A critical study of Ānandajñāna’s Tarkasaṅgraha
by Satyan Sharma | 2022 | 96,182 words
This page relates ‘Conclusion’ of the study on the Tarkasangraha by Anandajnana (also, Anandagiri), a Sanskrit text from the 12th century which, supporting Advaita Vedanta, refutes the Vaisheshika branch—both schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy. This essay advocates for detachment from logic, aligning with the Advaita Vedantic path to liberation.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Conclusion
[Full title: Textual similarities, variations and a historical revision of Ānandajñāna and his Tarkasaṅgraha]
Refutations of the Tarkasaṅgraha have been divided into primary and secondary for this thesis. The primary refutations are those which are related to the basic or fundamental concepts of the Vaiśeṣika darśana. Examples of these refutations are those of dravya, guṇa, and so forth. With the refutation of these concepts, other concepts which depend on the former, are inevitably refuted. The secondary refutations are those which are related to the concepts based on the primary concepts of the Vaiśeṣika darśana. Examples of these refutations are those of pṛthivī, rūpa, and so forth. Refutation of the secondary concept by refuting the primary concept, is a method which Ānandajñāna has employed in the Tarkasaṅgraha. These refutations have been described and analysed in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the Advaita Vedānta and Vaiśeṣika darśanas, including an introduction to the Tarkasaṅgraha. Chapter 5 provides a revision of the date of Ānandajñāna and of his historical position. Following is a summary of the chapters and a conclusion.
Summary of the chapters; Chapter 1
From a brief introduction of the tradition of darśana in the ancient Indian tradition, to the introduction of Ānandajñāna's Tarkasaṅgraha, along with the tools and methods of refutation adopted by him, have been mentioned. It has been shown that the terminologies specific to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas have their origin in the Vedic literature. What the critical study means with regard to this thesis, has also been outlined.
Chapter 2
The refutations in the first pariccheda have been dealt with in this chapter. The primary refutations are those of lakṣaṇa, kārya, paramāṇu and dravya. The first three are included in the refutation of pṛthivī dravya. With the refutation of these, the subcategories of dravya and all the other padārthas are inevitably refuted. At times Ānandajñāna uses brief methods of refutation, whereas at other times he overstretches the discussion, where he again and again mentions and considers the concepts he has previously refuted. When an already refuted entity is again considered as being existent, it puts a question mark on the previous claim that it has been refuted. Overall the refutations seem correct, because they make apparent the hidden inconsistencies in the definitions and consequently the concepts of the Vaiśeṣika darśana.
The refutation of lakṣaṇa is the highlight, because if not further refuted, the definition and concept of lakṣaṇa stand validly disputed, putting a question mark over the apparent logical validity of each and every definition and concept of the Vaiśeṣika darśana.
The refutation of kārya is also of importance, since it disputes the very concept of effect, leading to the concept of kāraṇa or cause to be disputed. Although very brief in length, Ānandajñāna seems to have succeeded in tackling the major definitions of kārya prevalent during his times.
The concept of paramāṇu holds a lot of importance for the Vaiśeṣikas because it is these paramāṇus which conjoin and disjoin during creation and dissolution respectively. Along with this, it is also in the paramāṇus that the viśeṣa padārtha resides. Although an overstretched one, the refutation of paramāṇu adequately disputes the concept of paramāṇu and consequently of ārambhavāda, which is one of the central notions of the Vaiśeṣika darśana.
With the refutation of dravya, there does not remain any need to individually refute the each and every type of dravya. At the end of this refutation, Ānandajñāna indirectly accepts the existence of dravyas and adds one more to the list of the nine accepted by the Vaiśeṣikas. This seems to be the reason why Ānandajñāna had to then individually refute each and every type of dravya.
It must also be noted that before Ānandajñāna begins to refute dravya padārtha, he attempts to refute the idea that all other padārthas like guṇa, karman, and so forth, are dependent on dravya. Had he not attempted to refute this idea, merely refuting the definitions and concept of dravya would have sufficed.
The refutations both directly state and imply that dravya is what is experienced and observed as existent, but it doesn't exist as a fundamentally real entity. Along with this, Ānandajñāna also shows that all these refuted entities are indefinable and inexplicable, which is a refutation of the very basis of the Vaiśeṣika darśana.
Chapter 3
The refutations in the second pariccheda are dealt with and analysed in this chapter. The primary refutations are those of guṇa, anumāna, avidyā and vidyā. With the refutation of guṇa, the refutation of all types of guṇas like rūpa, and so forth is inevitable. It must be noted that with the refutation of dravya, any need for the refutation of guṇa was absent. Yet the author begins the refutation of guṇa padārtha by referring to those who believe that if guṇas are not separately refuted, they would still hold some real existence. As Ānandajñāna has himself indicated that Tarkasaṅgraha is aimed at refuting the Vaiśeṣika darśana, and Vaiśeṣika darśana does not believe in the existence of guṇas separate from dravyas, even if some Vaiśeṣika says that guṇas need to be separately refuted, it would be against the Vaiśeṣika siddhānta. Yet Ānandajñāna does not state the fault of apasiddhānta regarding such a notion. The refutation of guṇa seems to be sufficient. Yet, after this, Ānandajñāna takes up the task to refute each and every type of guṇa.
