Part 3 - Classification of Sphoṭa

Sphoṭa is classified into a number of varieties. They are varṇasphoṭa, padasphoṭa and vākyasphoṭa. Meaningfulness is the fundamental aspect in all these cases. In varṇasphoṭa, letter is the unit which bears meaning. If the word is the unit which carries meaning, it is called padasphoṭa. In vākyasphoṭa, sentence is the meaning-bearing aspect. Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in his Śabdakaustubha^[1] and Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa in his Paramalaghumañjūṣā^[2] describe eight different varieties of sphoṭa.

These are:

1. varṇa-sphoṭa,
2. pada-sphoṭa,
3. vākya-sphoṭa,
4. varṇajāti-sphoṭa,
5. padajāti-sphoṭa,
6. vākyajāti-sphoṭa,
7. akhaṇḍapada-sphoṭa and
8. akhaṇḍavākya-sphoṭa.

It should be borne in mind, that of all these eight-fold divisions it is akhaṇḍavākya-sphoṭa which alone represents sphoṭa, the other seven being creations of an ingenious brain for the purpose of enabling the student to comprehend the nature of the first. It is also maintained by the grammarians that the seven divisions of sphoṭa, mentioned above, enable the beginners to know the nature of the akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa.

1) Varṇasphoṭa

Varṇasphoṭa does not mean that each and every letter is regarded as sphoṭa, but the letter or letters constituting either a stem or a suffix are regarded as such. The term sphoṭa is derived from the root sphuṭ and it is defined in two ways. In the first place, sphoṭa is defined as an entity which is manifested by letters. Secondly, it is an entity from which sense emanates.^[3] According to the second definition, we may say that when stems and suffixes are found to be expressive of sense, they should be regarded as denotative of sense or sphoṭa.

According to the later grammarians, varṇasphoṭa is justified on the grounds that a meaning is understood from roots and suffixes having one letter only. Patañjali himself has stated that from one point of view the individual letters may be considered to have meaning; since roots, suffixes and particles of a single letter are meaningful.^[4]

In this connection, there arises a problem that may be expressed in the following way. So far as the question of the stem is concerned, there is hardly any difficulty in calling it sphoṭa. But, there is a difference of opinion in the matter of the suffix as it means either the sthānin or the ādeśa. The grammarians maintain that in words such as pacati, rāmaḥ etc., the ādeśas, viz. ti and ḥ (visarga) are expressive of sense and not the sthānins, viz. la and su. Tip, tas, jhi etc., are all ādeśas in the place of la. And it is contended by them that the su having been changed into ḥ (visarga) as in the case of rāma+ su = rāmaḥ, it is the ādeśa which is to be regarded as denotative of the meaning.

On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas, maintain that it is the sthānin and not the ādeśa that is endowed with the power of denotation. They criticise the view of the grammarians by pointing out that it is certainly more reasonable and economical to hold that the sthānin is really expressive of sense on the ground that there is no limit to the number of ādeśas while the sthānin is more or less of a fixed character.^[5]

The grammarians refute the argument of the Naiyāyikas. According to Patañjali, a word is one which is endowed with the power of denotation. It is, therefore, argued that a man who has even little knowledge of la, understands the meaning of such expressions as pacati, gacchati and the like. Hence, what is actually used in language should be regarded as denoter (vācaka) and not what is necessary only for grammatical operations. The Naiyāyikas, however, assert that it is through mistake that the ādeśa is regarded as the vācaka. But, the grammarians enquire about the cause or causes of this error. As to the charge that ādeśa being numerous, it is not desirable to maintain that they are denotative of sense, it is replied that the sthānins too, are none the less numerous. Therefore, the grammarians do not see any justification as to why the ādeśa should not be regarded as the denoter. Then, again, there is hardly any truth in the statement that the sthānin is fixed while the ādeśa varies. The serious objection to the Naiyāyika theory is that it involves unnecessary cumbrousness (gaurava). Thus the grammarian’s view that it is not the sthānin, but the substitute (ādeśa) that carries the meaning has been established. They rightly point out the fact that the sthānin is an artificial entity contended by the grammarians to explain the formation of the various words in a simple way, and that they have no reality of their own, since they could be different in different systems of grammar.^[6] The people who speak the language are concerned only with the ādeśa, and the meaning is understood from that. Hence the meaning has to be ascribed to the word as a whole, and therefore, the padasphoṭa has to be assumed.

2) Padasphoṭa

The conception of padasphoṭa is that there are innumerable indivisible words, each denoting a particular meaning. When a word is denotative of sense, it is padasphoṭa.^[7] It is argued by the supporters of padasphoṭa that one does not actually remember the sense as each letter is perceived. On the contrary, one understands the sense of the word as a whole. For example, the word ghaṭa (jar) entirely expresses the required sense and it is never a fact that each one of the four letters (gh, a, ṭ, a) constituting the said word is denotative of a fraction of the entire sense. When letters in some sequence are said to constitute a word, it is reasonable to accept that the same is endowed with the power of expressing the import.

