1. The Four Pramanas (iv) Verbal Testimony or Sabda

136 (iv) Verbal Testimony Verbal testimony or sabda pramana occupies the forth position in the list of the sources of valid knowledge of the Nyaya philosophy. In this regard, both the schools of Mimamsa differ from the Naiyayikas and the Vedantins who place Upamana before the sastra or sbda pramana. 116 It consists in the 117 assertion of a trustworthy person. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of other persons. But it is a matter of common observation that a sentence or a statement is not sufficient to denote any knowledge of things. Nor the mere perception of words of a sentence does give any knowledge about objects. It is only when one perceives the words and understands their meanings that he acquires the knowledge of a verbal statement. Hence sabda or testimony as a source of valid knowledge consists in understanding the meaning of the statement of a 118 trustworthy person. All the systems of Indian Philosophy except the Carvakas, the Bauddhas and the Vaisesikas have recognized verbal testimony as a separate source of valid knowledge. 116. anumanatah parastadupamanam varnayanti tarkavidah/ vadiparigrahabhumna vayam tu sabdam puraskurmah// Manomeyodaya p.95. 117. aptopadesah sabdah. Nyayasutra 1.1.7. 118. vakyarthajnanam sabdajnanam. Tarkasamgraha 68.

137 The Refutation of Verbal Testimony by the Carvakas The Carvakas do not recognize verbal testimony as a source of valid knowledge. According to them, it does not give rise to valid knowledge. They reject the validity of Vedas as they are vitiated by falsehood, contradiction and tautology. They say that Vedas are the works of some cunning priest who earned their living by duping the ignorant and the credulous. The three authors 119 of the Vedas are buffoons, knaves and devils. Vedas are false because they make statements which are false. They are contradictory because they make statements which are incompatible with one another. A Vedic text declares: "one who desires a son should perform the putresti sacrifice." Yet it is found that a son is not born after the sacrifice has been performed The text is false. If a text is false with regard to imperceptible results must be false. Carvaka says that the Vedas are the inventions of the brahmanas, who cheat the other castes to earn their livelihood. There is no logical ground or justification for believing in anything simply on the statement of another person because in that case, they think that they would have to believe the utterance of absurd and fictitious objects of any fool. Hence, sabda or testimony should not be recognized as a valid source of knowledge. Bauddha View of Verbal Testimony The Buddhist logicians are in the view that sabda is not an independent source of knowledge, but a form of perception or inference. According to them there is no relation of a word and an external object referring to it. The Bauddhas do not accept the validity of the Vedas and do not believe in the 119. trayo vedasya kartarah bhanda-dhurtah-nisacarah. Sarvadarsana-samgraha p.14

138 Vedic assertion of a seer. The Vedas deal with other worldly object like heaven, hell, etc. e.g. the performance of agnihotra sacrifice will lead a person to paradise. The Buddhists believe on objects which are either perceived or inferred If by sabda it means the statement of trustworthy persons, it is reduced to inference. If, however, it is used to prove that these are actual facts corresponding to a statement, Bauddhas reduce it to perception. So they do not admit the validity of verbal testimony. The Vaisesika View of Verbal testimony The Vaisesikas do not recognize the verbal testimony as independent source of knowledge although they agree with the Naiyayikas and the Bhattas on the validity of the verbal testimony. The Vaisesikas include verbal testimony within inference. According to Prasastapada, sabda and other sources of knowledge belong to inference because these sources involve invariable coherence with a perception free from doubt. 120 Sridhara propounds that there is no natural relation between word and its object, i.e. the meaning of the words is but conventional in origin. Verbal testimony is an inference because we understand the meaning only through coherence, as smoke indicates fire on the hill. 121 According to Vaisesikas, sabda as a form of 120. Sabdadinam apyanumane 'ntarbhavah samanavidhitvat yatha 121. prasiddhasamayasyasandigdha linga darsana prasiddhyanusmaranabhyam atindriye arthe bhavatyanumanam evam sabdadibhyo'piti. Prasastapada-bhashya p.512. sabdonumanam vyaptibalenarthapratipadakatvat dhumavat. Nyayakandali p.512

