Part 1 - Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā at a glance

One of the six orthodox (āstika) schools of philosophy is Pūrvamīmāṃsā or Karmamīmāṃsā popularly called Mīmāṃsā. The great sage Jaimini is the founder of this philosophical system. It is a reasoned investigation, examination or judgement.

It is the investigation of the doubtful meaning of a Vedic sentence.^[1] It is called Pūrvamīmāṃsā as it deals with the earlier parts viz. Mantra and Brāhmaṇa of the Veda. It is Karmamīmāṃsā, because it is concerned with the Vedic rituals (karmans). Though the Mīmāṃsā system is based on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini, yet Jaimini is not the first thinker of the system of Mīmāṃsā. He himself has referred to some thinkers before him. Mention may be made of Sage Bādarāyaṇa, Bādari, Aitiśāyana, Kārṣṇājini, Lābukāyana, Ātreya and so on. The great grammarian Pāṇini mentions two more Mīmāṃsā thinkers namely Kāśakṛtsna and Āpiśali.

The first sūtra athāto dharmajijñāsā of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini indicates that dharma is the theme and purpose of this system.^[2] Dharma is that which is enjoined by the Veda as conducive to human good and it is known exclusively from the Veda. Mīmāṃsā plays the role of modus operandi (itikartavyatā) in respect of discussing dharma with the Veda as a means or instrument.^[3]

In the bhāṣya stage, we find much more that is of philosophical interest. Śabarasvāmī (or Śabara in brief) is the commentator on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini. He wrote the Śābarabhāṣya which has come down to us. From references occurring in the bhāṣya itself and the Mīmāṃsā literature of subsequent period, Upavarṣa, Bhartṛmitra, Bhavadāsa and others are known to have commented on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra before Śabarasvāmī. The commentaries of all these commentators except a small portion of Upavarṣa’s Vṛtti which has been quoted by Śabara are lost and as such their contribution to the evolution of the system is not known.

Śabara’s time is followed by what may be said to be the golden period of Mīmāṃsā. This was the period in which the greatest exponents of the system of Mīmāṃsā namely Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra flourished who differed on important tenets and issues from each other and as a result of their difference of opinion, the Mīmāṃsā school got divided into two separate schools known as the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara school. The school propounded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is known as the Bhāṭṭa school and the school propounded by Prabhākara Miśra is called the Prābhākara school. There was another school propounded by one Murāri Miśra called Miśramata (murārestṛtīyaḥ panthāḥ). However, their third school is lost to us and no work of this school is available. So, nothing more is known to us.^[4]

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra continuing Śabara’s line of thought with all its implications, preferred the arguments of Śabara while keeping fully in view what was going on the hostile camps and also introduced many new ideas into the system. One of the most important of such ideas is mokṣa (emancipation) which made the Mīmāṃsā system a full-fledged thought. Till Śabara’s time, the system of Mīmāṃsā remained context with the original Vedic ideal of Heaven of which sacrifices were the sole means.

Now the main points of difference between the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara schools are presented below:

	Bhāṭṭa school	Prābhākara school
1.	Bhāṭṭa school recognises six pramāṇas viz. pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda, arthāpatti and anupalabdhi.	Prābhākaras admit only five pramāṇas viz. pratyakṣa, anumāna, upamāna, śabda and arthāpatti.
2.	Bhāṭṭas recognises only five padārthas namely dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya and abhāva.	Prābhākaras admit eight padārthas namely dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, śakti, sādṛśya, samavāya and saṃkhyā.
3.	Kumārila advocates the theory of abhihitānvaya.	Prabhākara advocates the theory of anvitābhidhāna.
4.	Bhāṭṭa school accepts the theory of anyathākhyāti.	Prābhākara school accepts the theory of akhyāti.
5.	Bhāṭṭas admit the theory of bhāvanāvākyārtha.	Prābhākaras accept the theory of niyogavākyārtha.
6.	Bhāṭṭa school admits importation of words (śabdādhyāhāra).	Prābhākara school recognises the importation of ideas (arthādhyāhāra).

The Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini is a systematic work and this is clear from the references he gives to the views of other preceding authors. This work of Jaimini is deemed so masterly work that it has survived all other attempts that were made before him. This work of Jaimini was written about 200 B.C. and it is the groundwork of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā system. The Mīmāṃsāsūtra of sage Jaimini contains twelve chapters and each chapter is divided into some quarters (pādas), but each chapter has no equal pādas in number. It is a voluminous work containing more than 2500 sūtras. Besides, there are four additional adhyāyas called Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa, but these chapters have not yet been discovered. Only the first pāda of the first adhyāya of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra has philosophical importance and the rest pādas are dealt with yāga and the rules about the interpretation of the Vedas. This pāda is called the Tarkapāda.

