Part 7 - Refutation of Sphoṭa by Vācaspati Miśra

Like other Mīmāṃsakas, Vācaspati Miśra refutes the grammarian’s theory of sphoṭavāda and forwards his own view regarding the efficient cause of śābdabodha. In his Tattvabindu, Vācaspati mentions the view of the Sphoṭavādins or the Vaiyākaraṇas who hold that vākyasphoṭa conveys the meaning of the sentence and they describe sphoṭa as being devoid of parts and properties though it is experienced as possessing avayavas through avidyā, the efficient cause of śābdabodha.^[1] The division of vākya into varṇas and padas is not real but is based on a superimposition caused by eternal ignorance (anādyavidyā).

In the explanation of this sphoṭavāda, Vācaspati Miśra puts forward a question from the point of view of Mīmāṃsakas which has two alternatives-whether the sphoṭa which is devoid of parts is to be accepted as the efficient cause of vākyārtha on the basis of the time-honoured experience of the world or on the basis of the difference of the meaning of words and sentences which cannot be otherwise explained. Again, in the case of the first alternative, another question is raised there-whether the vākya is to be considered as one composite unit possessing many parts such as varṇas and padas (syllables and words) or whether it is completely devoid of any such parts.

The alternatives:

Thus, two alternatives are put forward by Vācaspati–

1) The first alternative is that the vākya is a composite whole possessing many parts such as varṇas and padas.^[2]
2) The second alternative is that the vākya is totally devoid of any parts.^[3]

These are the two alternatives which come under the basis of the experience of the world.

The first alternative: Vācaspati Miśra shows that the first alternative is not strong. Here, the first alternative that the vākya possesses parts is shown to be unsound. This is in view of the accepted doctrine of the Vaiyākaraṇas that the varṇas are vibhus i.e. those possessing paramamahattva. According to this doctrine, it is not possible to posit the production of an avayavin (whole) which is greater than the avayavas (parts) which are possessing paramamahattva.^[4] Again, if the all-pervading nature of letters (varṇas) is assumed and if letters be held to be the constituents of words, the magnitude of a word would be greater than that of the letters constituting it.^[5] Hence, the first alternative on śābdabodha is not sound.

Vācaspati further shows that this alternative is not sound even from the point of view of the Naiyāyika theory that śabda is a quality (guṇa) of ākāśa (ether).^[6] The varṇas or padas which are regarded as qualities cannot be the material cause of the sentence (vākya), because it is unanimously held that only a substance (dravya) and not a quality (guṇa) can be the samavāyikāraṇa (material or inherent cause).^[7] If one takes the view of the Śikṣākāras that varṇa is produced from the particles of vāyu (wind), these wind-particles are to be associated with one another for the production of vākya, but since varṇas are momentary, the contact of the varṇa with another cannot be thought of when the varṇas come in a sequence and they cannot produce any avayavin. Further, they do not have the contact as the asamavāyikāraṇa (non-inherent cause) which is very essential for the production of an effect (kārya) in the form of an avayavin.^[8] It is, however, absurd to suppose that the part is one and produces the whole. If two or more parts do not come together, the substance as effect is inconceivable. And it is not possible to maintain that the cognitions of varṇas, associated with one another, become the cause of the vākya, since the cognitions of varṇas or varṇas themselves do not co-exist. So, it cannot be held that vākya is one composite whole with parts and the theory that vākya is one avayavin with many parts such as varṇas and padas is untenable.

The second alternative: The second alternative that vākya is one unit devoid of parts is also not tenable. According to this view, vākya alone conveys the meaning, but varṇas or padas do not convey the meaning as they are not unitary.

It is also noteworthy that varṇas and padas have no real existence in language. Vākya (sentence) being nitya (eternal) is alone manifested. This manifestation of vākya is achieved by dhvanis (sound). Due to their different places and modes of articulation, the dhvanis generate an invalid cognition of the real śabdasphoṭa as possessing many parts like varṇa and pada.^[9] This is compared with the experience of a person who looks at his own face through a gem or mirror of varied shape.^[10] Here, the question that the second and succeeding dhvanis in a pada or a vākya are superfluous since the first dhvani itself is capable of manifesting the sphoṭa, does not arise, in view of the fact that the manifestation by the first dhvani is not so successful and complete as it would be at the end of the series of manifestations by different dhvanis. In the same way, it cannot be held that the last dhvani manifests the unitary sphoṭa because the last dhvani has not the full capacity to manifest it unless it is strengthened by the saṃskāras (impressions) produced by the experiences of the previous dhvanis.^[11] Thus, the manifestation of sphoṭa by dhvanis can be compared with the examination of a gem by an expert jeweller who satisfies himself about the genuineness of a gem, after a series of detailed examination.^[12]

