A critical study of Ānandajñāna’s Tarkasaṅgraha
by Satyan Sharma | 2022 | 96,182 words
This page relates ‘refutation of Vishesha’ of the study on the Tarkasangraha by Anandajnana (also, Anandagiri), a Sanskrit text from the 12th century which, supporting Advaita Vedanta, refutes the Vaisheshika branch—both schools of orthodox Hindu philosophy. This essay advocates for detachment from logic, aligning with the Advaita Vedantic path to liberation.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Part 1.2 - The refutation of Viśeṣa
[Full title: Primary Refutations (2) Viśeṣa]
As has been said before, there was no need to separately refute viśeṣa. Viśeṣas are said to reside in nitya dravyas, and Ānandajñāna has claimed to have refuted the nitya dravyas during the refutation of dravyas. Also, to say that they reside in nitya dravyas is the same as saying that they reside in the paramāṇus of the dravyas, in the vibhu dravyas and also in manas, because the paramāṇu-forms of those dravyas, the vibhu dravyas and manas are considered to be nitya in the Vaiśeṣika darśana.[1] Ānandajñāna many a time claims to have established that paramāṇus are aprāmāṇika and asiddha.[2] Yet he takes up the task to refute viśeṣa. It is also to be noted that in the refutation of viśeṣa, Ānandajñāna does not even once point out that he has already refuted the existence of paramāṇus, although he does say that there is no agreement regarding nitya dravyas.[3] Regarding the vibhu dravyas (ākāśa, kāla, dik and ātman), he has earlier claimed to have refuted them.
The refutation is as follows.
Lakṣaṇa.—Lacking in sāmānya, those which are the cause of knowledge of the absolutely excluded, residing in the nitya dravyas (antya).[4]
Refutation of 'sāmānyaśūnyatva'.—Viśeṣas are taken to be lacking in sāmānya. Ānandajñāna says that like dravya and so forth, there is knowledge of sattā in viśeṣas.[5] If not, they can be said to be absent in dravya and so forth.[6] If such knowledge of sattā in viśeṣas is said to be due to the svarūpa sambandha, same could be said about dravya and so forth.[7] The said lakṣaṇa is established through the denial of sattā and through the lakṣaṇa, the denial of sattā is established, leading to parasparāśraya fault.[8]
Refutation of 'atyantavyāvṛttibuddhihetutva'.—Viśeṣas are ideated as being the cause of the knowledge of absolute exclusion. To this Ānandajñāna says that it is not correct to say that in the paramāṇus and so forth, which have similar form, qualities and activities, viśeṣas lead to such a knowledge for each paramāṇu and so forth, because such a knowledge is not established in Advaita Vedānta.[9] It is not correct to say that people like Yogins, experience that knowledge, because it is doubtful.[10] To say that in the absence of such knowledge, there would be confusion between paramāṇus, is wrong because there's no agreement regarding nitya dravyas, and Ātman alone is a nitya dravya, and because it is advitīya (singular), it cannot be differentiated from anything else.[11] If as the differentiator there is ātmatva or anātmatva, the pratiyogin and the dharmin, which are both ātmans, cannot be ātmans, and hence because of advitīyatva (singularity), viśeṣas cannot be the differentiator of nitya dravya (ātman).[12]
Refutation of the word 'antya'.—If antya means that which cannot be differentiated, then it is futile because mentioning of svarūpa in the lakṣaṇa is useless.[13] If it is defined as that which has the specific feature or viśeṣa of being the differentiator of nitya dravyas, then there would be both infinite regression and the impossibility of antya being antya.[14]
Refutation of viśeṣa being a differentiator of its āśraya (dravya).—It has been refuted by the refutation of its being the differentiator of nitya dravyas.[15]
Refutation of viśeṣa being 'svatovyāvṛtta'.—If it is said that viśeṣas get differentiated from each other by themselves, the same could be possible with ātman and so forth, which would lead to the uselessness of accepting viśeṣas for that purpose.[16] To say that because paramāṇus and so forth possess similarities of jāti and so forth, due to which they are extremely similar, they cannot be differentiated by themselves, is wrong because the viśeṣas also possess the same knowledge which leads viśeṣas to be similar, and being undifferentiated by themselves.[17]
Refutation of viśeṣas being infinite in number.—If nitya dravyas are not different because of being extremely similar/same, viśeṣas can't be called infinite in number on the basis that they reside in each nitya dravya.[18] Because it has been said that ātman alone is the nitya dravya, such infinity in number cannot be stated.[19]
Refutation of viśeṣas being unborn.—Nitya dravyas alone are said to be samavāyikāraṇas, and as they do not exist, viśeṣas cannot be said to be unborn.[20] Being born, they are also subject to destruction.[21] The cause of their destruction is not just the destruction of their āśraya dravya, but also adṛṣṭa and so forth.[22]
Refutation of an anumānaprayoga.—'Subject of debate (viśeṣa) is that which is the substratum of samavāya sambandha with that which is other than the sāmānya of guṇa, because of being dravya, like a pot'.[23] Because samavāya is unestablished, there's a fault of aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa, if 'other' means viśeṣa, there would be a similar fault, including the fault that the example does not prove the sādhya (viśeṣa), and that if one takes the sādhya to be something other than viśeṣa, there would be the fault of arthāntara.[24]
By all these refutations, Ānandajñāna then refutes another lakṣaṇa; 'those which reside in each dravya, and exist on their own'.[25] He refutes it by saying that there is no other nitya dravya than ātman, and ātman does not have viśeṣa, and also because its sattā, which is other than the svarūpa sattā, has been established as existing in viśeṣas.[26]
Analysis.