It has already been stated that the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā is the system of Mīmāṃsā propounded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa known as Vārttikakāra.^[5] The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā is also called Bhāṭṭamata. Kumārila is believed to have lived between 600 and 660 A.D. Kumārila wrote four books namely Ślokavārttika, Tantravārttika, Bṛhaṭṭīkā and Ṭupṭīkā. The Ślokavārttika is the main philosophical work of Kumārila. It is a commentary in verses on the Tarkapāda section (1^stpāda of the 1^stadhyāya) of the Śābarabhāṣya of Śabarasvāmī. The Tantravārttika is a commentary on the portion of the bhāṣya of Śabara beginning from 1^stadhyāya, pāda II to the end of the 3^rdadhyāya and the Ṭupṭīkā contains the remaining part of the bhāṣya of Śabara. The Bṛhaṭṭīkā is believed to have been lost. Only quotations of some verses are found in some works of other writers on the Mīmāṃsā system.^[6] The earliest commentary on the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila is the Tātparyaṭīkā by Umveka. According to Vidyāraṇya, author of the Pañcadaśī, Umveka is none but the great Maṇḍana Miśra. According to some, he is none but the great poet Bhavabhūti.^[7] Another famous and very extensive commentary on the Ślokavārttika is the Kāśikā by Sucarita Miśra. However, the best commentary on the Ślokavārttika is the Nyāyaratnākara of the greatest Mīmāṃsaka of the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsā next to Kumārila, Pārthasārathi Miśra who is supposed to have belonged to the 10^th century A.D.

Another important work of Pārthasārathi Miśra is the Nyāyaratnamālā, an independent treatise on the Bhāṭṭa system. This work of Pārthasārathi contains two chapters of philosophical importance. One of the two chapters deals with the theory of intrinsic validity (svataḥprāmāṇyavāda) and the other deals with vyāpti. One more book written by Pārthasārathi is the Śāstradīpikā. It is an independent commentary on the Śābarabhāṣya on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini.

Vācaspati Miśra, one of the great follower of Kūmārila Bhaṭṭa has some contributions to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. On Mīmāṃsā system, he has written two works viz. the Nyāyakaṇikā and the Tattvabindu. The Nyāyakaṇikā is a commentary on Maṇḍana Miśra’s Vidhiviveka, which is an exposition of one of the aspects of Mīmāṃsā philosophy pertaining to the nature of vidhi. His Tattvabindu is an independent work on the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā. It is a short treatise relating to the efficient cause of śābdabodha or vākyārthabodha.

Another great scholar and follower of Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā is Maṇḍana Miśra, whose works are namely Vidhiviveka, Bhāvanāviveka and Vibhramaviveka. The Vidhiviveka is chiefly an exposition of one of the aspects of Mīmāṃsā school pertaining to the nature of vidhi. The Bhāvanāviveka is another important work of Maṇḍana Miśra dealing with the nature and scope of two bhāvanās viz. ārthī bhāvanā and śābdī bhāvanā and the elucidation of the difference between these two bhāvanās. The Vibhramaviveka is an important work of Mīmāṃsā, which elucidates the five khyātivādas namely viparītakhyāti or anyathākhyāti of the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas, the asatkhyāti of the Mādhyamika Bauddhas, the ātmakhyāti of the Yogācāra Bauddhas, anirvacanīyakhyāti of the Vedāntins and the akhyāti of the Prābhākaramīmāṃsakas.

The Nītitattvāvirbhāva of Cidānanda Paṇḍita and Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa and Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍita are also two important works of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. Cidānanda belongs to 14^th century and the two Nārāyaṇas belong to the 16^th-17^th centuries. The Mānameyodaya is a summary of the Nītitattvāvirbhāva of Cidānanda.

Some more works on the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā are the Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa of Āpadeva, Arthasaṃgraha of Laugākṣi Bhāskara, Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā of Kṛṣṇayajvan and Nāyakaratna of Rāmānujācārya.