Another question put by the opponent is how the dhvani cognitions manifest sphoṭa and this is answered by Vācaspati Miśra by saying that invalid cognitions sometimes lead one to a valid knowledge and he illustrates this point by giving the instance of the cognitions of trees at a distance as a row of green grass as it leads one to that of green trees which does not exist there.^[13]

Again, the Sphoṭavādin advance their arguments in favour of the acceptance of sphoṭa as a unitary śabda. The unitary experience of a word and a sentence cannot be satisfactorily explained unless a unitary śabda called sphoṭa is accepted.^[14] Here the question arises-do the varṇas each separately produce the cognition of the unitary śabda or in their combination?^[15] The first alternative is untenable, since it goes against our ordinary experience and it makes other varṇas superfluous. The second is treated as consisting of two alternatives-whether varṇas are in reality associated with one another or they are cognised together.^[16] Since the varṇas are both nitya (eternal) and vibhu (all-pervading), they are not associated with one another. They are also to be cognised separately and with some time-sequence (due to the generations of different cognitions), it is not possible to maintain that varṇas are cognised together.^[17]

In this regard, the followers of the varṇavāda contends their position by saying that the last varṇa in combination with the impressions produced by the experiences of the previous sounds in a word or a sentence conveys the idea.^[18] Here the Sphoṭavādin puts questions regarding the nature of the impression (saṃskāra) cited by the Varṇavādin-is it that saṃskāra which produces a smṛti (recollection) or is it of that type which one finds in corns (vrīhis) by sprinkling (prokṣaṇā) on the basis of the Śruti i.e. vrīhīn prokṣati?^[19] The second alternative is inexplicable in view of the fact that the uncombined varṇas cannot produce in themselves one saṃskāra; nor can it be said that each varṇa produces a saṃskāra and that all these saṃskāras of different varṇas and the experience of the last varṇa generate the arthapratīti,^[20] for, it accepts many adṛṣṭas which are not known by popular means of knowledge like pratyakṣa. The citation of the well-known āgneya and other vedic sacrifices, which, being enjoined by Śrutis, compel us to accept such adṛṣṭas in the instance of vrīhis does not favour our acceptance of many saṃskāras for the production of the arthapratīti.^[21] The first alternative^[22] that the saṃskāra otherwise known as vāsanā, the cause of recollection, helps much the last varṇa in a pada not only in recollecting the śabda but also in understanding the idea by the last varṇa, so much so that there is no additional adṛṣṭa excepting the assignment of an additional function to the existing saṃskāra, is also untenable, on the ground that such a thing goes against the very nature of saṃskāra; and it also drags us to accept another adṛṣṭa, for, the saṃskāra which rests in ātman produces the recollection in him (ātman). Moreover, the saṃskāra, vāsanā or bhāvanā is the only capacity of ātman for recollecting an object which he has experienced; and this capacity we have preferably to posit in ātman and not in the saṃskāra as its very existence is based on the cognition of ideas (from the words in sentence) by the same ātman.^[23]

The Varṇavādin again puts forward with their explanation^[24] that all varṇas in a pada or vākya being recollected together convey the idea, so that there is no necessity for accepting the unitary śabda, viz. sphoṭa. The Sphoṭavādin as unsatisfactorily rejects^[25] this explanation, in view of the fact that the varṇas in words-nadī, dīna etc. being the same in one recollection, do not convey the same idea. At the same time, it cannot also be held that the different saṃskāras produced by the experiences of the various varṇas produce one smṛti which has all varṇas as its object with the same sequence as they were in the previous experiences, so that these varṇas together with their individual traits being bound by one recollection constitute different padas and as such, convey different ideas.^[26] Moreover, varṇas, being vibhudravyas,^[27] do not possess any sequence (krama), and if they are spoken of as possessing that, it is only in reference to a cognition which presents them and speaking sequence to varṇas on the basis of cognition is absurd.

