Part 4 - Bhartṛhari’s theory of sphoṭa

The theory of sphoṭa is one of the important contributions of the Indian grammarians to the problem of Semantics in General Linguistics. Its first mention has been traced as early as in the Mahābhāṣya of Patañjali (2^ndCent. B.C.), though the word sphoṭa has been referred to by earlier grammarians like Pāṇini in his pioneer work Aṣṭādhyāyī.^[1] But it is the Vākyapadīya of the great grammarian Bhartṛhari (5^thCent. A.D.) where we get a fully developed and systematized description of the sphoṭa doctrine.

Bhartṛhari begins the discussion on the sphoṭa theory with the observation that words or sentences can be considered under two aspects, as sound-patterns or as meaning-bearing symbols. He says that in meaningful language, linguists admit two entities, both of which may be called words: one is the underlying cause of the articulated sounds, while the other is attached to the meaning.^[2] The former is the sound-pattern which is the external facet of the language symbol, while the latter is the semantic facet which expresses the meaning. Words have two faces: the external face looks as the sounds (dhvani), while the internal face looks as the meaning (artha). The underlying cause of the articulated sounds (śabdānāṃ nimittam) is the sound-pattern which underlies instances of the utterances of the word; this abstract sound-pattern with the time-sequences still attached to it is called prākṛta dhvani and is the external aspect of the language. The internal aspect, which is directly attached to the meaning is the sphoṭa which is partless, integral linguistic symbols.^[3]

This fundamental dichotomy between form and content in language is mentioned by Pāṇini himself in the sūtra:^[4]

svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasyāśabdasaṃjñā,

‘A word (in a grammatical rule) which is not a technical term denotes its own form’.

On this sūtra, Kātyāyana says:^[5]

śabdapūrvako hyarthe saṃpratyayaḥ, tasmād arthanivṛttiḥ,

‘The understanding of the thing-meant is preceded by that of the word; hence in a grammatical context, the question of the thing-meant does not arise.’

A word can signify its own form as well as the thing meant by it. One is the name and the other is the thing-named. Bhartṛhari says^[6] that every word, first of all, expresses its own class, thereafter it is fictionally superimposed on the form of the class of things. He emphasizes again and again the fact that a word has a double power; it can convey an idea of the form of an expression as well as its content. He explains the problem by means of various illustrations. Śabda is similar to light and consciousness in so far as it can reveal itself and also reveal other things. Just as consciousness can be conscious of itself, while being conscious of other things,^[7] and just as a light can reveal itself while revealing other objects, so also every word has the power of referring to itself as well as to the external things symbolized by it.

According to the grammarians also, the words will have to be taken as referring to themselves until the relation between the word and the meaning is known. Thus, Bhartṛhari says that when we do not hear a word properly, we ask, ‘What did you say?’, thereby indicating that we have not understood the form of the word.^[8]

Bhartṛhari lays stress on the fundamental truth that, strictly speaking, words are psychical entities (śabdo buddhisthaḥ)^[9] which reveal themselves through the articulated sounds. As fire always resides in araṇi, but it is not manifested until it comes into contact with the other things. Similarly, śabda always resides in buddhi, but it is manifested only by the articulate sounds.^[10]

As A. H. Gardiner says,^[11]

‘It is only inaccurately, though by a sort of necessary inaccuracy, that the name of “words” is given to the articulate sounds which pass between speaker and listener’.

‘As words exist in the possession of every individual (of a linguistic community), they are psychical entities, comprising on the one hand an area of meaning, and on the other hand the image of a particular sound susceptible of being physically reproduced whenever wanted.’^[12]

Even earlier thinkers in India had recognized the fact that the word is something more than the audible sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener; Vyāsa, in the Yogasūtrabhāṣya states clearly that the word is to be grasped in the mind, though it is brought together by the sounds.^[13] Even the Mīmāṃsakas who consider the word as an aggregate of the permanent letters (varṇas) in a fixed order recognize that it is much more than the articulate sounds.

The concept of sphoṭa is something more than what is generally implied by the term linguistic sign. The relationship between the word and the meaning is an essential factor for the sphoṭa concept as for the sign. There is no sphoṭa without meaning; it is the meaning-bearing nature of an expression that makes it a sphoṭa (when considered as a whole apart from its parts which are irrelevant). In fact, the sphoṭa is the significant taken as a timeless and indivisible symbol denoting a meaning. The time-order of the significant is merely a means for revealing the timeless and partless sphoṭa.

