Vaisesika Doctrines (in the Nyaya Works)

by Diptasree Som | 2010 | 25,594 words

This essay studies the Vaisesika Doctrines in the Nyaya Works.—Both part of the system of Indian philosophy, Nyaya and Vaisesika are accepted to be friendly to each other. Many standpoints are advocated by both systems. For example, both Nyaya and Vaisesika strongly argue that all the three terms (viz., buddhi, upalabdhi and jnana) are synonymous, ...

Chapter 2 - The Position of Gautama and Vatsyayana

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We have already noted that the Nyaya and the Vaisesika are considered samanatantra or closely related. In the earliest work of the Nyaya system, the Nyayasutra of Gautama, we find on many occasions references to the Vaisesika views, which are also admitted by the Nyaya. Generally the Vaisesikasutra of Kanada is considered earlier than the work of Gautama. Still, we cannot say that Gautama borrowed from Kanada. It is better to accept that Gautama admitted and developed these views independently, though similarity with the Vaisesika position is very clear. We shall now try to give some idea in this regard from the text of Gautama.

Self (atman) is admitted as a separate entity by the Nyaya and the Vaisesika. According to Gautama, the self is a prameya and it is known by inference.^[1] Thus Gautama says that the marks for the inference of the self are desire, aversion, motivation, pleasure, suffering and knowledge. Now, introducing the sutra, Vatsyayana says that the self cannot be known by perception. That it can be known from verbal testimony is beyond question. But it may be asked, is there any other means for knowing the self? In answer to this, Gautama says that it can also be known by inference.^[2]

This explanation agrees well with the Vaisesika position. Kanada also says clearly that the mind (manas) and the self are both imperceptible.^[3] Some Naiyayikas argue that a person can have an internal perception of his individual self. But here it is claimed that the self can never be perceived. The implication seems to be that the self cannot be cognized as distinct from the body etc. by internal perception. Inference alone can establish the self as such. However, it is to be noted that under special conditions Kanada also admits the perception of the self.^[4] In a sutra Kanada simply says that from a special kind of contact there may be produced the perception of the self. Commentators point out that Kanada here refers specifically to the perception of a Yogin, who can restrain the mind from all external objects and solely concentrate on the self. In fact, Vatsyayana has quoted the sutra of Kanada under the third Nyayasutra while explaining the Nyaya theory of pramana-samplava. The self can be known by a number of pramanas, namely, verbal testimony, inference and perception. In this connection we may point out that Kanada and his followers have mentioned quite a lot of grounds for inferring the self. Besides mentioning some which are specially Vaisesika arguments, Kanada has also stated all the six marks as enumerated by Gautama. There is similarity of expression also. Prasastapada also notes all the grounds given by Kanada and explains them.^[5] The ground as stated by Gautama also are explained by him, though very briefly. Pleasure etc. are qualities. They must belong to some substance (dravya). This substance must be a new one, and it is nothing but the self. The explanation as given by Vatsyayana under the sutra referring to the self is different and elaborate. However, in a different context—while illustrating the third form of inference^[6] according to the second interpretation ─ he gives exactly the same argument as given by Prasastapada.

In the Nyayasutra, we find a lot of discussion on the nature of the self extending over a number of sections. In the Vaisesikasutra and the Prasastapadabhasya the discussion is brief and many of the arguments are absent. However, at least two arguments noted by Prasastapada are found in the Nyayasutra.^[7] How is it that qualities like desire etc. cannot belong to body etc.? One argument is that the qualities of material elements are present as long as the substance is there. But desire etc. are not so. Secondly, the qualities of material elements are known by external senses. But desire etc. are not so. Hence, desire etc. cannot belong to the body.

In the list of prameyas given by Gautama, the third and the fourth are respectively indriya and artha. The senses are five in number, namely, the olfactory (ghrana), the gustatory (rasana), the visual (caksus), the cutaneous (tvac) and the auditory (srotra). Each of them again is of the nature of one of the five material elements, namely, earth, water, fire, air, and akasa.^[8] These elements again have each a special quality, namely, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. This account is in complete agreement with the Vaisesika position.

According to the Vaisesika, the first category (padartha) is substance (dravya). All the material elements are substances. Each of them is the material cause of one of the senses. Of course, in the Vaisesika works, the elements are discussed in a detailed manner and also according to a different plan. Thus, for example, Prasastapada discusses the nature, classification, and qualities etc. of each element in a separate section. But in Gautama’s work they are mentioned rather incidentally.

