Part 5 - Mīmāṃsā and its objections against sphoṭa

The Mīmāṃsakas strongly criticise the doctrine of sphoṭa advocated by the grammarians. They hold that a word is not different from its component letters, and that a sentence is not different from its component words. According to them letters constitute a word and words constitute a sentence. They maintain that the phoneme is eternal and all-pervasive.

To the question, ‘in gauḥ what is to be considered as the word’, the earliest Mīmāṃsaka’s answer is that the word gauḥ is nothing more than the three phonemes which are found in it, viz. g, au and visarga.^[1] The word śabda must obviously be something which can be heard when somebody utters the word gauḥ. It is also these very phonemes which cause the understanding of the meaning of the word. When phonemes are grouped together, according to the units of meaning which are conveyed, they are called pada or individual word. Each individual word is therefore, an aggregate of phonemes and expresses one unit of meaning called padārtha.

The Mīmāṃsakas explain how the grouping of phonemes can take place. They admit that the simultaneous existence of phonemes is unaccountable, since the first phoneme disappears as soon as the second is uttered. The Mīmāṃsakas assert that even if the cognition of preceding and succeeding phonemes cannot be simultaneous, still the phonemes apprehended in succession may leave behind the impressions which give rise to the cognition of unity of meaning and word. Thus, according to the Mīmāṃsakas, the last phoneme in combination with the impressions produced by the cognition of the preceding phonemes in a word or a sentence conveys the unitariness of word and meaning.^[2] If the cognition of visarga together with the impressions of previous sounds g and au constituting the word gauḥ, is present in the mind of a listener, he understands the notion of a cow. If the impression of the preceding sounds g and au in the same order is not present in the mind of a listener at the time of cognition of the last phoneme ḥ, he does not comprehend the meaning ‘cow’.^[3] Thus, the Mīmāṃsakas assign a special power to the impressions also. Therefore, they argue that there is no necessity of postulating an indivisible entity, called sphoṭa.

Against the Mīmāṃsaka’s contention, the grammarians argue that this defence does not succeed in explaining the felt unity of word. The single memory impression does not account of the particular order of phonemes. The individual phonemes in a word can produce only the recollection of the phonemes heard, but they have nothing to do with the order of phonemes. The impressions left by the phonemes will be same even if the order of phonemes is reversed. Thus, the difference between jarā and rājā and nadī and dīnā will be unaccountable to those who do not accept the sphoṭa theory. The order, which is an external fact of utterance and of audition, doesn’t affect either the phonemes or their impression. Moreover, it is not possible to attribute any sequence to the sound units, because according to the Mīmāṃsakas, the phonemes are permanent and all pervading.^[4]

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this objection by pointing out that when the speaker utters the phonemes of a word in their fixed order, they are heard by the listener in the same sequence. The phonemes uttered in a particular order and apprehended by the hearer in the same sequence leave behind the impression which together with the perception of final phoneme conveys the meaning.^[5]

The grammarians strongly criticise the view of the Mīmāṃsakas that the memory impression leads to the cognition of meaning on the ground that the cognition of phonemes can very well produce the memory impression, but it cannot be supposed to have power of conveying meaning. The grammarians further point out that the nature of memory-impression is such that it can produce the recollection of the very object which is the object of cognition. Since the phonemes by themselves are not meaning-conveyors, their impressions cannot possess additional capacity for conveying meaning. To this, the Mīmāṃsakas state that the impressions do not denote the meaning directly, but the cognition of the last phoneme accompanied by the impressions of previous phonemes causes one to have a simultaneous recollection of all the phonemes, which conveys the meaning. As regards the second objection, the Mīmāṃsakas point out the fact, that, although the sequence cannot be attributed to the phonemes which are eternal, it is still possible to attribute it to the manifestation of individual phonemes, which is not regarded as eternal. Therefore, the Mīmāṃsakas argue that there is no necessity for postulating the one indivisible entity i.e. sphoṭa.