As has been said earlier, there was no need to separately refute viśeṣa. Paramāṇus enter the discussion thrice, but not even once does Ānandajñāna state that he has already refuted them. It has been shown through a footnote in the introduction to this refutation how many a time Ānandajñāna has claimed to have refuted paramāṇus. Also, he claims to have refuted the dravya padārtha before refuting these.[27]
For two reasons it seems unreasonable for him to argue that viśeṣas are utpattimat (born); one, that to say that the viśeṣas being utpattimat is ascertained, leads to the acceptance of the existence of viśeṣas as a separate padārtha, and two, that the argument given for such an ascertainment seems faulty at least in its available textual form. The reason for ascertaining viśeṣas as utpattimat is the absence of samavāyikāraṇas (nitya dravyas). As something is utpattimat because it has a samavāyikāraṇa, and viśeṣas have no such kāraṇa, viśeṣas are said to be anutpattimat. Ānandajñāna's argument seems to be that because such a kāraṇa does not exist for anything whatsoever, viśeṣas cannot be anutpattimat, and hence are utpattimat. When utpatti is itself a concept based on nitya dravyas being samavāyikāraṇas and he says that they are absent, how can the utpatti of viśeṣas be established on the basis of that very absence? To say that entity X is utpattimat because there is no utpādaka (producer), is clearly a fallacious statement. Furthermore, it wasn't required at all. It does not matter if viśeṣas are utpattimat or anutpattimat, if viśeṣas as a padārtha are proved to be nonexistent.
In the anumānaprayoga, the word denoting sādhya begins with the word guṇa, and the hetu is dravyatva, both of which Ānandajñāna claims to have refuted.[28] Yet, he does not state that they have been already refuted. He rather attacks the samavāya in the sādhya which he is yet to refute after viśeṣa. The fault of aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇa could have been similarly established by stating that guṇa has been refuted, and as the hetu also has been refuted, the anumānaprayoga would have been refuted in a rather precise manner.
Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa says that viśeṣa is not a separate padārtha, on the basis of the absence of any pramāṇa.[29] He further says something similar to what Ānandajñāna says about the possibility of nitya dravyas differentiating themselves without any viśeṣa.[30] Regarding the Vaiśeṣika idea that Yogins see viśeṣas, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi goes a step further than Ānandajñāna, and challenges the one who believes in such an idea to go and ask the Yogins with a śapatha (pledge of truth) if they really see viśeṣas or not.[31]
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
nityadravyāṇyākāśādīni pañca pṛthivyādayaścatvāraḥ paramāṇurūpāḥ -Tarkabhāṣā (Keśava Miśra) (Prameyapadārtha), p. [981]
[2]:
paramāṇūnāṃ vā aprāmāṇikatvasya pṛthivyadhikāre sādhitatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 1), p. 42, paramāṇūnāṃ ca aprāmāṇikatvena tanniṣṭhacāturvidhyāsiddheḥ -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 1), p. 43, paramāṇoḥ tatsaṃyogasya tajjanyadvyaṇukasya tanniṣṭhasaṃyogasya ādyasaṃyogadvārā tadupapatteśca aprāmāṇikatvena pratyuktatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 2), p. 74, paramāṇvasiddheśca tasyaiva āpātāt...paramāṇvaprasiddheḥ āśrayāsiddhiprasaṅgāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 2), p. 76, na hi paramāṇuṣu gurutvaṃ nityaṃ ityaṅgīkartuṃ yujyate teṣāṃ tannityatvasya ca abhāve tadīyagurutvatannityatvayoḥ asambhāvitatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 114, paramāṇorasiddhatvātkārye tādātmyasambhavāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 115.