According to Gautama, artha stands for the five special qualities, smell etc., as present in the five elements.^[9] However, the word artha is used in a technical sense by the Vaisesika also. Kanada himself says that the term is applied to mean the first three categories, namely, substance, quality and action.^[10] Though there may be difference in the presentation, there is no difference regarding the basic positions.

From the works of the different systems of Indian philosophy, it appears that there is controversy regarding the meanings of the terms, namely, buddhi, upalabdhi and jnana. The Sankhya maintains that these terms signify different things involved in the production of a cognition. As against this, both Nyaya and Vaisesika strongly argue that all the three terms are synonymous, they mean knowledge or cognition itself. Gautama himself states this conclusion and Prasastapada also mentions it clearly.^[11]

According to Gautama, manas is the sixth prameya. It cannot be proved by perception. Gautama says that it is inferred from the fact that cognitions are not produced simultaneously.^[12] It is also one, i.e. each body has a single mind. It is also atomic (anu) in magnitude. Sometimes it may appear that many cognitions or actions are taking place at the same moment. How, then, can manas be regarded as atomic? The answer is that the awareness of simultaneity is actually wrong. It is due to the extremely quick movement of the mind. We have such illusion, for Example in the case of a circling fire-brand (alatacakra).

All this also agrees fully with the Vaisesika view, though the presentation may be different. Like the material elements, manas also is regarded as a substance. The ground for its existence as given by Kanada and Prasastapada is different. Kanada himself states that in spite of contacts among the self, the sense and the object a cognition may not be produced.^[13] This implies that some other factor is necessary for the production of knowledge, and this is nothing but the manas.^[14] However, there is no doubt about the similarity of basic ideas.

In the list of prameyas, we also find body (sarira). That a body is made of material elements is admitted by all the systems of Indian philosophy. But the question is, is the body, like the different senses, composed of a single element or is it composed of different elements? The question has been discussed by Gautama in a special section of the third chapter of his work.^[15] From this discussion and Vatsyayana’s comments, it is clear that different opinions are held in this regard. In the first sutra of the section, Gautama says that the body is made of earth. The reason for this is that, in the body, only the specific quality of earth (i.e. smell) is perceived and the specific qualities of water etc. are not perceived. Vatsyayana points out that in spite of this there may be a possibility of earth being conjoined with the other four elements in the making of the human body.

It may be objected that the specific qualities of other elements also may be found in the body. For example, sneha and usnasparsa which are respectively the qualities of water and fire are also found in the body. Thus, it cannot be said that the body is made of earth only. Gautama himself does not really refute the position of the opponents. Vatsyayana explains why Gautama does not do so. The position of the opponent is rather doubtful.^[16] The presence of the specific qualities of the different elements in the body may mean two things. First, all the elements actually produce the body. Secondly, earth alone is the material cause, but the other elements are simply conjoined with it. The second position is more logical. If different elements are accepted as the material cause, then actually no specific quality would be produced in the body. If it is made of earth it cannot have the quality of water, on the other hand, if it is made of water, it cannot have the quality of earth.

It is easy to see that Kanada also holds the same view. He categorically states that the body cannot be made of five elements. In the Vaisesika view the material elements like earth etc. may be divided into three classes, namely, sarira, indriya and visaya.^[17] The first argument given by Kanada is however different. That which inheres in the perceptible as well as the imperceptible is itself imperceptible, for example, the conjunction between a tree and akasa. Here a tree is perceptible, but akasa is imperceptible. If it is assumed that the body is made of the five elements, it should inhere in each of these elements. But one of the elements, akasa, is imperceptible. Thus, according to rule, the body should not be perceptible.^[18]

It may be argued that even then the body may be considered as made of the first three elements, namely, earth, water and fire, which are all perceptible. Kanada rejects the objection by saying that in that case the body cannot have the specific quality of any of the material elements. As we have seen, the same argument has been offered by Vatsyayana.^[19]

Finally, it may be noted that there is also complete agreement of views between the Nyaya and the Vaisesika regarding the qualities of the five material elements and nature of the senses, each as being made of one particular element. Thus, for example the qualities of smell, colour, taste and touch belong to earth and the olfactory sense is made of earth. The total position is mentioned and discussed, and also the opponents’ position is refuted—in the sutras of Gautama himself.^[20]