Hence, the Sphoṭavādin concludes that a unitary śabda called sphoṭa is to be accepted for satisfactorily explaining the popular experience that śabda conveys idea and that this śabda cannot be the varṇas and it being nitya (eternal) is to be accepted as manifested by dhvanis which we experience. The successful manifestation and full experience of sphoṭa is possible only when all dhvanis separately manifest it; and as the manifestation of sphoṭa being a perception (pratyakṣa) can have various degrees, there is no reason for placing the arthapratīti by varṇas on a par with the manifestation of sphoṭa by dhvanis. So, the unitary sphoṭa is to be accepted.

Again, by raising a question the Varṇavādin rejects the sphoṭavāda-whether the cognitions of varṇas present only those varṇas or a sound element devoid of any form or property in addition to those varṇas. In the first view, no sphoṭa is known in addition to the varṇas, which cannot be spoken of as the vivartas (manifestations) of another sound element. In the second view, a sound element apart from varṇas is to be accepted, which, while cognised, is known as śabda-the conveyor of ideas. Is it śabdatva^[28] (the generality of śabda) which is to be considered as the conveyor of ideas? If it is accepted, śabdatva being a common property of all śabdas, all ideas, it may be objected, may be known to each and every listener of śabda. But the experience of differences in ideas is to be explained by śabdas only. The explanation that śabdatva, though one and devoid of any form or properties, has got its own different vivartas (manifestations) like gakāra, aukāra and visarga in the word gauḥ, which, however, produce the cognitions of different ideas, is unsatisfactory on the ground that the same can be well explained by śabdas themselves, which are acceptable to both parties. Moreover, just like śabdatva, other generalities-sattva, varṇatva etc. may be taken as the conveyor of ideas through their own vivartas.^[29] Hence, there is vinigamanāviraha-no means to prefer one generality to others.

Besides, the Varṇavādin raises an objection that śabdatva, being an eternal generality, exists in varṇas that are cognised previously in a word or sentence; it may not necessarily depend on the anusaṃhārabuddhi of the last varṇa to convey the idea, so it is to be accepted that even the first sound or sounds in a word, while cognised, may convey the idea. In this connection, Vācaspati Miśra hits the Prabhākaras who have denied the existence of śabdatvajāti. He says that śabdatva never stands in the way of the reality of different varnas which are to be accepted as eternal. Just as śābaleyagotva is found along with gotva in a black cow, so in śabda the properties like acatva and halatva are found along with śabdatva on the basis of experiences gakāraḥ śabdaḥ. This cannot be explained without śabdatva.^[30]

Then the question is can the term śabda mean śrotragrahaṇa-that which can be experience by ear? Since like varṇas, grahaṇas (cognitions of those varṇas) also are different, nothing can be said about the unitariness of śabda. The ear also (being ākāśa) is inferable and as such, is beyond senses; and the cognition of ear, like all cognitions is inferable, so that nothing can be regarded as the object of the unitary experience of śabda by the senses (aparokṣāvabhāsa).^[31] If the ear (śrotra) and its cognition (grahaṇa) in the body of śabda are not cognisable by the senses, how can the cognition of śabda arise as conveyed by the word śabda?

Is it sphoṭa which is cognised as uniform in all varṇas in a word or sentence, but different in different words and sentences? Moreover, are the varṇas manifestations of the unitary sphoṭa, to explain the difference in the cognition of sphoṭa? The Varṇavādin again puts a question to the Sphoṭavādin-do the cognitions of the previous varṇas help that of the last varṇa in its combination with the previous varṇas? If so, the cognitions of the previous varṇas do not exist when the cognition of the last varṇa arises, and so the non-existing things are said to be helping in producing a real thing, a fact which always goes against popular experience. It is an accepted fact that all cognitions arise, exist for a while, perish and never brought back to life. So, even if they are supposed to be existing at the time of the cognition of the last varṇa in a word, they do not function at all in collaboration with that of the last varṇa. The argument that the varṇas, while cognised, manifest separately the sphoṭa without depending on their mutual combination is not correct, since it does not help us to propound the existence of an akhaṇḍapadārtha separate from the varṇas; in other words, the akhaṇḍasphoṭa does not exist like the horn of a man or rabbit. So, it is to be accepted on the basis of valid experience, the Varṇavādin contends that the perceptions of different varṇas produce an anusaṃhārabuddhi with those varṇas as its object and nothing else.

