2. The Concept of Space (Dik) in the Vakyapadiya

Bharthari holds space to be a Power or a Force (Sakti) along with time.¹ By Sakti he means something dependent, i.e. something which abides in its substratum and has no existence independently of it. Space cannot be a substance, as held by the Vaisesika, for it is a Sakti which is to be inferred from its effect of helping things hold together. Such a Sakti cannot be expressed by a single word or phrase and has to be defined. The required definition Bhartrhari gives us in Karikas 2 and 3 of the Dik-samuddesa². Dik is a Sakti which is the cause of differentiation (vyatireka) between a limit and an object sought to be limited by it, which again is the cause of the notion of straightness without reference to any other thing and which presents the lower species of motions such as rotatory, horizontal, etc. This Sakti, though one, is diversified by its limiting adjuncts. As explained by Helaraja, the relation between two things, one being prior and another posterior to it, is an adventitious quality produced in them, which certainly is no part of their nature; for that is incapable of producing it; it must, therefore, have another cause, and that cause is Dik (space). If it be urged that this (new) relation may be the effect of a universal, etc., we say no, for we are not conscious of our notion of it being coloured by a universal, etc. By the process of elimination, therefore, it is Dik that is the cause of it and nothing else. Hence the Vaisesikas say: "The characteristic of Dik is that it is from or on account of it that there arises the fact that this thing is here or there from this other thing."³ Since CC-0. Prof. Satya Vrat Shastri Collection, New Delhi. Dig Dik is knowable only by

Concept of Space (Dik) in the Vakyapadiya 69 inference and is understood as a qualification of things, it cannot be an independent substance. Dik is not perceptible like substances such as earth. Though Dik is one, yet by virtue of its limiting adjuncts, it appears as many and is spoken of as ten. It is the conjunction of the sun with a particular part of the horizon that is the cause of our notion of the east, the west, etc. Now if an accessory cause such as conjunction with the sun is to be accepted to explain our notion of the east or west, etc., why not dispense with Dik altogether, asks the objector? The reply is that the conjunction is not by itself either prior or posterior, which relation is admittedly a product of Dik. Nor can it be advanced that time can be that effective cause in place of Dik, for it is also equally the cause of the notion of the relation of mutual priority and posteriority. Because, these notions produced by time and space belong to two different spheres, this necessitates the assumption of these two distinct entities. The relation of priority and posteriority between finite bodies (corporeal things) is caused by space and that between the parts of an action, or between two actions having two different substrata, in the form of succession, is caused by time. This is set forth in Karika III. 6.4.4 As explained by Helaraja, our notions of prior and posterior in respect of finite things arise from their conjunction with a place which is prior or posterior, but a place owes this priority or posteriority to space (Dik). Not only that. Dik (space) is also the cause of the hypothetical relation of priority and posteriority between infinite things on the one hand, and finite things on the other. Hence there is no escape from it. Now Akasa is one, but this one Akasa comes to be differentiated by objects in association with it. Thus conditioned, it has various conjunctions and disjunctions with the parts of finite substances. It is space itself qualified as prior or posterior, east or west that functions to relate the assumed parts of the Akasa. Thus a group of stars conjoined with prior Akasa is termed prior, and another conjoined with posterior Akasa is termed posterior. All this is beautifully expressed in Karika III.6.5.5

Now an objector makes an attempt. He urges that the assumption that space possesses purvatva and paratva as parts of its nature involves the fault technically called anavastha and asks if space can have such parts as intrinsic or integral to it. He also asks what is wrong with the places that they are incapable of having such parts? This is answered in Karika III.6.6.6 That a place is a container or a receptacle is its own nature, it is not dependent upon the power of something else; but priority or posteriority is no part of its nature. When a place comes to have this adventitious quality, it must be due to a cause outside it and that cause is space. But in the case of space, priority or posteriority is not dependent upon anything else, it is a part of its nature. And space, being infinite, cannot assume the character of a receptable in addition to its quality of purvaparatva, for which it would require a cause. But space must be a principle such as is inferable from its effect, priority or posteriority, viz., it must be of the nature of priority and posteriority. This is cryptically put down in the first half of the Karika: diso vyavastha desanam digvyavastha na vidyate. Every thing has its own unique nature; hence space cannot be both a receptacle and have the nature of priority and posteriority. Things come to have varied or complex nature only under the influence of other things in relation with them. And, if a substance were assumed to possess a variety of Saktis, it would work independently of accessory causes and might produce all sorts of effects. Bhartrhari once again emphasizes that Dik is a Power (Sakti) and that priority and posteriority form its very nature. It is the condition of the priority and posteriority in places; but priority and posteriority are its own inherent qualities which are not due to any other external object. The Dik which gives the notion of priority is prior. If it were otherwise, Dik would be an empty name, not signifying any real thing. To Bhartrhari, as to the Vaisesika, Dik is vibhu, all-pervading; for it operates everywhere: the quality of priority or posteriority is produced by it in all things without exception. This is what is meant by vibhutva, all-pervasiveness, declares Bhartrhari.8