One of the well-known and important theories found in Indian philosophy is the atomic theory. Almost all the realist schools try to explain the origin of the world with the help of this theory. Although many schools have discussed it according to their own positions, this theory is generally associated specially with the Vaisesika. There is no doubt that the Vaisesika is an advocate of the atomic theory. However, in the earliest available work of the system, the Vaisesikasutra of Kanada there is no direct reference to it and it has not been discussed as a theory in the text. But there are some sutras on the basis of which it can be shown that Kanada is definitely an atomist. The theory is considered important and taken up for discussion seriously by later philosophers of this school. It is developed by them to a great extent.^[21]

In the Nyayasutra itself the theory has been discussed specifically and in detail. Gautama has also noted and answered some objections that may be raised by the opponents. In the fourth chapter there is a section called ‘on the reality of a partless entity’ (i.e. atom). He also mentions the triad (truti). Thus, for example, he says that an absolute nonexistence of all things is not possible, because an atom (anu=paramanu) remains in the end. According to Vatsyayana, this remark shows that Gautama considers an atom to be partless. The commentator has moreover explained that it also points to a proof for the existence of an atom.^[22]

We may note the position of Vatsyayana briefly. He says that the partlessness of an atom follows from the fact that an atom represents an entity compared to which nothing else can be smaller and hence, in which the possibility of getting smaller and smaller due to further and further division of the part is ended. For instance, the piece of an earth-clod (losta) which is being divided into parts further and further becomes smaller and smaller step by step. But such a possibility of getting smaller and smaller is ended after a piece is arrived at compared to which no other piece can be conceived to be smaller, i.e. which is minute to the utmost degree. Thus, what we call by the term ‘atom’ is an entity compared to which nothing else can be smaller.^[23] This is most probably the earliest proof for the admission of an atom found in any text of Indian philosophy. This idea may not be clearly found in any early text of the Vaisesika, but there is no doubt that it is quite an acceptable position for the school.

Explaining the argument further, Uddyotakara says that a limit to division has to be admitted, division cannot go on endlessly. If this is not accepted even a triad which is really a very small substance would become logically as big as a mountain, because both a triad and a mountain would be composed of an unlimited number of atoms. As Vacaspati comments, if a limit to division is denied, both a triad and a mountain would be equal in magnitude, for, in that case, the component parts of both would be unlimited in number and it would not be possible to justify the difference in their respective magnitude by referring to the varying number of their respective component parts, which in fact, pre-supposes the admission that the process is to be stopped at some point beyond the triad.

Another well-known view of the Vaisesika closely connected with the atomic theory is the doctrine of pakaja qualities. It is observed that when an earth-substance comes in contact with fire or heat its four original qualities -colour, taste, smell and touch—change into new ones, as for instance, a black and unbaked jar when put into fire becomes red and hard. The original colour etc. are due to the colour of the parts and the latter are due to a special conjunction with fire. The new colour etc. are called pakaja. Just as Kanada has spoken of such qualities in his work, Gautama also refers to them on many occasions showing that the theory is quite admitted by him.

For example, in the third chapter of his work, Gautama has discussed whether consciousness can be regarded as a quality of the body. Gautama says that the properties of the body are generally present in it as long as the body is there—a body is never seen, for instance, without its colour.^[24] Consciousness may sometimes be absent from the body. It is not therefore similar to the quality of the body. It cannot be a quality of the body. To this, one may object that a quality may not be present even when the substance is present. When a jar is put into fire, its black colour is destroyed, but the jar remains as before. Similar may be the case with consciousness and the body. Gautama answers that a substance is never absolutely without colour, because a different colour is produced in it due to its conjunction with fire.^[25] In the body, however, there may be an absolute absence of consciousness. Again, in the last section of the third chapter, while showing that the human body is produced by dharma and adharma, Gautama argues against the opponent that in his view there should be produced a body even after liberation has been attained. To this, the opponent may point out that it is not so. The objection may be answered by the instance of the uncaused black colour of an atom. The idea is that just as the uncaused black colour of an atom, when destroyed by conjunction with fire, is never produced again, so also the body which is produced by adrsta as present in the atoms and the mind is not produced once again after its destruction in liberation.^[26]

