Vaisesika Doctrines (in the Nyaya Works)

by Diptasree Som | 2010 | 25,594 words

This essay studies the Vaisesika Doctrines in the Nyaya Works.—Both part of the system of Indian philosophy, Nyaya and Vaisesika are accepted to be friendly to each other. Many standpoints are advocated by both systems. For example, both Nyaya and Vaisesika strongly argue that all the three terms (viz., buddhi, upalabdhi and jnana) are synonymous, ...

Chapter 3 - Views of Uddyotakara, Vacaspati Misra and others

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[Full title: Views of Uddyotakara, Vacaspati Misra, Jayantabhatta, Udayana and Bhasarvajna]

Uddyotakara’s treatment of the Vaisesika is very important. The original work of the Vaisesika system is the sutra of Kanada. But after the appearance of the Padarthadharma-samgraha of Prasastapada, the basic work of Kanada gradually lost its importance. The study of the Vaisesika system was mainly carried on only with this work. There is no doubt that there were some ancient commentaries on Kanada’s work, but almost none of them has come down to us^[1]. Uddyotakara is definitely later than Prasastapada. Still, in the Nyayavarttika there is practically no influence of the latter. Uddyotakara has utilized and depended upon the Vaisesikasutra only. Thus, in the absence of any early commentary on Kanada’s work, the treatment of Uddyotakara assumes importance.

Uddyotakara has commented on all the main categories admitted by the Vaisesika and has also touched upon their different forms. He has quoted a number of Kanada’s sutras and explained them^[2]. Sometimes it is found that he has not accepted the interpretation current at that time, instead he has added some new interpretations of his own. As we know, there is controversy about the actual number and readings of the Vaisesika-sutras. In view of all these, Uddyotakara’s contributions are really great.

Doubt (samsaya) is recognized by Gautama as a separate category. Doubt is considered important because it is a precondition for critical examination. This position is accepted not only by Gautama but also by Kanada. Gautama has spoken of five forms of doubt produced from five kinds of causes.^[3] But Kanada’s treatment of doubt is not systematic or detailed. However, in one sutra only he defines doubt, doubt in its most general form, namely, doubt resulting from the perception of similarity.^[4]

Uddyotakara has quoted Kanada’s definition and pointed out that perception of similarity actually means the perception of a thing having similarity. He has also noted an objection according to which the second and the third expressions in the definition are not necessary, only the first one is sufficient. Uddyotakara has rejected it with the comment that the objector has not understood the implications of the sutra and has explained how it is to be rejected.^[5]

According to the Mimamsaka, tamas is a separate substance. But the Vaisesikas reject this position. But since it cannot be denied that we have an awareness of tamas, the question arises as to in which of the admitted categories it is to be included.

According to some later commentator, it is a kind of quality (guna), but according to others it is the absence (abhava) of light. There is a sutra of Kanada which seems to support this position. But, then, there arises the problem that tamas is known as something positive (bhava) and not as something negative. In this context Uddyotakara offers a new explanation.^[6] He says that actually the word tamas means a substance, a quality, or an action, when their connection with any kind of light has been removed. It may be objected that this position would go against the sutra. Uddyotakara answers the objection by explaining that the sutra really means that when there is an absence of light there is produced the awareness of tamas; it is not meant that tamas itself is a kind of absence.

As is well-known, samavaya is admitted as a separate category by the Vaisesika. Such a relation is admitted by almost no other system. Naturally, many of the other systems have tried to show illogicality in the conception of this relation. For example, one of the objections against samavaya is that its presence in the relatum cannot be explained. The question is: Is it related to its relatum by another samavaya? If it be so, then, another samavaya would have to be admitted for relating the second, and in this way the process would continue resulting in infinite regress. If, on the other hand, it be not so, it cannot at all be related to the relatum. The other important relation admitted by the Vaisesika is conjunction (samyoga). It belongs to the category of quality and hence, it is related to the relatum through inherence. Thus, since inherence also is a relation, the question of relating arises as in the case of conjunction.^[7]

These questions are not found in the Vaisesikasutra. But Prasastapada has discussed them and provided answers in detail while critically examining the category. Uddyotakara also has done the same. But it is remarkable that he has offered his own argument and though the conclusions are the same, the discussion does not show any influence of Prasastapada. He says that properties may be of three kinds, prescribed, negated and independent. Inherence is of the third kind. It is independent in the sense that it does not depend on any other relation for its location in the relatum. He comments that this conclusion is not only a matter of reverence, but there is also inferential proof for it. He also discusses why inherence cannot be considered as asrita and though a relation, it is quite different in nature from conjunction. Finally, he argues that if a further inherence for the first inherence is admitted it will definitely go against Kanada’s sutra.

On other different occasions also he has incidentally made brief remarks on the nature of samavaya. For example, while explaining Gautama’s definition of the prameya called artha, he says that objects may be asrita and anasrita and following the Vaisesika position he says that samavaya belongs to the second type. Again, in the same context he gives a list of the objects which are perceived by some specific senses. He remarks that, just like the universal satta, samavaya also is perceived by all the senses. However, at least in later literature, we find a difference of opinion between the Nyaya and the Vaisesika on the perceptibility of inherence. According to the Nyaya, inherence is perceptible in some cases, i.e. when the relata are perceptible. But if the relata are not so, inherence cannot be perceived. But, according to the Vaisesika, inherence is not perceptible in any case. Thus, generally an inference is cited as proof for the existence of inherence.

