Reviews

[We shall be glad to review books in all Indian languages and in English, French, and German. Books for Review should reach the office at least SIX WEEKS in advance of the day of publication of the Journal.]

The Bronzes of Nalanda and Hindu-Javanese Art.–By Dr. A. J. Bernet Kempers. [Publishers and Printers, Late E. J. Brill, Ltd., Leiden–1933. Price, $1.20.]

The subject of Hindu-Javanese Art is of absorbing interest to the modern historian and artist, for viewed from any stand-point its study tends but to increase every day our appreciation of the cultural interchange between the mainland and Further India which was promoted by commercial intercourse and periodical pilgrimages and visits of learned priests, not only between India and the Far East but also between the Indian Archipelago and Further India. While the process of evolution of "Hindu-Javanese Art" has not yet lent itself for precise determination as to its sources, we may at once say that the "Indian elements of Hindu-Javanese culture, however, were certainly not introduced exclusively by the first Hindus who settled in the Archipelago" and that "the Hindu Artin Java from which it must have arisen is only a hypothetical quantity, all monuments and sculptures known to us belonging to later times." Coming to later days when we know precisely about the various schools of art with which Hindu-Javanese Art ought to be compared, we know our ground. Thus the subject of this paper bears upon an important period in the history of Hindu-Javanese Art, viz., the period of Nalanda in Bihar whose monastery was "the centre of the Mahayanist world in the centuries preceding the downfall of Buddhism in India proper."

The importance of Nalanda, the "Mine of Learning" as it was well known, has been brought to the notice of the modern student by various publications, prominent among which are those of the Archeological Survey of the Government of India. There was a golden age for Nalanda (in the latter half of the 8th century and the first half of the ninth century A. D.), when it was included in the Pala empire of Bengal. The Pala kings such as Dharmapala (c. 800) and Devapala (c. 840) were patrons of its monastery; the later art of Nalanda can therefore be styled "Pala Art." In short Nalanda occupies a place in Hindu-Javanese history "as one of the most important centres from which Indonesia has received its Indian cultural elements." One of the essential constituents of Hindu-Javanese culture, viz., Mahayana Buddhism originates, from Nalanda. The author is justified in pursuing the subject under review in view of the consideration that Nalanda exercised a great influence on the religious life in the Malay Archipelago."

The relations between Nalanda monastery and the Archipelago have been proved to be continuous. We hear of teachers of renown from North India visiting Java. Such are for instance Dharmapala, Vijrabodhi, Amoghavarsha, and Atisa. The Chinese pilgrims such as I-tsing and others make prolonged stay in Srivijaya in Sumatra on their way to India and on their return voyages. Buddhists from Indonesia visited, as proved by the Nalanda copper plate of Devapaladeva, the sacred places in India and the famous monasteries, prominent among which was then "the Mine of Learning" at Nalanda.

The fact that all the Buddhist temples of Java are Mahayanist has led some writers to think that there must be in Javanese buildings also a "stylistic influence" of Nalanda and the art of the Pala empire. The striking resemblance between the Buddhist images of the Pala period and those of Java which has led people to the conclusion that "Java derived its Buddhism from Northern India" has also given occasion to the author of this brochure for some deep thinking and to raise the question if these figures are representative of Hindu-Javanese Art or if they occupy an exceptional position. His paper is but an attempt to answer this question of his. He confines himself to the bronze figures and starts on the Nalanda bronzes, about which he concludes that "while partly exhibiting a distinct resemblance to some bronzes from Java, they belong to Pala Art."

The characteristic features of Pala bronzes and their provenance are narrated succinctly. A discussion on bronzes in general (Chapter I) is followed by the actual subject matter which is divided into two sections; the Nalanda bronzes are described in the first section (Chapter II) under the head of ‘Iconography.’ The various divinities represented, such as the Buddhas, the Bodhisattvas, Avalokitesvara, Manjusri, Maitreya, Samantabhadra or Kshitigarbha, Vajrapani and others, Jambhala, Vishnu, Surya, Nagaraja, and the goddesses Tara, Bhrkuti, Prajnaparamita, Chunda, Vasudhara, Hariti, Sarasvati, Ganga and other Saktis, are discussed thoroughly, the whole discussion being made easy to follow as 40 of these divinities have been illustrated here. (These are spread over 22 plates of excellent get-up.) In the second section (Chapter III) iconographic and other details such as dress of the Bodhisattvas, ornaments, poses, halos, pedestals and ings of the images are described and compared with the corresponding details of Pala bronzes and those of Java.