Anumāna is of critical importance to the Vaiśeṣika darśana, because much of its ideas are proved as valid only on the basis of anumāna. Hence, even though the refutation of anumāna wasn't separately required, because it falls within the guṇa named buddhi, yet it provides a good criticism of anumāna. Ānandajñāna has attempted to refute vyāpti, which is the backbone of anumāna. He has shown how the concepts of upādhi and vyāpti are based on each other.
The concepts of avidyā and vidyā are also important to the Vaiśeṣika darśana. Avidyā sets the ground for the Vaiśeṣika conception of erroneous perception and knowledge, while vidyā sets the ground for valid perception and knowledge. All the pramāṇas are included in vidyā. The refutation of these, adversely affects the very ground of Vaiśeṣika as well as Nyāya darśanas. The refutation can be safely said to be sufficient to refute all kinds of pramāṇas as accepted by the Vaiśeṣika darśana.
Another highlight is the refutation of vitaṇḍā because Tarkasaṅgraha is generally taken to be a work based on the vitaṇḍā style of debate. The refutation of vitaṇḍā is based on the refutations of vāda and jalpa, which is further based on the dichotomy of general and specific. Ānandajñāna shows the narrowness of the definitions of vāda, jalpa and vitaṇḍā, which leads to the avyāpti fault.
In this chapter, it can be seen that Ānandajñāna has also refuted portions of Nyāya darśana. For example, the author attempts to refute the five avayavas of the pañcāvayava vākya while using the terms pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya and nigamana. These terms are accepted by the Nyāya darśana. In the Vaiśeṣika darśana, the terms for the same are, pratijñā, apadeśa, nidarśana, anusandhāna and pratyāmnāya. Along with this, his attempt to refute chala, jāti and nigrahasthāna, which are padārthas of Nyāya darśana, makes this chapter a refutation of both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas. This handshake between both the darśanas could be the reason that Ānandajñāna named his text 'Tarkasaṅgraha', where 'tarka' stands for both the darśanas, and 'saṅgraha' stands for defeat. A detailed analysis of this name has been done in chapter 1.
Chapter 4
The refutations in the third pariccheda are dealt with and analysed in this chapter. The primary refutations are those of sāmānya, viśeṣa and samavāya. The secondary refutation is that of abhāva. Sāmānya, viśeṣa and samavāya require a dravya as their substratum. Dravya having been refuted, the need to individually refute each of them was nonexistent. Ānandajñāna has repeatedly referred to dravya and guṇa in this pariccheda, because without again considering them as existent, he could not begin to refute the three padārthas. Abhāva also is based on all the other padārthas, which ultimately depend on dravya. So a separate refutation of abhāva was not needed.
Chapter 5
In this chapter, textual variations and similarities between the Tarkasaṅgraha and its other similar contemporary texts has been presented. Śeṣaśārṅgadhara in his commentary called Nyāyamuktāvalī on Udayana's Lakṣaṇāvalī quotes the refutations from the Tarkasaṅgraha and attempts to refute them. It has been shown how Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra and Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya probably mention a few refutations or
counterarguments from the Tarkasaṅgraha. Along with this, a revision of the historical position of Ānandajñāna has been attempted. Viewing multiple internal and external evidences, it is highly likely that Ānandajñāna's Tarkasaṅgraha predates Citsukha's Tattvapradīpikā. It also likely that Citsukha was a disciple of Ānandajñāna. Śrīharṣa also seems to have referred to the Tarkasaṅgraha for authoring his Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya, hence it could be the case that Tarkasaṅgraha predates it.
Ānandajñāna's period could be 1154 CE to 1243 CE. Being Citsukha's Guru, Ānandajñāna can be said to have authored two more texts titled Nyāyasudhā and Jñānasiddhi. It may also be the case that Ānandabodha and Ānandajñāna are one and the same person.
The contribution of this thesis is that firstly this is the first dedicated research conducted on Ānandajñāna's Tarkasaṅgraha, so in the absence of any other such research work, this thesis can be put to use for studying the Tarkasaṅgraha.
