Part 3 - Refutation of the Anvitābhidhāna-vāda

Vācaspati Miśra, after rejecting the third view on śābdabodha takes the view of Prabhākara Miśra, which is well known as anvitābhidhānavāda. According to this view, words themselves convey the anvitapadārthas, viz. their meanings and mutual relation, so that the padārthas conveyed by padas do not convey the meaning of the sentence i.e. vākyārtha.

Prābhākara and his followers maintains that the vākyārtha is one and viśiṣṭa and it is related to many subordinate ideas conveyed by padas.^[1] So, it can be well said that the padas themselves while they convey the padārthas, convey them only as related to one another on the strength of the three well known accessories viz. ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi. Hence, there is no necessity to accept the sphoṭavāda as the cause of the cognition of the vākyārtha.^[2]

Here, Vācaspati Miśra shows certain objections to the anvitābhidhānavāda from the point of abhihitānvayavāda. Firstly, he raises a question to the anvitābhidhānavādins: when a word in a sentence conveys its idea and the relation to the other ideas, are the other ideas conveyed or not by their own expressions in the sentence?^[3] If other ideas are not conveyed by their own expressions, it is to be admitted that ideas that are to be generally conveyed by words in a sentence are conveyed by the first word itself and so, there is the superfluity of the second and other words in the sentence.^[4] If it is said that other words also convey their own ideas, as well as their relation with other ideas, then in the sentence ūkhāyāṃ pacet for example,^[5] till the word pacet does not convey the idea ‘cooking’ as related to ūkhā, the word ūkhāyāṃ does not convey the adhikaraṇaūkhā; so also, the word pacet does not convey its idea till word ūkhāyāṃ conveys its meaning. Hence, there is the fallacy of interdependence.^[6]

The argument that words first convey their ideas (padārthasvarūpas) and then those padārthas as related (anvitārthas), so that there is no fallacy of interdependence (parasparāśrayadoṣa), involves the acceptance of two denotative powers (abhidhānaśaktis) for words, a fact which is neither warranted nor accepted on authority.^[7] It cannot also be argued that words convey only the ideas with their relation (anvitapadārthas), but those ideas were first recollected by their mere juxtaposition (sāhacarya) in order to avoid the assumption of double śabdaśakti for words. This is because the recollection of the meanings of words which should be based on their anubhavas as related to one another. In the example gāmānaya, the gośabda conveying the idea of cow (gopadārtha) as related to the action of bringing (ānayanakriyā) produces in the hearer a recollection of cow (ānayanānvitagopadārtha) as related to the action of bringing, but not a mere cow. This explanation would arises here a difficulty that the same gośabda in the sentence gāṃpaśya would not convey cow as related to the action of seeing (darśanānvitago), since it had been originally related to the action of bringing (ānayanakriyā).^[8] So also in the example prāsādaṃpaśya, the word paśya conveys the action of seeing (darśanakriyā) as related to the palace (prāsādapadārtha), and it does not convey the same as related to the cow (gopadārtha). This would set aside the possibility of explaining the padārthas and vākyārthas in all verbal propositions.^[9]

The argument that the gośabda on the basis of invariability (avyabhicāra) generates in the hearer a recollection of its meaning only, viz. cow and not the meanings of other words, is not correct as that invariability is not recognised as the cause of recollection.^[10] Recollection (smṛti) is actually produced by the mental impressions (bhāvanā), which is roused by the strong and constant previous experiences. And avyabhicāra has no place among the causes of rousing the mental impression (bhāvanābodha), since among the causes of mental impression, meditation (praṇidhāna) and others are recognised as a cause and not avyabhicāra.^[11] Sāhacarya is however accepted as one of the causes of the bhāvanābodha, should not be mistaken as invariability.^[12] And this sāhacarya is common to both svārtha and padāntarārtha (the meaning of one word and those of others), so that there arises from words a recollection of anvitapadārthas i.e. both svārtha and padāntarārtha. So, the gopadārtha cannot be said as related to darśanakriyā by ākāṅkṣā. Hence, there is no possibility of cognising the vākyārtha from a verbal proposition, if anvitābhidhāna is accepted.^[13]

That’s why the abhihitānvayavādin contends that words convey only their own meanings and those meanings are incomplete and incoherent in their isolation and related to one another on the basis of the threefold conditions viz. ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi and convey the vākyārtha.^[14]

In reply to this above, the anvitābhidhānavādin answers all the objections raised from the point of view of abhihitānvayavāda. Firstly, he says that there is no fallacy of interdependence, though the words through abhidhānaśakti convey the anvitapadārthas, the meanings of other words are not invariably recollected from one word for want of abhyāsa, so much so that there arises a recollection of its own meaning (svārtha) and its relation (anvaya) from a word (pada).^[15] Therefore it can be said that words invariably convey only their own meanings (svārthas) together with their relation, but not the meanings of other words also.