[3]:
nityadravyāṇāṃ asaṃpratipannatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
[4]:
[5]:
dravyādiṣviva teṣvapi satpratyayānugamāvagame sattāsāmānyasya durapahnavatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 123
[7]:
svarūpasambandhanibandhanāt teṣu sattvānugatiḥ iti cet na dravyādiṣvapi tathāprasaktau sattvāpalāpāpātāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
[8]:
lakṣaṇāṃśavyāghātabhiyā viśeṣeṣu sattvāpahnavena yathoktalakṣaṇasiddhiḥ tatsiddhau ca lakṣaṇāṃśe vyāghātalakṣaṇasvarūpahāninirāsārthaṃ teṣu sattvāpahnavasiddhiḥ iti parasparāśrayatā - Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124 The text reads 'sattvāpahnave', which seems to be 'sattvāpahnavena'.
[9]:
nityeṣu dravyeṣu tulyākṛtiguṇakriyeṣu paramāṇvādiṣu pratyādhāraṃ vyāvṛttadhīhetutvāt viśeṣeṣu tatsiddhiḥ iti cet na tadvyāvṛttibuddheḥ asmākaṃ asiddhatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
[10]:
asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ sā asti iti cet na sandigdhatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
[11]:
nityadravyāṇāṃ asaṃpratipannatvāt (ātmana eva nityatvāt) tasya ca advitīyatvena kutaścit vyāvṛtteḥ abhāvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
After the statement 'nityadravyāṇāṃ asaṃpratipannatvāt' and before 'tasya ca advitīyena kutaścit vyāvṛtteḥ abhāvāt', there seems to be some other statement which is missing. The word 'nityadravyāṇāṃ' is plural, while the following 'tasya' is singular. The word 'tasya' cannot be connected with 'saṅkaraḥ' because it cannot be connected with 'advitīyatva'. The following statement 'tatra ātmatvasya anātmatvasya vā bhedakatve...' makes it seem that between the aforesaid two statements, there is some statement about ātman, as has been mentioned on page 125 'ātmaiva hi nityadravyaṃ tatra ca bhedo nāsti ityuktam'. The word 'ityuktam' also shows that it has been stated earlier. Such a statement is not found during the discussion on ātmadravya. Although a similar idea regarding bhedakatva and pratiyogin is found in that discussion; 'na hi tasya cetanatvena bhedaḥ pratiyogino'cetanatvāpatteḥ nāpi acetanatvena bhedaḥ pratiyogina eva cetanatvaprasaṅgāt' (Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) Pariccheda 1, p. 51). If a statement like 'ātmana eva nityatvāt' is placed between the two aforesaid statements, it starts to make sense because due to being advitīya there is no vyāvṛtti of the nitya dravya ātman, from anything.
[12]:
tatra ātmatvasya anātmatvasya ca bhedakatve pratiyogino dharmiṇaḥ ca ātmatvāyogāt tadadvitīyatvalābhāt na viśeṣāṇāṃ nityadravyavyāvartakatvaṃ -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
[13]:
antyaviśeṣaṇasya ca avyāvartyārthatvena anarthakatvaṃ svarūpopavarṇanasya lakṣaṇānupayogitvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
The text reads vyāvartyābhāvena, which seems to be avyāvartyārthatvena.
[14]:
nityadravyavyāvartakatvaviśeṣavattvāt ca antyatvānupapattiḥ anavasthā ca -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
It seems that Ānandajñāna has used the word 'viśeṣa' for specific feature or difference, which leads the viśeṣa to possess viśeṣa. To define 'antya' by something other than itself, it has been defined as having the 'viśeṣa' of 'being the differentiator of nitya dravyas', implying that the viśeṣa possesses viśeṣa. This leads to the impossibility of it not being antya or the last, as one viśeṣa would be residing in another. This would also lead to infinite regress, due to all viśeṣas being possessed by other viśeṣas.