Some opponents argue that the attainment of liberation is impossible. Liberation means an absolute destruction of the stream of sufferings. But it is something natural and without beginning. Such a thing cannot be absolutely destroyed. Before giving his own answer, Gautama notes how some others answer the objection. They say, just as the black colour of an earth-atom, though without beginning, is non-eternal, because it is destroyed by conjunction with fire, so also the stream of sufferings, though without beginning, is non-eternal, because it is destroyed by right knowledge.^[27]

However, one point of difference between the Nyaya and the Vaisesika in the present context, which is clear from later literature of the two systems, may be briefly mentioned here. According to the Vaisesika, the disappearance of the original colour and the appearance of the new one start in the very atoms of the jar which, being put into fire, disintegrates and the changed colour of the atoms becomes the cause of the changed colour of the jar. This view is known as pilu-paka-vada. According to Nyaya, the jar remains intact and the disappearance and the appearance of colours take place in the jar as a whole. This view is known as pithara-paka-vada^[28]

Again, in the first ahnika of the third chapter Gautama incidentally refers to some conditions which make the perception of colour possible. The sutra of Gautama, it is found, is exactly similar to the one found in the Vaisesikasutra also.^[29] This has led to controversy among the scholars. Vatsyayana clearly explains the sutra with a lot of appropriate examples. But other commentators like Vacaspati, Visvanatha and others do not comment on it.

Therefore, some scholars argue that this is not a genuine sutra of Gautama. Actually, Vatsyayana has quoted this sutra of Kanada to make clear the implications of a sutra formulated by Gautama. Whatever may be the actual position there is no doubt about the fact that as regards the conditions of perceptibility there is no difference of opinion between the Nyaya and the Vaisesika.

In fact, the comments of Vatsyayana may very well be taken as explanation offered by a Vaisesika author.

Thus he writes:

“The visual rays are characterized by latent colour, and hence these are not perceived. The same element of fire is observed to have different characteristics. Thus, the element of fire may sometimes be visible with manifest colour and manifest touch, as in the case of the rays of the sun. The element of fire may, again, be visible with manifest colour but latent touch, as in the case of the rays of a lamp. The element of fire may also be invisible with manifest touch but latent colour, when, e.g., it is mixed up with water etc. The element of fire may moreover be invisible with latent colour and latent touch as in the case of the visual rays.”^[30]

According to both the Nyaya and the Vaisesika, doubt (samsaya), a distinct form of cognition, is generally supposed to be a precondition for critical discussion. The nature of doubt has also been discussed by both Kanada and Gautama. Regarding the causes of doubt there is some similarity between their views, but there is also some difference. For example, the knowledge of similarity is admitted to be a cause of doubt by both. But apprehension (upalabdhi) and non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) are admitted to be the causes of doubt separately by Gautama only.^[31] Some Vaisesika commentators have tried to show that really there is no opposition between the views of the two. It is interesting to note that in the fourth chapter of the Nyayasutra there is a sutra mentioning the cause of doubt, which agrees almost word for word with a sutra of Kanada explaining the same point.^[32] Gautama mentions it to justify a discussion on the nature of the ‘whole’ (avayavin) as a separate entity, while Kanada mentions it to justify a discussion on the nature of the quality of sound (sabda).

It is well-known that universal (samanya or jati) is recognized as a distinct category (padartha). In the scheme of categories as found in the Nyaya it is not actually mentioned as such, but there is no doubt that the Vaisesika concept of universal is quite acceptable to the Nyaya also. In the last section of the second chapter Gautama discusses about the meaning of a term. According to Gautama universal also is signified by a term, along with individual and shape. In this connection Gautama gives the definition of universal also, which is very similar to the Vaisesika conception.^[33] The basic argument for admitting universal is the same for both.

We have tried above to give an account of how many Vaisesika views have been treated in the Nyayasutra of Gautama. We shall now try to see what is the attitude of Vatsyayana, the author of the Nyayabhasya, towards the same. It is clear that he was very much acquainted with such views. He has quoted a number of Vaisesika sutras and often explained them with great care, showing properly the Vaisesika standpoint. Moreover, in the commentary he has made statements which are almost Vaisesika sutras with only some variations in word. Again, while explaining many of the sutras of Gautama he has given examples and brought out the implications by referring to distinct Vaisesika doctrines.

As a notable example of the last, we may refer to Vatsyayana’s commentary on the anumanasutra of Gautama.^[34] This sutra is very brief, though it has two parts, one giving the definition and the other giving the classification. The implication of the definition is not difficult to follow, but in the case of classification we have only three names and no definition or example what so ever. No help in this regard is available even from the critical examination of inference in the second chapter. But the commentator has explained the three forms of inference with much importance. In fact, he has defined and illustrated each of them with two sets of definition and example. However, he has not given any indication of his preference for either of the alternatives.