According to the grammarians, word (pada) is one which ends in a nominal declension (sup) or a verbal inflexion (tiṅ).^[8] In our discussion of varṇasphoṭa, we have pointed out that both the stem and the suffix are denotative of sense. But, if we carefully examine the above statement, certain difficulties are sure to crop up. In such forms like ghaṭena (the instrumental singular of ghaṭa), it is very difficult to say which portion of the term is the stem and which again is the suffix. An ordinary man who is acquainted with the meaning of the term very accurately, will not be in a position to distinguish the stem from the suffix, in this particular case. Even a man who has made an extensive study of Sanskrit grammar, will find some difficulty in ascertaining whether the na or the ina is the suffix in the form ghaṭena, unless he accurately remembers the views of Patañjali on this point. The Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇinisūtra, VII. I. 12 rejects the portion ināt from the sūtra and strongly asserts that the na and at are the respective ādeśas in places of tā (instrumental singular) and ṅas (ablative singular). After a careful review of the position of the school of Patañjali, we are sure that it is the na in ghaṭena that should be looked upon as the ādeśa in the place of ta. In this regard, the Naiyāyikas point out to their advantage that to a man well up in the Science of Grammar, there will be hardly any difficulty in recognising the stem and the suffix; and hence, there is no justification for positing padasphoṭa. The grammarians, however, assert that the aforesaid distinction between the stem and the suffix cannot be recognised in those cases where the ādeśa replaces both the stem and the suffix. In this way, the grammarians carry out their point that the meaning has to be ascribed to the word as a whole and thus padasphoṭa is established.

3) Vākyasphoṭa

Vākyasphoṭa is based on the conception of the sentence made up of smaller meaning-bearing units viz. the words, the roots and the suffixes. There are numerous indivisible sentences each of which is possessed of the power of denotation.

According to the grammarians, a sentence is one in which it possesses at least one-word ending with a sup termination and another with a tiṅ. In the case of padasphoṭa, it has been argued that as the distinction between the stem and the suffix cannot be understood in some places, it is desirable that besides varṇasphoṭa, we required to admit padasphoṭa too. The exponents of vākyasphoṭa point out that it is difficult to distinguish between one term (pada) and another in certain cases of assimilation (sandhi).^[9] For instance, Koṇḍabhaṭṭa points out that in the case of hare’va, the two terms that have combined are not clearly discernible on the ground that the e which is the substitute for the e, the final letter of hare and a, the first letter of ava, may be, in the opinion of the grammarians, looked upon as the last letter of hare or the first letter of ava.^[10] Hence, Koṇḍabhaṭṭa asserts that we should do well to recognize another type of sphoṭa.^[11]

But, there is yet stronger justification for admitting vākyasphoṭa. It cannot be denied that for purposes of communication of ideas, the sentence serves our purpose well. The child who is yet ignorant of the technicalities and principles of grammar understands the meaning of a sentence when between two persons, in its presence, it observes one to perform a certain act, after he has been told by another person to do
the same. For instance, the child knows the meaning of the sentence ‘Bring a cow’ (gām ānaya), when it sees that the man to whom it is said, goes away and brings the animal. But, as it can hardly be said that the child knows the individual imports of the constituent words of the sentence, it is to be admitted that the sentence as a whole is endowed with the power of expressing sense; and as such, vākyasphoṭa is established. Koṇḍabhaṭṭa explicitly states that as words are capable of expressing meaning, so, sentences are possessed of the power of denotation. And, he establishes his point by maintaining that it is from such expressions as ghaṭam ānaya (bring the jar) that we understand some meaning but not from ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanaṃ kṛtir iṣṭasādhanam, on the ground that in the latter case we have no sentence. In this regard, Naiyāyikas asserts that for purposes of expressing sense, expectancy (ākāṅkṣā) is necessary and here the grammarians would like to suggest that this ākāṅkṣā-śakti is nothing different from the vākya-śakti as maintained by them.

4-6) Jātisphoṭa

We have already acquainted with the nature of varṇasphoṭa, padasphoṭa and vākyasphoṭa and now we propose to discuss the other three varieties: varṇajātisphoṭa, padajātisphoṭa and vākyajātisphoṭa. According to Bopadeva, the denoter (vācaka) like the denoted (vācya) should be of the nature of the universal (jāti). The Mīmāṃsakas have discussed the question of the import of words and they maintain that the individual (vyakti) cannot be regarded as the import for the reason that there is no limit to the number of individuals and that they vary widely amongst themselves. It is, therefore, that they have sought to find out one common attribute (sādhāraṇadharma), technically called the universal (jāti) which is present in each one of the individuals within the universal; and this universal is denoted by a word.