Prabhākara Miśra who founded the Prābhākara school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā is also known as guru. There is a story about the origin of the title guru which presents him as a scholar of very rich intellect. Tradition makes Prabhākara Miśra a pupil of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also known as Tuṭāta Bhaṭṭa who was one of the greatest philosophers that India had produced. It is said that one day while in class, Kumārila came across a sentence viz. atrāpi noktaṃ tatra tunoktamiti dviruktam which apparently means that it has neither been said here nor there, hence it is said twice. Kumārila who was puzzled could not explain. But Prabhākara quickly explained the sentence as atra apinā uktaṃ tatra tuna uktamiti dviruktam which means here it has been expressed by the article api and there by the article tu and thus it has been expressed twice. Having been very much satisfied there upon, Kumārila conferred the title guru on his pupil Prabhākara.

Prabhākara was an independent thinker. He wrote two commentaries on the Śābarabhāṣya namely Bṛhatī (also called Nibandhana) and Laghvī (also known as Vivaraṇa).

Śālikanātha Miśra, a polemical writer of the Prābhākara school, wrote two commentaries namely Ṛjuvimalā on Bṛhati and Dīpaśikhā on Laghvī of Prabhākara Miśra. Śālikanātha is also known as Śālikānātha and Śārikānātha. It deserves mention that Śālikanātha is the main pillar of the system of Prabhākara. Without the commentaries of Śālikanātha, much of Prabhākara’s works have remained obscure. Śālikanātha flourished before 9^thcentury. He was a native of Bengal.

In addition to the above mentioned two commentaries, Śālikanātha also wrote two more works namely Prakaraṇapañcikā and Mīmāṃsābhāṣyapariśiṣṭa. However, the Prakaraṇapañcikā is the main work of the Prābhākara school. It contains the views of Prabhākara almost on all the topics and as such it is indispensable for understanding the system. The Prakaraṇapañcikā is an independent treatise of the Prābhākara school containing 14 chapters (Prakaraṇas) of which the chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10 are more important for the students of philosophy.

Next to Śālikanātha, mention may be made of Bhavanātha Miśra as a staunch follower of the Prābhākara school. He lived before 11^th century. The Nayaviveka of Bhavanātha Miśra is an independent commentary on the Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini. The number of commentaries on the Nayaviveka indicates that it is a very important work of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā system. The Dīpikā of Varadarāja is a good commentary on the Nayaviveka. The Tantrarahasya of Rāmānujācārya (18^th century) is also an important work of the system of Prabhākara dealing with both epistemology and metaphysics. Another work on this system is the Prabhākaravijaya of Nandīśvara. Though a small treatise it is good and helpful to understand the issues and topics of the system.

Like other systems of thought, the Mīmāṃsā also deals with the three main areas namely epistemology, metaphysics or ontology and ethics and religion. Epistemology or the theory of knowledge deals with the sources or means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). It is the best developed aspect of the Mīmāṃsā philosophy and it is the key to the understanding and proper evaluation of the Mīmāṃsā theories. According to this system, the Veda is the supreme authority. In order to justify this dogma, the Mīmāṃsakas made a detailed and critical enquiry into the nature and number of pramāṇas. According to the Prābhākaras, there are five pramāṇas namely pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), śabda (verbal testimony), upamāna (comparison) and arthāpatti (postulation).^[8] But the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, accept six pramāṇas by adding anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) to these five pramāṇas.^[9]

Perception is the basic source of knowledge and it enters into the rest in some forms. It is a cognition derived from the activity of the sense in the presence of an object or a thing. According to the Bhāṭṭa school, perception is the valid knowledge produced by sense contact.^[10] But it is not always valid. For, sometimes it misleads us as when what we perceive a snake turns out as a piece of rope. This is a case of illusion. The cause in such cases in some defect in the sense organ or in the conditions under which perception occurs. In this context, there are two theories of illusion offered by both the Mīmāṃsā systems to explain such phenomena without giving up realism and yielding to idealism. The theory of illusion accepted by Kumārila is called viparītakhyātivāda according to which in illusion one real thing existing elsewhere (e.g. snake) is due to some defects identified with another real thing ‘this’ (e.g. rope).

The theory of illusion admitted by Prabhākara is known as akhyāti or vivekākhyāti, according to which an illusion consists of two cognitions, one presentative and the other representative and as the perceiver forgets the representative character of the latter, he cannot apprehend their difference. On the first theory of illusion, it is a misapprehension, while on the second, it is a non-apprehension or incomplete apprehension.