Why does the commentator offer alternative explanations? According to some, even before Vatsyayana, there were current different interpretations of the Nyayasutra. As Gautama himself is silent on the nature of the three forms, possibly there was difference of opinion even among the Naiyayikas themselves. Vatsyayana has chosen only two of such views and recorded them as he found to be logical and acceptable. Others think that may be he himself was not clear about the nature of the three forms and only tried to show that different interpretations were possible. Again, according to a third opinion, his first explanations actually represent the Nyaya position, while the second explanations are offered according to the Vaisesika tradition.

Let us try to understand the implication of the third view. According to the second explanation, a purvavat inference is one when an object not perceived at the moment is inferred through the perception of one of the two objects as they were previously perceived, for example, fire from smoke. That is, two objects are earlier perceived as invariably related. One object similar to one of them is now perceived. From this is inferred an object similar to the other. Kanada does not offer any clear definition or classification of inference. But Prasastapada has done so systematically. He classifies inference into two forms, drsta and samanyatodrsta. It appears that this first form and purvavat according to second explanation are basically the same.^[35]

According to Gautama, the second form of inference is sesavat. This name has not been mentioned by Kanada or Prasastapada. But it is clear from Vaisesika literature that a typical form of inference is recognized by the Vaisesika, which is generally known as parisesa. According to Vatsyayana’s second explanation, it is clear that sesavat and parisesa are really synonymous, and the commentator has given a typical illustration from the Vaisesika.

From a very early period there was controversy among the Indian philosophers about the nature of sound (sabda). Some consider it to be a quality (guna), others think that it is a substance (dravya). According to the Vaisesika, sound is a quality. But, how is this view established? Vatsyayana argues that it is proved by a sesavat or parisesa inference. He explains the process by quoting a sutra of Kanada. In the sutra, it is said generally that satta etc. are the common properties of the three categories, namely, substance, quality and action. Sound is found to be characterized by these two properties. Therefore, it follows that it cannot belong to the categories of universal, particularity and inherence, which do not have these properties. Thus, there arises a further question: Is sound a substance or a quality or an action? No substance can have as its inherent cause a single substance. But sound has for its inherent cause only a single substance, namely, akasa. Therefore, sound is not a substance. Again, one action cannot result in similar successive actions. But a sound is found to result in a series of similar successive sounds. Therefore, sound is not an action. As there are only six categories and it is found that sound can not belong to the five, it is to be concluded that it must belong to the remaining category, namely, quality. It is easy to see that in this account Vatsyayana is almost presenting himself as a follower of the Vaisesika.^[36]

Both the Nyaya and the Vaisesika admit the self as distinct from the body etc. Generally the self is admitted to be imperceptible. Kanada has stated clearly that the self and the mind cannot be perceived. Prasastapada also says that the self is very subtle and can not be known by perception. However, it seems that under certain special circumstances the self may be directly known. Thus in the case of Yogins there may be the perception of the self owing to a special form of contact between the mind and the self. It is an extraordinary form of perception possible only in the state of samadhi.^[37]

Vatsyayana has accepted and made use of this position quite clearly. While explaining the Nyaya view of pramana-samplava, he illustrates it in the case of an extraordinary (alaukika) object by referring to the view of the extraordinary perception of the self in samadhi. In fact, he quotes the relevant sutra of Kanada.

In the first chapter of his work Gautama has stated that the self is proved by marks (linga) like iccha etc. Vatsyayana introduces the sutra in the following manner. It is established that the self is not known by perception. It is also accepted that its existence is known from verbal testimony. So a question may arise: Is the self known by verbal testimony only? In answer, Gautama says that the self can also be proved by inference and there are certain specific marks for that.^[38]

As regards the nature of the sense-organs, there is a well-known controversy between the Sankhya and the Nyaya. According to the former, they are not material, but all are produced from the single element of ahamkara. But, according to the latter, they are all material and each external sense-organ is produced from a single bhuta. The former view has been criticized in the third chapter of the Nyayasutra.^[39] In the Nyaya view, the visual organ is made of tejas and has rays (rasmi). But the followers of Sankhya deny such rays because they are not perceived even though the conditions of perceptibility are present in their case.

