Part 1 - Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka perception

As we have noticed in a previous chapter, perception has been divided by the Naiyayikas into two broad classes, namely, laukika or the ordinary and alaukika or the extraordinary. This division depends on the nature of the sense-object contact that is involved in all perceptions. Ordinary perception. again, has been divided into the six kinds of olfactory, gustatory, visual, tactual, auditory and mental perceptions. Such classification of ordinary perceptions has reference to the senses concerned in perception. According to another classification, ordinary perception is of two kinds, namely, nirvikalpaka or the indeterminate and savikalpaka or the determinate. Here the principle of classification is the character of the perceptual knowledge which arises from sense-object contact. To these two kinds of perception we may add pratyabhijna or recognition as a special form of determinate perception. Thus keeping in view the nature of perception, the Naiyayikas distinguish between three modes of ordinary perception, namely, the nirvikalpaka, the savikalpaka and pratyabhijna. Extraordinary perception being explicit and definite knowledge, has but one mode, namely, savikalpaka or determinate." While the distinction between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions is generally recognised in Indian philosophy, there is much difference of opinion, among the different systems, as to their exact nature and validity. The grammarian philosophers (sabdikas) along with others take the extreme view that all perceptions are savikalpaka or determinate, since every perception must be expressed in a verbal proposition and is consequently predicative in its character. This is met by another 1 Alaukikam tu . . . savikalpakameva, Nyayakosa, p. 499.

extreme view, held by the Buddhists and some Vedantists, that nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception alone is valid, while savikalpaka or determinate perception is false knowledge. Between these two extremes we may place the other systems of philosophy which accept both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions as true knowledge. Thus among the different theories of perception in Indian philosophy there seems to be a sort of gradation from the most abstract to the most concrete view of perception. In the Advaita Vedanta system we seem to have the most abstract view of nirvikalpaka perception. According to it, nirvikalpaka is the knowledge of pure being (sanmatram). It is a cognition of the 'this' or the existent as such, but not as determined by anything. To determine a thing is to characterise it by this or that quality and is thus to distinguish it from other things having different qualities. All this, however, is the work of discriminative thought (vikalpa). Prior to discrimination there cannot be any cognition of an object as such-andsuch, i.e. as a determinate reality. Hence nirvikalpaka perception must be the cognition of pure indeterminate being. It is in savikalpaka perception that an object is determined by certain qualities and is distinguished from different objects. But all objects being ultimately one undifferentiated unity of consciousness (caitanya), their distinction or difference is only an appearance. The view of the world as a plurality of independent reals is not only opposed to scriptural testimony, but also logically untenable and self-contradictory. Hence we are to say that savikalpaka gives us a knowledge of appearances, while nirvikalpaka gives us the ultimate truth.' The epistemology of the Neo-Advaita Vedanta is in agreement with the general metaphysical position of the earlier school. From the vyavaharika or practical standpoint it makes a distinction between savikaipaka and nirvikalpaka perceptions. According to it, savikalpaka is the knowledge of a thing as 1 Vide Ramanuja's commentary on the Vedanta-sutra, I. 1. 1 : Sastradipika, p. 40.

qualified by an attribute (vaisistyavagahi). In it the thing is related as subject to the attribute as its predicate. Hence the essence of savikalpaka perception is the determination of its object by way of predication. The perception of an object as a jar is savikalpaka, since the quality of 'jarness' is predicated of the object. On the other hand, nirvikalpaka is the knowledge of a thing as not related to anything, not even to itself (samsarganavagahi). It is the knowledge of the identity of a thing as excluding all relations. Hence in nirvikalpaka perception there cannot be any predication of the object in terms of the subject-predicate or substantive-adjective relation (visesya-visesana-sambandha). As instances of such nirvikalpaka or non-relational knowledge, the Vedantist mentions the propositions this is that man,' 'that art thou.' When in the presence of a man we have it said this is that Devadatta,' we have the perception of Devadatta as the same identical man. This knowledge of the man is nirvikalpaka, since its object is not qualified by or related to anything. What we apprehend here is the simple identity of the man in the past and the present, but not his relation to any time, space, or anything else. It is true that the man may have certain attributes and is related to this or that time and space. But in the perception in question we are not at all concerned with his relation to any attribute, but only with his identity as such. It may be urged here that since the knowledge is grounded on a proposition (vakyajanya), it cannot but be relational in character. A proposition is the assertion of a relation between two things, of which one is the subject and the other predicate. Hence the knowledge this is that man' must be savikalpaka or predicative. To this the Advaita Vedantist replies that a proposition which asserts the identity of an object does not come under the law of predication. When we say this is that man' we do not predicate that man' of 'this.' It is not the case that we relate this man' with 'that man,' but simply assert the identity between the two. An identity proposition (akhan- dartha vakya) thus gives us non-predicative or non-relational