Uddyotakara also comments that inherence is really the relation of substratum-superstratum (asraya-asrayi-bhava), e.g. cow-ness is present in cows through this relation. The special characteristic of the relation of inherence is that it gives rise to an awareness in the form ‘it is in this’. This agrees well with not only Kanada’s sutra, but also the comment of Prasastapada.

Sound (sabda) is considered to be a quality by the Vaisesika. It can be present only in akasa. It is also non-eternal and is produced from three causes, namely conjunction, disjunction and a sound itself. In Vaisesika literature we find a lot of discussion on the nature of sound. Uddyotakara has done the same while explaining the special sense-object contact for the perception of sound. Here also he has shown his sound knowledge of the Vaisesika position. Besides, mentioning the general idea that conjunction is produced from three causes he has referred to some finer points also. For example, he explains that when conjunction produces a sound it does not act independently, it has to depend on something else. The conjunction between the drum and akasa is the non-inherent cause of sound. But sound cannot be produced unless it has the cooperation of the conjunction between the drum and the stick, which again is dependent upon the velocity of the stick. If only the conjunction between the drum and the stick is admitted to be the cause of sound, it may be shown that sound may be produced anywhere. Secondly, he gives an example of sound resulting from a disjunction which is produced by another disjunction itself.^[8]

In Vaisesika literature there is also some discussion on the nature of conjunction. As regards the perception of conjunction the Vaisesika holds the view that a conjunction between the perceptible and the imperceptible cannot be perceived^[9] e.g. the conjunction between akasa and a bird. Uddyotakara has utilized this conclusion in refuting Vatsyayana’s illustration of the third form of inference mentioned by Gautama which may be offered to prove the movement of the sun.^[10]

According to Vatsyayana’s interpretation, Gautama mentions five forms of doubt in his sutra. The second form of doubt is the one produced by the apprehension of a unique property. Giving an example of it, Vatsyayana remarks that the unique property of sound is that it is produced by disjunction. No other category is produced by disjunction. Thus, there arises a doubt regarding the nature of sound whether it is a substance or a quality or an action. Sound may be characterized by the said unique property in spite of being a substance or a quality or an action.

In this context, Uddyotakara points out that an objection may be raised against the above. It cannot be said that sound only is produced by disjunction because in the Vaisesika view disjunction also may be produced by disjunction. In answer, he says in the first alternative that Nyaya does not accept that one disjunction may be produced from another disjunction. It is always produced from action. But subsequently he also justifies Vatsyayana’s position even admitting the Vaisesika view. He argues that the second disjunction which is produced by the first disjunction is never a non-inherent cause of a further disjunction, it can only be such a cause for sound. In other words, he has respect for both the Nyaya and the Vaisesika positions.^[11]

It is also found that Uddyotakara has referred to numerous accepted conclusions of the Vaisesika, though he has not explained them. But there is no doubt that he often treats the Nyaya and the Vaisesika as if they were almost one single system. Moreover, in his work he has quoted not less than twenty five sutras of Kanada. At present, we have with us only two commentaries directly on Kanada’s sutras, one somewhat earlier, namely, the Vrtti by Candrananda and the other much later, the Upaskara by Sankara Misra.

In the Indian philosophical tradition Vacaspati is a very honoured and famous commentator. He is well-known for his mastery of all the astika systems of Indian philosophy, a distinction shared by nobody else. In Nyaya his most well-known and masterly work is the Tatparyatika, a commentary on Uddyotakara's Nyayavarttika. However, he has not only explained the implications of Uddyotakara, he has also added detailed explanations of his own of the Nyaya views and has often commented directly on Vatsyayana’s Bhasya. He has naturally explained with care the Vaisesika views as they occur in the text he is commenting upon. But on a few occasions he has also independently referred to important Vaisesika views.

At least from one instance we can be sure of his acquaintance with Prasastapada’s work. He does not mention him by name, but refers to him by the term Padarthavid, and fully quotes the long definition of sukha given by Prasastapada.^[12] In the same context he also mentions a form of cognition called svapnantika, which is a typical Vaisesika concept. The context is as follows. The commentator is showing the justification for adding the term jnana in Gautama’s definitions of perception. The qualities of sukha and duhkha are also produced from sense-object contact. If the term jnana is not there the definition of perception will also unduly apply to those two qualities. But it may be objected that sukha and duhkha are not really produced by senseobject contact. As is found in the case of svapnantika, they can be produced from cognition alone. If it be so, there would be no reason for adding the term jnana. Vacaspati refutes the objection in detail and finally quotes the long definition of sukha given by Prasastapada in support of the Nyaya position that sukha and duhkha are produced by sense-object contact.^[13]

The Nyaya system has developed to a great extent through confrontation with the Buddhists. Thus, for example, Dinnaga has criticized the position of Kanada, Gautama and Vatsyayana on many occasions. But, on the other hand, he has been criticized from the Nyaya position by Uddyotakara and Vacaspati. While commenting on Gautama’s anumanasutra, they have examined and refuted the definition of inference given by Dinnaga.^[14] In that context he has referred to a sutra of Kanada which specifies the conditions for the perception of a substance: a substance is perceived if it has intermediate magnitude, is composed of many parts and possesses colour.^[15]