To guess something as sphoṭa apart from the letters is opposed to all cognition and experience. Letters are actually perceived in a word, as for instance, the word gauḥ does not appear to have any other element except the three constituent letters-g, au and visarga. The assumption of sphoṭa involves a negation of perceptible facts and is unwarranted assumption of something that is invisible and imperceptible. So, because of its non-perception, it is concluded that sphoṭa has no factual existence. The concluding verse of Ślokavārttika (sphoṭavāda) reveals, however, the reason why Kumārila Bhaṭṭa does not lend support to the theory of sphoṭa.^[6]

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the celebrated scholar of the Mīmāṃsā school, says that words are what we actually hear. We do not hear sphoṭa and thus it is not word.^[7] He contends that meaningfulness cannot be the criterion of words. We cannot say that all those that are meaningful are words, because if that be the sole nature of words, smoke would be a word. Smoke indicates fire and thus according to this definition, it would be a word. But it is equally true that which does not mean will not be called a word and a letter having no meaning will cease to be called a word.^[8] Thus only that which can be spoken or heard is the real word and not necessarily that which is meaningful. This is the reason that even when one does not know the meaning of a word he knows it to be a word at least.^[9]

No one will ever say that meaningfulness is the sole property of words alone. There are things which are meaningful or significant. But it is equally true that which is spoken or heard is also not necessarily a word. No one will say that he hears a word when a cuckoo sings a song on the top of a tree. The song of a cuckoo is not a word. To say that word exists without a meaning is contradiction. A word is always a meaningful word. That sound which has meaning is called a word. Speakability or audibility is not the only criterion of word. Thus a word is that which can be spoken or heard and at the same time is meaningful.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the Mīmāṃsaka, refutes the sphoṭa theory and ascertains that the significance belongs to the letters themselves and not to any sphoṭa (name).

In this regard, Kumārila asks a question,

“Do letters singly or conjointly reveal sphoṭa?”^[10]

He points out that letters cannot reveal sphoṭa singly for the obvious reason that if any one letter in a particular word is competent to reveal sphoṭa, the remaining letters will obviously be superfluous.

The grammarians face the objection by saying that sphoṭa is revealed on the very moment when the first letter is perceived; but, it becomes more and more definitely manifested with the perception of each one of the succeeding letters.^[11] So, Kumārila’s apprehension that succeeding letters will be redundant, is absolutely without any ground.

Vācaspati Miśra in his Tattvabindu^[12] defends the unity of word and sentence without accepting sphoṭa. He criticises the sphoṭa concept by pointing out that the phonemes cannot be said to be different or non-different from the sphoṭa. If one phoneme is non-different from the sphoṭa, then the single phoneme would also be competent to convey the meaning. Accordingly, the remaining phonemes will obviously be meaningless. On the other hand, if the phonemes are different from the sphoṭa, why should they manifest the sphoṭa and why should there be association between the sound and the manifestation of sphoṭa? Similarly, the idea that the sphoṭa is progressively revealed by the succession of phonemes, does not hold good, because the sphoṭa is regarded as indivisible and devoid of parts. He^[13] concludes that, since the meaning of sentence or of the word can be well-cognised from the knowledge of the words after the auditory perception of phonemes, it is not necessary to establish sphoṭa, devoid of parts and properties. Vācaspati’s views on sphoṭa will be discussed in detail in the succeeding pages.

According to Upavarṣa, letters are not of a momentary nature on the ground that at the time of recognition (pratyabhijn ~ ā), they are recognised not as something similar to what have been previously perceived but as identical with them.^[14] The Bhāmati clearly puts it that even when we utter the word ‘Cow’ for a thousand and one times, we do not perceive that the word on each occasion is a different one and that each closely resembles the other. On the contrary, we perceive that the same word is pronounced on each occasion. But when we observe one cow after another, we never say that the second animal is the same as the first. But it can be said that the second one is something similar to the first. It is exactly for this reason that Upavarṣa maintains that when a letter pronounced at different times is not different in character, there is absolutely little justification for the assumption that it is transient.

The grammarians criticise Upavarṣa’s view by saying that when all letters are permanent, it is difficult to ascertain which particular sense is expressed by which particular group of letters. We cannot speak of the sequence of letters with reference to either time or space in view of the supposition that they are eternal entities.^[15]

Śabara discusses the correctness of Upavarṣa’s theory according to which word (śabda) means a number of letters and not sphoṭa.^[16] He maintains that word cannot imply letters for the obvious reason that if it does so, we shall not be able to explain how meaning is expressed, is it expressed by letters singly or conjointly? The first alternative cannot be accepted on the ground that the import is not obtained with the perception of any one of the letters. As for the other one, it may be said that letters being transient and not admitting of being pronounced simultaneously, cannot be said to form an aggregate. Śabara is of the view that the perception of each letter will give rise to an effect (saṃskāra) which will last even when the final letter is perceived; and, the final letter forming an aggregate with these individual effects will be expressive of sense. He admits a number of unseen potency (apūrva) accruing from the perception of letters.

The grammarians criticise Śabara’s theory and opine that a perceptional effect is never perceived but is inferred from the result (kāryānumānaikagamya). So, it is not possible to know that the perception of each one of the letters gives birth to an effect (saṃskāra) unless meaning is cognised. Hence Śabara’s statement involves the fallacy of inter-dependence (parasparāśraya).

