Part 2.1 - The concept of Ākāṅkṣā (mutual expectancy)

[Full title: The causes of verbal knowledge in Mīmāṃsā (1) Ākāṅkṣā]

Amongst all the three conditions, the greatest linguistic importance has to be given to ākāṅkṣā. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, it is ākāṅkṣā on the basis of which one can understand the syntactic unity of a sentence. Ākāṅkṣā is the most important and well-comprehensive of all the factors.

The factor or condition about ākāṅkṣā or the mutual expectancy, among words in a sentence is generally believed to have been promulgated first by the Mīmāṃsakas; but the necessity for interdependence of words to give a unified sense, as in a compound word or a sentence, was recognized even earlier by the grammarians. Pāṇini himself says^[1] that words can form a compound word only if they have sāmarthya or capacity; this term sāmarthya has been variously interpreted by different commentators. According to some it is vyapekṣā or mutual connection pertaining to the meaning,^[2] in which sense it is similar to the condition of ākāṅkṣā given by the Mīmāṃsakas. According to some others sāmarthya is to be explained as ekārthībhāva, or unification of meaning;^[3] that is to say, the different words with different meanings are made to signify a unified sense. This latter view may be compared to the condition of arthaikatva given by Jaimini, when he explained it as a unity of sense. Pāṇini discusses compounds words, whereas Jaimini deals with the sentence, still the conditions referred to seem to be simililar. It is strictly speaking, sāmarthya is the capacity of the words for mutual association, vyapekṣā is their interdependence, and ākāṅkṣā is the need one has for the other for completing the sense. Patañjali explains these two views as mutually exclusive, and accepts the ekārthībhāva point of view as the correct one. According to Haradatta^[4] both vyapekṣā and ekārthībhāva are necessary in a compound word, since in the absence of mutual connection of meanings, words are not allowed to form a compound. But others like Kaiyaṭa give^[5] these two as the conditions for a sentence and a compound word respectively.

The word ākāṅkṣā is derived from the root kāṅkṣ, which means ‘to expect’, ‘to desire’ (for something to follow) and ‘to thirst after’. Ākāṅkṣā can accordingly be rendered as: expectation to learn more–the anxiety, in other words, that is roused in one through what is already known but not known sufficiently or adequately, or through what has just come to the attention of the audience, but not in any coherent form. It consists in a word not being able to convey a complete sense in the absence of another word; literally ākāṅkṣā is the desire on the part of the listeners to know the other words or their meanings to complete the sense. A word is said to have ākāṅkṣā for another, if it cannot, without the latter, produce knowledge of its interconnection in an utterance. In every language certain words necessarily require certain other words to complete the sense. Thus a noun in the nominative case requires a verb to convey a complete meaning; a verb like ‘bring’ has expectancy for a word denoting some object.^[6] A string of words such as ‘cow, horse, man, elephant’^[7] does not convey a complete sense, as there is no connection between them owing to lack of ākāṅkṣā.

According to Śālikanātha Miśra, the staunch follower of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, ākāṅkṣā being the curiosity on the part of the listener is the enquiry into another meaning and that enquiry arises due to the non-completion of the entire denotation or sometimes only of a denotable.^[8] It is because of the fact that when only one pada (word) like dvāram (door) is used, there will be no denotation at all.^[9] Ākāṅkṣā consists in a word not being able to convey a complete sense in the absence of an another word. A word is said to have ākāṅkṣā for another, if it cannot, without the latter, produce knowledge of its inter-relation in an utterance. In a language, certain words necessarily require certain other words to complete the sense. For example, a verb like ‘bring’ has expectancy for a word denoting some object.^[10] This ākāṅkṣā according to Śālikanātha Miśra, is admitted as an auxiliary cause (upalakṣana) in respect of the knowledge of the sentence-meaning.^[11] He also solves the objection as to why ākāṅkṣā is admitted as an auxiliary cause of understanding the sentence-meaning, while sannidhi (contiguity) and yogyatā (compatibility) can also be accepted as such. In his reply to this objection, Śālikanātha contends that there can be no syntactic unity without ākāṅkṣā even if sannidhi and yogyatā are present. In order to explain it clearly, he cites an example viz. ayameti putro rājñaḥ, puruṣoyamapanīyatām (here comes the son of the king, let this person be removed), wherein the word rāja (king) being unexpectant because of its relation with the word putra (son), is not syntactically related to the word puruṣa (person).