Concept of Space (Dik) in the Vakyapadiya How do we know that space exists? 71 The definition of space (Dik) given above implies that we derive our knowledge of it from inference. Now, what is the basis of this inference? In other words, what constitutes the logical ground (linga) for this inference? A summit of a mountain is aglow with sunshine, while another is covered by thick shade. This division of the mountain into parts, characterized by sunshine and shade, would not be possible, if there were no space. For in the absence of space, there would be no prior or posterior limit which alone is the cause of the notion of the plurality of parts. The division into parts (to have been due to relation with Dik) is surely the evidence of the existence of Dik.9 It might perhaps be urged that so far as corporeal bodies are concerned, there is little necessity of postulating an independent entity like Dik to account for the notion of the diversity of parts, because that diversity can become the object of our consciousness by virtue of the conjunction of those bodies, say, with shade, sunshine, etc. To this we reply 'No'. It is wrongly assumed here that corporeal bodies are directly in conjunction with shade or sunshine. The fact is that it is their component parts that are directly conjoined with sunshine or shade. For instance, the rays of the sun that fall on one side of a jar are in contact only with the potsherds of that particular side; and on the other side, the potsherds alone are in conjunction with the shade. This means that the jar is neither in conjunction with the shade nor with the sunshine. If, however, it be said that the whole, the substance, having the same locus with, and thus present in the parts is in contact with the shade, etc., we point out that in that event the whole, being in contact with the shade, etc., will cease to have the same locus with its parts-a contingency highly undesirable. Moreover, it is an indirect admission that it is parts only that are directly in conjunction with the shade, etc. Hence Dik has to be assumed to account for the notions of priority, posteriority, lowness, highness, etc., in all corporeal things. There is also another logical necessity for the assumption of Dik. All produced things are ultimately the product of atoms. The

atoms are believed to be without parts. Production of various things-means combination of atoms. But how do they combine and how does the minimal gross magnitude (visible to the naked eye) arise from the combination of atoms which are the limits of minuteness? As a rule a magnitude is capable of giving rise only to a superior magnitude of the same order. Thus the gross magnitude of two bodies is invariably found to be the cause of a grosser magnitude in the body which they produce by their combination. Hence the magnitude of a dyad (dvyanuka) should be minuter than that of either of the constituent atoms. The Vaisesika, however, denies causal efficiency to atomic magnitude and hence rules out a minuter magnitude resulting in the effect. Bhartrhari has his own answer. He affirms that atoms, though themselves without parts, come to have four sides and the lower and upper surfaces by virtue of association with Dik (space). Thus when six atoms combine, they have each a side for conjunction. This explains the resultant gross magnitude. Yet, however, unless Dik is assumed, it would not be possible to account for the development of a gross magnitude from the atomic magnitude of the constituents. Dik has, therefore, to be assumed as the very first cause of the ascription of parts to the primary material cause of production, viz., the atoms.10 The necessity of the assumption of Dik has been challenged on yet another ground. It is urged that things emerge (come into existence) possessed of a particular structural arrangement of parts, how then does Dik help to give them a form? To this Bhartrhari gives a reply in Karika III. 6.14.11 Says he: Things are in their nature devoid of locus (desa), parts (bhaga), succession (krama) and the colouring by conditions (upasraya); it is only on account of their association with other things that they vary. Infinite things such as akasa have no locus. (or locality), for they are all-pervading. Similarly with finite things, for how could such an external thing as a place or room form part of their nature? Both these categories of things are only assumed to be in conjunction with places or to inhere in them. Things are in their nature devoid of parts which are distinct from them, and which

