Vaisesika Doctrines (in the Nyaya Works)

by Diptasree Som | 2010 | 25,594 words

This essay studies the Vaisesika Doctrines in the Nyaya Works.—Both part of the system of Indian philosophy, Nyaya and Vaisesika are accepted to be friendly to each other. Many standpoints are advocated by both systems. For example, both Nyaya and Vaisesika strongly argue that all the three terms (viz., buddhi, upalabdhi and jnana) are synonymous, ...

Chapter 4 - Treatment of the Vaisesika in Navyanyaya

Navyanyaya may be said to represent the culmination of Nyaya-Vaisesika logic and philosophy. In this new school of Nyaya, as it is well-known, the philosophers develop almost a new language to discuss everything. This school is well-known for its subtle, critical and deep analysis of the different problems of metaphysics, epistemology etc. Gangesa Upadhyaya of Mithila is generally accepted as the founder of this school. It is true that he also had some predecessors in this field and a few of them had actually been named by him. Still, he is definitely the most prominent and important philosopher of this school and surpasses all others in popularity and depth. His only work, the Tattvacintamani is considered an epoch-making work and subsequently, Navyanyaya has developed through the hundreds of commentaries, sub-commentaries, critical notes, dissertations etc. on this single work.

We have already noted that from Udayana onwards the Nyaya and the Vaisesika come closer and closer and finally combine into almost a single system. But Nyaya maintains its original position by strictly adhering to the view that pramanas are four in number, neither more nor less. But so far as prameyas are concerned the Vaisesika view is accepted in its totality. It is said generally that Gautama speaks of sixteen padarthas[1], but in Kanada’s work we find admitted only six padarthas.[2] The principles of classification are obviously different, though it may be said that in the case of the Vaisesika it is more logical and scientific. In later Vaisesika works abhava is definitely accepted and discussed as a separate padartha. It is however not mentioned by Kanada or Prasastapada. The explanation for this omission which is generally offered is that abhava can never be known without reference to bhava i.e. the six padarthas. The very conception of abhava is vitally dependent upon any of the six padarthas like dravya etc. That is why abhava in spite of being a padartha is not mentioned separately.[3]

With this brief introduction let us try to see briefly how the Vaisesika is treated in Navyanyaya works. In a very general way we may say that Vaisesika metaphysics is wholly accepted in this school. The credit of developing the Vaisesika further and further, deeper and deeper, and introducing new concepts and arguments certainly goes to the authors of this school.

Specially in the first section of Gangesa’s Tattvacintamani, the section on perception, the author has strongly defended a few of the most important Vaisesika theories. Though this work may be said to be primarily concerned with epistemology, still on various occasions the nature of padarthas is discussed in detail in the novel style of Navyanyaya. We may note here some of them.

The earliest author to specify by name the six sense-object contacts which produce perception is Uddyotakara.[4] This list of contacts is accepted by all later authors and Gangesa also is no exception.[5] According to the specification, the sense-object contact for the perception of sound is inherence (samavaya). But here a basic question may arise: Is samavaya to be really admitted as a separate padartha? If there is no ground to prove its existence, then, how can it be presented as a contact? Of course, arguments for admitting it have been offered and explained in the early Vaisesika works. But Gangesa presents the whole thing—the view of the opponent and its refutation—in a novel manner of his own.[6]

According to the Nyaya, inherence may be perceptible also. In case both of the things related by inherence are perceptible, the relation also is accepted to be perceptible. If however the relata are not so, then the relation is to be known by inference. But the Vaisesika holds a different position and says that inherence is never perceptible, it is always to be known by inference. Gangesa formulates an inference for proving the reality of samavaya in Navyanyaya terminology.[7] This inference is accepted by all later authors and is mentioned in their works.[8] In this connection Gangesa also notes a few other inferences which were offered by others to prove the same. However, he does not find any of them satisfactory. Before offering this inferential proof he also presents the objections raised against the admission of inherence.

Gangesa also specially notes and rejects the view that if his argument for inherence is accepted, then, one would have to accept further a special kind of relation, namely, vaisistya to explain the perception of abhava and a qualificative cognition involving it. The Mimamsakas accept identity (tadatmya) or identity-cum-difference (bhedabheda) between a quality and its substratum. In that case it becomes unnecessary to admit inherence to justify a qualificative cognition involving quality etc. This goes against the Vaisesika view and accordingly Gangesa refutes it. Another typical conclusion of the Vaisesika is that, though inherence is a relation, like conjunction, it is not different even if the relata are different, it is always one and the same. But such a position may lead to an absurdity. Gangesa notes it and also answers the objection. Finally, he clearly shows how inherence can be accepted as a sense-object contact. In short, it may be said that the category of samavaya is discussed here in almost every detail.