There are mainly two types perception viz. indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka). Perception that arises immediately after the contact of a sense organ with some object is nirvikalpaka type of perception. After the indeterminate perception, when the sense-object contact still continues, the object is determined as belonging to a particular class or as possessing some qualities etc., then the perception becomes determinate (savikalpaka).

Inference is the second source of valid knowledge, which is accepted by all the systems of Indian Philosophy except Cārvāka. It comes just after perception. It is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is knowledge which arises after (anu) other knowledge. It is a process of arriving at the truth not by direct observation but by the means of natural relation between two things. Prābhākaras hold that anumāna or inference is apprehension rather than memory. According to the Bhāṭṭas, anumāna is the cognition of what is not proximate resulting from the perception of what is pervaded.^[11] The definition of anumāna given by the Prābhākaras is found to be satisfactory and more logical. For, unless we know the relation between the fire and the smoke, we cannot infer fire by means of seeing the smoke. This natural and inseparable relation between the fire and the smoke is called pervasion (vyāpti).^[12] The Prābhākaras say that the relation of smoke with fire is understood with a single observation and as such pervasion can certainly be understood from a single observation. In this regard, the system of Bhāṭṭas holds that pervasion or vyāpti is a natural relation.^[13] But it is known through repeated observation and not from single observation.

Anumāna is necessary for us in our practical life apart from perception. Even for some common matters in our daily life anumāna is essential. For example, we often hear the whistle of a train even when we are in sleep at home. Immediately, after hearing the sound, we come to a conclusion that a train is in its track. In this case, we take the help of anumāna which is based on our past experiences that a train makes a sound with the whistle before starting or running on the track.

In the system of Mīmāṃsā, verbal testimony (śāstra) is accepted after inference^[14] and not comparison as other systems do. It is the third source of valid knowledge. The Prābhākaras name the verbal testimony as śāstra, while the Vedāntins āgama. But other schools call it śabda. Śālikanātha defines verbal knowledge as the knowledge of facts which lie beyond the range of perception and is due to the knowledge of words.^[15] This definition of śāstra is almost similar to the definition given by Śabara.^[16] Kumārila also follows Śabara’s definition of śāstra.

Kūmārila Bhaṭṭa divides verbal testimony into personal (pauruṣeya) and impersonal (apauruṣeya). The former is the testimony of the trustworthy person (āptavākya) and the latter is the testimony of the Veda (vedavākya).^[17] It is valid in itself. But the former is not valid in itself. Its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person.

The fourth source of valid knowledge is comparison which is accepted by the Nyāya and Vedānta systems also. Śabara defines comparison as resemblance which brings about the knowledge of an object not in contact with the senses.^[18] According to Śālikanātha, upamāna is the cognition of similarity brought about by the perception of similarity.^[19] The Naiyāyikas states that comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word.^[20] It is the knowledge of similarity of an unknown object like a wild cow with a known object like a cow. The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow is comparison. The Mīmāṃsakas refute this account of comparison. They point out that the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word is derived by verbal authority and not by comparison.

Postulation is the fifth source of valid knowledge accepted first by the Mīmāṃsakas as an independent source of knowledge. Later on, the Vedāntins also accepted postulation as a means of knowledge. Śālikanātha Miśra defines postulation as that in a case, where the well-ascertained perception of a thing cannot be explained without the assumption of another thing then it is the assumption that makes arthāpatti.^[21] For example, when we know that Devadatta who is alive is not in the house and this absence in the house leads to the presumption that Devadatta is somewhere outside the house.^[22] According to the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, when something is otherwise unintelligible, the assumption of what will make it intelligible is postulation. In this regard, Śabara claims that this is the only correct definition of arthāpatti.^[23] According to the Bhāṭṭas, there are two types of postulation viz. dṛṣṭārthāpatti (postulation from what is seen) and śrutārthāpatti (postulation from what is heard). The Prābhākaras recognises dṛṣṭārthāpatti only.

The sixth source of valid knowledge is non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) accepted by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and the Advaita Vedāntins. But other school of Indian philosophy rejects anupalabdhi as an independent means of valid knowledge.

Non-apprehension is the immediate knowledge of the non-existence of an object. Here, one does not perceive the book directly through his sense organs but the knowledge of non-existence of the book on the table arises because of the non-perception of the perceivable object. As for example “there is no fruit in the basket, it means the basket is empty”-this form of knowledge is known as anupalabdhi.

It may be mentioned that the best developed aspect of the system of Mīmāṃsā is its epistemology and according to this system Veda is the supreme authority.