Even though the sphoṭa is an integral symbol which is indivisible and timeless, it can be revealed only by means of the sound in a time-series pattern. The fact that the sound is produced serially is no argument for considering the sphoṭa to have a time sequence. The individual sounds of the letters that we hear in the course of revealing the sphoṭa seem to be present in the sphoṭa itself only because of our incapacity to hear the symbol apart from the sounds.

Types of Sound (Dhvani) according to Bhartṛhari

Bhartṛhari contends that dhvani has two faces viz. prākṛta dhvani (primary sounds) and vaikṛta dhvani (secondary sounds).^[14] Prākṛta dhvani is the original sound, which is the cause of sphoṭa. But vaikṛta dhvani is the pure phonetic term used the by grammarians. It is the sound spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener.

The sounds are uttered in order to manifest the sphoṭa, which is therefore, their root cause (prakṛti). Hence, in their first moment i.e. at the time of the manifestation of the sphoṭa, they are called prākṛta dhvani. They are so called because without them the form of the sphoṭa would remain unmanifested and therefore, unperceived. Not only that, even though the sphoṭa, being eternal, has no duration, it appears to have the duration of the primary sounds with which it is perceived as identical. It is the duration of the primary sounds which determines that the sphoṭa is manifested. As soon as we hear the primary sounds, we perceive the sphoṭa; but its perception does not disappear at once. It lasts a little while more in quick speech, a little longer in speech of medium speed, and longer still in slow speech. But this continuity of perception of the already manifested sphoṭa cannot be explained unless the manifesting sounds also continue in the succeeding moments. These sounds of the succeeding moments, having the same duration as the sounds of the first moments are called secondary sounds (vaikṛta dhvani). They continue to manifest the sphoṭa already manifested by the primary sounds. To put it differently, the sphoṭa continues to be perceived again and again as long as the secondary sounds last. Those are called secondary sounds, by which the forms of the sphoṭa already manifested, are perceived again and again uninterruptedly for a longer period of time. As soon as the lamp is lit, one perceives the object and if the light continues, one continues to perceive the object. The sphoṭa is perceived as identical with the manifesting primary sounds (though quite different from them) and as having their properties.^[15]

The secondary sounds, on the other hand, come after the sphoṭa is manifested. It arises from the primary sounds. The prākṛta dhvani reveals the identity of the word; but the attribute of speed, such as slow, fast or medium-paced, vṛtti, actually belong to the vaikṛta dhvani or secondary sounds which enable us to hear the word. The properties of the secondary sounds are not wrongly attributed to the sphoṭa.^[16]

Puṇyarājā has explained the nature of the vaikṛta dhvani in the following way: when we beat a drum, the sound produced is heard from a long distance but when a strike is going, the sound reaches only a short distance and is heard for a long time without ceasation. The difference in the nature of the two sounds explains the conception of the vaikṛta dhvani.^[17] On the other hand, prākṛta dhvani is what serves to manifest the sphoṭa.

The primary sounds are produced by the contacts and separation of the vocal organs, themselves conditioned by the desires and efforts of the speaker. On the other hand, the secondary sounds are produced by the primary sounds.^[18] They are a continuation of the primary sounds, after the manifestation of the sphoṭa and are responsible for the continued perception of sphoṭa. The sphoṭa cannot be perceived apart from the primary sounds which manifest it, though it is a distinct entity. Therefore, the properties of the primary sounds such as duration and accent are wrongly attributed to the sphoṭa. Primary sounds are the sounds of the first moment of utterance. The sounds which follow like echoes or reverberations of those of the first moment are called secondary sounds. They are the cause of the repeated cognition of the sphoṭa or speed of utterance. They are external to sphoṭa.

Relation between Dhvani and Sphoṭa according to Bhartṛhari

The ancient Indian grammarians accepted sphoṭa as the essential element of speech, but there is difference of opinion about the real nature of sphoṭa. Bhartṛhari has mentioned those views in his Vākyapadīya. According to one view, sphoṭa is the original sound produced by the contact of the different vocal organs with the various places of articulation.^[19] These sounds disappear as soon as they are produced, but they are the cause of producing other sounds which spread in all directions like the reflections of the original sounds. These subsequent sounds produced by the sphoṭa are called dhvani which spreads like a wave,^[20] becoming weaker and weaker as they go further and further from the sphoṭa. This view has been explained in the commentary of the Vākyapadīya with the example of the sound of bherī (a kind of drum).^[21] As the sound of bherī goes further and further it becomes weaker and weaker.

