the peasants are helpful and sympathetic. The Republic will continue to fight to the last ditch. Madrid is impregnable. The Catalonian front is well fortified. And the production of war material is increasing in every respect. Moreover, winter is approaching, and unless the rebels make a dash for Madrid, the war will peter out into a war of attrition. Thus if definite action is taken now to stop the continual flow of men from Italy and Germany and if the Republic is given its legal right to buy arms, the Government would beat the rebels and in a few months end the war. And, incidentally, the democratic forces could be mobilised in Europe with profound consequences to the totalitarian States.

But it would be fatuous to expect any of these things from the non-intervention committee. Our analysis of the mainsprings of British foreign policy would be totally wrong if we expect that committee to produce a single constructive idea. The whole scheme of non-intervention was designed to localise the conflict and draw a cloak over the activities of Italy and Germany; to prevent the social revolution from advancing to a stage which would be inimical to British vested interests in Spain. It is not surprising that in these critical months the non-intervention committee has succeeded only in perfecting an elaborate and unworkable plan–the British plan–for the withdrawal of volunteers in Spain. According to this plan published on the 11th, London, Marseilles, Genoa, Hamburg and Lisbon are to be the ports to which volunteers will be withdrawn, and thence repatriated. 2000 volunteers will be evacuated every day; and when the withdrawal reaches "substantial proportions," belligerent rights will be granted to the two sides. The first evacuation is to take place 46 days after the adoption of the plan and the last on the 164th day; and it is thought that a month at least will elapse before the plan is agreed to by both the parties, Thus, the period of withdrawal will last six months-sufficiently long to enable the rebels to force an issue.

But the worst feature of the plan is not the period of withdrawal but the vagueness of the definition of volunteers. It is not defined who the volunteers are and whether the technicians are to be included among them. As the Spanish Ambassador in London remarked, Italy will be free to withdraw 10,000 of her sick and wounded and enroll the rest as members of the Spanish Legion and retain them in the fighting lines. Lack of sea control would leave the rebels free to bomb and sink ships trading with the Republic. Lack of air patrol would leave the German and Italian aeroplanes free to fly into rebel aerodromes. The Republicans on the other hand will be depleted of their best fighting material. And when the time for granting belligerent rights arrives, the Government will be on its last legs in Catalonia.

But in spite of all these crippling conditions the Spanish Government has accepted the plan. Franco, however, is still hedging, attaching conditions and delaying a definite answer. The Government has also accepted the British proposal to send a British commission to enquire into the bombing of open towns. But Franco has replied by bombing the Standand and the Kellwyn, both of British nationality. And very soon, when Parliament rises for the vacation and no questions will be asked, he will revert to piracy on the high seas and bomb Republican ports with impunity.

Meanwhile, in the Far East the Japanese are advancing on Hankow in all directions. They have occupied Wachang and Kiukiang, and are pressing up the Yang-tze. On the 13th their aeroplanes raided Hankow with a peculiar ferocity and left behind them 1,150 killed and wounded. On the other hand, the Chinese are also preparing to give battle. The civil offices are being removed to Cheng-Kung, troops poured into the Lunghai theatre and the defences of Hankow reinforced. Soviet advisers are busy drawing up plans. And the Government is negotiating for financial assistance from Britain. All sections behind the front are united in their resistance. On the 13th, the People’s Political Conference consisting of delegates from all parties and races met and unanimously supported the Government. China is in no mood to capitulate.

But the Japanese want a victory badly and soon. Their situation at home is daily growing desperate. The financiers wish to wind up the gamble in Central China and consolidate the conquests in the North; but the textile manufacturers demand the wiping out of British interests in the South. The elder statesmen view with alarm the steady worsening of Japan’s diplomatic and military position; but the peasants and the smaller landlords profit by the war and do not want their sons to come home and keep idle. So Japan’s dilemma is becoming increasingly acute. If the war continues, her strength would be sapped; if it is precipitately concluded, there would be an internal explosion. In any case, there would be chaos and revolution. Only a quick victory would save her ‘face’ and postpone a crisis. Some of her statesmen have talked lightly of a ten-year struggle; but already Japan has exported 800 million yen of her gold reserves for the purpose of purchasing raw materials, and the Government has proposed far-reaching administrative reforms and social legislation which would suppress all opposition.

The time is then opportune for the democratic Powers to act in concert and hasten the fall of Japan. The U. S. A. and Britain could impose an embargo on the export of oil and minerals, which would paralyse her striking power. Miss Freda Utley has shown in her recent book, Japan’s Gamble in China, that Britain and America could bring Japan to her knees by means of a mineral embargo and a boycott of her goods. But vested interests stand in the way of governmental action. The aeroplanes raiding Hankow are driven by British, American, and Dutch oil; the bullets massacring the Chinese are made of Canadian lead and Australian steel. In fact, the interested elements cynically support both Japan and China and profit by prolonging the struggle. British investments are pouring into Central and South China; a thin stream of armaments and financial assistance trickles through Hong Kong and Canton into Hankow. At the same time, the mining interests in the Dominions rake in huge profits through exports of war material to Japan. And so, for the sake of class interests Hankow will be razed to the ground and the war indefinitely continued.