After that, there are many objections raised by the Sphoṭavādin to the view of the Varṇavādin. The experience gauḥ speaks of the unitary aspect of the word gauḥ, and this unitariness cannot be satisfactorily explained^[32] if we accept only varṇas as its object (viṣaya). It cannot also be argued that this unitariness is based on an upādhi^[33] (limitation) like that of the experiences of ‘army’, ‘forest’, etc., because nothing is to be said as the upādhi in this instance.

Here two upādhis are suggested and then refuted:

(1) ekavijñānaviṣayatā (being the object of one cognition) and
(2) ekābhidheyapratyayahetutā (being the cause of the cognition of one idea).

The former cannot be accepted for the cognition of upādhi as it must be known before the object is cognised through that upādhi; and that cognition is not cognised when its object is known and it is either to be cognised by a perception called anuvyavasāyajñāna or by inference.^[34] The second alternative is also untenable because it involves the fallacy of interdependence (itaretarāśraya). The argument that the distinction of a word from another is known by that of the idea conveyed by it leads to the fallacy of interdependence between cause and effect: the conception of one word is based on that of its conveying an idea and vice versa.^[35] So, the capacity of vācakatva of a word is to be explained only in reference to the unitary sphoṭa.

Moreover, if we explain the cognition of unitariness (ekāvabhāsa) as due to some upādhi, nothing would be possibly explained as a real and unitary object, for, some upādhi may be invented to explain the same. So, the Sphoṭavādin concludes that there will be no plurality among objects, since the plurality of objects is only a manifestation of one real object or entity.^[36]

The Varṇavādin further refuses to accept the sphoṭa theory on the basis of the following grounds: The cognition of unitariness is not an authority to prove the existence of a unitary object, viz. sphoṭaśabda, but only the possibility which bears out the oneness of the object cognised.^[37] Though elephants, horses, chariots and footmen are different entities and though the campaka, aśoka, kiṃśuka etc., are different species of trees, they become objects of the unitary cognitions—‘It is an army’, ‘it is a forest’, etc., which (through some limitation) present unitary objects like ‘army’ and ‘forest’. It cannot be held that the experiences, as ‘it is an army’, ‘it is a forest’, ‘it is a śabda’ have as their objects another entity-a whole-separate from the parts (avayavas).^[38] It cannot also be argued that for the lack of a limitation (upādhi) as explained above, the unitary śabda may be accepted, for it can be said that the three varṇas in the word gauḥ while they become the objects of one cognition, become the cause of the knowledge of one idea, just like three or more stones supporting one piṭhara (oven).^[39] The fallacy of interdependence as cited above, does not arise, in view of the fact that the conception of one word is based on that of its capacity to convey one idea. The word pada connotes that particular kāraka-karaṇa–in relation to the knowledge, since it is derived from the root pad–to know, in the sense of instrument (karaṇa); and as it is a kāraka, it ought to be related to a kriyā viz. knowledge.^[40] The difference between one word and another found in the pairs (i) gauḥ and aśvaḥ, (ii) vṛṣa and vṛṣabha and (iii) nadī and dīnā etc. is not possible to explain before it becomes the object of one cognition and conveys a unitary idea. So, it is maintained that the unitary conception of pada is based on that of the idea conveyed by it.

Moreover, by pointing out some gross absurdities the Varṇavādin again criticises the sphoṭa theory. The view that the previous dhvani manifest sphoṭa not so clearly as the last dhvani, does not hold good, in view of the fact that the sphoṭa, devoid of any parts, cannot be spoken of as being partly or fully manifested by dhvanis. The full or clear manifestation is possible only for a thing which has got parts or qualities, both common and special. The sphoṭa cannot be said to have a full or partial manifestation. It should or should not be fully manifested and cognised.

Here the view that the manifestation of sphoṭa is based on superimposition cannot be held. For, no superimposition can be explained with reference to an object-the substratum of it, previously unknown.^[41] Even if it is held that the sphoṭa can be and is previously cognised, it is not possible to maintain that it is devoid of any parts. So, the Sphoṭavādin’s view that the padatattva is experienced as one devoid of parts, contains no truth and as such, is not reliable.^[42] The popular experience ‘we learn idea from śabda’ has no special significance in favour of the Sphoṭavādin’s view.^[43] This popular experience is sometimes acceptable and sometimes unacceptable. If we say that the unitariness or oneness of śabda belongs to the varṇas themselves when they become the object of one recollection, they convey one idea. This explanation is possible in the case of śabda, since it is so experience in the world, but it is not possible in other instances.