Bhartṛhari mentions another theory regarding sphoṭa and dhvani which is slightly different from the previous one. According to this theory, both the dhvani and sphoṭa are produced simultaneously. According to the previous theory, the sphoṭa is produced first; but according to this theory there is no interval between the production of the sphoṭa and the dhvani. The sphoṭa is the central sound and may be compared to a flame of fire; the dhvani is like the light of the flame which spreads in different directions. Sometimes we hear the dhvani without recognizing the sphoṭa, just as we perceive the light even without seeing the flame.^[22] As the flame and the light are produced simultaneously, so is the production of the sphoṭa and the dhvani. These two theories hold that the sphoṭa is produced by human effort and is ephemeral.

According to the third view mentioned in the Vākyapadīya regarding the nature of the sphoṭa and the dhvani, the former is the class and the latter are its members. Bhartṛhari says that according to some, the sphoṭa is the class revealed by the various individual instances and the dhvanis are the members of this class.^[23] Many scholars have taken this theory as that of Bhartṛhari himself. Even Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita quotes this verse in support of the view that Bhartṛhari accepted the Class sphoṭa theory.^[24] Here it is important to note that for Bhartṛhari, the sphoṭa is the word or the sentence taken as a single meaningful unit; if he accepts the concept of the class, it will be a class whose members are themselves sphoṭas. The identification of sphoṭa with the class of dhvanis, without any reference to the meaning-bearing aspect,^[25] is entirely against Bhartṛhari’s conception of sphoṭa.

Now Bhartṛhari comes to the question of the relation that subsists between dhvani and sphoṭa. He says that just as there is fixed eternal relation between sense organs and the object, similar is the relation of manifestor and manifested between dhvani and sphoṭa.^[26] Hence, the relation between dhvani and sphoṭa is of manifester and manifested and not of cause and effect, since the śabda monist accepts the eternality of sphoṭa. Thus, speech only illuminates the sphoṭa, as a flash of light illuminates an earthen jar in a dark room. The light does not produce the jar. The jar is already there and the light only illuminates it. Similarly, the sphoṭa which is suddenly exposed by our speech is something whose nature is completely independent of any physical sound (prākṛta dhvani) and articulate sounds (vaikṛta dhvani). They are only the instruments of the temporary perception of the sphoṭa already present.

Bhartṛhari maintains that the primary sound causes the manifestation of the sphoṭa. Accordingly, the properties of the primary sounds are falsely attributed to the manifested sphoṭa. After the manifestation of sphoṭa, the sounds which also continue in the succeeding moments are called secondary sounds. The sphoṭa continues to be perceived as long as the secondary sounds last. The difference in rapid or slow mode of pronunciation of the secondary sounds does not affect in any way the nature of sphoṭa which is already manifested by the primary sounds. The secondary sounds are not considered as identical with sphoṭa. Accordingly, variabilities in the secondary sound do not make any significant change in the perception of the sphoṭa. So, the properties of the secondary sounds are not attributed to the sphoṭa.^[27]

According to Bhartṛhari, sphoṭa is one and eternal, and neither the question of order nor of plurality can arise in the conception of sphoṭa. It is sound or nāda, that is produced at different moments of time, and the notions of sequence of plurality that really pertain to sounds are wrongly attributed to sphoṭa.^[28] Strictly speaking, sphoṭa has a permanent and indivisible character, but because it is a spiritual entity requiring the aid of sound in the process of its manifestation before the finite minds, the character of sound colours the real nature of sphoṭa. To be more clear it is sound which is either short or long, but in reality, the sphoṭa always remains unaffected—it is unchangeable. The confusion arises because we cannot apprehend sphoṭa without the help of sound.

Bhartṛhari has clearly explained the fact with apt illustrations. He says that the moon shinning above in the blue sky is one and fixed, but when it is reflected in the dancing ripples of the lake down below, do we not see a thousand and one moons all moving about in the water?^[29] What is one appears to be many, what is fixed appears to be unsteady and full of movement. It is practically impossible on our part to imagine that the moon shinning above is one and fixed when our eyes are fixed on the ripples that have caught the reflection. Likewise, sphoṭa or śabdatattva is one and eternal and the character of plurality or of sequence is but superimposed on it.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

avaṅ sphoṭāyanasya / Pāṇinisūtra , VI.1.123

[2]:

dvāv upādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavido viduḥ /
eko nimittaṃ śabdānām aparo’rthe prayujyate // Vākyapadīya , I. 44