In support of this argument, the anvitābhidhānavādin raises a question to his opponent, the abhihitānvayavādin-what kind of cognition is that which one derives from words? There are only four kinds of cognitions are recognised, i.e., pramāṇa (valid knowledge), saṃśaya (doubt), viparyaya (misapprehension) and smṛti (recollection). The cognition of the meanings from words is not a pramāṇajñāna, because it does not possess as its object anything previously unknown.^[16] It is a doubt or viparyaya which is out of place. As there is no fifth variety, it is to be accepted that it is a recollection and that words, like praṇidhāna, are the conditions of saṃskārodbodha (rousing mental impressions). And this recollection of the meanings of words presents both objects and their relation.^[17]

Again, the abhihitānvayavādin is of the opinion that the padārthas are recollected by the abhidhānaśakti of words and not by mere sāhacarya, become the objects of the vākyārthabodha. This opinion is not tenable, because in the instances like gaṅgāyāṃghoṣaḥprativasati, the ‘bank’ which is only a secondary meaning of the word gaṅgā is related to ‘dwelling’, the primary meaning of the word prativasati.^[18] Moreover, one padārtha recollected by the abhidhānaśakti of one word can be related to another recollected by mere sāhacarya on the basis of ākāṅkṣā, so that it may not be again related to the other idea conveyed by its own word with its abhidhānaśakti. If this is possible, the whole vākyārtha would not be cognised at all.^[19] So, it should be admitted that the recollection of isolated ideas (ananvitārthas) first arises by the mere sāhacarya of words and then arises the recollection of the anvitapadārthas from words.^[20] It cannot be said that the padārthas are not mutually related because of the absence of verbal expectancy and this expectancy^[21] is said to be nothing but the knower’s desire for knowledge. It is explained on the basis of the incompleteness of abhidhāna (abhidhānāparyavasāna) as in the example dvāram which, being in nominative case, does not convey any new idea other than that of the stem (prātipadika); so, the knower seeks some other idea, which can be well related to the padārtha, viz. dvāra.^[22] It is also explained on the basis of the incompatibility of the idea already known from a word (abhihitāparyavasāna). In the example viśvajitāyajeta the sacrifice viśvajit is known by the instrumental case as the karaṇa (instrument) of the kārya, which is incompatible with the karaṇa without a niyojya-puruṣa and as such, leads to the explanation of a niyojya-viśeṣa (like svargakāma).^[23]

The argument of the abhihitānvayavādin that words convey their meanings without their mutual relation and those meanings produce vākyārthajñāna on the basis of the threefold accessories i.e. ākāṅkṣā etc., is not correct because words have no direct capacity to generate śābdabodha and unless those ideas are conveyed by words, they are not considered as the cause of the vākyārthajñāna.^[24]

Besides, the abhihitānvayavādin is of the view that one who perceives a white object and hears the heṣā sound (neighing) and the noise of galloping, experiences that a white horse gallops even without the cognition of words expressing meanings.^[25] Here, the anvitābhidhānavādin answers that this knowledge is attained either from inference (anumāna) or from presumption (arthāpatti), but not from words (śabda).^[26] In this above explanation he raises a question-whether in this instance one experiences the heṣā sound and the noise of galloping as co-existing in the white object, or whether all these three are independently known.^[27] In the former, the knowledge is inferential on the basis of probans; in the latter, it is a knowledge from presumption, in case no other object having these qualities are definitely known.^[28]

Moreover, if śābdabodha is generated by padārthas, it would be aśābda i.e. not based on śabdas; and as it is not definitely known whether the arthas seek the help of the mind which does not operate on the external objects, it would result in the acceptance of a seventh pramāṇa, called padārtha, which would be separate from the six well-known pramāṇas.^[29] Hence, it is to be accepted that the padārthas not conveyed by words do not become the cause of vākyārthajñāna, and that the

ideas conveyed by words possess the capacity to generate the śābdabodha.^[30] In this case, the abhihitānvayavādin has to accept two śaktis–one over the padārthas to generate the vākyārthajñāna and other over words capable of creating śakti over the padārthas.^[31] But for the anvitābhidhānavādin, only one śakti is to be accepted over words which convey padārthas on the strength of the intention of the speaker, and through that śakti alone one word conveys its meaning as related to the meanings of other words in the sentence on the basis of ākāṅkṣā etc. Hence, it is appropriate to say that words which convey padārthas are the cause of the cognition of the vākyārtha.^[32]

In this way, Vācaspati Miśra in his Tattvabindu formulates the rejection of the Prabhākara’s view on śābdabodha i.e. anvitābhidhānavāda from the point of view of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s abhihitānvayavāda.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

padārthameva hi (ekaṃ) pradhānaṃ guṇabhūtārthāntaravyatiṣaktaṃ vākyārthamācakṣate dhīrāḥ / Tattvabindu , p. 32

[2]:

taṃ ca padānyevākāṅkṣādyupadhānalabdhasukaravyatiṣaktīni prayojayitumīśata iti kṛtamaprāmāṇikānupapadyamānānavayavavākyādikalpanābhiḥ / Ibid.