Now, the Varṇavādin begins to blame the second main alternative of the Sphoṭavādin’s view that the unitary sphoṭa is to be accepted on the basis of the difference in ideas, which cannot be otherwise explained. The sphoṭa which is not perceptible, cannot be understood by inference from its function, viz. its conveying an idea, as it involves the fallacy of interdependence.^[44] The śabda by itself cannot convey the idea but only through its knowledge; otherwise it being eternal and it may have to be accepted that all people know for ever ideas from śabdas. But its knowledge is derived, as it has been already said, by inference from the middle term, viz. the cognition of idea derived from it, so much so, that the śabdajñāna depending on the arthapratyaya, which again depends on the śabdajñāna.^[45]

Besides, there is no need for accepting a unitary śabda like sphoṭa. The knowledge of idea is well brought out by the single cognition of varṇas, which, as they appear different on account of the order, sequence or properties like hrasvatva convey different ideas, as in the instances nadī, dīnā etc.^[46] The Varṇavādin mentions many conditions–krama, nyūnātiriktatva, svara, vākya, śruti and smṛti for differentiating one pada from another.^[47] If the varṇas or padas are uttered at a time by different persons, there arises no cognition of the idea (artha). So, it is held that these padas are to be uttered in a particular sequence by one and the same person and that this ekavaktṛtva is necessarily cognised by the person who knows ideas from words.^[48] In this regard, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa mentions in the Sphoṭavāda section of his Ślokavārttika.^[49] Moreover, this ekavaktṛtva is a cause of cognition (jn ~ āpakahetu) and so, it need not be necessarily cognised just like the mind which, as uncognised, becomes the cause of inference.^[50]

In this manner, Varṇavādin concludes that since the meaning or knowledge of the sentence or word can be well cognised from the knowledge of the words in the combination of varṇas, it does not force one to the necessity of establishing the akhaṇḍapadatattva viz. sphoṭa, devoid of any parts and properties.^[51]

Thus, Vācaspati Miśra formulates the refutation of the sphoṭavāda in the context of the efficient cause of śābdabodha. It is done from the point of view of the Varṇavādins, whose doctrine would be discussed and refuted in the next section. For the present, so far as the refutation of the sphoṭvāda is concerned, the varṇavāda is used as an effective weapon to destroy the concept of akhaṇḍatva underlying the sphoṭavāda. The varṇavāda is here regarded as superior to the sphoṭavāda, because it does not postulate a thing like sphoṭa which goes beyond one’s easy understanding and also because it emphasises the varṇas and padas as the cause of arthapratīti. According to this view, the meaning of a sentence arises from the cognition of the last varṇa in it. This cognition of the last varṇa together with the impressions created by the cognition of the sentence meaning, just in the same manner the cognition in the last varṇa in a word together with the impression created by the preceding varṇas of a word give rise to the cognition of the word meaning.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

anavayavameva vākyaṃ anādyavidyopadarśitālīka varṇapadavibhāgamasyā nimittamiti kecit / Tattvabindu , p.3

[2]:

varṇāḥ padāni cāsyāvayavāḥ sattāmātreṇa anubhūyamānatayā vā bhaveyuḥ / Ibid., p. 5

[3]:

syādetat; anavayavameva vākyaṃ vākyārthasya vācakam / Ibid., p. 7

[4]:

avayavinyūnaparimāṇatvād avayavānāṃ, paramamahatāṃ ca varṇānāṃ tadanupapatteḥ / Ibid., p. 5

[5]:

parimāṇasya svasamānajātīyasvotkṛṣṭaparimāṇajanakatvaniyamāt / Siddhāntamuktāvali under Bhāṣāpariccheda , 15

[6]:

gaganaguṇatve cā’dravyatayā, samavāyikāraṇatvābhāvena avayavabhāvābhāvāt / Tattvabindu , p.5