knowledge (nirvikalpaka jnana).' Thus we see that, according to the Advaita Vedanta, nirvikalpaka perception is a judgment of identity expressed in a proposition. The identity that is perceived in nirvikalpaka does not pertain to any of the specific attributes or parts of the perceived object. It refers only to the identity of the object as an unrelated essence, i.e. as pure being. But while the 'identical' perceived in nirvikalpaka is an abstract unity of being, our knowledge of it is a propositional judgment of the non-predicative order (akhandartha vakya). The Vedantist further holds that nirvikalpaka perception is selfmanifest or self-conscious knowledge. It is perceived by itself (pratyaksa), and does not require any other knowledge to manifest or perceive it. It follows also that we have first the savikalpaka perception of an object as related to certain qualities and then a nirvikalpaka perception of it as a unity that remains identical with itself under different conditions. 2 According to the Buddhists, nirvikalpaka is the only type of valid perception. It is such cognition of an object as contains no element of thought or ideation in it (kalpanapodham). Ordinarily, knowledge involves two elements, namely, the given or the sensed and the meant or the ideated. The Buddhists hold that what is given is a unique individual (svalaksana) that belongs to no class and is not related to anything." We may call it by a name, bring it under a class and think of it as having certain qualities, actions and relations. But its name, class, quality, action and relation are not any part of what is directly given; these are the contribution of our mind (kalpana) to the given experience. Hence nirvikalpaka perception is a cognition of the given datum as such, i.e. as not modified by any idea or concept like those of its name, class, etc. (namajatyadyasamyutam). It is a pure sensation of the simples of experience and does not lend itself to any verbal 1 Vedanta-paribhasa, Ch. I. 2 Dignaga, Pramanasamuccaya, Ch. I; Nyayabindutika, pp. 9 f. Cf. "Apare tu svalaksanamatragocaram nirvikalpakamicchanti," Sastradipika, p. 41.

expressoin (abhilapasamsargayogyapratibhasam). As contrasted to this, savikalpaka perception is a verbalised experience, in which the object is determined by the concepts of name, class, relation, etc. Here we think of the object as a complex of parts and attributes, bearing a certain name and having certain relations. Such knowledge, however, is false, since it is not due to the given object, but to our conceptual construction of it. Thus the Buddhists reduce nirvikalpaka to pure sensation which is valid but blind, and savikalpaka to conceptual knowledge which is definite but false. Be it noted, however, that the Buddhist's nirvikalpaka as a cognition of the simples or unique individuals of experience is less abstract than the Advaitin's nirvikalpaka as a cognition of pure being. In the Minamsa, the Sankhya and the Nyaya-Vaisesika system we have what may be called a concrete view of perception. According to these realistic schools, what is given in perception is not, as the Advaitins think, a pure unity of being or the abstract identity of the 'this' and 'that' of experience. Nor is it, as the Buddhists suppose, the unique individual, the bare particular or the mere 'this' of experience. On the other hand, it is held in these systems that any perception, nirvikalpaka or savikalpaka, is a direct cognition, of the real individual which is a unity of the universal and the particular. The distinction between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka is not due to any difference in the contents of perception, but to the way in which the same contents of experience may be ordered and arranged. As we shall see, however, there is some difference of opinion as to the nature and structure of nirvikalpaka perception between the Bhatta Mimamsa and Sankhya systems, on the one hand, and the Prabhakara and Nyaya-Vaisesika systems, on the other. According to the Sankhya and the Bhatta Mimamsa, both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka are equally valid and necessary modes of perceptual knowledge. By nirvikalpaka 1. 1. 4. 1 Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, Bauddha philosophy. 25-(O.P. 103) Madhavacaryya, Sarvadarsanasamgraha. Chapter on Vide also Nyayamanjari, pp. 92 f.

NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE they mean that cognition which spontaneously arises at the first moment of contact between sense and object.' It is a knowledge of the object as one individual whole of generic and specific attributes. There is no differentiation between the universal and the particular that are combined in the body of the individual. Hence there is only an apprehension of the individual as an indefinite object (sammugdhavastumatra), but no definite understanding of it as this or that kind of object (vastuvisesa). Nirvikalpaka perception thus resembles the perception of children and dumb persons. Like the latter perception, it is a simple apprehension of an object as something, but not as this or that kind of thing. So, likewise, it cannot be expressed in words, i.e. embodied in propositions. Thus nirvikalpaka perception is a simple apprehension, in which the 'this' of experience is brought under the general idea of 'something' (vastusamanya). It is a judgment without words, i.e. a non-propositional judgment.3 That nirvikalpaka is a real mode of perception appears from the fact that it is the basis of what we call reflex actions and savikalpaka perceptions. When a man suddenly withdraws his finger from a pricking pin, we cannot say that there is in him a clear understanding of the pricking object as a pin. Yet without some knowledge of the object his action remains unintelligible. What prompts the man's action in this case is properly described as nirvikalpaka perception of 'something pricking him'. Again, savikalpaka perception is understood by all as the predicative knowledge of an object (vaisistyavagahi jnana). In it the homogeneous indefinite object of nirvikalpaka perception is analysed into the universal and the particular (samanya-visesa), and the two are then related by way of predication. Thus when I perceive an animal as a cow, my perception is savikalpaka, 1 Aksasannipatanantaramaviviktasamanyavisesavibhagam sammugdhavastumatragocaramalocanajnanam, Sastradipika, p. 40. 2 Sammugdham vastumatrantu praggrhnantyavikalpitam, visesabhyam kalpayanti manisinah, Tattvakaumudi, 27. 3 Ibid. tatsamanya-

since I definitely predicate 'cowness' of the animal before me. Now such predication is possible only through comparison of the animal in question with other objects of our past experience and recollection of their respective class-names. But the impetus to the acts of comparison and verbal memory must be given by a previous cognition of the animal as some kind of thing. This first nirvikalpaka cognition of the animal as something (vastusamanya) is necessary for the subsequent savikalpaka understanding of it as this particular kind of thing (vastuvisesa), i.e. as a cow. The indefinite individual of the first experience is analysed into this thing' as a particular, relation to it and qualifying lie 1 and 'cowness as a universal in it as a predicate. This is the savikalpaku knowledge of the thing in terms of the substantive-adjective relation, and it is expressed as a verbal judgment of the form: 'this is a cow.' Thus we see that, according to the Sankhya and Bhatta Mimamsa schools, nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka are but two stages in the perception of the same fact. The former is a stage of unverbalised judgment of an object as an individual whole, while the latter is a verbal judgment of it by way of predication. In the Nyaya-Vaisesika and Prabhakara Mimamsa systems we find a theory of perception which is in substantial agreement with that just explained above. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, ordinary perception is of two kinds, namely, nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka, both of which are equally valid and grounded in reality. They hold that nirvikalpaka is not merely a cognition of the bare particular (svalaksana), since it manifests the universal (samanya) as well. If the universal 2 1 Sastradipika & Siddhanta-chandrika, p. 40; Tattvakaumudi, 27. 2 Some commentators on the Nyaya system think that the distinction between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka is not recognised in the Sutra, Bhasya and Varttika, and that it was introduced into the Nyaya philosophy by later logicians. Vacaspati Misra, however, in his Tatparyatika (p. 125) traces the distinction to Nyaya-Sutra, I. 1. 4. Following his teacher, Trilocana, he takes the words avyapadesyam and vyavasayatmakam contained in this sutra to mean respectively nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions. Later Naiyayikas follow Vacaspati in this interpretation of the sutra and hold that it distinguishes between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka as two kinds of ordinary perceptions.