[3]:

athāpi syādanabhihitenaivārthāntareṇānvitamarthamabhidadhīta padam? abhihitena vā / Ibid., p. 33

[4]:

tatrānabhihitasvārthāntarānvitasvārthābhidhāne padādekasmādevoccāritādvivakṣitārthapratīteḥ vaiyarthyam etareṣām / Ibid.

[5]:

abhihitānvitābhidhāne tu yāvatpacedityanenānvitasvārtho nābhidhānīyaḥ, tāvat ūkhāyāmityanenādhikaraṇamukhā nābhidhīyate / evamukhāyāmityanenāpi yāvatsvārtho nābhidhānīyaḥ, tavatpacedityanena svārtho nā-bhidhīyat iti parasparāśrayaprasaṅgaḥ / Ibid.

[6]:

padāntarasya vaiyarthyamaśrutānvayabodhane /
śrutānvitābhidhāne tu vyaktam anyonyasaṃśrayam // Ibid., p. 32

[7]:

padārthasvarūpābhidhānapūrvake tu tadvadanvitārthābhidhāne dvirabhidhānam aprāmāṇikam anupapadyamānamāpadyet / Ibid., p. 33

[8]:

tathā ca gāmānaya ityatra ānayanānvitasvārtho gośabdastena sahacarito gāṃ paśyetyatra tadanvitāmeva gāṃ smārayet na tanmātram/ tathā ca tannirākāṅkṣo gaurna paśyetyanena anviyāt / Ibid., pp. 33-34

[9]:

evaṃ ‘prāsādaṃ paśya’ ityatra prāsādānvitasvārthaṃ paśyapadaṃ tannirākāṅkṣaṃ na gavā sambandhyate iti, sarvapadārthapratyayo dattajalāñjaliḥ prasajyet / Ibid., p. 34

[10]:

na cāvyabhicārād gāmiti padaṃ svārthameva smārayati, na tu padārthāntarārthaṃ vyabhicārāditi sāmpratam / Ibid.

[11]:

paṭvabhyāsāhitā hi bhāvanā prabodhavatī smṛtiḥ saṅgīyate / tasyāśca prabodhaḥ praṇidhānādijanmā nāvyabhicāra evāyatate / Ibid.

[12]:

sāhacaryamātrasyāpi tu sambandharūpeṇa praṇidhānādigaṇapāṭhādupapatteśca, tadbodho na virūddhyate / Ibid.

[13]:

tacca svārthasyeva padārthāntarasyāpyastīti padāntarārthasahitameva svārthamanākāṅkṣitaṃ sahasaiva smārayediti, hatā vākyārthadhīstapas-vinīti, padānāmarthasvarūpamātrameṣitavyam / Ibid., pp. 34-35

[14]:

tathā ca te’rthāḥ kriyādayaḥ svasāmarthyena svarūpamātreṇa padairabhihitāḥ vināḥ kārakādibhiraparyavasyantastadākāṅkṣāyogyatāsattisahakāriṇo vākyārthadhiyamā-dadhatīti yuktam / Ibid., p. 35

[15]:

vidhāntarānavagamāt smṛtilakṣaṇayogataḥ /
abhyāsātiśayāt rūpasmṛtenārnyonyasaṃśrayaḥ // Ibid.

[16]:

edaṃ bhavānapi nirūpayatu pramāṇa-saṃśaya-viparyaya-smṛtiṣu katameyaṃ padātpadārthapratipattiriti? tatra na tāvatpramāṇamanadhigatārthabodhanaṃ tadupeyate / Ibid., p. 36

[17]:

na hi padasya praṇidhānādibhyaḥ saṃskārodbodhahetubhyaḥ kaścidviśeṣaḥ/ saṃśaya-viparyayahetubhāvastu padasyeti sthavīyaḥ/ na ca pañcamī vidhā samastīti, smṛtiḥ pariśiṣyate/ sā cānvitagocarā, na svarūpagocareti tulyo doṣaḥ / Ibid.