[7]:

samavāyikāraṇatvaṃ dravyasyai’ve’ti vijnñeyaṃ / Siddhāntamuktāvali under Bhāṣāpariccheda , 23

[8]:

asamavāyikāraṇanāśasya dravyanāśajanakatvāt / Ibid., 18

[9]:

dhvanayastu tulyasthānakaraṇalabdhajanmatayā parasparavisadṛśatattatpadavākya vyañjakā anekavidhadhvanisādṛśyena anyonyavisadṛaśatattatpadavākyasādṛśyāni āpādayantaḥ sādṛśyopadhānabhedādi ekam api anavayavamapi nānāvarṇātmeva, avayavīva cāvabhāsayanti / Tattvabindu , p. 8

[10]:

mukhamiva maṇi-kṛpāṇa-darpaṇādayo niyatasthānamanupaplavam ekamanekamiva, anekavidhasthānamiva varṇaparimāṇasaṃsthānabhedopaplavamiva darśayanti / Ibid.

[11]:

pūrvapūrvābhivyaktijanitasaṃskārasacivottarottarābhivyaktikrameṇa tvantyo dhvaniḥ sphuṭataraṃ viśiṣṭasphoṭavijñānamādhatte iti, na vaiyarthyaṃ dvitīyādidhvanīnām / nāpi pūrveṣāṃ, tadabhāve tadabhivyaktijanitasaṃskārābhāvena antyasya dhvanerasahāyatayā vyaktyavabhāsavākyadhīhetubhāvābhāvāt / Ibid., p. 9

[12]:

tadyathā ratnaparīkṣiṇaḥ punaḥ punā ratnatattvamīkṣamāṇasya ratnadarśanāni pratyekaṃ ratnasvarūpamavagāhamānānyapi sahasaiva na samānāsamānajātīyavyāvṛttaṃ ratnatattvam avabhāsayanti, kintu pañcaṣadarśanajanitabhāvanāsacivacetolabdhajan

[13]:

ārādvanaspatau haritapravāhasya vyaktataraṃvanaspatitattvapratītihetutvadarśanāt / Ibid.

[14]:

seyaṃ varṇātiriktaikapadavākyānubhavamantareṇa nodetumarhati/ Ibid., p. 10

[15]:

te hīmāṃ pratyekaṃ vā vidadhīrannāgadantā iva śikyāvalambanaṃ, militā vā grāvāṇa iva phitharadhāraṇam / Ibid.

[16]:

varṇāntaroccāraṇānarthakyaprasaṅgāt ca. nāpi militāḥ, tathābhāvābhāvāt. tathā hi–vāstavo vā samūha ateṣāmāśrīyate / Ibid.

[17]:

tatra sarveṣāmeva varṇānāṃ nityatayā vibhutayā ca vāstavī saṅgatiratiprasaṅginī / keṣāñcideva padavākyabhāvaṃ nāpādayitumarhati / anubhūyamānānāntvanubhav-ānusāriṇī tatparyāyeṇa paryāyavatī na samūhabhāgbhavati / na ca khalvekadeśakā-lānavacchinnāḥ samūhavanto bhavanti bhāvāḥ, atiprasaṅgāt / Ibid.

[18]:

pūrvapūrvavarṇānubhavajanitasaṃskārasahito antyo varṇaḥ pratyāyako’rthasya tena tathaivaikānubhavakalpaneti cet / Ibid., pp. 10-11

[19]:

kiṃ smṛtibījam, anyo vā prokṣaṇādibhya iva vrīhṇādeḥ / na tāvadantyaḥ / Ibid., p. 11

[20]:

na hyasāvasahabhuvāṃ varṇānāṃ janya ekaḥ sambhavati, uktādeva prakārāt / varṇairyathāsvaṃ kramaviśeṣaśālibhiranye’nye janyante saṃskārā, teṣāñca sthemnā sambhava tyantyavarṇasācivyamabhidheyapratyayajananāyeti cet / Ibid.

[21]:

āgneyādivatkalpanāgauravaṃ na kalpakagarhitatāmāvahati iti cet / na/ ihānyathā-siddheḥ/ Ibid.

[22]:

vāsanāparanāmā saṃskāraḥ smṛtibījamantyavarṇasahakārī, tasya ca smaraṇaphala prasavonnītasadbhāvasya arthadhījanmani sahakāritāmātraṃ kalpanīyam / Ibid.