In this context, Gautama, and following him Vatsyayana, have explained why the visual rays, though actually existing, are not perceived. Incidentally, the conditions of perceptibility are also explained and illustrated. The whole discussion appears to be according to the basic views of the Vaisesika.^[40] For example, it is pointed out that perception of an object depends on its specific nature. Different substances and different qualities have their own nature. Because of this difference of nature some may be perceived and some may not. There can be no simple or uniform rule in this regard. There may be some general conditions of perceptibility, but when one substance is mixed up with another, the quality of one may not be perceived. For example, the colour of a water-substance may remain latent and unperceived, while its cold touch may be manifest and perceived. Similarly, the colour of a firesubstance, being latent, may not be perceived, though its warm touch may be perceived because of being manifest. Even the same ‘fire’ is found to have different characteristics. In the case of the rays of the sun both colour and touch are perceived. But in the case of the rays of a lamp colour is manifest, but touch is latent. Thus, it can be said that the visual rays, which are of the nature of fire, have colour and touch, both being latent. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the visual rays do not exist.

If we go through the commentary of Vatsyayana carefully we also find that in many cases he has briefly but clearly referred to distinct Vaisesika conclusions. Sometimes his comments appear as the sutras of Kanada. We have already mentioned the example of parisesa inference given by Vatsyayana. Many comments there almost represent Kanada’s sutras. Again some such sutras have been partially quoted by the Nyaya commentator.

One of the sixteen categories admitted by Gautama is siddhanta. It is of four kinds, one of them being pratitantrasiddhanta, which means a conclusion admitted in one’s own system but not accepted in another system. Gautama gives the definition only, but no example. Vatsyayana adds the example in the commentary.^[41] He says that with reference to the Sankhya, such conclusions would be—the nonexistent never comes into being, nor is the existent absolutely destroyed; the conscious selves are without modification; modification occurs in the body, senses and mind, in the objects and their causes, namely mahat, ahamkara and the five tanmatras. On the other hand, with reference to the followers of Yoga such conclusions are—the creation of the material world is due to karman; evils and activity are the causes of karman; the conscious selves are characterized by their respective qualities like iccha etc.; the nonexistent comes into being and the existent is absolutely destroyed. Vatsyayana here does not mention the name Vaisesika, but he refers to some special Vaisesika views with the remark that these views are held by the followers of Yoga. Here the word yoga cannot refer to the system of Patanjali, because it generally accepts the doctrines advocated by Sankhya. Thus scholars have shown that the Vaisesika also is often referred as Yoga and therefore Vatsyayana has definitely illustrated the point with Vaisesika views. All these conclusions are based on arambhavada which is a doctrine commonly shared by both Nyaya and Vaisesika.

One of the topics which is generally taken up for discussion in almost all the texts of particularly the Nyaya and the Mimamsa is the question whether sound (sabda) is to be considered as eternal or non-eternal. Both Kanada and Gautama have discussed the question in their works, the former in the second chapter of the Vaisesikasutra^[42] and the latter in the same chapter of the Nyayasutra.^[43] Gautama has given some typical arguments of his own to establish that sound is non-eternal. But Vatsyayana has made some comments in his explanation which are in fact a repetition of the words of Kanada.

While introducing the section on the non-eternality of sound and explaining why a doubt regarding the nature of sound is produced, Vatsyayana says that, according to some, sound is a quality of akasa and just like jnana it is also characterized by origin and destruction. The commentator has not mentioned the name, but Vacaspati clearly points out that the reference is to the Vaisesika view. Moreover, explaining one of the grounds offered by Gautama—sound is to be considered as eternal, because it has origin (adi)—Vatsyayana comments that whatever has a cause is non-eternal. Sound is a quality which is produced by either conjunction or disjunction and thus, since it has a distinct cause, it must be non-eternal. All this is really taken from Kanada. Kanada also says that sound may be produced due to conjunction or disjunction or a sound itself, and sound must be non-eternal because of having a cause.^[44]

In this connection we may also note that, according to the Vaisesika, sound is a peculiar quality, because sound is produced in a series (santana). A sound is momentary and gives birth to exactly similar sounds one after another. Each previous sound is destroyed by each succeeding sound in the series. Thus, in fact, the cause is destroyed by the effect. This is a typical Vaisesika view. Vatsyayana has referred to this more than once. Many other similar instances may be traced in the commentary of Vatsyayana.