[18]:

abhidhānataḥ smāritaṃ vākyārthānvayi, na sāhacaryamātrāditi cet? kutastarhi ‘gaṅgāyāṃghoṣaḥprativasati’ etyādau tīrādīnāmanabhidheyānāṃ prativāsānvayaḥ / Ibid., pp. 36-37

[19]:

api cābhidhānataḥ smāritasya sāhacaryasmāritenaivārthāntareṇākāṅkṣoparateranā-kāṅkṣasya caramapratītena abhidhānato’rthāntareṇa saṃgamāyogātsamutpanna saṅkaṭaḥ vākyārthaḥ prasajyet iti kutastadbhāvanāḥ? Ibid., p. 37

[20]:

kutastamāṅca tadanvayasmaraṇamiti, akāmenāpyananvitasmaraṇamabhyupeyam / Ibid.

[21]:

ākāṅkṣā ca pratipatturjijñāsā / Ibid., p. 38

[22]:

sā ca kvacidabhidhānāparyavasānādbhavati, yathā ‘dvāram’ iti. na hyatra prakṛtyarthātirikte pratyayārthe pratītirasti yenānvitaḥ prakṛtyā svārtho abhidhīyate, prātipadikārthamātre prathamotpatteḥ / tadanabhidhānaparyavasānāya pratipattā padārthāntaraṃ smāritānvayayogyaṃ jijñāsate / Ibid.

[23]:

kvaciccābhihitārthāparyavasānāt / yathā-‘viśvajitā yajet’ iti / iha hi kāryasya viṣayakaraṇānvitasyābhidhānaṃ paryavasitam / na paryavasyati hi tatkāryaṃ niyojyabhedamantareṇa, na khalu kāryamanuṣṭhānaṃ vinā avatiṣṭhate, tadeva nākartṛkaṃ, na cānadhikṛtaḥ kartā, na cāniyojyo’dhikṛta ityānupūrvīkasiddham / tenātrāpi tatparyavasānāyāsti tadanvayayogyaniyojyajijñāsā / Ibid., pp. 38-39

[24]:

na cānanvitasvārthasmaraṇamātrāvasitavyāpāreṣu padeṣu tadarthā eva ākāṅkṣādisahakāriṇaḥ kariṣyanti vākyārthadhiyamiti, kṛtamatra padānāṃ sāmarthyeneti sāmpratam / Ibid., p. 39

[25]:

śvetamadhyakṣaṃ paśyataḥ, heṣāravaṃ ca śṛṇvataḥ, khurani kṣepa śabdaṃ ca ‘śveto’śvo dhāvati’ ityanvitadhiyaḥ padaśravaṇamantareṇotpādo dṛṣṭa iti cet? Ibid.

[26]:

anumānāt, arthāpattervā tadavagamāt / anavagamādvā / Ibid.

[27]:

evaṃvādī hi tāvatpraṣṭavyo vyācaṣṭāṃ -kiṃsvicchvetasamānādhikaraṇau yena heṣādhvanikhuranikṣepaśabdāvavasitau, tasya jñānaṃ nirūpyate, āhosvit yena sitimā ca padanikṣepaśabdo heṣādhvaniśca svarūpamātreṇavasitaḥ / Ibid., p. 40

[28]:

tatra pūrvasmin kalpe liṅgasāmarthyajametat, na padārthasāmarthyajam. uttarasminnapi dravyāntarābhāvaniścaye satyarthāpattiḥ, tadabhāve ca anadhyavasāya eva / Ibid.

[29]:

api ca padārthasāmarthyajatvābhyupagame śabdamūlatvābhāvena aśābdatvāt, manasaśca bāhyānapekṣasyāpravṛtteḥṣaṭpramāṇī vyatiricyamānasahakārisāpe-kṣatve saptamapramāṇābhyupagamaprasaṅgaḥ / Ibid.

[30]:

tatsiddhametannānabhihitā arthā vākyārthadhīhetava iti, padairabhihitānāmayaṃ mahimā abhyupetavyarateṣām / Ibid.

[31]:

tathā ca padārthānāṃ vākyārthapratyayādhānasāmarthyaṃ, padānāṃ ca tatsāmarthyādhānasāmarthyam iti śaktidvayaṃ kalpanīyam / Ibid., p. 41

[32]:

anvitābhidhānavādinastu prathamāvagatānāṃ padānāmabhidhāyakānāṃ vākyārthapratyayopajanaparya vasitatātparyavṛttīnāmevākāṅkṣāyogyatāsattirūpopādhyupāyagṛhītārthāntarānvitasvārthābhidhānasāmarthyamiti lāghavam / ato’rthābhidhāyināṃ padānāmeva vākyadhīhetubhāvaḥ iti caturastram / Ibid.