In another small sub-section which may be said to be closely related with the section on sense-object contacts, Gangesa discusses some special conditions of perceptibility.[9] That the most vital condition for the perception of the object is the contact is indisputable. But some other conditions also are necessary for it, such as a contact between the object and light (aloka), great magnitude (mahattva) and manifest colour (udbhuta-rupa). Gangesa explains why these are also necessary. The discussion is quite in keeping with the Vaisesika position.[10]

Another typical position of the Vaisesika is that according to it gold (suvarna) is to be accepted as a variety of the substance called tejas. Kanada does not specifically say so, though he says that things like iron, silver, gold etc. turn into liquid when they come in contact with fire and in this respect they have similarity with the substance called ap.[11] Prasastapada clearly states that gold is a kind of tejas, called akaraja,[12] one of the four varieties, but he does not offer any argument for considering gold a kind of tejas. Gangesa takes up the question in a small section of his work. He offers inferences for the position and also examines in detail, mentioning the views of others, how the position can be logically defended. He seems to do a lot for the cause of the Vaisesika.[13]

Kanada and Prasastapada do not mention abhava as a separate category. But it was definitely recognized by all later followers of the Vaisesika and its nature and divisions are discussed elaborately. Commentators of Prasastapada claim that it is accepted as a category even by the early authorities. But it is not separately mentioned, because abhava can never be understood without reference to bhava and the mention of the bhava categories implies that abhava means the absence of any of them. Abhava is always dependent upon bhava.

But later there is some controversy about the reality of abhava. The Bhatta Mimamsaka and the Nyaya-Vaisesika both accept it, but the Prabhakara Mimamsaka contends that it is not a separate category, it is identical with a bhava, actually with the substratum in which it is supposed to be present. It was historically not possible for earlier Vaisesika authors to take up this view for refutation. But Gangesa takes the problem very seriously and establishes abhava as a separate category with various arguments. He examines all the different opinions held by the opponents and ultimately rejects them. He mentions a number of absurdities which would result if abhava is not given the status of a separate category. This goes a long way for the development of the Vaisesika and most of the later works collect materials from Gangesa’s work.[14]

Gautama does not include manas in the list of senses, but mentions it as a separate prameya.[15] The Buddhists argue that in the Nyaya view it cannot be accepted as a sense. Thus it becomes impossible to justify the perception of the qualities like iccha etc. which cannot be known by any external sense. Vatsyayana has refuted this position and given arguments to show that in the Nyaya view also manas is to be accepted as a sense.[16] According to the Vaisesika, manas is included in the category of substance (dravya). From the description of its nature it is clear that in the Vaisesika view it is definitely conceived as a sense. Moreover, the Vaisesika strongly argues that it must be of the minute magnitude (anuparimana). In a section of his work, Gautama discusses this substance in detail.[17] He offers arguments for the admission of manas and defends the position that it must be of a minute magnitude. The Mimamsakas contend that it should be accepted as vibhu. Gangesa mentions this view and strongly criticizes it. He further shows that there is no absurdity involved in the Vaisesika view.[18] This also is an example of his contributions to the development of the Vaisesika.

One of the most well-known Navya Naiyayika belonging to Navadvipa is Mathuranatha Tarkavagisa. His fame rests mainly on his masterly commentaries on Gangesa’s work. But he was a prolific writer and had to his credit a lot of commentaries though many of them are not available now. But scholars note that he wrote two works on the Vaisesika, namely, one, a commentary on Udayana’s Kiranavali on the section of substance and the other, a commentary on the same work on the section of quality. His commentaries are of a very high standard, full of critical and elaborate analysis.

In this connection we can also easily refer to Jagadisa Tarkalankara who was also primarily famous as a Navya Naiyayika and a commentator of Gangesa. He wrote an original commentary on the Dravya and the Guna sections of the Prasastapadabhasya, called Sukti. The former is available, but the latter is not. His commentary is brief and naturally full of Navyanyaya terminology. But he has made many original points and shows his deep knowledge. He had also to his credit a small handbook on the Vaisesika system, called Tarkamrta, giving very briefly the basic tenets of the Vaisesika and it is useful for the beginners.