Concept of Space (Dik) in the Vakyapadiya 73 are assumed to be related to them. And if things have no real parts, they are free from succession, for that is grounded on difference. Again, in their own nature, they are not subject to the colouring by limiting adjuncts. But it is association with other things that seems to change their nature, which really remains unaffected. Thus of a number of things lying in the same direction, say, the west, one particular thing may be positionally lower. Now, this notion is entirely due to Dik. Again, the parts of a whole stand undistinguished on account of the quality of inherence. But we have a notion of its parts. This notion, too, is produced by Dik. If, indeed, things are really without parts, how is it that an object like a jar presents itself to us as a whole apparently made up of parts and possessing sensible magnitude? To this Bharthari's reply is that, as a matter of fact, the whole being quite distinct from its component parts a jar as well as an atom is devoid of parts. It is under the influence of the power called Dik that the component parts develop positional relation of priority and posteriority and become non-distinguishable from the whole by virtue of the quality of inherence. If a whole were in its very nature possessed of parts, it would not be one, but many. And we are here not concerned with secondary divisibility, for that could well be predicated even of an atom. As for magnitude itself, which is minute in the case of an atom and gross (sensible) in the case of a jar, it is also different from the thing produced. Dimension is a specific Force which is the cause of our notions of the gross and atomic magnitudes. Hence what differentiates a jar from an atom is the difference in dimension.12 Again, if wholes are really different from their component parts, and if a qualification supplied by a limiting adjunct is no inherent part of their nature, all things would become undefinable and indistinguishable. They would, like Brahman, be internally non-differentiable (svagatabhedasunya). To this Bhartrhari says: we agree. This is the real nature of things. All this difference is apparent, it is empirical, a product of avidya. It has become, as were, a part of the nature of things and cannot be denied. Yet it

it cannot be maintained that it is real. As already observed, the wholes are different from their parts. But the parts must be different from their parts, and these other again from their parts, so on and so forth, till we come to the atom. To the atom too, space imparts parts or sides, for how else is the undifferentiated atom to produce diversity? Space, too, is differentiated by conjunction with the sun. The conjunctions of the sun are also differentiated by the different parts of the Meru mountain; and these parts by their own, and these again by their parts, till we come back to space. This difference is like a movement in a circle and stops nowhere. There is anavastha. All this difference, therefore, lacks proof and must be held to be apparent only. Not only are things not differentiated in themselves, they are not differentiated even by the limiting adjuncts, for they must themselves be differentiated by other limiting adjuncts, and those others by still others, and so on and so forth, the differentiation stopping nowhere. The limiting adjuncts, too, therefore, are quite incapable of differentiating the nature of things. 13 Now Bhartrhari declares emphatically that he would be a bold man indeed who would deny the empirical existence of both time and space. All our experience is determined by priority or posteriority. The notion of priority and posteriority has become so inextricably woven into our consciousness of things that it has become vital to our very being. We are as much convinced that time and space exist as our own consciousness (Intelligence) which is no other than the self; and the self is recognized by all controversialists. Since both time and space are objects of experience, there is little sense in discarding them.14 And if time and space are discarded, what will be there to regulate our conduct, secular and religious? Sastraic injunctions, with a seen or unseen purpose, such as 'one should face the east when dining, one should perform the Sraddha ceremony in the afternoon,' could not be faithfully carried out in the absence of both time and space. For, in their absence, there would be nothing to cause the notion of priority and posteriority in things and action. Although this world is devoid of succession, there being

Concept of Space (Dik) in the Vakyapadiya 75 nothing prior or posterior positionally or chronologically, yet the enlightened person to whom the falsity of this world of phenomena has become manifest, accepts this world and while he rejects time and space on the basis of reason, does accept them both in practice; for there is no escape from the notion of priority and posteriority generated by them.15 The Advaitin's View As is usual with Bhartrhari, he concludes his treatise on space with the statement of the Advaitin's view of it. According to this view, Dik (space) does not exist externally. It is the externalization of the Inner Consciousness under the influence of Avidya without a beginning, an outward manifestation of that One Principle in various forms which have no real existence. 16 Bhartrhari repeats the idea when he says: The heaven, the earth, the wind, the sun, the oceans, the rivers and the quarters are all parts of the internal organ, which had manifested them in so many external forms. 17 This Appearance is, therefore, independent of any real external existence. Priority and posteriority too are the product of Nescience. Things are said to be internal and external; but as a matter of fact, there is no such difference. The so-called difference does not go beyond words, it does not touch the nature of things. Proceeding further, Bhartrhari discusses the question whether space is one or many. He says that neither assumption brings us any the nearer to the truth. The assumption that space is fundamentally one, being only diversified by the various limiting conditions, is as false as the one that space is primarily many as inferred from its effects. Anyway, human activity goes on unhampered. Things are not in their essence as they are represented to us by various thinkers; surely they could not have the conflicting characteristics attributed to them by the different schools of thought. Their true nature transcends the various views held of them.18 Now, Bhartrhari argues why oneness or manyness cannot be space, and, for the matter of that, of any thing. There is the dictum that of two interdependent things, if the one cannot true of