It may be noted here that the Mīmāṃsakas explain ākāṅkṣā not only on the basis of the syntactic incompleteness of the sentence, but also on the basis of the psychological incompleteness of the idea.^[12] They are concerned with the interpretation of the Vedic injunctions.

Ākāṅkṣā does not arise at once in respect of all the counter correlatives (pratiyogi), but it arises according to the peculiar order in which the causes occur.^[13] In this context, Śālikanātha refers to three essential psychological ākāṅkṣā which are towards-(i) viṣaya or the act enjoined; (ii) karaṇa or the means of doing the act and (iii) niyojya^[14] or the person who is enjoined to do it. Thus in the passage like viśajitā yajeta (the viśajit sacrifice is to be performed), as there is no mention of the niyojya, the expression i.e. the sentence is incomplete and as such there arises expectancy towards a word conveying the niyojya i.e., a person like Devadatta and so on, who is desirous of attaining heaven (svargakāmaḥ), without whom, the act cannot be performed.^[15] As rightly observed by K.K. Raja, the well-known line in the Śrīmadbhagavatgitā denouncing the expection of the results of one’s duties (karmaṇyevādhikāraste mā phaleṣukadācana) seems to imply this view of the Prābhākaras.^[16]

But according to the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā, the content of a Vedic injunction is the realization that the act enjoined is productive of some beneficial result. Kūmārila states that not even a fool will act without a purpose.^[17] The ākāṅkṣā of the Vedic injunction is for the itikartavyatā or the act enjoined, for the sādhana or karaṇa or the means, and for the phala or the result of the act. There is no special ākāṅkṣā for the niyojya or the person who is to do it; anyone interested in the phala or the result will do it. Thus in the sentence viśvajitā yajeta the additional word svargakāmaḥ is to satisfy the ākāṅkṣā regarding the result of action. In this way the two schools of Mīmāṃsā give two different sets of ākāṅkṣā according to the difference in the interpretation of the psychological factors involved in an injunction. According to K.K. Raja, the ākāṅkṣā that holds between words in a sentence is not merely psychological but a grammatical one. It is only the need for the syntactic completeness of the sentence.^[18]

The ākāṅkṣā or the expectancy that holds between words in a sentence is a grammatical one, and not merely psychological. It is only the need for the syntactic completeness of the sentence. The Naiyāyikas later made a clear distinction between the psychological ākāṅkṣā and the grammatical ākāṅkṣā. They have defined ākāṅkṣā as a kind of syntactic need which one word has for another in a sentence in order to convey the interrelation of the words.^[19] It is the ākāṅkṣā that brings the knowledge of the syntactic relation of the words in a sentence. The Naiyāyikas consider that even in the case of a word, there should be mutual expectancy between the root or the stem on the one hand and the verbal or nominal suffix on the other.

Nāgeśa, the great grammarian maintains that ākāṅkṣā is the desire on the part of the listeners on hearing a word in a sentence to know the idea which can be related to its meaning in order to attain a complete meaning.^[20] Thus to him, ākāṅkṣā is on the part of the listeners and not on the part of words or their meanings. It is only in a figurative sense that this expectancy is attributed to the words and their meanings.

It may be added here that the Prābhākaras do not deny the existence of individual words and their isolated meanings. According to them, it is not possible to comprehend the isolated meanings of a word apart from its relation in a sentence. The words themselves convey their meanings only as related to one another on the basis of the three well-known factors viz. ākāṅkṣā, yogyatā and sannidhi. The words convey not only their individual meanings, but also their syntactic relation. Thus according to Prābhākaras, the words themselves convey the sentence-meaning directly.^[21] This is because the Prābhākaras advocate the theory of anvitābhidhāna (denotation of the correlated) according to which the padas denote their respective meanings only when they are syntactically related.