[3]:

A Study in the Dialectics of Sphoṭa , p.13

[4]:

Pāṇinisūtra , I. 1. 68

[5]:

Mahābhāṣya , I, p. 176

[6]:

svā jātiḥ prathamaṃ śabdaiḥ sarvair evābhidhīyate / tato’rthajātirūpeṣu tadadhyāropakalpanā // Vākyapadīya , III. 1.6

[7]:

ātmarūpaṃ yathā jnñāne jnñeyarūpaṃ ca dṛśyate / artharūpaṃ tathā śabde svarūpaṃ ca prakāśate //Ibid., I. 50

[8]:

ato’nirjñātarūpatvāt kimāhetyabhidhīyate /
nendriyāṇāṃ prakāśye 'rthe svarūpaṃ gṛhyate tathā // Ibid., 57

[9]:

Ibid., I. 46

[10]:

araṇisthaṃ yathā jyotiḥ prakāśāntarakāraṇam /
tadvacchabdo’pi buddhisthaḥ śrutīnāṃ kāraṇam pṛthak // Ibid.

[11]:

Speech and Language , p. 69

[12]:

Ibid., p.70

[13]:

padaṃ punar nādānusaṃhārabuddhinirgrāhyam / Yogasūtrabhāṣya , III. 17

[14]:

iha dvividho dhvaniḥ, prākṛto vaikṛtaśca / Vākyapadīya , I. 142

[15]:

svabhāvabhedānnityatve hrasvadīrghaplutādiṣu /
prākṛtasya dhvaneḥ kālaḥ śabdasyetyupacaryate //Ibid., I. 76

[16]:

śabdasyordhvamabhivyakteḥ vṛttibhede tu vaikṛtāḥ /
dhvanayaḥ samupohante sphoṭātmā tairna bhidyate //Ibid., I. 77

[17]:

kasya ciddhi bherīdaṇḍābhighātasyaiva kāryaparamparā dūramanupatati / Puṇyarājā under Vākyapadīya under Vākyapadīya , I. 104

[18]:

tasya nityasya ye abhivyaṅjakāste ca kecit prākṛtāḥ kecit vaikṛtāḥ / yaḥ karaṇasannipātāducyate yaśca tasmāt tau prākṛtau / tābhyo viśeṣopalabdhiḥ / yastu dhvaniḥ dhvanerūtpadyate saḥ vaikṛtaḥ / tato viśeṣābhāvāt/ Ibid., 75

[19]:

yaḥ saṃyogavibhāgābhyāṃ karaṇaiḥ upajanyate /
sa sphoṭaḥ śabdajāḥ śabdā dhvanayo’nyaiḥ udāhṛtāḥ // Vākyapadīya , I. 102

[20]:

vīcīsantānavacca śrotraṃ daśādigavasthitānām upagacchanti / Ibid.

[21]:

yathā bherīdaṇḍābhighātasyaivakāryaparamparā dūramanupatati / Ibid., 103

[22]:

dūrāt prabheva dīpasya dhvanimātraṃ tu lakṣyate /
ghaṇṭādīnāṃ ca śabdeṣu vyakto bhedaḥ sa dṛśyate // Ibid., I. 104

[23]:

anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā jātiḥ sphoṭa iti smṛtā /
kaiścid vyaktaya evāsyā dhvanitvena prakalpitāḥ // Ibid., I. 93

[24]:

Śabdakaustubha , p. 11

[25]:

ubhayataḥ sphoṭamātraṃ nirdiśyate, ra-śruter la-śrutir bhavatīti / Mahābhāṣya , I. p. 26

[26]:

grahaṇagrāhyayoḥ siddhā niyatā yogyatā yathā /
vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvena tathaiva sphoṭanādayoḥ // Vākyapadīya , I. 97

[27]:

śabdasyordhvamabhivyakteḥ vṛttibhede tu vaikṛtāḥ /
dhvanayaḥ samupohante sphoṭātmā tairna bhidyate //Ibid., I. 77

[28]:

nādasya kramajanmatvāt na pūrvo nāparśca saḥ /
akramaḥ kramarūpeṇa bhedavāniva jāyate //Ibid., I. 48

[29]:

pratibimbaṃ yathānyatra sthitaṃ toyakriyāvaśāt /
tatpravṛttimivānveti, sa dharmaḥ sphoṭanādayoḥ // Ibid., I. 49