We have already noted that Uddyotakara has quoted quite a lot of Kanada’s sutras. Vacaspati also quotes them, though much lesser in number. For example, from an early period we find a controversy regarding the nature of sound—whether it is eternal or non-eternal—specially between the Nyaya and the Mimamsa. While explaining one of Gautama’s sutras showing the grounds for considering sound as non-eternal, there arises the question how gurutva becomes a cause of action. The typical Vaisesika view that gurutva is an independent cause of action is examined. An objection against the view is noted and it is answered by pointing out that the word ‘independent’ is to be taken in a special sense. In that connection Vacaspati seems to have in mind at least three sutras of Kanada.^[16]

While explaining the definition and classification of inference given by Gautama, Vacaspati examines the views of other systems also, such as, Vaisesika and Sankhya. In the context of inference generally one sutra of Kanada is referred to and discussed. In this sutra, five cases are stated in which, through some particular relation, inference of one from another is possible.^[17] Kanada does not give any example, but it is provided by the commentators. There is controversy regarding the interpretation of the sutra. According to some, the cases mentioned there are the only examples or possible instances of inference. But others argue that they are only some of the instances and it is not an exhaustive enumeration.

Vacaspati has fully quoted this sutra, but has criticized it.^[18] He says that the first part, i.e. the first two terms, states that if one thing has a relation with another one may be an inferential mark for the other. If it is implied that the relation is invariable, it would be sufficient to state this part only. It does not matter how the two are specifically related. The exact nature of the relation need not be known. If, on the other hand, it is admitted that the first part speaks of just a relation, it may not indicate an invariable relation and therefore there is a possibility of a fallacy and that is why valid cases of inference are added in the sutra, then, this second part alone would have been sufficient. It is not necessary to mention the first part.

Vacaspati has also referred to some examples which are definitely based on Kanada’s sutras, though the sutras have not been quoted.^[19] He criticizes the cases of inference based on opposition. He argues that when there is really opposition between the two, one is not an inferential mark for the other; rather one negates the other.

According to the Vaisesika, kala is admitted as one of the nine substances (dravya). But it cannot be known by perception, it has to be inferred on the basis of certain special kinds of experiences. Kanada has mentioned them in a sutra in the second chapter.^[20] In the second chapter of his work Gautama also has incidentally made a critical examination of the present time (vartamana-kala).^[21] Under the first sutra of this section, Uddyotakara has briefly noted the arguments for admitting kala as a separate entity. But Vacaspati has made a detailed examination of the Vaisesika theory of kala, obviously on the basis of the sutra of Kanada. It clearly shows that Vacaspati had a profound knowledge of the Vaisesika doctrines and defended them ably.^[22]

According to Jayanta’s own statement, his work Nyayamanjari is an elaborate exposition of the sutras of Gautama. But there is no doubt that he was a great scholar and had deep knowledge of all the systems of Indian philosophy. His writings are very profound and detailed. He also has referred to many Vaisesika views and discussed some of them. But it appears that his attitude towards the Vaisesika is somewhat different from that of the other followers of the Nyaya system.

Almost at the beginning of his work Jayanta explains the great importance of the Nyaya in the orthodox Indian tradition. He says that it is indispensable for establishing and defending the validity of the Veda. In fact, he says, Nyaya is the most important one of the fourteen vidyasthanas which have been propagated for the benefit of the mankind by providing the means for acquiring right knowledge. He quotes two verses, one from the Yajnavalkyasmrti and another from the Visnudharmottarapurana and claims that Nyaya has been given a place of honour in both.^[23] However, in the first verse we have the term tarka and in the second the term nyayavistara which may not specifically be taken to mean the Nyaya system. The terms may mean any system which is based on logic. In fact, generally six systems which specially discuss and argue with the help of anumana are generally known by the term sattarki and they are Sankhya, Arhata, Bauddha, Vaisesika, Carvaka and Nyaya. Jayanta points out that no other system except the Nyaya is to be taken by the term tarka or nyayavistara. The systems like the Bauddha etc. are of course opposed to the Nyaya and the Vaisesika, although it follows the Nyaya and is included in the six kinds of Tarka, still it cannot be regarded as a vidyasthana.^[24] In a sense perhaps Jayanta considers the Vaisesika inferior to the Nyaya. In rare cases he has even criticized Prasastapada. Even then, it may be generally said that he has mentioned the Vaisesika views without any strong bias.