Tarkasaṅgraha is the only available text from the 12th to 13th centuries CE by an Advaita Vedāntin, where a refutation of the whole of Vaiśeṣika darśana has been peformed in detail, unlike Śrīharṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya and Citsukha's Tattvapradīpikā. Hence, through this thesis, by analysing the arguments of Ānandajñāna against the then Vaiśeṣika darśana (and Nyāya), many more details of the then debate between Advaita Vedānta and Vaiśeṣika darśana (and Nyāya) have been revealed. By observing and analysing the contents of the available text, by providing insights into the probable scribal mistakes, missing portions, meaningless readings and so forth, and by providing suggestions for the said portions, many of the previously unknown details of the available text of Tarkasaṅgraha have been presented, which shall aid the further study of the text. The revised historical position of Ānandajñāna and his Tarkasaṅgraha shall be of a lot of interest to the scholars studying history of philosophy in general and that of darśana specifically.
This thesis can be put to use for comparing Ānandajñāna's dialectics with those of other Advaita Vedāntins, which shall throw more light on the history of Advaita Vedānta as a critic of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas. Furthermore, with the help of this thesis, studies focused on the structuring and restructuring of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika concepts and definitions can be conducted, which could reveal more about how the scholars of the said darśanas responded to the refutations and either defended or reformed the refuted concepts. Other texts where Ānandajñāna has demonstrated his dialectical prowess, can be compared with Tarkasaṅgraha and a minute study of the patterns of his argumentation can be conducted. This thesis being based on Mr. T. M. Tripathi's published version of Tarkasaṅgraha and a single available manuscript, a focused study of the available manuscript could reveal much more than what has met the eye upto this point. A thorough search for other manuscripts of Tarkasaṅgraha in the whole of India, is needed to be conducted. The topics which have been covered in Tarkasaṅgraha, but which were beyond the scope of this thesis, can be studied separately, from dialectical, linguistic, philosophical and other such perspectives.
General and specific observations
It is to be noted how the superfluous manner in which Ānandajñāna indulges while refuting the Vaiśeṣika darśana, seems to have been revised and shortened by Citsukha and Śrīharṣa because both of them refute mainly the padārthas and not their subtypes. Along with this, Citsukha and Śrīharṣa do not refute vitaṇḍā, unlike Ānandajñāna.
Although superfluous at many places, refutations in Tarkasaṅgraha inform the reader of the many ways in which a refutation can be performed, that is in a brief manner as well as in a detailed manner. Ānandajñāna attempts to establish the Advaita Vedāntic siddhānta of non-duality of reality through the refutation of Vaiśeṣika darśana and certain portions of Nyāya darśana as well. He concludes many refutations by calling the refuted category or sub-category as anirvacanīya/anirvācya. His main counterargument against the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas is that what they take to be definable, can be argued to be indefinable. This indefinability is what categorises all that is indefinable, as ajñāna/avidyā which is called anirvacanīya/anirvācya. By arguing that the padārthas or categories accepted by the said darśanas are anirvācya, he intends to call them vivartas of avidyā/ajñāna. One can think that all of Ānandajñāna's refutations in the Tarkasaṅgraha are refutations based on indefinability.
If compared with Śrīharṣa's Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya and Citsukha's Tattvapradīpikā, Ānandajñāna's Tarkasaṅgraha is better organised from the point of view of the distribution of its contents. Tarkasaṅgraha follows the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha's sequence of the padārthas. Hence for anyone who wants to look for the refutations of particular padārthas of the Vaiśeṣika darśana, they can easily locate the refutations in the Tarkasaṅgraha. Unlike Tarkasaṅgraha, regarding the sequence of topics, Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya and Tattvapradīpikā do not strictly follow the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha.
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya follows a conversation like style, which is free flowing, and makes way for various related topics to be discussed in between a certain refutation. Unlike it, Tarkasaṅgraha limits itself with the refutation at hand and does not follow a free flowing conversation like style, which makes it easier for a reader to locate and study the specific refutation one desires to. Hence, although Ānandajñāna indulges in superfluous argumentation many a time, Tarkasaṅgraha is a well organised encyclopaedia like text of refutation, which is easier to refer to. Tattvapradīpikā follows both Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya and Tarkasaṅgraha, and hence is rather easier to refer to than the former.
The texts which Ānandajñāna seems to have referred to are the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha of Praśastapāda, Kiraṇāvalī of Udayana, Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī, Sarvadeva's Pramāṇamañjarī, Bhāsarvajña's Nyāyasāra, Śrīdhara's Nyāyakandalī, Ānandānubhava's Padārthatattvanirṇaya, Mānamanohara of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra, Udayana's Lakṣaṇāvalī and so forth. The idea that Ānandajñāna has referred to Tattvapradīpikā of Citsukha, does not stand valid on the basis of the evidences presented in chapter 5.