It has been pointed out by many scholars that there were at least nine early commentaries on the ancient and basic text of the Vaisesika system, namely, the Vaisesikasutra of Kanada. But, unfortunately, except the Vrtti of Candrananda, none of them has come down to us. In the present context we must therefore specially mention a commentary directly on the sutras of Kanada, called Upaskara, written by Sankara Misra, a well-known scholar of Navyanyaya who belonged to Mithila. This work is important for the fact that it explains Kanada’s sutras only and is not a commentary on Prasastapada’s work or some other commentaries on the same. It appears that the tradition of studying the Vaisesika on the basis of the sutras themselves was lost for a long time. In fact, in one of the introductory verses Sankara himself says that he had nothing to take hold of except the sutras themselves and he was as if engaged in the daring and rash act of playing in the sky.[19]

Sankara was a great scholar and a prolific writer. He wrote not only on Nyaya and Vaisesika but also on Smrti. It appears that he had to his credit some kavya and nataka also. Besides Upaskara, he wrote an independent work on the Vaisesika called Kanadarahasya. In this work he discusses many Vaisesika theories in his own way. This book is available in print. In this work Sankara himself refers to one of his other works, the Kiranavaliniruktiprakasa, obviously a commentary on the Vaisesika. However, the book is not available.

Sankara was far removed from the original author (Kanada) in time. Moreover, he was a great scholar in Navyanyaya. Therefore, so far as an authentic explanation of the Vaisesika position is concerned not much importance is attached to his commentary by the scholars. However, there is no doubt about his ability and power of thinking. Naturally he has used a lot of Navyanyaya terminology. But it may be said that without doubt he has made important contribution to the study of the Vaisesika in his own way. Using the terminology current in his time he has tried to present and defend the Vaisesika position in a novel way.

There is no doubt that he was conversant with the commentary of Prasastapada and had not gone against the conclusions given by him. Still, Sankara has not followed him blindly, but on many occasions has shown that there is scope for new thought. For example, there is a debate among the philosophers about the result of performing some auspicious act at the beginning of a work. The earlier authorities claim that the result is the completion of the work. But later authorities like Gangesa and others refute this position and claim that the result is the removal of obstacles. Sankara explains the position of Gangesa, but finally rejects it and defends the earlier view. Some of his comments, while he discusses liberation, doubt, pervasion etc., are also remarkable for novelty. Thus even being a Navya Naiyayika he could make important contributions to the study of the Vaisesika.

Raghunatha Siromani who belonged to Navadvipa created a new school of Navyanyaya by writing a brief but very erudite commentary called Didhiti on the famous work of Gangesa, the Tattvacintamani. It was due to him that ultimately the Mithila school lost its importance and became almost obsolete. After Raghunatha the development of Navyanyaya went on through the various commentaries and sub-commentaries following his line of interpretation. Raghunatha also was a prolific writer and wrote commentaries not only on older basic texts of the Nyaya and the Vaisesika, but had to his credit many independent works also. He was a genius and his works are all marked by subtle analysis and profound thinking. That he had mastery over both the Nyaya and the Vaisesika is beyond doubt.

In the present context, one of his independent works called the Padarthatattvanirupana deserves special notice. In this work his discussion of the different categories as admitted in the syncretic school of Nyaya-Vaisesika is two-fold. First, many of the categories generally accepted are critically examined and finally rejected. Secondly, he admits as separate categories even some which are not generally accepted in the Nyaya-Vaisesika tradition but are advocated by the Mimamsakas. If we go through the work we find that so many accepted conclusions are rejected and newer and newer ones are accepted.

According to the standard view, dik and kala are admitted to be two separate substances (dravya). But Raghunatha contends that they are not so, they are identical with isvara. Again, it is generally admitted that the division of a thing comes to an end in an atom (paramanu). Two atoms combine and form a small particle called dvyanuka. Three such dyads combine and produce a triad or trasarenu which is the smallest visible substance. But after a lot of discussion Raghunatha claims that the admission of a dyad and a triad is not necessary. There is no harm in admitting that the process of division rests in a triad. He mentions and answers the different objections that may be raised against this novel position. Inherence (samavaya) is accepted as one of the seven padarthas. Though it is a kind of relation like conjunction, the general position is that, like conjunction, it is not different in different cases, but is always one and the same. Raghunatha holds that inherence also should be considered as many. Many other similar examples may be easily found.

On the other hand, as it is well-known, potency (sakti) is admitted as a separate category by the Mimamsaka. It is of two kinds, sahaja and adheya. Both earlier and later Nyaya-Vaisesikas have strongly criticized this view. Udayana has made a detailed study of the position of the Mimamsakas and finally shown that potency is nothing but causality (karanata) and it is not at all a distinct category.[20] Gangesa also does the same. But Raghunatha is a notable exception. He argues that potency should be accepted as a different category.