In the metaphysics, the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā discusses the categories (padārthas) which are classified under two heads viz. bhāva (positive) and abhāva (negative). The negative categories are of four kinds namely prāgabhāva (prior negation), praddhaṃsābhāva (posterior destruction), annonyābhāva (mutual negation) and atyantābhāva (absolute negation).^[24] There are four categories under positive class.

They are dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karma (action) and sāmānya (universal or generality). Thus these five categories (abhāva and bhāva four) in total according to the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā. Other categories like viśeṣa (particularity), samavāya (inherence), śakti (potency) and sādṛśya (similarity) are not admitted in the system of Bhāṭṭa. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa jāti, ākṛti and sāmānya are all synonyms.^[25]

The Mīmāṃsā metaphysics is pluralistic and realistic. It is not empiricism as it believes in the non-empirical. Vedic means of knowledge which is accepted to be more dependable than sense experience and also because it admits many realities such as potential energy, unseen moral principle (apūrva), heaven, hell etc. which cannot be known by sense-experience.^[26] The conception of soul (ātmā) in the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā is more or less similar to other pluralistic and realistic systems of thought like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.^[27] Soul is an eternal, infinite substance which is related to a real world and it survives death to be able to reap the consequences of its action performed here.

In ethics and religion aspect, the system of Mīmāṃsā deals with the place of the Vedas in the religion, conception of duty, duty for duty’s sake and highest good etc. Kumārila and his followers do not believe in a creator of the world. They cannot believe in God as creator whose authority would be superior to or at least, on a par with that of the Vedas which they consider the supreme authority. To them, dharma (righteousness) becomes identical with the Vedic injunctions.^[28] The Vedas tell us the criterion of what is right or what is wrong. A good life is a life which is led in obedience to the Vedic commandments. A Vedic rite or ritual should be performed because the Vedas command us to perform the rites. Some of the Vedic rites should be performed with a view to attain heaven life hereafter or to attain worldly benefits like rain etc.^[29] It is a kāmya karman. It may be noted here that there are some nitya (regular) and naimittika (occasional) karmans which must be performed because they are enjoined by the Vedas. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas contend that the nitya and naimittika karmans do not have any result (phala). But it not performed they lead to sin.^[30]

In the Bhāṭṭa system, apavarga or mokṣa (liberation) is adopted side by side with svarga (heaven) as the fourth puruṣārtha (goal of human life) and transcendental goal of human efforts. Mokṣa is the highest or supreme goal of human life.^[31] It is the summum bonum of human life. It is a trouble-free state in which the soul has shaken off the worldly appendage. Jaimini, Śabara and Prabhākara do not mention it. Kumārila and later Mīmāṃsā thinkers, however, have it as an essential part of their ethics.

Thus the Bhāṭṭa school of Kumārila deals with all the three areas of philosophy viz. epistemology, metaphysics and ethics and religion. The Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā was widely studied in many institutions in India.

Mīmāṃsā is an orthodox system par excellence and it does not believe in God. Jaimini seems to have ignored God and Śabarasvāmī denies God as the creator of the universe.^[32] But both Kumārila and Prabhākara positively deny God as the creator of the world.

The system of Mīmāṃsā is primarily concerned with dharma.^[33] Dharma is something transcendental and is concerned with the individual’s good in life beyond.

The aim of dharma is the attainment of heaven and as such it cannot be known through ordinary empirical means, not even by mystic intuition. The Veda alone can tell us what is dharma and what is adharma. Dharma comprises religious values and in it are included compulsory religious duties (nitya karmans) which are performed daily and occasional religious duties (naimittika karmans) which are performed on special occasions. There are also optional duties (kāmya karmans) which are performed for desiring particular results or fruits.^[34]

The influence of Mīmāṃsā system on other branches of learning in India is formidable. No system of thought can be properly and comprehensively understood without a reference to the Mīmāṃsā system.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

sandigdhavedavākyārthavicārātmakaṃ śāstraṃ mīmāṃsā / Prakaraṇapañcikā , p. 2

[2]:

athāto dharmajijñāsā sūtramādyamidaṃ kṛtam /
dharmākhyaṃ viṣayaṃ vaktuṃ mīmāṃsāyāḥ prayojanam // Ślokavārttka , 1.11

[3]:

dharme pramīyamāṇe hi vedena karaṇātmanā /
itikartavyatābhāgaṃ mīmāṃsā pūrayiṣyati // Bṛhaṭṭīkā , p. 36