As has been shown in between, centuries after Ānandajñāna had authored his Tarkasaṅgraha, some of his ideas seem to have been accepted by at least some of the later Navya Naiyāyikas like Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, Gaṅgā Sahāya Śarmā, and so forth. Some of the faults which Ānandajñāna points out in various padārthas, were accepted by these Navya Naiyāyikas and changes were made to their own siddhānta accordingly. A probable case of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya taking one of Ānandajñāna's ideas as pūrvapakṣa has also been demonstrated. It could be that his ideas were not known by them by his name or text, but nevertheless it is clear that the relevance of his criticism of both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas is apparent through the relevance of the ideas he presented and that at the merit of those ideas, changes were accepted by some of his opponents.
Ānandajñāna does not refute the Vaiśeṣika padārthas at the level of vyavahāra, but only at the level of paramārtha. Not only Vaiśeṣika, Ānandajñāna has stated that all the other darśanas can be refuted using the same method of the refutation of lakṣaṇas and niyamas. The refutation being only for the level of paramārtha, does not pose any challenge to the usefulness and validity of Vaiśeṣika darśana (along with Nyāya) at the level of vyavahāra. Hence, Tarkasaṅgraha does not negate the validity of Vaiśeṣika darśana upto the point that one does not gain the direct knowledge of the Self.
A side-effect of reading the refutations of ideas conceived through painstaking logical analyses, is that one may see the futility of the over-attachment to logical argumentation. Most of the darśanas have been created on the foundation of inference. As has been mentioned by Bhartṛhari, even though many expert logicians (anumātṛs) may arrive at a conclusion after much effort, the more skilful logicians conclude in a way opposed to the former.[1] Vācaspatimiśra II goes a step further and says that the statements of scholars, usually slip while they wander in the jungle of logic, and that it is the eternal dharma, that the other scholars rectify them.[2] As is evident from the changes that have been incorporated in the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya darśanas since their creation, there is no end to the loop of assertion, investigation and refutation.
This may also be one of the reasons that the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika scholars usually conceive of detachment as the result of practising their darśanas. Having indulged in several debates, both with those of opposing darśanas, as well as with those of their own darśana, and also looking at the well recorded evidence in the form of texts which removes all hopes of a final resolution of all disagreements or faults regarding one's own darśana, it would be but natural that a person will become detached from their own firmly held ideas.
So, although the texts of refutation like Tarkasaṅgraha provide a detailed criticism of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika darśanas, through which they imply the validity of their own darśana, they also seem to be intended to lead one to detachment, by the way of exhausting them with logical argumentation. It could also be in this way, that the statement of Ānandajñāna at the end of Tarkasaṅgraha, that the Tarkasaṅgraha has been created for the upakāra of kṛtins, could be interpreted. The sophistication of logicians can be attractive, and consequently logical argumentation could seem to be the ultimate tool which could effect the knowledge of fundamental reality. So for those who desire such a knowledge, it is necessary for them to see the boundaries of logical argumentation.
Ānandajñāna's Tarkasaṅgraha looks like a detailed demonstration of the first half of Brahmasūtra 2.1.11, which is 'tarkāpratiṣṭhānāt'. Ādi Śaṅkarācārya's commentary on this tells how tarka (which as per him seems to include pramāṇas like pratyakṣa, anumāna, etc.) cannot access the fundamental reality on its own and that tarka keeps on changing based on one's own ideas. As many are the people, so many are the variations in tarka. Tarkasaṅgraha shows the multiplicity of lakṣaṇas of Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika concepts and the ever changing vivakṣā (intended meaning).
Along with this, it has been shown in this thesis, that some of the later scholars of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya darśanas went further and drastically changed the age-old concepts. Hence, Tarkasaṅgraha brings the 'apratiṣṭhā' of tarka to the surface for everyone to behold. Tarka can work very finely on the vyavahāra level of existence, but when it comes to the fundamental reality, tarka by itself has no ability to grasp it. As has been told in the Kaṭhopaniṣad 1.2.9; "naiṣā tarkeṇa matirāpaneyā", that is, this knowledge of the fundamental Ātman or Brahman, cannot be received through tarka. If anyone wants to see a practical demonstration of this Upaniṣadvākya, they could read Ānandajñāna's Tarkasaṅgraha.
Ānandajñāna's manner of refuting a kind of dualism and such other schools of thought by appealing to the inexplicability of the categories they believe in, can be used to refute literally anything which is defined, or has a definition. For instance, space and time as envisioned and defined by contemporary physics, can be demonstrated to be inexplicable.
In this manner, looking clearly at the boundaries of logic, the way is paved for the goal of both the Advaita Vedānta and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika darśanas, that is, mokṣa. What is the way? The way is detachment. Which method ultimately leads to mokṣa, is for the sādhaka to experience.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
yatnenānumitopyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ/ abhiyuktatarairanyairanyathaivopapadyate// -Vākyapadīya, 1.34