[23]:

api ca saṃskāra iti ca vāsaneti ca bhāvaneti ca prācīnānubhavajanitamātmanaḥ sāmarthyabhedameva smṛtijñānaprasavahetumācakṣate / Ibid.

[24]:

tāvatsmṛtisamārohiṇo varṇā vācakāḥ, tato na gauravamiti cet / Ibid., p. 12

[25]:

akramānukramaviparītakramāṇāṃ tatrāviśeṣeṇārthadhīsamutpādaprasaṅgāt/ Ibid.

[26]:

athāpi syāt ye yathāsvaṃ varṇānubhavairāhitāḥ saṃskārāḥ, te sambhūya nikhila varṇaviṣayamekameva smaraṇaphalaṃ prasuvate, tadārohiṇo varṇā avyavadhānā abhidheyadhiyamādadhati / na caikaikavarṇopalabdhipratilabdhajanmānaḥ saṃskā-rāḥ prativarṇagocarāstāvatīreva tatkramavatīḥ smṛtīrapi bhāvayitumīśate / tatra tatra nirapekṣāṇānāṃ kāraṇabhāvopalambhāt / Ibid., pp. 12-13

[27]:

na hi vāstavaḥ kramo nityānāṃ vibhūnāṃ teṣām upalabdhinimittattvamāśrīyate, sā cedekā, kutastyastarhi krama eṣām? Ibid., p. 13

[28]:

tatkiṃ śabdatvameva vācakamabhidheyabhedānām. tathā ca tasya sarvasyā viśeṣātsarve’rthāḥ sarvaśabdebhyaḥ pratīyeran / Ibid., p. 15

[29]:

gakārādyākārabhedavivartaṃśabdatvamabhidheyabhedānāmabhidhāyakaṃ, tannātiprasaṅga iti cet. na / prāptāprāptavivekena gādīnāmevābhidheyadhīhetu-bhāvāt / anyathā sattvaguṇatvādīnāmapi tatprasaṅgāt / Ibid.

[30]:

na ca śabdatvamekaṃ vastu sat gakārādinānātvabhāvikatvavirodhi, yena tadbhāvika tvāya śabdatvamapākriyate / śābaleyādibhedavyavasthāpanāya gotvāderapi sāmānya syāpākaraṇaprasaṅgāt / Ibid., p. 16

[31]:

na caiṣāśrotragrahaṇopādhirvināpi śabdatvamekamiti sāmpratam / tadgrahaṇānāmapi nānātvenaikapratyayasamutpādāsāmarthyāt / śrotrasya cātyantaparokṣatayā tatpratīte ragrahe śabdaḥśabdaḥ ityekāvabhāsaprakāśānupapatteḥ / Ibid.

[32]:

gaurityekamidaṃ padamityekapadāvabhāsinī dhīrasti laukikaparīkṣakāṇām / na ceyamanālambanā, nāpi varṇālambanā; teṣāṃ nānātvāt / Ibid., p. 18

[33]:

na ca senāvanavat aupādhikī / upādhiḥ khalvekavijñānaviṣayatā vā bhavet, ekābhidheyapratyayahetutā vā/ Ibid.

[34]:

na tāvat pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ, apratītopādherūpahitapratyayāyogāt / svasaṃvedanaṃ saṃvedanamanicchatāmanusaṃhārabuddhyā svarūpāgrahaṇāt tadekatvāgrahāt tadupādhyekapadapratibhāsānupapattiḥ / Ibid.

[35]:

uttarasminnapi pakṣe parasparāśrayaprasaktirdurvārā / na khalvaviditapadarūpā-vadhirarthamavaiti / avadhyantaraparigrahe tattve’pi varṇānāṃ tadarthabhedāna-dhyavasāyāt / tatrārthapratipattyā padarūpaviśeṣamupakalpayataḥ durūttaramitar-etarāśrayaṃ prasajyet / Ibid.