In fact, there is a tradition that the Naiyayikas are not in favour of admitting a fixed and unalterable number of categories (aniyatapadarthavadin), while the Vaisesikas are inclined to accept a fixed number of categories (niyatapadarthavadin). That is, the Naiyayikas are more dependent on logic and arguments. If logic demands that a thing should be accepted as a separate category, they have no objection to admitting it. Probably Raghunatha has extended this rule to the Vaisesika also and tries to show that the Vaisesika position also may be considered flexible. One may or may not accept Raghunatha’s views, but there is no doubt that Raghunatha is an original thinker and his discussion presents the Vaisesika position in a new light.

Finally we may refer to a few Nyaya-Vaisesika works which are supposed to be a sort of primer for the beginners who may be interested in studying this system. Some of them became quite popular and are used as textbooks even today. Perhaps the most popular and also instructive is the Bhasapariccheda or Karikavali of Visvanatha. Following the Nyaya tradition, it is divided into four parts according to four pramanas admitted by the Nyaya. But while discussing the categories, it strictly follows the Vaisesika position. Almost in the very first verse it names the seven Vaisesika categories and the whole book is devoted to an analysis of their definitions, divisions and other allied problems. The author also notes the points on which the Nyaya and the Vaisesika differ. He explains the views of both and generally does not reject the view of one in preference to the view of the other. At the time of the author Navyanyaya has already developed fully and he has adopted its terminology quite a lot. A peculiar tendency of the later Nyaya-Vaisesika writers seems to start with him. After mentioning the seven Vaisesika categories in the verse, he writes further in the auto-commentary that these categories are wellaccepted by the Vaisesika, but the Nyaya also is not at all opposed to them.[21] Thus the commentators of Visvanatha try to show in detail how the sixteen categories of the Nyaya may actually be reduced to the seven.[22] There are some good commentaries on the work, but they are difficult to understand because of the use of very intricate Navyanyaya terminology. However they develop the discussion further and in many cases controvert even the novel views advocated by Raghunatha.

In this context, another work which may justifiably be mentioned is the Tarkabhasa of Kesava Misra. In the introductory verse, the author declares that he is writing this primer for those who wish to enter into the Nyaya views easily and without much labour. He seems to follow a pattern of discussion as is to be found in the Nyayasutra of Gautama. But in course of discussion he brings in the Vaisesika categories also and gives a good account of them. In the first part of the book he discusses the four pramanas following the Nyaya tradition. The next part is concerned with the discussion of prameyas. As we have already noted Gautama takes prameyas in a technical sense and gives a list of twelve specific prameyas only. Kesava Misra quotes Gautama’s sutra, discusses each, but he mentions the six positive categories of the Vaisesika under the fourth one (i.e. artha) and gives a thorough account of them. Some of the special doctrines of the Vaisesika also are discussed well.[23]

Lastly, mention may be made of Annambhatta’s Tarkasamgraha. This work is very much in the line of Visvanatha’s work, though the text is very brief. However, the points are presented in some details in the auto-commentary. Annambhatta also finally concludes that all the padarthas may be logically included in the seven categories admitted by the Vaisesika and therefore, it is not necessary to admit any additional one. In the auto-commentary the author quotes the first sutra of Gautama and explains how the sixteen categories mentioned there may be reduced to the seven.[24]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

NS 1.1.1

[2]:

VS 1.1.4

[3]:

See Vyomavati and Kiranavali.

[4]:

On NS 1.1.4

[5]:

Tattvacintamani (TCM), section I, topic 6.

[6]:

Ibid, topic 7.

[7]:

Ibid.

[8]:

E.g. see Muktavali.

[9]:

TCM, section I, topic 8.

[10]:

Cf. PPBh, section on perception.

[11]:

VS 2.1.7.

[12]:

PPBh, section on tejas.

[13]:

TCM, section I, topic 10.

[14]:

Ibid, topic 12.

[15]:

NS 1.1.9, 1.1.16.

[16]:

On NS 1.1.4.

[17]:

NS 3.2.56-59.

[18]:

TCM, section 1, topic 13.

[19]:

Introductory verse 3, sutramatravalambena etc.

[20]:

Kusumanjali, I. 10 ff.

[21]:

Muktavali, on the verse naming the seven categories.

[22]:

See, e.g. Dinakari commentary.

[23]:

E.g. paramanu-karana-vada, dvitvotpatti` etc.

[24]:

The concluding statement of Annambhatta. Details are given in the auto-commentary, Dipika.

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