The main conclusions of the author may be summarized as follows:

The Nalanda bronzes correspond completely to those of the Pala period in North-East India and "in many respects to the bronzes of Java, though the Nalanda images include some deities which are not found in Java." There were artistic affinities with the art of countries "that were culturally dependent on Magadha and Bengal." The Nalanda bronzes are purely Pala images while the Javanese ones which resemble them "either likewise belong to Pala art or at least have been influenced by it." As Pala influence on the evolution of Central Javanese Art is not apparent, the Pala and Pala-type bronzes in Hindu-Javanese art "have had a somewhat exceptional position." The term "stylistic Pala influence" that is applied so often to ancient Javanese bronzes can therefore only mean that the "Pala elements, once admitted into Hindu-Javanese Art, have developed according to the rules of their new sphere." In other words, the Hindu-Javanese bronzes in general do not owe their development to Pala art but "the Pala images have enriched the art of Java with a number of motifs and types." While the spread of Pala art outside India was "not inferior to that of the art of Gandhara and of the Gupta empire" its influence on Hindu-Javanese culture "is much more complicated," the part that it placed being "apparently much less important and in particular much less active than in "Nepal and Tibet.

This careful work (of 77 pages) of Dr. Kempers is indeed a valuable contribution to our knowledge of Hindu-Javanese Art which no student of art can do without. It has, we think, vindicated "the vigour and vitality of Hindu-Javanese Art" in a manner that does credit to the author's scholarship and analytical study. The letter-press and the excellent plates at the end are indeed a credit to the publishers and printers.

T. N. RAMACHANDRAN, M.A.

New Light on Fundamental Problems. –By Dr. T. V. Seshagiri Row, M.A., Ph.D. [Published by the Madras University, pp. 273. Price Rs. 3.]

The University of Madras has published in the form of this handsome volume the approved doctorate thesis of the learned author. According to the title-page, the book includes a section on the Nature and Function of Art, and is a "critical and constructive study of the problems of philosophy from the new point of view of Henri Bergson." The first three chapters of the book as well as parts of later chapters contain expositions and extracts of Bergson's work; these would no doubt constitute a useful part of the book. An uncomfortable feeling in the mind of the author that he might have been led away by excessive adulation of Bergson, is responsible for an apologetic sentence in the Introduction. Indeed the reader is very soon made aware that the author has been badly bitten by Bergson, and that his laboured criticism of the other schools of philosophy smack rather of the lawyer over-zealous of his clients' interests, than of the balanced philosophic critic who has all his wits about him. Even in his exposition of Bergson the author does not give the impression of having come to grips with the crucial problems at issue. As anything like a detailed criticism is out of the question within the limits of a review, we must confine ourselves to a few general remarks both about Bergson's fundamentals and about the author's production.

The present reviewer is one of those who believe that Bergson's work, though brilliant and suggestive, should not be taken too seriously as a philosophic basis, because it does not understand its own limitations, because what it mistakes for the real is only an aspect and a definable aspect of the real. To be lured by the brilliance of Bergson's scattered and incoherent ideas, into an attempt to erect a firm philosophic superstructure on them, is to head straight towards disaster.

To expose the weakness of Bergson's thought, let us ask Bergson the question: How do you know that the Real is a creative change or flux, and not a substratum which undergoes change? Bergson answers: By intuition. Intuition is thus the hinge on which Bergson's thought turns; he tries his best to describe its nature, but the resulting picture remains vague and unsatisfactory. According to Bergson the Intellect is inherently capable of understanding only the discrete; it can grasp the continuous only through the preliminary falsification of analysing it into static and discrete elements, and then synthesising these elements again into a whole. Knowledge through the Instinct (e.g., in the case of bees) is, on the other hand, true and concrete knowledge, as there is no distortion or falsification through the intrusion of the conceptual element. Intuition according to Bergson combines in itself the double essence of Intellect and Instinct, while free from the limitations of either separately.