139 our knowledge is the same in both. Just as in inference one knows an unperceived object from the perception of something which is related to it, so in sabda from the perception of words one knows the objects which are unperceived but related to words perceived by us. Establishment of Verbal Testimony 122 Verbal testimony has been accepted as a separate pramana by almost all the important Schools of Indian philosophy. Jaina View of Verbal Testimony According to Jaina system, sabda or verbal testimony is a separate source of valid knowledge. It means the knowledge of objects derived from the words of reliable persons. It consists in the knowledge derived from words which, when properly understood, express real objects and consistent with the evidence of perception. Testimony is of two kinds one is laukika or secular testimony and the other is sastraja or scriptural. When the words come from an ordinary reliable person, it is laukika and when the testimony proceeds from a liberated person of extraordinary powers and knowledge and relates to supersensible realities then it is sastraja. The Mimamsakas and Vedantins give the status of this pramana primarily to the Vedas. Hence, in these schools sabdapramana or verbal testimony is known as sastra, sruti and agama also. 123 122. 123. sabdasyapyanumanavisayatvena abinabhavopajivakatvena anumanatvam. Saptapadarthi p.115. pratyaksamanumanam tatha sastram. Prakarana-pancika p.44. athagamo nirupyate. Vedanta-paribhasa p.168.

140 Mimamsa View of Verbal Testimony Sabda as a pramana got the greatest importance in Mimamsa system. It consists in the true knowledge of objects, derived from the understanding of the meaning of a sentence. Accoding to Kumarila, it is of two types, personal (pauruseya) and impersonal (apauruseya). It is called 'pauruseya' when constituted by the words of trustworthy persons, and 'apauruseya' when constituted by the words of the Vedas. The Prabhakaras however, accept sabda to mean only vaidika or scriptural testimony about the existence of supersensuous realities. Vedanta View of Verbal Testimony Vedanta philosophy takes sabda or agama, as a source of valid knowledge consists in sentences or propositions which affirm a certain relation between things that is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge. Samkhya-Yoga View of Verbal Testimony 124 In the Samkhya-Yoga system too, we find, recognition of sabda or verbal testimony as a valid method of knowledge. Yet with some of the Samkhyas, we directly find sabdapramana being named as aptavacana. Samkhya-karika is the earliest work to define verbal testimony. Its definition is precise but meaningful. The Samkhya-karika defines verbal testimony as the statement (sruti) of the 125 reliable (apta). The author of the Samkhya-karika tries to satisfy both the sections of the Samkhya thinkers namely atheists and theists, by the very definition of verbal 124. drstamanumanaptavacanam ca. Samkhya-karika k. 4. 125. aptasrutiraptavacanantu. Samkhya-karika k. 5.

141 testimony. From the atheist standpoint it may be explained as words which convey that uncontradicted knowledge is authentic. The compound word aptasruti may mean the words derived from reliable persons are trustworthy. Isvarakrsna does not explain the word aptasruti himself. But Gaudapada, a commentator of Samkhya-karika says, aptas are the speakers, figuratively it stands for the words written by them, and sruti means the Vedas or the authoritative source of knowledge. The words of the trustworthy persons like the creator of the world Brahma and sages of his status are reliable. Nyaya View of Verbal Testimony According to Nyaya, verbal testimony is the fourth kind of valid knowledge. It is the statement of a trustwordy person, who has immediate knowledge of the moral law and competent to guide others. Gautama defines sabdapramana as aptopadesa. 126 This aptopadesa means a communication from or assertion of a reliable person. Manu advocates upadesa only in the 127 sense of an instructive statement or assertion Gautama's upadesa is understood in the sense of an instruction, all non-instructive statements or assertions spoken by the trusted person (aptas) will not obtain the status of the sabdapramana. It will bring a limitation to the scope of sabda. Because of this, Navya-Naiyayikas used the word 'vakya' instead of the word 'upadesa' in the context of defining sabda. 128 They did it only to widen the scope of 126. aptopadesah sabdah. Nyayasutra 1.1.7. 127. Samkhya-yoga Epistemology p 190. 128. aptavakyam sabdah. Tarkasamgraha 66.