be proved, the other too becomes automatically unproved; hence the oneness or manyness of space is incapable of proof. We in this world go by our experience, take things as they appear to us. In the ultimate analysis, even such contraries as difference and non-difference do not exist. The one without a second is the only truth. Moreover, space has been defined here as a power, which is the condition of other things. And a power cannot be said to be one or many. 19 Manyness is doubtless predicable of things possessed of power; but a power cannot be differentiated, dependent as it is on a substratum, even when they, the substrata, are many. Nor the oneness such as experienced in a jar is part of the nature of a power.20 And there is further reason why oneness or manyness in respect of a power like space is unprovable. The concept of oneness must necessarily involve the concept of its opposite, viz., manyness. It cannot stand alone. It is unthinkable without its counterpart. Similarly, manyness, dependent upon its oppositeoneness, is unthinkable; independently of the latter. Hence, neither oneness nor manyness can be exclusively predicated of space. It . is, therefore, neither one nor many. REFERENCES 1. dik sadhanam kriya kala iti vastvabhidhayinahi saktirupe padarthanam atyantam anavasthitahll III. 6.1. 2. vyatirekasya yo hetur avadhipratipadyayohi rjv ity eva yato 'nyena vina buddhih pravartatell karmano jatibhedanam abhivyaktir yadasrayal sa svair upadhibhir bhinna saktir dig iti kathyatell III. 6.2-3. 3. ita idam iti yatas taddiso lingamll Vai. su. II. 2.10. 4. paraparatve murtanam desabhedanibandhanel tata eva prakalpyete kramarupe tu kalatahll It. It may be noted that the Text of the Vakyapadiya and of the Helarajiya (the Commentary thereon) is generally corrupt but at places so horribly spoilt by the unintelligent scribe that it is a challenge to the most learned among scholars. Even the most ingenious fail to hit upon the correct reading. The confusion is

Concept of Space (Dik) in the Vakyapadiya 77 indeed baffling. In the above Karika, we have changed the original reading kramarupe na kalpatah to kramarupe tu kalatah, for that alone makes sense, and has, besides, the support of Helaraja who remarks: purvam abhud bhavisyati param iti tu kriyapaurvaparyam kalasaktikrtapratibandhabhyanujnavasad vyavatisthata iti. 5. akasasya pradesena bhagais canyaih prthak prthaki sa samyogavibhaganam upadhitvaya kalpatell 6. diso vyavastha desanam digvyavastha na vidyatel saktayah khalu bhavanam upakaraprabhavitah| 7. pratyastarupa bhavesu dik purvety abhidhiyatel purvabuddhir yato dik sa samakhyamatram anyathall III. 6.7. 8. sarvatra tasya karyasya darsanad vibhur isyatel vibhutvam etad evahur anyah karyavatam vidhihll III. 6.17. 9. chayabhabhyam nagadinam bhagabhedah prakalpatel ataddharmasvabhavesu bhagabhedo na kalpatell III.6.12. 10. paramanor abhagasya disa bhago vidhiyatel bhagaprakalpanasaktim prathamam tam pracaksatell III. 6.13. 11. adesas capy abhagas ca niskrama nirupasrayahi bhavah samsargirupat tu saktibhedah prakalpatell 12. nirbhagatmaka tulya paramanor ghatasya call bhagah saktyantaram tatra parimanam ca yat tayohll III. 6.15. 13. yatah prakalpyate bhedo' bhedas tatrapi drsyatel adrstoparatim bhedam ato' yuktataram viduhll III. 6.16. 14. caitanyavat sthita loke dikkalaparikalpana prakrtim praninam tam hi ko'nyatha sthapayisyatill III. 6.18. 15. sankaro vyavaharanam prakrteh syad viparyayel tasmat tyajann iman bhavan punar evavalambatell III. 6.19. 16. antahkaranadharmo va bahir evam prakasatel asyam tv antarbahirbhavah prakriyayam na vidyatell III. 6.23. 17. dyauh ksama vayur adityah sagarah sarito disah antahkaranatattvasya bhaga bahir avasthitah|| III. 7.41. 18. ekatvam asam saktinam nanatvam veti kalpanel avastupatite jnatva satyato na paramrsetll III. 6.24. 19. naikatvam asti nanatvam vinaikatvena netarahi paramarthe tayor esa bhedo 'tyantam na vidyatell III. 6.26. 20. na saktinam tatha bhedo yatha saktimatam sthitih! na ca laukikam ekatvam tasam atmasu vidyatell III. 6.27.