Of course the doctrine that the Intellect (mati, in Sanskrit) is a practical organ, an instrument of life and not of knowledge proper, is a familiar one. It may be recognised in the Vedic name pranas (spurts of vital force) for the sense-organs, which indicates that sense-perception, together with the conceptual elements which it involves, is a product of the life-activity subserving its purposes. It is irrelevant to us that Bergson's view of the nature of Instinct and of its opposition to the Intellect is not accepted by modern psychologists. What matters is, that we can readily distinguish the feature of instinctive knowledge which has impressed Bergson, and is recognised by him as a characteristic of Intuition. This feature is the integrality and concreteness of the knowledge evidenced in instinctive behaviour. It seems as if the bee is aware at one stroke of the entire situation in which it finds itself, replete with all its component details in their mutual order and relations. This kind of knowledge is in complete contrast with canalised and externalised sense-experience, and the therewith associated intellectual knowledge, which has the form of a synthesis between the abstract and the concrete, the universal and the particular. The perception in instinctive knowledge is of the sort sometimes described as the unification of the pranas, and also as mind-perception, as opposed to sense-perception. In Yoga psychology the mind is the organ of sensation and perception, and contains in itself the activities which have become, canalised into the five senses. In mind perception the mind flows out and envelops the object, and by its intimate inward contact with it reveals its sense-form. According to the theory of perception advanced in Hindu Sastras, this happens to some extent even in ordinary sense-perception. The difference between sense-perception and mind-perception lies however in the fact that the former is subject to the limitations of the nervous medium, while the latter is not so subject, and is consequently less limited by the conditions of space and time. That Bergson is aware of these differences may be inferred from his saying in one place that the physical eye is intended not so much to see with, but to limit vision, and that similarly the brain is not intended to remember with, but to limit memory to what is relevant to the occasion. The disciplines of Dharana, Dhyana, and Samadhi in Raja Yoga are intended to bring about not only this direct perception by the mind, but in addition to destroy ultimately the vritti of triplicity in the form of knowledge.

While this mind-perception is the most striking feature of Intuition as explained by Bergson, and constitutes its affinity with Instinct, the nature of its affinity with the Intellect is not made equally clear. Intuition is identified with a certain intellectual sympathy by which the mind is placed within the object, so that it is not opposed to the Intellect, but a refined development thereof in which conceptuation is fluid and concrete. This suggests that Intuition is the vehicle of a sovereign power of knowledge, which is akin to, but vaster in scope and subtler in apprehension than the Intellect, and which is instrumented by the more intimate mind-perception we have described. Theosophists and other thinkers have accordingly identified Bergson's Intuition with Buddhi, which is known to be identical with the Mahat (and also the Antarakshan, or the middle of the three worlds) of the Veda, and also with the cosmic consciousness’ of modern times. It is, of courseobvious that Bergson's Intuition cannot be a new discovery, but must have been experienced and docketed before. The Vedic theory of Lokas is the most ancient and the most authoritative of all analyses of coherent human experience, and a placing of Intuition in such a complete scheme would seem to be essential for understanding Bergson. There is no reason, so far as I know, to question the validity of this identification.

Returning now to our earlier query about the nature of the Real, the first question which arises is: Is this Intuition part of this flux which endures? Bergson with his insufficient familiarity with Intuition has not squarely faced this question. But our author in his section on Art has valiantly stepped into the breach, and asserted that Intuition also grows and evolves creatively. To know that the Real is a flux, we require according to Bergson the instrument of an Intuition; is it a second sort of intuition that makes us know that the first intuition is itself part of the flux? Or, is it that Bergson's Intuition is itself a quality of the elan vital, so that the flux is self-knowing? This possibility is, however, ruled out in Bergson's theory on account of the real antithesis between the Life-force and knowledge–an antithesis which Bergson has repeatedly stressed. According to Bergson the intellect and senses are primarily organs of practical and interested activity subserving the purposes of the Life-force, and only secondarily and to an inferior extent instruments of knowledge; indeed in them Mind has become involved in Life, and it is only in Intuition that Mind has disentangled itself and attained to an independent status, from which it can look on Life disinterestedly, ceasing to be its servant, and see it not as Being but as Flux which endures. It is clearly impossible in this view to identify Intuition with the elan vital. Whatever Intuition is, it is certainly not the elan vital or one of its qualities. If at this point we compare notes with the theories and recorded experiences of Hindu thought, the suggestion is irresistible that the Intuition is the higher term of the Real, that Intuition is the Being which serves as the support and continent of the Life-flux. Looking now on Bergson’s explanation of Intuition, one recognises that the affinity of Intuition with Intellect (which would have led to the recognition of Intuition as the higher term of the Real) is that which is not well understood or explained by Bergson, while its affinity with Instinct in the matter of mind-perception is exploited thoroughly on account of its more sensational character. It would seem indeed that Bergson was so taken up with exhibiting Intellect as a falsifying practical organ, that he failed to isolate that element of higher value in it which linked it with Intuition. By the colossal obtuseness of neglecting to investigate the nature of Intuition and its relation to the Life-flux which it reveals, Bergson has been led to mistake the elan vital for the ultimate real. The lameness ofhis position is seen from his failure to face squarely the problem of knowledge (intellectual or intuitional) which is the very crux of the problem of the real; this failure cannot be compensated for by his dazzling pictorial descriptions of the flux. A similar lameness besets, and for the same reason, his treatment of the problem of Freedom.