is not cognised at the nirvikalpaka stage, our knowledge of it at a subsequent savikalpaka stage becomes inexplicable. But for a direct knowledge of the universal as a unity of the individuals we could not recognise them as similar and group them together into one class. The universal cannot be constructed by our mind at any stage of our knowledge, unless we start with it as a directly given fact.' Nor again, is nirvikalpaka a knowledge of the abstract universal (samanyamatra), or of pure being (satta). Our first cognition of a thing is not merely an apprehension of its unity, but also of its differences. When we perceive anything, its manifoldness is as much manifest to consciousness as its unitary character. It is cognised as a unity of many parts, qualities and aspects. Likewise, if nothing but mere being (satta) be the content of immediate apprehension, we do not know how to account for our knowledge of the particulars (visesa) of experience. Further, pure being which is nothing in particular cannot be the object of our knowledge.² Hence we are to admit that in nirvikalpaka perception there is a cognition of both the universal and the particular, the generic and specific properties of an object as such." It is a knowledge of the perceived object with all the wealth of its concrete characters in themselves. It cognises the universal or the class-essence present in the object of perception as well as its colour, form, structure and other specific characteristics. Thus the nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception of an orange is the cognition which is produced immediately after the contact of the senses with the object, and which manifests its generic and specific properties in their isolation. It gives us a knowledge of the orange, not as orange, but as the grouping of a certain colour, taste, smell, etc., with a certain universal called orangeness. But while both the universal and the particuNM., 2 Ibid. 4 P. 98. ³ Samanyaviscsesu svarupalocanamatram pratyaksam, Padarthadharina-samgraha, p. 187; nirvisamanyam viscsam cobhayamapi grhnati, Nk., p. 189. kalpakam. 4 Siddhanta-muktavali, 58. .

lars constituting an object are cognised in nirvikalpaka perception, they are not brought under the substantive-adjective relation (visesyavisesanasambandhanavagahi). In nirvikalpaka perception these are cognised as unrelated units of reality. Here then the object of perception is not known as an individual related to a certain universal. It is not judged as an individual belonging to a certain class and bearing that classname. Hence nirvikalpaka is the knowledge of an object as not characterised in any way (nisprakaraka)." It is an apprehension of the object as 'something', but not as related to a class and called by a name (namajatyadiyojanahinam... kincididamiti). Hence it is not a judgment of the object in terms of the subject-predicate relation (vaisistyanavagahi). On the other hand, it is a simple apprehension of the existence and attributes of an object without any corresponding judgment of it in words, or by way of predication. 3 According to some linguistic thinkers there cannot be any nirvikalpaka perception in the the sense sense of an unverbalised experience as explained above. They hold that we cannot think things except through words. All objects are inseparably connected with the words by which they are denoted. To cognise a thing is to know it as such-and-such and so to relate it to a denotative word (vacakasabda). Likewise, we can act in relation to a thing only when we know it precisely as of this or that kind, i.e. determine it by means of a class-name. In fact, all our cognitions are embodied in verbal propositions, such as 'I know a colour,' 'I have a taste,' 'it is a smell,' and so on. All cognitions being thus inseparable from verbal expressions, there can be no nirvikalpaka or unverbalised cognition. The Nyaya-Vaisesikas repudiate the linguistic con- 4 1 Avyapadesyamm jatyadisvarupavagahi na tu jatyadinam mitho viscsanavisesyabhavavagahiti, Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, p. 125. 2 Namajatyadiyojanarahitam alpakam, Tattvachintamani, I, p. 809. vaisistyanavagahi nisprakarakam nirvikNirvikalpakam visesyaprakaradirahitam vastusvarupamatrajnanam Tarkamrta, Ch. II. * Nyaya-Bhasya, 1. 1. 4. ; Nyayakandali, p. 189.