Maṇḍana Miśra, the great philosopher of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system has written the work Sphoṭasiddhi, which deals with the establishment of sphoṭa. Here, the term siddhi stands for the conclusive ascertainment as a result of careful investigation. He has said that there is no valid ground to deny the existence of sphoṭa as a spiritual entity. In his Sphoṭasiddhi, he discards the arguments of Kūmārila who in his Ślokavārttika, has tried to prove that there is hardly any necessity for the postulation of sphoṭa.^[17] He carefully examines the views of the great master and finally establishes the doctrine of sphoṭa. In order to establish the existence of sphoṭa, Maṇḍana presents the arguments of Bhartṛhari with quotations from the Vākyapadīya wherever necessary. In this connection it is mentionable that though he has, in particular, discussed the nature of padasphoṭa, he has spoken of vākyasphoṭa as well.^[18] It is a fact that Maṇḍana criticises Kumārila’s views in many places, but it should be remembered that he does not hesitate to criticise the views of any philosopher, however, eminent he may be, whenever he finds good reason for an honest difference of opinion.

While discussing the theory of sphoṭa, Śaṅkarācārya says:

“I do not postulate a new entity called sphoṭa; I know it through perception.”^[19]

He criticises the theory of sphoṭa on the ground that the apprehension of a temporal series can be explained as due to the synthesizing activity of the mind.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

atha gaurityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ? gakāraukāra visarjanīyā iti bhagavān upavarṣaḥ / Śābarabhāṣya , I.1.5

[2]:

pūrvapūrva varṇajanitasaṃskārasahito’ntyo varṇaḥ etyadoṣaḥ / Ibid.

[3]:

api ca kramavyatikramabhāvitapūrvavarṇajanitasaṃskārasadbhāve’pi nārthādhigamaḥ samīkṣyate / Sphoṭasiddhi , pp.18-19

[4]:

svato varṇāḥ nityatayā vibhutayā ca na deśanibandhanaṃ nāpi kālanibandhanaṃ parāparabhāvam anupatantīti prakhyānanibandhana eṣa samupāśrīyate / Ibid., p. 22

[5]:

Ibid., p. 129

[6]:

varṇātiriktaḥ pratiṣidhyamānaḥ padeṣu mandaṃ phalamādadhāti /
kāryāṇi vākyāvayavāśrayāṇi satyāni kartuṃ kṛta eṣa yatnaḥ // Ślokavārttka , Sphoṭavāda 137

[7]:

tasmācchrotraparicchinno yadyarthaṃ gamayenna vā /
sarvathā tasya śabdatvaṃ lokasiddhaṃ na hīyate // Ibid., 5

[8]:

agnyādīn gamayanto’pi śabdā dhūmādayo na hi /
na vā’pratyāyakatvāt syādekavarṇeṣvaśabdatā // Ibid., 7

[9]:

na ca prāgarthavijnñānācchrotragrāhye na śabdadhīḥ /
na cārthajñānataḥ paścādaśrautre'pi ca śabdatā // Ibid., 8

[10]:

yasyānavayavaḥ sphoṭo vyajyate varṇabuddhibhiḥ /
so’pi paryanuyogena naivānena vimucyate // Ibid., 91

[11]:

Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha , p. 47

[12]:

upādhiḥ khalu ekavijñānaviṣayatā vā bhavet, ekābhidheyapratyayahetutā vā / Tattvabindu , p. 18

[13]:

tadiha dṛśyamānebhyo dṛśyamānaprakārānupātibhyaḥ abhidheyapratyaya upapadyamāno naivājñātāvayavamatyantānanubhūtaṃ padatattvam upakalpayati, atiprasaṅgāt / Ibid., p. 25

[14]:

Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha , p. 25

[15]:

Ibid., pp. 25-26

[16]:

atha gaurityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ? gakāraukāra visarjanīyā iti bhagavānupavarṣaḥ / Śābarabhāṣya , 1.1.5

[17]:

durvidagdhairavakṣipte darśane padadarśinām /
yathāgamaṃ yathāprajñaṃ nyāyaleśo nidarśyate // Sphoṭasiddhi , 2

[18]:

nirastabhedaṃ padatattvam ekam /
vyādarśi yuktyāgamasaṃśrayeṇa // Ibid., 36

[19]:

na kalpayāmyahaṃ sphoṭaṃ pratyakṣameva tu enamavagaccham / Śābarabhāṣya on Brahmasiddhi , 1.3.28