Part 7 - The fallacies of Chala, Jati and Nigrahasthana

Apart from the fallacies of inference, the Naiyayikas deal with certain other fallacies which occur in connection with the art of debate. These are called chala, jati and nigrahasthana. The fallacy of chala consists in using the same word to mean different objects in the course of a debate. It thus corresponds to the fallacy of ambiguity in Western logic. It is of three kinds, namely, vakchala, samanyachala and upacarachala. In vakchala or the fallacy of equivocation the same word is used in different senses. This is illustrated when one man says the boy is navakambala' (possessed of a new blanket), and another objects he is not nava-kambala (possessed of nine blankets). In samanyachala the same word is taken to mean an individual and the class to which it belongs, e.g. one man says 'this Brahmin is a learned man,' and another objects all Brahmins are not learned men.' In upacarachala or the fallacy of figure of speech, a confusion is made between the figurative and literal senses of an expression, 2 1 Vide Tarkabhasa, p. 37; Tarkasamgraha, pp. 58-60. 2 The word 'nava' means both new and nine.

e.g. when one says 'the scaffolds cry out,' and another objects 'scaffolds cannot cry." 1 Jati is the fallacy of irrelevance. In it a futile argument is based on some irrelevant consideration which does not really prove the conclusion. There are twenty-four kinds of jati or futile arguments. The first is called sadharmyasama, where an argument is based on some kind of similarity between two things, e.g. ' sound is eternal because it is incorporcal like the sky.' The second is vaidharmyasama, where an argument is based on some kind of dissimilarity between two things. The utkarsasama, apakarsasama, varnyasama, avarnyasama, vikalpasama and sadhyasama are futile arguments in which the character of the minor term or the example is altered or they are unduly assumed without sufficient reason. The praptisama and apruptisama are futile objections based on the wrong implictions of the co-existence between the middle and major terms or or their absence. The prasangasama and pratidrstantasama are futile objections based on the ground that the given example has not been proved by a series of arguments, or that there is a counter-example. The anutpattisama is an objection based on the ground that the middle term of the given argument cannot exist in the minor term before it comes into existence. The samsayasama is an objection based on the doubt arising from a middle term with opposite examples. The prakaranasama is an objection based on the ground of a middle term middle term which is related to both the sides of a controversy. The ahetusama is an objection which is based on the ground that the middle term is unintelligible in the three orders of time. The arthapattisama is an argument based on mere presumption. The avisesasama is an argument to prove the identity of all things on the ground of their having existence in common. The upapaltisama is an objection based on the ground that there is a counterargument to the given argument. The upalabdhisama is the 1 Vide Nyaya-sutra & Nyaya-Bhasya, 1. 2. 10-14.

objection to a given argument based on the ground that we can perceive the truth of the conclusion even without the argument. The anupalabdhisama is an argument to invalidate a given argument from non-perception, on the ground that non-perception cannot be perceived. The nityasama is an argument to prove the eternality of all non-eternal things on the ground that they are eternally non-eternal. The anityasama is an argument to prove the non-eternality of all things on the ground of their resembling a non-eternal thing in some respect or other. The karyasama is an argument opposed to a given argument from the nature of an effect, on the ground that an effect may have very different natures, and so cannot be taken to lead to a single conclusion.' The nigrahasthana, which literally means a ground of defeat, is a fallacy which is due either to a misunderstanding or to the want of understanding. It is said to be of twentytwo kinds. These are: pratijnahani or weakening one's proposition by adducing such examples as run counter to it; pratijnantara or shifting the proposition; pratijnavirodha or contradicting the proposition; pratijnasannyasa or renouncing the proposition; hetvantara or shifting the ground; arthantara or shifting the topic; nirarthaka or the meaningless. statement like abracadabra ; avijnatartha or the unintelligible statement; aparthaka or the incoherent statement; apraptakala or the wrong order of the parts of an argument; nyuna or the suppression of any part of an argument; adhika or the duplication of the middle term or the example; punarukta or the meaningless repetition of any part of an argument; ananubhasana or the refusal to answer a question; ajnana or ignorance of the proposition; apratibha or the inability to give a reply to the argument; viksepa or evasion of the argument; matanujna or admission of the defect in one's argument; paryyanuyojyopeksana or overlooking a defect in the argument; niranuyojyanuyoga or finding fault with the 1 Vide Nyaya-sutra, 1. 2. 18; 5. 1. 1 ff.

faultless apasiddhanta or the deviation from an accepted position; and hetvabhasa or the fallacy of the middle term.' It will appear from the above that some of the fallacies of chala, jati and nigrahasthana come under the inferential fallacies, while others are either semi-logical or non-logical fallacies. These relate either to the meaning of words and propositions, or to the conduct of the parties concerned in any discussion. Hence any elaborate account of these three kinds of fallacies with their many subdivisions is not necessary in connection with the Nyaya theory of inference. • Fide Nyaya-sutra, T. 2. 19; 5. 2. 1 ff.