The author's criticisms of other philosophers appear to be superficial and to indicate a cruder plane of thought than the doctrines criticised. Very often the author means by ‘criticism of a doctrine,’ the bare assertion of the opposite doctrine. For example in Croce's theory, Expression is the essence of Art, where ‘expression’ refers to the form and details of the content of the original aesthetic experience which is the seed and the impetus of the work of art. Croce considers this original experience to be the complete work of art in itself, and holds that its outward manifestation through some medium–the work of art usually so called–is simply a later elaboration of the original experience for practical purposes. As against this, our author claims that the aesthetic intuition itself evolves creatively. To this the expressionists will point out that the growth and evolution relate to the technique and mastery of the medium, but not to the original intuitional impetus which remains as it was. That successful aesthetic creation does depend on reseizing an original intuition is seen in the case of Kubla Khan. Coleridge composed this poem by reliving a dream-experience, but could not complete the poem after he was disturbed, because he could no longer remember. Surely it could not be significantly claimed in this case that Coleridge's dream-intuition grew and evolved creatively, as he wrote down the fragment. On the other hand, the original dream-experience was infinitely richer and more beautiful than what the fragment could indicate, and (if we are to believe Bergson's theory of memory) continued to remain a part of Coleridge's spirit that never achieved external manifestation. I have merely cited this point to show that the author is not in the habit of anticipating obvious objections to his statements, or advancing plausibility considerations to support his views.

DR. R. VAIDYANATHASWAMY, M.A., Ph.D.

GUJARATI

Sansar Viplav.–By Keshav H. Sheth. [Published by the Gunasundari Karyalaya, Bombay. pp. 186. Price. Re 1.]

A novel illustrating the present changing time bordering on revolution, written in Mr. Sheth's characteristically racy and graghic style,–this is what the book is. It incidentally contains a stirring call to India’s women to bestir themselves and take a hand in the task of regenerating their country. The book is bound to appeal to all who read it.

Jivan manthi Jadev.–Parts I And II. By Mrs. Lilavati Munshi. [Published by Jivanlal A. Mehta, Ahmedabad. pp. 230 and 136. Price Re. 1-8.)

Mrs. Munshi is well known as a gifted writer of Gujarati, and this set of seven stories published when she was serving her sentence in the Belgaum prison for the second time (in 1932) for civil disobedience, maintains her reputation fully. The stories are concerned with various phases of life and betray the intimate knowledge she possesses of human nature, which she portrays very well. At times one comes across biting sarcasm which, without being bitter, successfully conveys the lesson meant to be conveyed. It was necessary to collect these stories in one place, and we are glad that has been done.

K. M. J.

TELUGU

Hindu View of Life.–By Sir S. Radhakrishnan. [Translated by K. Hanumantha Rao and published by the East and West Series, Rajahmundry. Price Re. 1-4.]

This is a Telugu version of the Upton lectures of Dr. Radhakrishnan, delivered at Oxford some seven years ago. Though primarily intended for his Western audiences, there is much in them that the average Hindu can learn with profit. In the present circumstances, most of the educated Hindus have either forgotten or have peculiar notions of the fundamentals of Hindu life. It is, therefore, of supreme importance that a full and consistent vision of Hindu life and thought should be presented to all classes of our countrymen. The last two lectures of the learned Doctor amply fulfill this purpose. The relatiohship between God and the Universe, the law of Karma, the purusharthas, the four ashramas, have all been elucidated with reference to texts as well as experience. His noble discourse on Marriage is particularly valuable in these days when all sorts of ideas regarding the relation between man and woman are finding their way into the popular mind. In one full lecture he explains and defends the nature of the caste-system, without prejudice to the present-day efforts to remove the more egregious aspects of our social evolution. In the first two lectures the various forms of Hindu worship and the broad reconciliation of the different schools of religion are clearly set forth. One striking claim the author makes for the Vedas is that they are Religion itself and not merely the sacred texts of one particular faith. But the world is yet far from accepting that position.

The translation has been rendered with great care; but effort is stamped on every page and the turns of expression are more Anglican than Andhra. It is hoped that in future productions of this kind the translator will adopt a native and felicitous style.

G. V. SUBRAHMANYAM

TAMIL

Sreedharan.–(A Tamil Novel) By Mrs. N. Swaminathan. [Price Re. 1.]

The novel aims at education of Indian women, with a conventional plot. Its incidents, not unreal, lack coherence; they trace, and trace faintly characters, but do not shape them. When she is preachy the authoress shows a very articulate mind, and we have no doubt of her sincerity. The Tamil style is simple, is freely sprinkled with Tamilised English words, which by their constant and indiscriminate use in Hindu households have become a part of the language. Sreedharan is a story for the juveniles.

M.S.I.