tention on the following grounds. In the case of children and dumb persons there is undoubtedly a knowledge of many objects, but no verbal expression of that knowledge. Even in the case of grown up persons, who are in the habit of expressing their thoughts in words, there is such a thing as sensation which is a bare apprehension of something, but no verbal judgment of it. The first stage of perception is a sensory cognition arising just with the contact between sense and object. Like the perception of the child or the dumb person, it does not require and has not the time to develop into verbal judgment. The verbal expression of sensory cognitions is a later stage of perception, which serves the purpose of social intercourse and communication. The linguistic contention that objects are inseparable from their corresponding words leads to absurd consequences. If it were true that all objects are inseparably connected with all the words denoting them, even children and idiots should know all those words when they perceive the objects. It follows also that a man who perceives the words colour,' 'sound,' etc., should have a knowledge of the objects denoted by them, even though he may be deprived of their special sense organs. Hence the Naiyayikas conclude that all cognitions need not necessarily be verbally expressed knowledge. As a matter of fact, what enables us to recall the words with which an object is associated is a previous nirvikalpaka cognition of it as an existent fact. Our first experience of an object is a simple apprehension of its existence apart from any verbal association. Such simple unverbalised experience is the ground of our subsequent judgment of it in words or predicative propositions. Hence nirvikalpaka is a real stage of perception." $ 2 According to the Naiyayikas, nirvikalpaka is a real but not a perceived fact (atindriya). It is a conscious, but not a self-conscious state. The Naiyayikas hold that to be self-conscious means, for a conscious state, to be perceived by another state of consciousness. In self-consciousness (anuvyavasaya) 1 Nyaya-Bhasya and Nyayakandali, ibid. 2 Jannirvikalpakhyam tadatindriyamisyate, Bhasapariccheda and Siddhanta-muktavali, 58.

one cognition is cognised by another which follows the first and apprehends it as an object to itself. But there cannot be a cognition of nirvikalpaka cognition. To cognise a cognition is to know it explicitly as a cognition of this or that object. To become conscious of a mental state is to refer it explicitly to the self, on the one hand, and some definite object, on the other. Thus my awareness of a perception (anuvyavasaya) appears in the form 'I know this jar,' or 'I know this table.' Nirvikalpaka perception is a knowledge of the uncharacterised object. It is an undifferentiated feeling of the indefinite. As such, it cannot be known as a perception of this or that object. Hence the Naiyayikas differ from the Advaitins in holding that nirvikalpaka perception cannot be perceived or directly known.' Although we cannot perceive it, we can logically prove it. The existence of nirvikalpaka perception is proved by inference. In savikalpaka perception an object is known as related to certain qualities. But we cannot know the relation between a thing and its qualities unless we previously know these in themselves. Nirvikalpaka is this prior knowledge of the thing and its qualities as unrelated entities. It is the ground of our savikalpaka or relational knowledge about the thing. Hence we must admit nirvikalpaka as the first stage of all grades of perception, since a simple cognition of existents as such is the precondition of all complex cognitions of their different relations. Thus the reality of nirvikalpaka is inferred from savikalpaka perception." With regard to savikalpaka perception, the NyayaVaisesikas agree with others in holding that it is the cognition of an object as qualified by certain attributes (visistajnana). In it the object of perception is known as characterised by some qualities. So it is a judgment in which certain attributes are related to the object by way of predication, e.g. 'this is a 1 Nirvikalpakam na pratyaksam ' vaisistyanavagahijnanasya pratyaksam na bhavati, ghatamaham janamiti pratyayat, etc., Siddhanta-muktavali, 58. 2 Visistavaisistyajnanam prati hi visesanatavacchedaka-prakarakam jnanam karanam, etc., Tattvachintamani, I, p. 812.