It may be pointed out here that most of the modern scholars also accept ākāṅkṣā. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa maintains that ākāṅkṣā is the relation of one word to another which produces a connected idea of speech.^[22] S. Rādhākṛṣṇan accepts ākāṅkṣā as mutual need or interdependence.^[23] Thus modern scholars also lay stress on the concept of ākāṅkṣā which is, according to the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, the basis of syntactic unity and their views seems to be a preferable one.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

sāmarthaḥ padavidhiḥ / Pāṇinisūtra , II. 1. 1

[2]:

parasparavyapekṣāṃ sāmarthyam eke / kā punaḥśabdayor vyapekṣā? na brūmaḥśabdayor iti / kiṃ tarhi? arthayoḥ / Mahābhāṣya , p. 365

[3]:

pṛthagarthānām ekārthībhāvaḥ samarthavacanam / Vārttika under Pāṇinisūtra , II. 1.1

[4]:

Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar , p. 293

[5]:

iha vyapekṣāyāṃ samāso na bhavati, ekārthībhāve vākyaṃ neti / Mahābhāṣyapradīpa under Pāṇinisūtra , II. 1.1

[6]:

tatra padārthānāṃ parasparajijñāsāviṣayatvayogyatvam ākāṅkṣā, kriyāśravaṇe kārakasya, kārakaśravaṇe kriyāyāḥ, karaṇaśravaṇe itikartavyatāyāśca jijñāsāviṣayatvāt / Vedāntaparibhāṣā , IV.3

[7]:

‘gauḥ aśvaḥ puruṣo hastī /’ ‘daśa dāḍimāni ṣaḍ apūpāḥ kuṇḍam ajājinaṃ palalapiṇḍaḥ adharorukam etat kumāryāḥ sphaiyakṛtasya pitā pratiśīnaḥ’ / Mahābhāṣya , I, pp. 1 and 38

[8]:

atrocyate-abhidhānāparyavasānam, abhidheyāparyavasānañca jijñāsodaye nibandhanam/ Vākyārthamātṛkā-vṛtti , p. 386

[9]:

ekapadaprayoge hi dvāramityādabhidhānameva na paryavasyati / Ibid.

[10]:

kriyāśravaṇe kārakasya kārakaśravaṇe kriyāyāḥ…/ Vākyapadīya , IV.3

[11]:

sā ceyamākāṅkṣā bhavantī vyutpattāvupalakṣanamāśrīyate /Vākyārthamātṛkā-vṛtti , p. 40

[12]:

anvitasyābhidhānārtham uktārthaghaṭanāya vā /
pratiyogini jijñāsā yā sākāṅkṣeti gīyate // Prakaraṇapañcikā , p. 387

[13]:

sā ceyamākāṅkṣā pratiyogiṣu sarveṣu na sahasaivopajāyate, kintu karanopānipatakrameṇa / Vākyārthamātṛkā-vṛtti , p. 388

[14]:

niyojyaḥ sa ca kāryaṃ yaḥ svakīyatvena budhyate / Prakaraṇapañcikā , p. 391

[15]:

atha pratipanne viṣayasambandhini vidhyarthe /
niyojyamantarena tatsiddyasambhavānniyojyākāṅkṣā // Vākyārthamātṛkā-vṛtti , p. 388

[16]:

Indian Theories of Meaning , pp. 160-161

[17]:

prayojanam anuddiśya na mando’pi pravartate / Ślokavārttka , p. 653

[18]:

Indian Theories of Meaning , p. 163

[19]:

padasyapadāntaravyatireka-prayuktānvayanānubhāvakatvamākāṅkṣā / Tarkasaṃgraha , p. 52

[20]:

sā caikapadārthajñāne tadarthānvayayogyārthasya yajjñānaṃ tadviṣayecchā; 'asyānvayyarthaḥ kaḥ' ityevaṃrūpā puruṣaniṣṭhaiva, tathāpi tasyāḥ svaviṣaye’rthe āropaḥ / Paramalaghumañjuṣā , p. 71

[21]:

ākāṅkṣā-sannidhiprāptayogyārthāntarasaṅgatānam /
svārthānāhuḥ padānīti vyutpattissaṃśrityā yadā // Vākyārthamātṛkā-vṛtti , p. 384

[22]:

HIL., p. 447

[23]:

IP., Volume II, p. 109