Part 6 - Refutation of Sphoṭa according to the Naiyāyikas

The Naiyāyikas admit that letters are endowed with the power of expressing meaning; and to posit a transcendental entity, viz. sphoṭa, for this purpose is hardly warranted.

According to the Nyāya system, śabda is only an aggregate of phonemes that are produced by the moments of the vocal organs of the speaker. According to the Naiyāyikas, the word has transitory existence.^[1] During the first moment, the sound is produced. The second moment is the moment of its existence. It disappears at the third moment. They maintain that whatever is meaningful or significant is a word which is composed of several phonemes. The listener apprehends the meaning of a word when he hears the last phoneme of a word together with the recollection of previous phonemes, through their impressions.^[2] They admit that a word is a single unit since this is shown by experience; but it arises from the single act of collective memory of the phonemes.

The Naiyāyikas maintain that the sequence of phonemes is denotative of meaning on the basis of the principle of contrast and agreement. The particular meaning is not apprehended in the absence of a particular phoneme. The whole is meaningful because its parts are meaningful. The logicians consider that the phonemes uttered by different speakers in different tones are regarded as non-distinctive, because the phonemes represent a class,^[3] rather than a particular instance.

The Naiyāyikas do not find appropriateness in postulating the entity sphoṭa apart from the combination of phonemes. Thus, the collective remembrance of the preceding phonemes together with the perception of the final phoneme is regarded as conveyor of meaning.

The view of the Naiyāyikas does not appear quite convincing to the grammarians. The grammarians feel that language has two levels: distinctive and significative. These must be kept apart from each other. The meaning-bearing aspect of a word cannot be dispensed with regard to the notion of the phonemes and their sequences. The phonemes are not directly associated with the meaning, and hence it is necessary to postulate the sphoṭa concept as a single meaning-bearing entity.

The Naiyāyikas reject the sphoṭa concept by noting down the absurdities. The Sphoṭavādin’s view that previous dhvani manifest sphoṭa not so clearly as the last dhvani, cannot be correct, as sphoṭa devoid of parts cannot be spoken as manifested by dhvanis. The sphoṭa cannot be full or partial manifestation.

The view that the manifestation of sphoṭa is based on superimposition is not correct, since with reference to an object superimposition cannot be explained. It is not possible to say that it is devoid of parts. So, Sphoṭavādin’s view that padatattva is devoid of parts is not acceptable.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa clearly points out that it should not be supposed that the Naiyāyikas criticise the doctrine of sphoṭa only to make a parade of their power of argumentation. The theory of sphoṭa is opposed to the vital principles of their philosophy. The Naiyāyikas have established the authority of word (śabda) as a pramāṇa by proving that it is created by God. We have pointed out that the grammarians describe word (śabda) as something eternal. And, as an entity which is said to be eternal cannot be created by any being, be it human or divine, the Naiyāyikas cannot but refuse to accept the theory of the grammarians.^[4]

The Naiyāyikas make the validity of verbal knowledge (śābdabodha) conditional on God whereas the grammarians and the Mīmāṃsakas make it a self-sufficient instrument of knowledge.

The Naiyāyikas, may, however, point out that word (śabda) in their system of thought is regarded as possessing transient existence; it is said to be produced at one moment, exists for the next moment and dies out at the third moment. But, the grammarians conceive word as one endowed with a permanent character. Thus, the conception of word being different in the two systems of thought, the Naiyāyikas naturally raise a note of protest against the theory of sphoṭa as propounded by the grammarians.

The Naiyāyikas again point out that letters are designated as śabda for the only reason that they are perceived by auditory organs.^[5] Sphoṭa, on the contrary, can be cognised only through mental perception.^[6] It has been said that the realisation of sphoṭa requires a mental discipline and spiritual meditation. Hence, the Naiyāyikas opine that when we do not perceive the existence of sphoṭa in the usual course, it is certainly desirable that letters which are ordinarily perceived should be regarded as being expressive of sense. Thus, when verbal knowledge (śābdabodha) can be easily explained as occurring from the perception of letters, the Naiyāyikas do not find any justification for postulating a spiritual entity like sphoṭa as causing the cognition of meaning.

Moreover, they claim that there would be controversy if we accept sphoṭa apart from the letters. Mahābhāṣyakāra has clearly stated, śabda is that entity by whose pronunciation there arises a concept of cow having dewlap, ears etc. So, it is clear that which is the viṣaya of pronunciation, in other words, that which is pronounced is called śabda and that is the only denoter of artha. Sphoṭa cannot be the viṣaya of pronunciation. Hence, varṇas are only denoter of meaning, therefore, they are śabda. So, there is no sphoṭa apart from the letters.