." NYAYA THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE Here the attribute of cowness is predicated of the presented object. Hence savikalpaka perception is always expressed in a proposition, of which the subject is the thing perceived and the predicate is the attribute present in the thing. From this it follows that the contents of savikalpaka perception are the same as those of the nirvikalpaka. It is the same object that is cognised in both. But while in the former the object and its attributes stand in the subject-predicate relation, in the latter they are not so related. Hence the two differ, not in their object or content, but only in point of predication. Savikalpaka is a judgment of the object in words or propositions, but nirvikalpaka is a judgment of it not in words or propositions. The one is a predicative, while the other is a nonpredicative judgment of the same object or fact.² While nirvikalpaka is the first, savikalpaka is the second stage of an ordinary perception. The first stage develops into the second in the case of all normal individuals who know the use of any language. The process of development from the one to the other is explained by association and memory. In the case of the perceptional judgment: this is a cow,' the first step is the contact of sense with the object, which immediately leads to a nirvikalpaka perception or simple apprehension of the COW as something indefinite. The indefinite object of nirvikalpaka perception being associated with a certain class-name in our past experience revives the word-image answering to that name. With this we remember the class-name of the perceived object and call it by that name. It is here that we have a savikalpaka perception of the object expressed in the proposition 'this is a cow." The Buddhists deny the validity of the savikalpaka mode of perception. They contend that what is given in perception is a 1 Savikalpakamca visistajnanam yatha gaurayamiti, ibid., p. 839. Savikalpakam namajatyadiyojanatmakam. Tarkabhasa, p. 5 2 Tasmat ya eva vastvatma savikalpakasya gocarah sa eva nirvikalpakasya sabdollekhavivarjitah. . . Iha sabdanusandhanamatramabhyadhikam param, visaye na tu bhedo'sti savikalpavikalpayoh, Nyayamanjari, p. 99. 3 Vide Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, p. 128; Nyayakandali, p. 192.

bare particular which belongs to no class and bears no name, i.e. has no relations. Its class, name, etc., are only thoughtrelations which do not exist in the object, but are introduced into it by the thinking subject to meet the needs of our practical life. From the standpoint of the Nyaya realism, however, there is no error in the savikalpaka perception of an object as qualified by certain attributes and called by a name. According to it, what is given in nirvikalpaka perception is neither a characterless nor an uncharacterisable object, although it be not so far characterised in any way. In reality the object is a concrete individual in which certain particulars or specific attributes are united with a certain class-essence or universal. While in nirvikalpaka the object is apprehended as an undifferentiated whole of the universal and the particulars, in savikalpaka these are analysed, unfolded and recombined into the substantive-adjective relation. Hence it cannot be said that savikalpaka is concerned only with thought-relations which have no objective basis. Rather, it unfolds all that is implicitly involved in the nirvikalpaka stage and expresses it in the form of a proposition. It does not add anything that is not contained in the object itself. It represents no change or development in the object of perception. On the other hand, it marks a change in the perceptive consciousness of the object, a development of it from a dumb feeling of 'something there' to an articulate expression of the feeling as a cognition of this or that definite thing. Hence savikalpaka is as valid as, but more expressive than, nirvikalpaka perception." Yet another theory of perception, which we have to consider now, presents what may be called the most concrete view of perception. It takes up the extreme position that all perceptions are savikalpaka or determinate and that there is no such thing as a perfectly indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception. This view of perception is shared by the Carvakas, the Jainas, the ancient Sabdikas and the Visistadvaita Vedanta of 1 Vide Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, pp. 133 f., and Tarkikaraksa, pp. 60-61. 2 Vide Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, pp. 137-44; Nyayamanjari, pp. 64-69. 26-(O.P. 103)

amanuja. According to Ramanuja, to know a thing is to know it as possessed of certain attributes. A thing's existence cannot be separated from its nature and attributes. To know the 'that' or existence of a thing is also to know the 'what' or the nature of its existence. All knowledge is, therefore, a definite cognition of some object as related to a certain class and qualified by certain attributes. It is always a determinate (savikalpaka) cognition of the object as this or that kind of thing. There cannot be any knowledge of the perfectly indeterminate. That which is no thing in particular cannot be the object of our knowledge. Hence there is no such thing as indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) knowledge in the sense of a cognition of what is not determined or characterised in any way (nirvisesa). There being thus no absolutely indeterminate knowledge, the distinction of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception is a relative distinction. It is a distinction between two perceptions, both of which cognise an object as somehow qualified and determined (savisesavisaya). But while in mirvikalpaka the object of perception is partially determined, in savikalpaka it is determined more fully and clearly. Thus the first perception of a cow is nirvikalpaka in the sense of being a cognition of it as an animal of a certain make-up, or of some kind, but not of this or that particular kind. On the other hand, the perception of the same object, in the case of an adult who knows cows as a class, will be savikalpaka in so far as the object is here further determined and definitely known as belonging to the class of cows. Savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka perceptions are thus cognitions, not of the characterised and uncharacterised, but of the more or less definitely characterised object.' The Carvakas, the Sabdikas and the Jainas go further than Ramanuja and hold that nirvikalpaka perception is not real in any sense. According to the Jainas, all true knowledge must 1 Pratyaksasya nirvikalpakasavikalpakabhedabhinnasya na nirvisesavastuni pramanabhavah, etc., Sribhasya, 1. 1. 1.