In the concluding part of his discussion on pramana in general Jayanta says that abhava also is to be accepted as a prameya and it is known by perception, there is no necessity of admitting any special kind of pramana to cognize it. But Jayanta is unique in holding that abhava is of two kinds only, namely, pragabhava and pradhvamsabhava. He however notes that others admit four kinds of abhava adding two more, namely, absolute non-existence and mutual non-existence. This is a clear reference to the Vaisesika view and it is also the generally accepted Nyaya view. But Jayanta contends that the additional two forms are to be included in pragabhava.^[25]

In the definition of perception given by Gautama, the first term states the most important characteristic of perception, namely, that it is a form of knowledge which is produced from sense-object contact. Jayanta explains with examples the six kinds of such contacts accepted in the Nyaya view, which were actually first enumerated by Uddyotakara. However, if we consider the definition of perception as offered by Kanada and Prasastapada, we find that they do not lay stress upon any single contact, rather they specially note that perception is the product of many contacts which occur among four or three or between two. Thus, for example, in the case of external objects, such as colour etc., perception is produced by contact among the four, namely, self, mind, sense-organ and object. For the perception of the quality of sound the necessary contact occurs among the three, namely, self, mind and the auditory sense. Again, when we perceive the qualities like knowledge, pleasure etc., which are the specific qualities of the self, we require a contact between only two, namely, self and mind. All this has been discussed by Prasastapada very clearly. After explaining the sense-object contacts according to Nyaya, Jayanta concludes the discussion by almost repeating the words of Prasastapada.^[26]

We have already pointed out, Jayanta’s discussion on every topic is elaborate. He not only explains the Nyaya position, but also critically examines the views of other philosophers on the same problem and rejects them. In the concluding portion of his discussion on the nature of perception he has criticized the Bauddha, the Mimamsaka and the Sankhya definitions of perception. But it is interesting to note that he has also criticized the Vaisesika definition, though without naming the system specifically. Actually, he quotes Kanada’s sutra defining perception, but indicating the source simply says that ‘some people’ offer this definition.^[27] It is also of interest that his quotation also contains an additional expression which is not found in the generally available version of the sutra. According to it, perception is knowledge which is produced from a contact among the self, the mind and the object and which is also different from inferential knowledge etc. Cakradhara, the commentator of Jayanta, explains the justification for adding the additional qualification that perception is knowledge other than inference etc. After there is produced a contact between the sense and the object, there may be produced a knowledge of the motion (gati) of the sense. Actually this knowledge is inferential, but the definition of perception would unduly apply to it. Secondly, some one looks at a panasa tree, his visual sense has conjunction with the tree. But the person does not know that this particular tree is called panasa. Immediately after the contact with the tree some other person who knows the tree says that it is called panasa. Then the former has a cognition in the form ‘this is panasa’. This kind of knowledge, since it is produced from both sense-object contact and verbal testimony, is known as ubhayaja-jnana. The Vaisesika definition of perception may also apply to such knowledge, which is not a case of genuine perception. That is why the additional expression is mentioned.

According to the general Vaisesika view, action (karman) is a separate category. But it appears that there is some controversy regarding this position among the Mimamsa and even the Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers. For example, Bhasarvajna says that action is really nothing more than conjunction and disjunction.^[28] Though Jayanta is earlier than him, he has noted such a view and criticized it. He says that if action is identified with conjunction and disjunction, then the awareness would be of the form samyujyate or vibhajyate, and never of the form calati. Different categories are admitted to justify different forms of awareness. An awareness differs from another because of the difference of the object itself. Moreover, if such a view is admitted there would be an awareness of movement even in what is fixed or not moving. For example, a bird may come and sit upon a tree and then fly away. This means that the tree has conjunction with and disjunction from the bird. Therefore, one should have the awareness of movement in respect of the tree also. This shows that Jayanta has respect for the Vaisesika views and defends them logically.^[29]

Kala (time) is admitted to be a substance in the Vaisesika view. Though a discussion of kala cannot be one of the main subjects, Jayanta has incidentally explained to some extent the nature of kala. He has also remarked that the nature of dik and kala has been discussed in great details in the allied system (samanatantra). He has not said much on this because one who speaks too much is despised by all. However, while discussing the views of the opponents on the nature of kala, he notes a view according to which kala is perceptible. In the description of the opponent’s view Jayanta quotes the words of Prasastapada which say that the first three substances have perceptibility, colour and liquidness. Of course, the opponent may contend that this is not a divine command which can never be violated.^[30] Whether a thing is perceptible or not perceptible is to be decided on the basis of arguments. Finally, Jayanta defends the position that kala can only be inferred. Just as akasa which is inferred as the substratum of the quality of sound is admitted to be one due to the absence of any difference, so is the case with kala. It is without any component part and is also an eternal substance. Anyway, it is clear that Jayanta has a thorough knowledge of the Vaisesika system.

In Indian philosophy, there is also difference of opinion regarding the nature of sabda. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, it is a quality, but according to the Jaina and others it is a substance. Jayanta discusses the problem. For example, he says that to prove that sound is a quality some offer the argument that it is so because it is ‘located in a substratum’ (asrita). But Jayanta points out that this is not a valid argument, because this property of being located in a substratum is present in all the categories except the eternal substances. This is a clear reference to the standard Vaisesika view and Jayanta actually repeats a remark of Prasastapada made in the context of stating the similarities and dissimilarities of the categories.

Of the six categories admitted by Prasastapada, two are samanya and samavaya. These two may be said to be specially related, because a universal is present in its loci through the relation of inherence. But the Buddhists do not admit the category of universal, and they moreover very strongly criticize the concept of universal. One of the arguments they offer is that there can be no relation between a universal and its locus. They also show in this connection that inherence cannot at all be admitted as a relation. While giving an account of the Buddhist contention Jayanta presents a detailed analysis of the various points connected with the concept of inherence.