The Grammarians believe that sphoṭa is more and more clearly expressed with the perception of each one of the succeeding letters and to explain this issue they give the well-known illustration of a piece of gem in this connection.^[7] Jayanta, however, observes that this analogy does not hold good. Thus, he says that sphoṭa being an indivisible entity, it is hardly reasonable to opine that some of its parts will be manifested with the perception of the first letter, while others with that of the second and so on until its parts are completely revealed with the perception of the final letter. In the case of a piece of gem, however, we are justified in maintaining that some of its parts are cognised at the first sight, others at a second glance and the rest gradually. There is every chance that some parts will escape our notice at the time of the first or the second observation and our knowledge of the object may be perfect at the fifth or the sixth time. But, it is certainly wrong to say that an object like varṇa, śabda, which does not admit of any division into parts will be gradually manifested.^[8]

Jayanta has further pointed out that the theory of the manifestation of sphoṭa through the medium of sound is also untenable. For, he asserts that if sounds were capable of manifesting sphoṭa, there would have been no difficulty on our part to understand the import of a word even when it is uttered so quickly that its constituent letters are not distinctly heard.

Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, denotation lies within the word and not with the imperceptible entity as sphoṭa. To assume sphoṭa, as distinct from letters, therefore, according to Naiyāyikas, is as fallacious as to conceive a flower in the sky.^[9]

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

uccāraṇādūrdhvamanupalabdheḥ anityaḥ śabdaḥ, na hyenamuccaritaṃ muhūrtāmapyupalabhāmahe, tasmād vinaṣṭa ityāvagacchāmaḥ. karoti śabdavyapadeśācca kāryaḥ śabdaḥ śabdaṃ kuru, śabdaṃ mā kārṣīriti vyavahartāraḥ prayujate te nūnamavagacchanti kāryaḥ śabdaḥ iti / Nyāyamañjarī , p.189

[2]:

yathā pūrvavarṇajanitasaṃskārasahito’ntyavarṇa iti tatra bhavatā mīmāṃsābhāṣyakṛtā varṇitaṃ tathā vā varṇānāmarthapratyāyakatvamastu / Ibid., p. 346

[3]:

tatra yo’rtho yaṃ śabdam anugacchati, sa tasyārtha ityavasīyate tatkathamasatyā bhāgāḥ / Ibid., p. 354

[4]:

tasmād anityānāṃ varṇānām eva vācakatvaṃ. pratiṣṭhāpanīyaṃ, parākaraṇīyaśca sphoṭaḥ / Ibid., p. 367

[5]:

ataḥśravaṇagrahaṇataiva śabdalakṣaṇaṃ nyāyam / varṇā eva cedaṃśabdalakṣaṇam anupatanti iti abhidheyadhīhetubhāvam anupayanto’ pi lokaprasiddhesta eva śabdāḥ / Sphoṭasiddhi , p.13

[6]:

tadeva hi sārvajanīnamānasapratyakṣapravedanīyaprayatnabhedabhinnanānādhvanibhiḥ pratyekapravyañjanīyaṃ tattvam / Tattvabindu , p. 7

[7]:

yathā ratnaparīkṣiṇaḥ parīkṣamāṇasya prathamasamadhigamānupāravyātamanukhyeya rūpapratyayopahitasaṃskārarūpāhitaviśeṣāyāṃ buddhau krameṇa carame cetasi cakāsti ratnatattvam / Sphoṭasiddhi , p. 131

[8]:

yat punaravādi prathamavarṇabuddhivelāyām iva vyaktaṃ sphoṭatattvam uttarottara buddhi bhiratiśayitatarapratyayatāṃ nīyate ratnatattvavaditi, sā eva viṣama upanyāsaḥ ratnasya hi sāvayatvāt prathamapratyayā viṣayīkṛtasūkṣmatarāvayavaviśeṣagrāhiṇam uttarottara pratyayanāmasti tattāvakāśaḥ sphoṭastu varṇasvarūpavadanaṃśa iti tatsva rūpasarvasvamādhenaiva varṇaina vyaktaṃ kimidānīm anye varṇāḥ kariṣyanti / Nyāyamañjarī , p. 378

[9]:

gaganakusumasyeva sphoṭakalpanā na yuktā / Nyāya Sūtra , p. 270