[15]:
na hi svāśrayaviśeṣakatvena viśeṣāṇāṃ viśeṣatvaṃ teṣāṃ nityadravyavyāvartakatvasya purastādeva nirastatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
[16]:
[17]:
paramāṇvādīnāṃ tulyajātyādibhāktvena atyantāvilakṣaṇatvāt na svatovyāvṛttiḥ iti cet na... viśeṣeṣvapi tulyapratyayavattvena availakṣaṇyasya tulyatvāt na svatovyāvṛttiḥ sidhyet -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), pp. 124-125
[18]:
nityadravyabhedābhāve ca pratinityadravyaṃ ekaikaśo vṛtteḥ ānantyaṃ kuto bhavet -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125
[19]:
ātmaiva hi nityadravyaṃ tatra ca bhedo nāsti ityuktam/ tathā ca pratinityadravyaṃ ekaikaśo vṛtteḥ vaktumaśakyatvāt nāsti viśeṣeṣu ānantyam/ -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125
[20]:
nityadravyāṇāmeva samavāyikāraṇatvopapattyā tadabhāvena anutpattimattvasya asiddhatvāt utpattimanto viśeṣā nirdhāryante -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125
[21]:
bhāvatve sati utpattimattvāt viśeṣā nāśavanto bhavitumutsahante -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125
[22]:
na ca nāśakāraṇaṃ āśrayanāśādi eva iti niyantuṃ śakyaṃ niyāmakābhāvāt anyasyāpi kalpanīyatvāt prāguktanītyā tannāśasyāvaśyakatvāt tatkāraṇasya āśrayanāśādeḥ abhāve’pi kāraṇāntarasya adṛṣṭādeḥ eṣṭavyatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125
[23]:
vimataṃ guṇasāmānyānyasamavāyi dravyatvāt ghaṭavat -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125
[24]:
samavāyāprasiddheḥ aprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatvāt anyaśabdasya viśeṣaviṣayatve'pi tathābhāvāt dṛṣṭāntasya ca sādhyavikalatvāt arthāntaraviṣayatve ca arthāntaraprasaṅgāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125
[25]:
ekadravyāḥ svarūpasanto viśeṣāḥ. -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125 Here, T. M. Tripathi has put 'vyāśritāḥ' in parenthesis to suggest that 'ekadravyāḥ' may be 'ekadravyāśritāḥ'. But this definition is found with 'ekadravyāḥ' in Lakṣaṇamālā (Udayana) (Viśeṣapadārthalakṣaṇavicāra), p. 35.
[26]:
ātmātiriktanityadravyābhāvāt ātmanaśca nirviśeṣatvāt viśeṣeṣu ca tatsvarūpasattātiriktasattāyāḥ sādhitatvāt -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125
[27]:
see Footnote 929
[28]:
Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 125. After refuting the various lakṣaṇas of guṇa, Ānandajñāna takes on the lakṣaṇa 'guṇatva'. After having refuted the vyañjaka, he refutes guṇatva. At another place in this text he says; sattāyā guṇatvasya ca nirākṛtatvāt (Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna), p. 57).
[29]:
viśeṣo'pi ca na padārthāntaram mānābhāvāt/ -Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa (Raghunātha Śiromaṇi) (Viśeṣanirākaraṇa), p. 63
[30]:
vināpi vyāvartakaṃ dharmaṃ pareṣāṃ viśeṣāṇāmiva nityānāṃ dravyāṇāmapi svata eva vyāvartakatvāt -Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa (Raghunātha Śiromaṇi) (Viśeṣanirākaraṇa), p. 63 na hi viśeṣāḥ viśeṣāpekṣayā mitho vyāvartante kintu svārasyena anyonyaṃ vyāvṛttāḥ svīkriyante/ tathātmādīnāmapi svata eva vyāvṛttabuddhisiddheḥ viśeṣābhyupagamavaiyarthyaṃ viśeṣakāryasya anyonyaṃ vyāvṛtteḥ ātmādisvabhāvavaśādeva sambhāvitatvāt/ -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124
[31]:
yogino'tiriktaṃ viśeṣamīkṣante/ evaṃ tarhi ta eva saśapathaṃ pṛcchyantāṃ kimete'tiriktaṃ viśeṣamīkṣante na veti/ -Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa (Raghunātha Śiromaṇi) (Viśeṣanirākaraṇa), p. 63 asmadviśiṣṭānāṃ sā asti iti cet na sandigdhatvāt/ na hi teṣāṃ paramāṇvādiṣu pratyekaṃ atyantavyāvṛttabuddhiḥ asti ityasti pramāṇam/ -Tarkasaṅgraha (Ānandajñāna) (Pariccheda 3), p. 124