The exponents of jātisphoṭa argue that when the import that is denoted is the universal, it is reasonable to admit that what expresses sense is also of the nature of the universal. Hence, it is not that the individual word hari uttered by a certain person is expressive of sense but the universal which finds its expression through the different use of the said word, is significant.^[12] And, this is the conception of padajāti-sphoṭa. Similarly, we have varṇajātisphoṭa and vākyajātisphoṭa. That means, the universal which finds its expression through the different use of varṇa, then it is varṇajātisphoṭa. When the universal is expressed through the different use of sentence, it is vākyajātisphoṭa.

7) Akhaṇḍasphoṭa

After discussing the nature of jātisphoṭa and its three fold divisions, we are going to explain the nature of another two varieties of sphoṭa, i.e. akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa and akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa. The conception of akhaṇḍasphoṭa is that neither the sentence nor the word admits of any divisions. It has been definitely stated that letters have no metaphysical existence. Bhartṛhari says that in actual speech situations, there are no letters in the word, and no word in the sentence.^[13] On more occasions than one it is said that the division of word into stems and suffixes has been resorted to for practical purposes alone.^[14]

The exponents of akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa contend that it is the indivisible word that is expressive of sense. But, it should be noted that the sentence being the unit of thought and expression should be endowed with the power of denotation. The exponents of akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa believe that it is the indivisible sentence which is expressive of sense. And, according to them, therefore, words, stems, suffixes and letters are absolutely fictitious.^[15]

We have explained the eight-fold division of sphoṭa as it has been treated in later standard works of Sanskrit grammarians; but, we should like to point out that we do not appreciate their conception of padasphoṭa and vākyasphoṭa as also of akhaṇḍapada-sphoṭa and akhaṇḍavākya-sphoṭa. The difference between padasphoṭa and akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa and that between vākyasphoṭa and akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa has been stated by Kṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa in his Sphoṭacandrikā. He says that the difference between padasphoṭa and akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa lies in the fact that in the case of padasphoṭa, there is a reference to the stem and the suffix which, however, have been so intermingled that it is difficult, if not totally impossible, to differentiate the one from the other and word is, therefore, conceived as being endowed with the power of denotation. In the case of akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa, however, there is absolutely no reference to the stem and the suffix, rather, they are regarded as being fictitious and word as an indivisible unit expresses sense. Similarly, in the case of vākyasphoṭa, it is the sentences which are said to be expressive of sense; but, these sentences are not understood in their indivisible character; they comprise words and the constituent words are not clearly distinguishable. But, when we say that the indivisible sentence is denotative of sense, we think of akhaṇḍavākya-sphoṭa.^[16]

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Śabdakaustubha , p. 7

[2]:

tatra varṇapadavākyabhedena sphoṭas tridhā / tatra’pi jātivyaktibhedena punaṣ ṣoḍhā/ khaṇḍapadasphoṭo’ khaṇḍavākyasphoṭaś ce’ti saṅkalanayā’ṣṭau sphoṭaḥ / Paramalaghumañjuṣā , p. 1

[3]:

ata eva sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇais sphoṭo varṇābhivyaṅgyas sphuṭati sphuṭībhavatya-asmād artha iti sphoṭo’rthapratyāyaka iti sphoṭaśabdārtham ubhayathā nirāha / Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha , p. 112

[4]:

Mahābhāṣya , I, 220

[5]:

Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha , p. 60

[6]:

Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa-sāra , pp. 574-575

[7]:

athā’ deśā vācakāścet padasphoṭastataḥ punaḥ / Ibid., p. 64

[8]:

Pāṇinisūtra , I.4.14

[9]:

Ibid., VI. I. 85

[10]:

hare’ve’tyādi dṛṣṭvā ca vākyasphoṭaṃ viniścinu / Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa-sāra , 66

[11]:

vastutastu padaiḥ padārthabodhavad vākyena vākyārthabodha iti padārthaśaktiḥ padeṣviva vākyārthaśaktir vākye’bhyupeye’ti padasphoṭa-vākyasphoṭau vyavasthitau / Op. cit. pp. 427-428

[12]:

śakyatva iva śaktatve jāter lāghavam iṣyatām /
aupādhiko vā bhedo’stu varṇānāṃ tāramandravat // Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa-sāra ,71

[13]:

pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā na ca /
vākyāt padānām atyantaṃ praviveko na kaścana // Vākyapadīya , I, 73

[14]:

upāyāś śikṣmāṇānāṃ bālānām upalālanāḥ /
asatye vartmani sthitvā tatas satyaṃ samīhate // Ibid, II. 240

[15]:

kecid āhur anavayavameva vākyam anādyavidyopadarśitālīkavarṇapadavibhāgamasya nimittam / Tattvabindu , p.3

[16]:

tad evā’ smābhis sakhaṇḍapadasphoṭatvena vyavahriyate /
khaṇḍaśaktyanusandhāna pūrvakakośādinā samudāyaśaktigrahāt /
yasya tu vyākaraṇajñānaśūnyasya kevalavyavahāreṇa samudāyaśaktigrahas tasya sa evā’khaṇḍasphoṭaḥ / Sphoṭacandrikā , p. 6