Vaisesika Doctrines (in the Nyaya Works)

by Diptasree Som | 2010 | 25,594 words

This essay studies the Vaisesika Doctrines in the Nyaya Works.—Both part of the system of Indian philosophy, Nyaya and Vaisesika are accepted to be friendly to each other. Many standpoints are advocated by both systems. For example, both Nyaya and Vaisesika strongly argue that all the three terms (viz., buddhi, upalabdhi and jnana) are synonymous, ...

Chapter 5 - Conclusion

From the above survey it is clear that the Nyaya system was closely allied to the Vaisesika system. As we have already pointed out, originally they started as separate systems. The earliest work on the basis of which the Nyaya system is supposed to develop through the ages, through commentaries and sub-commentaries on it, is Gautama’s Nyayasutra. On the other hand, the basic and primary text of the Vaisesika is generally accepted to be the Vaisesikasutra of Kanada, and the development of the system consists in explaining and elaborating the views set forth there. But we have also noted that finally the two systems became very close to form almost a single system. The tendency started at about the tenth century A.D. led by Udayana who was a master of both the systems and also wrote extensively on both. Later almost all the works belong to this composite school. It appears that the bulk of Nyaya literature is somewhat greater than that of the Vaisesika. Actually pure Vaisesika scholars are hard to find and the development of the Vaisesika is mostly done by authors who may be said to belong to Nyaya more. In the above survey we have not naturally taken into consideration all the Nyaya works containing Vaisesika doctrines. However, we have utilized all the important and representative works which sufficiently establish our view.

It has also been pointed out that there was a basic difference between Nyaya and Vaisesika as regards the pramanas and the prameyas. Nyaya accepts four pramanas and sixteen prameyas, while in the case of the Vaisesika the numbers are respectively two and six (or seven). When the two systems combine into one, it accepts the Nyaya theory in respect of the pramanas and the Vaisesika one in respect of the prameyas.

The last two pramanas of the Nyaya, namely, upamana and sabda are not accepted as distinct forms by the Vaisesika. It is argued that knowledge claimed to be produced by these two can actually be produced by inference, i.e. these two are to be included in inference. Arguments for and against such a position have been offered by the Nyaya and the Vaisesika. It may be noted that upamana is also not accepted by the Sankhya and the Bauddha.

In his commentary on the Sankhyakarika, Vacaspati has explained why upamana is not to be accepted as a separate pramana. He analyses the different steps involved in upamana and argues that it may be included in verbal testimony, inference and even perception. The Vaisesika however considers it only as a kind of inference. As we have already discussed, in both the Nyayakusumanjali and the Kiranavali Udayana has explained how the inference can be formulated. However, in the earliest source dealing with such problems, the Prasastapadabhasya, it is clearly stated that upamana is nothing but verbal testimony. But commentators point out that since verbal testimony also is included in inference, upamana ultimately becomes included in the same.

It is an accepted fact that in the combined Nyaya-Vaisesika school the Vaisesika view was accepted in full so far as the prameyas, objects of valid knowledge, are concerned. We may try to explain the fact by referring to the character of the Nyayasutra. Gautama also has used the term prameya, though in a technical sense and includes twelve specific objects. In the list we find an assortment of certain objects and it is not clear whether any principle is involved or not. Commentators explain that Gautama’s primary aim is to show how liberation can be attained and hence he mentions there only such objects the right knowledge of which can lead to it. There may be other objects of valid knowledge, but as their knowledge is not conducive to liberation they are not included in the list. However, it may be pointed out that in the first sutra Gautama gives a list of sixteen padarthas and clearly states that their right knowledge leads to the final good. There is no explanation for the fact why later only a few of them should be considered more important.

Actually speaking, if we closely look at the list of Gautama in the first sutra we find that the categories mentioned there can hardly be called padarthas. These are rather some specific topics of discussion. Gautama states at the beginning the subject-matter of his work, the things he is going to discuss. He has to refer to liberation, because the aim of every philosophical system is to provide freedom from sufferings.

Thus, for example, different views have been held as regards the actual nature and contents of the Nyayasutra. We find that in this work debate has been given a very important place. The list of categories includes three distinct forms of debate, known as vada, jalpa and vitanda. There are also mentioned many topics which are closely connected with debates. We have avayava or inference-component, the most useful instrument for one engaged in a debate. Fallacies of inference also are explained. Some other techniques which may be used to silence an opponent, such as, chala, jati etc. are also included. In fact, the second ahnika of the first chapter and the whole of the fifth chapter discuss different forms of debate and the topics directly or indirectly connected with them. This has led many noted scholars of Indian philosophy to suggest that originally the Nyaya represents the science of debate.

Other scholars, after analyzing the contents of the Nyayasutra come to the conclusion that in this work at least two different sciences have been mixed up. One is a work on logic or rather the science of reasoning and the other is a work of a system of philosophy. As if this work is not a single one but a collection of so many small treatises on different allied topics.

Indeed, the list contains different subjects which belong to different branches of a philosophical system, such as, epistemology, logic, metaphysics, ethics and so on. In the Vaisesika classification and enumeration we find, on the other hand, an attempt to explain logically the things of the physical world. All the existing things can be included in these categories. The approach of the Vaisesika is logical and scientific. There are definite principles involved in the whole discussion and there is effort to justify the positions offered. In a sense, the Vaisesika provides us with the rudiments of ancient Indian physics. Most probably therefore the Vaisesika view on prameya appealed much to the logical mind of the Naiyayikas and ultimately they accepted it as their own in preference to the older position.

Though from different sources and references it is clear that the literature on Vaisesika proper is not as little as it appears to be, still it is unfortunate that most of them are lost. We have already noted that no early commentary on the Vaisesikasutra itself is available. It can even be said that there is no authentic version of the work. There are so many editions of the work, but they differ widely among themselves as regards the readings, order and number of the sutras. Somehow the study of Vaisesika declined and gradually scholars of Nyaya took up the task of developing and defending the system. Of course, in many respects they could not give up their allegiance to the original system, i.e. Nyaya and thus, for example, they defended strongly the four-fold classification of the pramanas. In any case there is little doubt that the latest developments of the Vaisesika owe their origin to the commentators of the Nyaya.

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: