Essay name: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
Author:
Satischandra Chatterjee
Affiliation: University of Calcutta / Department of Philosophy
This essay studies the Nyaya theory of Knowledge and examines the contributions of the this system to Indian and Western philosophy, specifically focusing on its epistemology. Nyaya represents a realist approach, providing a critical evaluation of knowledge.
Page 312 of: The Nyaya theory of Knowledge
312 (of 404)
External source: Shodhganga (Repository of Indian theses)
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THE FALLACIES OF INFERENCE 295 objection to a given argument based on the ground that we
can perceive the truth of the conclusion even without the
argument. The anupalabdhisama is an argument to invali-
date a given argument from non-perception, on the ground
that non-perception cannot be perceived. The nityasama is
an argument to prove the eternality of all non-eternal things
on the ground that they are eternally non-eternal. The
anityasama is an argument to prove the non-eternality of all
things on the ground of their resembling a non-eternal thing
in some respect or other. The karyasama is an argument
opposed to a given argument from the nature of an effect, on
the ground that an effect may have very different natures,
and so cannot be taken to lead to a single conclusion.'
The nigrahasthāna, which literally means a ground of
defeat, is a fallacy which is due either to a misunderstanding
or to the want of understanding. It is said to be of twenty-
two kinds. These are: pratijñāhāni or weakening one's pro-
position by adducing such examples as run counter to it;
pratijñāntara or shifting the proposition; pratijñāvirodha or
contradicting the proposition; pratijñāsannyāsa or renounc-
ing the proposition; hetvantara or shifting the ground;
arthāntara or shifting the topic; nirarthaka or the meaningless.
statement like abracadabra ; avijñātārtha or the unintelligible
statement; apārthaka or the incoherent statement; aprāpta-
kāla or the wrong order of the parts of an argument; nyūna
or the suppression of any part of an argument; adhika or the
duplication of the middle term or the example; punarukta or
the meaningless repetition of any part of an argument;
ananubhāṣaṇa or the refusal to answer a question; ajñāna
or ignorance of the proposition; apratibha or the inability to
give a reply to the argument; vikṣepa or evasion of the
argument; matānujñā or admission of the defect in one's
argument; paryyanuyojyopekṣaṇa or overlooking a defect in
the argument; niranuyojyänuyoga or finding fault with the
1 Vide NS., 1. 2. 18; 5. 1. 1 ff.