be a definite and an assured cognition of objects (vyavasayatmakam jnanam).' What distinguishes true knowledge from doubt, error and the rest is the fact that it is a firm belief which is also true. It is a definite judgment of an object as this and not as that. In it there is a definite affirmation or denial that an object is or is not such-and-such. In the so-called nirvikalpaka perception, however, there is no such definite assertion of anything about any object. Hence it cannot be recognised as a form of valid knowledge. Further, all knowledge being implicit in an manifested by the self, perception is only conditioned and not produced by the function of the senses. Every perception, just when it occurs, will be a complete manifestation of the object. In perception there need not be a transition from an initial stage of vague and unorganised sense-impressions to that of distinct and determinate knowledge. All true perceptions are, therefore, determinate (savikalpaka) cognitions of objects as they really are in themselves." The same conclusion has been reached by the Sabdikas or grammarian philosophers on the ground of the intimate relation between thought and language. According to them, all objects are inseparably connected with the words or terms denoting them. All our thoughts and cognitions of things are expressed in words and propositions. We cannot think of things except through their corresponding denotative terms." Bhartrhari, a graminarian philosopher, lays it down as a general rule that there can be no thought without language and that all knowledge must be verbalised experience." It follows, therefore, that all our perceptions must be cognitions of objects as denoted by certain names or words. They must be expressed in propositions, in which the perceived thing and its qualities are 1 Vide Prameyakamalamartanda, 1. * Tanniscayatmakam samaropaviruddhatvadanumanavat, ibid., 3. 3 Ibid., p. 8. * Sarve'rthah sarvatha sarvada sarvatra namadheyanvitah, etc.. Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, p. 125. 5 Na so'sti pratyayo loke yah sabdanugamadrte, anuviddhamiva jnanam sarvam sabdena gamyate. (Bhartrhari, Karika quoted in Siddhantacandrika. PP. 39-40.).

related as subject and predicate. Hence there can be no nirvikalpaka perception in the sense of a cognition which is independent of verbal expression and free from association with words or general terms.' All perception is thus savikalpaka or determinate knowledge of objects as qualified by the attributes predicated of them. The Carvakas recognise only savikalpaka or determinate perception, in which we cognise objects as possessed of a number of perceptible qualities. For them, nirvikalpaka perception is a hypothesis which cannot be verified by actual experience. It is something which cannot be perceived and is therefore unreal. With this we pass from the extreme view of perception as blind sensation to what appears to us to be another extreme view of it as a fully developed judgment expressed in a predicative proposition. This is met by an intermediate position that distinguishes between two modes of perception, namely, the nirvikalpaka and the savikalpaka, of which the former is a simple apprehension or judgment of an object without words, and the latter a predicative judgment of it in a word-proposition. This intermediate position seems to be a more reasonable view of perception. The pure sensation, to which the Buddhists reduce perception, is a psychological myth. Then the linguistic view of perception as always a fully developed propositional judgment is contradicted by such perceptions as ante-date language, e.g. the perceptions of children and higher animals. Even in the case of adults who know a language, an indefinite cognition of an object as given in sensation may very well precede a definite perception, in which it is recognised as a particular kind of thing. According to most of the Indian systems, the former is the nirvikalpaka and the latter the savikalpaka mode of perceptual knowledge. It is also generally held by them that there is no room for error in nirvikalpaka perception, since it is a bare apprehension of the given object without any judgment of it as this or that. Hence it is always true. It is the 1 Nyaya-varttika-tatparya-tika, PP 125-26.

savikalpaka perception of an object as a particular kind of thing that is liable to error, since our judgment here may not conform to the real nature of the object.