Jayanta starts by quoting the full definition of inherence as given by Prasastapada.^[31] It is said that inherence is a relation existing between two things which cannot be existing separately (ayutasiddha). The Buddhists contend that this is self-contradictory. If the two things cannot exist separately, how can it be said that they are related? If two things can be present in separate places and sometimes come in contact with each other, it can be said that they are related, that there is a relation between the two, as in the case of a jar and water. The Vaisesikas may argue that a relation is possible even if the two things are not separately existing. For example, a substance and a quality are two different categories which are not so, but still we have the notion that a quality is present in a substance, i.e. there is a relation between the two. The Buddhists answer that this is simply illogical, because a quality is never perceived as separately existing from its substance and hence, the two are actually to be admitted as identical. If the two are identical the question of a relation between the two does not arise at all.^[32]

Moreover, separate existence has been defined in two ways, one in the case of eternal things and the other in the case of non-eternal things. In the first case it is said to consist in the separate movement (gati) of the two things and in the second, it is said to consist in having two substrata. However, it can be shown that this position also cannot be accepted logically.

Naturally Jayanta has refuted the position of the opponent in detail. He says that inherence has to be admitted to explain some specific forms of awareness which are valid. A substance and its qualities are logically proved to be separate and the presence of one in the other has to be justified. There are similar other cases. This can be justified only by admitting inherence. The only difference is that in the case of the things related by inherence there is the occupation of same space (samanadesata).^[33]

The whole discussion is a clear proof that Jayanta has a deep knowledge of the Vaisesika doctrines and defends them whenever necessary.

Jayanta has thoroughly discussed the different theories regarding the exact meaning of a term (pada).^[34] According to the Mimamsa view, a term signifies a universal (jati) and not an individual (vyakti). A lot of arguments has been given by the Mimamsakas to prove the point. One of the objections against this view is that in many cases the meaning of a sentence cannot be justified unless it is admitted that an individual also is signified by a term. For example, the statement gam anaya would be meaningless in the Mimamsa view, because it is not possible to bring cowness, one can only bring an individual cow. Thus it is necessary to accept that an individual also is the meaning of a term. To this, the Mimamsakas reply that if both universal and individual are admitted as the meaning of a term it would violate the principle of simplicity (kalpana-laghava). It is also not necessary to do so. The intellect has no power to go to an individual also after being related to the universal. In fact, the individual is implied by the universal itself. If one has the awareness of cowness, one subsequently has an awareness of the individual as qualified by cowness. The principle involved in this contention is that the knowledge of the qualifier (visesana) is the cause of a qualificative cognition (visistabuddhi). To justify this point Jayanta quotes a sutra of Kanada in which it is stated that if a thing is qualified by white colour, the awareness of the white thing is produced by a knowledge of the white colour. In other words, the knowledge of white colour is actually the knowledge of qualifier and from it the qualificative cognition of a white thing is produced.^[35]

In the list of sixteen categories admitted by Gautama, prameya is the second. Gautama has taken prameya in a technical sense to mean twelve specific things.^[36] While discussing them in the introductory part, Jayanta raises a possible objection against the Nyaya view. Gautama says that prameyas are of twelve kinds. But, how is it so? In the Vaisesika system six kinds of prameyas have been admitted and if we take into consideration their various instances we have actually an unlimited number of prameyas. Here Jayanta gives a full list of the six padarthas as enumerated in the sutra of Kanada.^[37] In answer to the objection, Jayanta says that the term prameya generally means a thing as known or proved by a pramana. The Vaisesikas take this meaning and say that all the things that can be known by a pramana, i.e. exist really, can be classified into six types. But Gautama’s intention is not to give a list of things or discuss their nature in general. Gautama specifies some prameyas the knowledge of which specially is conducive to the attainment of liberation. Thus there is no contradiction between the Nyaya and the Vaisesika.^[38]

According to both the Naiyayika and the Vaisesika, the four qualities of colour, taste, smell and touch when present in the substance of earth are changed by contact with fire. A jar for example, is black, but when it is put into fire it becomes red. But what is the process of such a change? The Naiyayika and the Vaisesika give different answers to the question. The former thinks that the change occurs in a substance as a whole, and it is not destroyed or reduced to atoms. The latter contends that unless there is a change of colour in the parts there can be no change of colour in the whole. Therefore, it is to be admitted that when a jar is put into fire, it is reduced to a heap of atoms, the colour of the atoms changes and then the jar is newly produced with the red colour. The view of the Naiyayika is known as Pithara-paka-vada and that of the Vaisesika as Pilu-paka-vada. Jayanta has given a very good account of both the views while discussing the Carvaka view that consciousness is produced from the material elements (bhuta) only. Jayanta has presented the Vaisesika view in detail, logically explaining why this process should be accepted. Such a good account is not sometimes available even in a Vaisesika work. Besides, he has described the Nyaya view side by side without actually saying anything against the Vaisesika.^[39]