[4]:

Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources , p. 26

[5]:

asyāṃ sūtraṃ jaiminīyaṃ śābaraṃ bhāṣyamasya tu /
mīmāṃsāvārttikaṃ bhāṭṭaṃ bhaṭṭācāryakṛtaṃ hi tat // Sarvasiddhānta-rahasya , as quoted in Pūrvamīmāṃsā in Its Sources , p.14

[6]:

Tantrarahasya , p. 20

[7]:

bhavabhūtiḥ umvekaḥ / Prakaraṇapañcikā , P. II

[8]:

tatra pañcavidhaṃ mānaṃ pratykṣamanumānaṃ tathā /
śāstraṃ tathopamānārthāpattī iti gurormatam // Prakaraṇapañcikā , p.104

[9]:

abhāvaḥ ṣaṣṭhānyetāni bhāṭṭāḥ vedantinasthā / Tārkikarakṣā , k.8

[10]:

tatra indriyasannikarṣajaṃ pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣam / Mānameyodaya , p. 4

[11]:

vyāpyadarśanād asannikṛṣṭārthajñānam anumānam/ Ibid., p. 25

[12]:

yatra yatra dhūmaṣṭatra tatra vahniriti sāhacaryaniyamo vyāptiḥ / Tarkasaṃgraha , p. 34

[13]:

svābhāvikaḥ sambandho vyāptiḥ / Mānameyodaya , p. 26

[14]:

anumānataḥ parastādupamānaṃ varṇayanti tarkavidaḥ /
vādiparigrahabhūmnā vayaṃ tu śabdaṃ upaskurmaḥ // Ibid., p. 91

[15]:

śāstraṃ tu śabdavijñānāt yad asannikṛṣṭārthe vijñānam/ Prakaraṇapañcikā , p. 234

[16]:

śāstraṃ śabdavijñānāt asannikṛṣṭe’ rthe vijñānam / Śābarabhāṣya , p. 105

[17]:

tacca dvividhaṃ-pauruṣeyaṃ-apauruṣeyaṃ ceti. tatra pauruṣeyamāptavākyam. apauruṣeyaṃ ca vedavākyam/ Śāstradīpikā , p. 134

[18]:

upamānamapi sādṛśyamasannikṛṣṭe’ rthe buddhimutpādayati / Śābarabhāṣya , p. 37
 

[19]:

sādṛśyadarśanothaṃ jñānaṃ sādṛśyaviṣayamupamānam / Prakaraṇapañcikā , p. 267

[20]:

upamitikaraṇamupamānaṃ, saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhajñānamupamitiḥ / Tarkasaṃgraha , p. 63

[21]:

vinā kalpanayārthena dṛṣṭenānupannatāṃ nayatādṛṣṭamarthaṃ yā sārthāpattistu kalpanā/ Prakaraṇapañcikā , p. 272

[22]:

arthāpattirapi dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vā’ rtho’ nyathā nopapadyateityarthakalpanā.
yathā jīvati devadatte gṛhābhāvadarśanena bahirbhāvasyādṛṣṭasya kalpanā / Śābarabhāṣya , p. 12

[23]:

anyathānupapattyā yadupapādakalpanam /
tadarthāpattirityevaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ bhāṣyabhāṣitam // Mānameyodaya , p. 116

[24]:

vayaṃ tāvat prameyaṃ tu dravyajātiguṇakriyāḥ / abhāvaśceti pañcaitān padārthānādriyāmahe // Ibid., 2n^d part, K. 5

[25]:

SV., Ākṛti 3-4.

[26]:

SV. K.72 under Mīmāṃsāsūtra , 1.1.2

[27]:

Śāstradīpikā , Ātmavāda, p. 119

[28]:

codanālakṣaṇo’rtho dharmaḥ / Mīmāṃsāsūtra , 1.1.2
 

[29]:

kārīryā vṛṣṭikāmo yajeta / Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā , p. 35

[30]:

nityanaimittikayorakaraṇe pratyavāyaḥ, kṛte tu phalaṃ nāsti/ Ibid., p.36

[31]:

iha khalu caturvidheṣu puruṣārtheṣu mokṣa eva paramapuruṣārthaḥ/ Vākyapadīya , p. 1

[32]:

Śābarabhāṣya under Mīmāṃsāsūtra , 1.1.5

[33]:

athāto dharmajijñāsā/ Ibid., 1.1.1

[34]:

Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā , p. 48