[36]:

vyavasthitaṃ hi vācakatvamākhyāyate / api ca ekāvabhāsasya pratyayasyaupādhi katvamicchataḥ na kiñcadekaṃ bhavet, sarvatraiva kathanñcit kasyacidupādheḥ sa-mbhavāt / tathā ca nānāpi na syāt, ekasamāhārātmakatvānnānātvasya / Ibid., pp. 18-19

[37]:

atra brūmahe -na vayamekāvabhāsapratyayamekavastuvyavasthitau pramāṇayāmaḥ; kintu vyapadeśamātram / Ibid., p. 19

[38]:

bhavati hi kari-turaga-ratha-padātiṣu, campakāśoka-kiṃśukādiṣu ca nānātve’pi
kañcidupādhimāśritya vyapadeśo laukikānām-seneti, vanamiti ca/ na ca tat senā vanaṃ vā karicampakādyanekasamavāyyeko'vayavī prasiddhyati / Ibid.

[39]:

asti khalvekābhidheyadhīhetubhāvaḥ trayāṇāmapi varṇānāmekasmaraṇasamārohiṇāṃ grābṇāmivaikapiṭharadhāraṇe, yasmāt padamiti vyapadeśaḥ / Ibid.

[40]:

na hi padāvadhāraṇādhīnaḥ sambandhabodhaḥ, kintu tadadhinaṃ padajnñānam / kārakabhedābhidheyi hi padaṃ, padyate’neneti vyutpattyā. tacchabdāśca kārya-sambandhopahitasīmāno nāsati tasminpravartitumīśate / Ibid., pp. 19-20

[41]:

na ca nikhilasāmānyaviśeṣavirahiṇaḥ sphoṭasyāsphoṭasya darśanamupapadyate / sa khalūpalabhyet, na vopalabhyet / Ibid., pp. 20-21

[42]:

kathañcidanubhave niraṃśatvānupapatterapasiddhāntaprasaṅgāt /
tasmādanavayavam-evānubhūyate padatattvamekamiti riktaṃ vacaḥ / Ibid., p. 21

[43]:

ata eva ca ‘śabdārthaṃ pratipadyāmahe’ iti vandhyāpatyetivadanupapannārthavacanam, anubhavābhāvāt / Ibid.

[44]:

na cāpratyakṣamarthadhīkāryeṇa śakyānumānam anyonyāśrayāt. Ibid., p. 22

[45]:

na khalu sattāmātreṇa śabdo’bhidheyadhiyamādhātumarhati, śāśvatatayā nityamādhānaprasaṅgāt iti, svajñānena taddhetureṣitavya iti / svajnñānaṃ cāsyārthapratyayalakṣaṇaliṅgaprabhavamiti, prāptamanyonyasaṃśrayam / Ibid.

[46]:

dṛśyate hi nadīdīneti smṛtidhiyorabhede’pi varṇarūpāṇāṃ viśadataraḥ padabhedaḥ / na cedamanavayavapadadarśanamiti niveditam / tadanubhavakarmatākramaḥ paramavaśi-ṣyate / Ibid., p. 23

[47]:

padāvadhāraṇopāyānbahūnicchanti sūrayaḥ / kramannyūnātiriktatvasvaravākya, śrutismṛtīḥ // Ślokavārttka , 1.1.180

[48]:

na ca nirantaramatisadṛśasvarabahuvaktṛprayukteṣvānupūrvyavatsu samānasmṛti-buddhisamārohiṣvarthapratyayādarśanād vyabhicāra iti sāmpratam, ekavaktṛpray uktatvena viśeṣāt / Tattvabindu , p. 23

[49]:

teṣāṃ ca guṇabhūtānām arthapratyāyanaṃ prati /
sāhityamekavakartrādi kramaścāpi vivakṣitaḥ // Sphoṭavāda , 70

[50]:

tadbhāvastu nairantaryādivadvaktrekatve’pi tulyaḥ / na ca jnñāpakahetuḥ viditasama stajñāpakāṅgo jnñāpayatītyapyaikāntikam, bhavati hi mano’numānāṅgam / Tattvabindu , pp. 24-25

[51]:

na cāpi samabhivyāhṛtapadābhihitapadārthapratyayādhīnotpattirvākyārthadhīranya-thopapadyamānā’nubhūyamānaparasparavyāvṛttamūrtipadānyapahnutyā, atyantāpa-ridṛṣṭaṃ vākyamekamanavayavamiti / tatsiddhametat arthāpatteḥ, anumānasya vā ni-vṛttistadekagocara padavākyābhāvasādhanīti, sthitaṃ nānavayavamekaṃ vākyaṃ vākyārthasya bodhakamiti / Ibid., pp. 25-26