In the Nyaya view there are five external senses, namely, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactual. Each of them again perceives only a particular quality, e.g. the olfactory produces the knowledge of smell only. How is such a rule established? In answer, it is pointed out that, though the four qualities of colour etc. are all present in earth which is the material cause of the olfactory sense, it is capable of giving the knowledge of smell only, because there is an excellence of this quality in that particular sense. This is a position admitted by both the Naiyayika and the Vaisesika. To emphasize the point Jayanta first quotes a sutra of Kanada and then refers to a sutra of Gautama which is very similar.^[40]

Liberation (apavarga) is admitted to be a kind of prameya by Gautama and he defines it as the absolute cessation of ‘that’. According to Vatsyayana ‘that’ here stands for suffering (duhkha) which is defined in the immediately preceding sutra.^[41] This appears to be the natural explanation also. But Jayanta explains that liberation actually means the absolute cessation of not only suffering but of all the nine specific qualities of the self, namely, pleasure, desire, aversion etc. He points out that all the other qualities are to be looked upon as suffering, because unless they are all destroyed there can be no cessation of suffering forever. It may be pointed out that this is really a Vaisesika position. It may not be in contradiction with the Nyaya view, but such a position is positively argued by the Vaisesika. They say that when the self loses all connections with the specific qualities and remains as unaffected as the sky, it attains the state of liberation.^[42]

One of the sixteen categories admitted by Gautama, the knowledge of which leads to the final good, is siddhanta. It is of four kinds, of which the second is called pratitantra-siddhanta,^[43] i.e. a doctrine which is admitted in an allied system (samanatantra), but not admitted in the opponent’s system (paratantra). As an example of it Jayanta says that the Nyaya accepts the view that the earth etc are made of atoms which are moved into action by the will of god. But this view is not admitted by the followers of Sankhya who argue that all material things are produced from prakrti. This is therefore a pratitantra-siddhanta for the Naiyayika, because it is admitted by the allied system of Kanada.^[44]

All this provides enough evidence to show how much respect Jayanta had for the Vaisesika doctrine.

We have already shown in the introduction that the Vaisesika and the Nyaya started as separate systems, but later they became as if a single system, showing a difference of opinion in a very limited number of cases. In this respect, Udayana stands as the most prominent and important representative of the syncretic school of the Nyaya-Vaisesika. Udayana is generally acclaimed as one of the most important philosophers in the whole range of Indian philosophy. He has to his credit a number of works, not only commentaries, but also independent ones. His works are marked by subtle logical analysis and philosophical insight. All the major philosophical problems are discussed by him from the NyayaVaisesika standpoint and he thoroughly defends them by refuting the philosophers of the other schools. He has written a lot on both the Nyaya and the Vaisesika. In the Nyaya, he has written a commentary on Vacaspati Misra’s Tatparyatika which is a commentary on Gautama’s system. Again as a Vaisesika he has written the Kiranavali which is perhaps the most important commentary on the Prasastapadabhasya. His two independent works, Nyayakusumanjali and Atmatattvaviveka are generally acclaimed as two most valuable contributions in Indian philosophy in general.

In the Parisuddhi Udayana is naturally most concerned with the interpretation of the Nyaya view as presented in Gautama’s Nyayasutra and Vacaspati’s commentary on the same. Here Udayana is a commentator and therefore his discussion is limited by matters which are presented in the basic text. We have already discussed how Vacaspati explains or refers to some particular Vaisesika views. Udayana, in this commentary, has followed Vacaspati and his scope for independent discussion of the Vaisesika views is naturally limited. However, there is no doubt about his acquaintance with the Vaisesika doctrines and whenever they occur they are properly presented.

In this connection we may also refer to some special features of this commentary of Udayana. It is well-known that Udayana was the most prominent Nyaya philosopher who tried to refute the Buddhist position specially after a very detailed and critical analysis. In fact, in this respect, Udayana may be considered as unique. Both Uddyotakara and Vacaspati refer to a lot of Buddhist views and criticize them in great details. Thus Udayana excels in going deeper and deeper into the Buddhist views. Later Buddhist commentators have naturally tried to refute the objections raised by the Nyaya commentators preceding them.

Udayana therefore have to reply to these Buddhist objections against the Nyaya. Udayana performed the task with great skill. He found much scope for discussing and criticizing the Buddhist arguments. Thus he could hardly pay much attention to Vaisesika views.

Secondly, it cannot be denied that there was difference of opinion among the Naiyayikas themselves regarding the interpretation of Gautama’s sutras and the exact Nyaya position.^[45] Udayana was quite concerned with noting and discussing the different Nyaya views themselves and as a result did not show much inclination to referring to Vaisesika views even if there was an occasion. We may, for example, refer to Udayana’s elaborate comments on Gautama’s sutra defining upamana.^[46]

As is well-known, upamana is accepted as a separate pramana by Nyaya, but not by Vaisesika, which argues that its purpose can very well be served by anumana. But, at least in the Parisuddhi, Udayana does not refer to this controversy. But as there was great difference of opinion regarding the nature of upamana among the Naiyayikas themselves, Udayana devotes long passages to present the different viewpoints of the different Naiyayikas. Thus he mentions the views of the older Naiyayikas like Jayanta etc., the modern ones (adhunika) and the novel ones (abhinava).^[47]

There is no doubt that Udayana was the first to propound a syncretic school of Nyaya-Vaisesika. As we have already pointed out, the Nyaya and the Vaisesika started as separate systems, but in course of time the two became closer and closer and finally combined themselves into one system. Udayana appears to be most serious in this regard. His contribution to both the systems is remarkable and it cannot be presented or evaluated within the short span of a few pages. Here we shall have to remain content with just a few brief comments.

As one of the main characteristic features of the syncretic Nyaya-Vaisesika school we may mention the fact that with regard to the prameyas or padarthas it accepts the Vaisesika position, but so far as the number of pramanas is concerned it accepts the Nyaya view. Further, in the case of the former, there is later found the tendency to show that the sixteen categories of the Nyaya as mentioned by Gautama may be easily included in the seven categories of the Vaisesika.^[48] The implication seems to be that as regards the number of prameyas, there is no opposition between the two schools, because, as if, the sixteen categories of the Nyaya are basically the Vaisesika ones, the difference lies only in presentation. Thus there is no attempt to criticize or refute the Vaisesika position so far as prameyas are concerned.

But with regard to pramana the position is quite the opposite. In many of the Nyaya works there is found some special discussion defending the Nyaya view that upamana and sabda also are to be accepted as separate pramanas. Udayana’s discussion of the topic presents an interesting picture. In the Nyayakusumanjali, Udayana is a staunch Naiyayika, but in the Kiranavali he is a loyal Vaisesika. Thus we find that in the third stavaka of the former work he discusses in great details the arguments of the Vaisesika for rejecting the claim of upamana^[49] and sabda^[50] as separate pramanas and then strongly criticizes them and tries to show that these two sources of knowledge must be accepted as separate pramanas; their function cannot be performed by inference as is claimed by the Vaisesika.

But in the other work he has to defend just the opposite view. Thus, there he names the Naiyayikas, mentions their objections and finally tries to show that they are logically untenable. It is interesting to note that Udayana specially mentions two inferences, one padapaksaka and the other padarthapaksaka, which establish that the so called valid knowledge produced by upamana and sabda may actually be produced by these two inferences and there is no scope for considering upamana and sabda as independent. Both of them are mentioned exactly in the same words in both the works.^[51] But in the one they are rejected as incapable and fallacious, while in the other they are shown to be free from all defects. Thus in the two works having affiliation to two different systems as if the same author assumes two different personalities.

Udayana equally wrote both on the Nyaya and the Vaisesika systems, though he had to his credit also two major independent works. These two works mainly contain an exposition of some of the most important doctrines advocated by the Nyaya, and also not opposed by the Vaisesika. In these works also, though Udayana is not consciously or directly concerned with the Vaisesika, often develops the Vaisesika theories logically as against the criticism of the opponent schools.

The Kiranavali is obviously a great contribution of Udayana to the Vaisesika in particular and to Indian philosophy in general. Even though a Sutra work attributed to Kanada is accepted as the basic text of the Vaisesika system, there is no doubt that the later work of Prasastapada, the Padarthadharmasamgraha, is much more systematic and in a sense generally accepted as the most authoritative. Udayana’s elaborate commentary on this work is really a valuable contribution. As is well-known there were at least two other important commentaries on the same, namely, the

Vyomavati and the Nyayakandali. The former is generally accepted as the earlier one, but there is controversy whether Udayana was earlier or later than Sridhara. As in the Nyaya works, Udayana gives evidence of his great logical acumen and power of exposition in this work also. He develops and explains the basic Vaisesika theories, going deeper and deeper. He also criticizes, as is his wont, specially the Buddhist. This is rather significant, because in a few respects some similarity is there between the Vaisesika and the Buddhists, though we find that Dinnaga specially is highly critical of the Vaisesika position and devotes a lot of space in his major works to the criticism of the Vaisesika. The language of Udayana is generally terse and he uses somewhat a special terminology, still the Kiranavali is a unique work and differs from the two other commentaries significantly. A study of the Vaisesika system can never be satisfactory without a thorough perusal of this work.

Lastly, we shall briefly refer to Bhasarvajna’s attitude to the Vaisesika. He belongs to the Nyaya school, though his views sometimes differ from the standard Nyaya position. His work, the Nyayasara along with the auto-commentary called Nyayabhusana has many unique features. Though he cannot be called an opponent of the Vaisesika and though there is no doubt that he also considers the Nyaya and the Vaisesika as samanatantra, on quite a number of occasions he does not hesitate to put forward his own special views as against the generally accepted Vaisesika ones.

At least on three occasions he refers to Kanada’s sutras directly or indirectly. For example, vega is a separate quality according to the Vaisesika. But Bhasarvajna does not think so.^[52] He says that it may be accepted as an action produced by another action. But this apparently goes against Kanada’s position. He clearly states that it is the special characteristic of a substance and a quality that they are capable of producing another substance or another quality. In this respect they differ from karman which is incapable of producing another karman. Bhasarvajna however explains away in his own way the objection that there is contradiction with Kanada’s view.

According to the Nyaya, atman is of two kinds, paramatman and jivatman. In the first chapter of the Nyayasutra Gautama has cited a number of marks (linga) for the inference of the second type of self. We have already shown that a similar position has been taken by Kanada also, though there is some difference in expression. Bhasarvajna quotes Gautama’s sutra^[53] and also notes that there is some difference with that of Kanada.

Bhasarvajna has elaborately discussed whether the body itself can be considered as the self. While explaining that the body cannot be equated to the self, he incidentally refers to the view that a single substance cannot be the inherent cause of a substance; at least two or many substances can be the inherent cause of another substance. Though he does not expressly mention Kanada or the Vaisesika, there is no doubt that it refers to a standard Vaisesika view recorded in Kanada’s own sutra.

The same author has also mentioned or opposed some of the views of Prasastapada. For example, Prasastapada raises a question whether gamanatva and karmatva should be regarded as synonymous or gamanatva is a less extensive (apara) universal. In the commentary Bhasarvajna clearly refers to this controversy.

Again, in the commentary he notes that according to some dream-knowledge is a distinct kind of knowledge different from recollection etc. This is a clear reference to Prasastapada’s fourfold division of avidya. Prasastapada has explained the nature of such knowledge, though, Kanada does not refer to it.

We shall now briefly refer to a few cases where Bhasarvajna differs from the accepted views of the Vaisesika and puts forward his own views. For example, it is well-known that action is a separate category according to the Vaisesika. But he does not accept this position and after a lot of discussion concludes that action may be considered as a kind of quality, the second category.^[54] Of course, in that case, the number of qualities would be twenty-five. His contention is that it is possible to formulate a single definition which would be applicable to both quality and action, namely, a quality is a category which is devoid of touch, but is a locus of a universal and also inheres in a substance. In fact, Udayana in the Kiranavali refers to this definition of quality and rejects it by saying that it is too wide, because it unduly applies to quality also.

So far as the category of quality is concerned Bhasarvajna has presented novel views of his own on many occasions. He has rejected some qualities accepted by all, and has also tried to show that the nature of certain qualities is different from that as is generally conceived. For example, disjunction (vibhaga) is not accepted by him as a quality, because such awareness can be explained by the absence of conjunction (samyoga).^[55] When a conjunction between two substances has long been destroyed or when a conjunction has not been at all produced between two substances, one may have an awareness in the form ‘this is disjoined from that’. It may be objected that disjunction is accepted as a quality which destroys conjunction. If there is no disjunction a conjunction would become everlasting. To this, he answers that action may be taken as a cause for the destruction of conjunction. He elaborately explains away the contradictions with the original Vaisesika views which may arise thereby.

Similarly, he says that number also cannot be accepted as a quality.^[56] His argument is that we may divide number into two—one is ekatva and the other is dvitva etc. The former is really nothing but identity (abheda) and the latter is synonymous with difference (bheda). As it is well-known, the theory of the production of dvitva is considered to be a special view of the Vaisesika and elaborate and intricate theories are found in this regard in most of the authoritative works of the Vaisesika school. But our author remarks that all this is simply unnecessary, because number is not a separate entity at all. He also rejects the claim of prthaktva which is generally taken to be a separate quality, because all cognitions involving this so called quality may be explained by difference (bheda).

Again, he does not admit paratva and aparatva as two separate qualities, because they can be explained by conjunction.^[57] His view has been refuted by Udayana and Sriballabha. According to the standard Vaisesika view, vega is a variety of the quality of samskara. But he thinks that when actions are very rapidly produced we have the notion of vega. As such, it should not be considered a quality. The quality of sneha is accepted by him, but he says that it should not be accepted as belonging to water alone, because in the medical science clarified butter (ghrta) etc. also are said to be possessing that quality.^[58] Moreover, when rice etc. are mixed with water one does not say that there is sneha, but when the same is mixed with such butter it is said to have that quality.

Coming to substances, we find that Bhasarvajna has rejected two, namely, dik and kala.^[59] Briefly, his contention is that it is enough to admit God as the efficient cause of all the effects in the world. These two substances also are accepted to be so. But it is not necessary to admit so many general causes. God is all-powerful and it is sufficient to admit Him as the cause. He also refutes the contention that in the awareness of simultaneity etc. kala is the special cause and in the awareness of east etc. dik is the special cause.

Finally, we must note in particular his view on the nature of liberation (moksa).^[60] He argues that there is manifested eternal bliss in the state of liberation. In some works, it is stated that the Nyaya and the Vaisesika differ on the nature of liberation. According to the former, pleasure is experienced in liberation, but, according to the latter, liberation means the destruction of all specific qualities of the self. In liberation, the self becomes devoid of all qualities and remains like akasa itself. There is no scope for any awareness of pleasure.

According to Gautama, liberation belongs to the category of prameya. While explaining the sutra of Gautama defining liberation, Vatsyayana elaborately examines and refutes the view that eternal bliss is manifested in the state of liberation.^[61] But Bhasarvajna has strongly argued for such a view and it seems that he has answered the major objections raised by Vatsyayana. Briefly, his contention is as follows. If it is said that in liberation there is no consciousness or knowledge, then such a state will not be at all different from states like swoon (moha) etc. In that case no sane person would exert himself for the attainment of liberation.

Moreover, there is also scriptural evidence which establishes that liberation is a state of bliss. There is no ground to suppose that in such scriptural statements ‘pleasure’ means absence of suffering. He also refutes the objection that if awareness of pleasure is admitted in liberation there would be no difference between a man in liberation and a man in bondage.