142 sabdapramana. Thus, the basic character of sabdapramana is a sentence instructive or non-instructive, uttered by an aptapurusa (trustworthy person). The Nyaya definition presupposes that all verbal statements are made by persons. Vedic statements are statements of God who is a supernatural person. But according to Mimamsakas, vedic statements are not made by any person. These are impersonal. According to Visvanatha, in cognition from verbal testimony, knowledge of words is the instrument or karana, recollection of the meaning of the words is the vyapara, knowledge of the denotative force of words is an accessory and verbal comprehension or sabdabodha is the result. Kesava Misra's View 129 Kesava Misra also says that the utterance of a trustworthy person constitutes verbal testimony. 130 According to him 'apta' is one who speaks about a thing as it really is and 'vakya (sentence)' is a collection of words which have the three characteristics at the same time: verbal expectancy (akamksa), congruity (yogyata) and sannidhi (proximity). For this reason, a collection of words like 'cow, horse, man, elephant' is not a sentence as it is wanting in verbal expectancy among them. Similarly 'spray with fire' is not a meaningful sentence as the two words are lacking in congruity. Here 'fire' and 'spraying' are not capable of being constructed together, because the 129. padajnanamtu karanam dvaram tatra padarthadhih/ sabdabodhah phalam tatra saktidhih sahakarini// Bhasapariccheda k. 81. 130. aptavakyam sabdah. Tarkabhasa p. 121.

143 instrumental case in 'agnina' denotes that fire is the instrument for the act of spraying and fire is not capable of becoming such an instrument in as much as 'fire' and the 'act of spraying' do not join together through cause-effect relation. Similarly if the words 'gam" and 'anaya' are uttered one by one with an interval of an hour between them and not together, the two will not become a sentence. Even though there may be expectancy and congruity between them the two words lack proximity. Therefore, a sentence is only such a collection of words which have all the three characteristics at the same time; e.g. one desires of attaining heaven should perform the sacrifice 'jyotistoma'; there are five fruits on the bank of the river are correct sentences. Similarly 'bring a cow (gam anaya)' become a real sentence if they are uttered without delay between the two. Again Kesava Misra discusses how verbal expectancy can be a characteristic of words which are uttered by the speaker. When a man hears certain words and understands their meanings these latter produce in his mind the expectancy and so being produced the expectancy the meanings themselves are said to have expectancy. Through them the words that generate those meanings are said to possess expectancy by implication. Or, the words themselves having denoted their meanings may be said to create in the mind of the hearer the expectancy of one meaning being construed with another by implication. Thus the meanings endowed with expectancy become capable of being construed together. Through these meanings the words themselves are said to be capable of being construed properly.

144 A word is a collection of letters; and collection here is such that the letters in it constitute a single conception. When a word is uttered the letters in it appear one by one in a certain order and each letter fades away by the time the next letter is uttered with the result that there is no possibility of any of the previous letters remaining in the ear at any one moment or in other words only one letters remains in the ear at any single moment. But their impressions are left behind in the mind of the hearer. As soon as the last letter is heard, the auditory organ combines it with the impressions of all the previous letters and conveys to the mind the idea of the thing denoted by that collection of letters even though all the letters except the last one are not there at that moment. The auditory organ is endowed with this special faculty of piecing together the impressions of the previous letters with that of the last one to create a single conception from the whole. This is because of the efficiency of the accessory causes just as in a case of recognition. When recognition occurs, the previous experience though long past, is conveyed at the moment as though it were part of the present time. The idea of a sentence consisting of a collection of words is also conveyed by the auditory organ in a similar manner after combining the denotation of the last word with the impressions of the several previous words heard in succession. Thus, when such a sentence is uttered by a trustworthy person it becomes the sabdapramana. The result of this pramana is to understanding the meaning of a sentence. This sabdapramana is similar in human utterances as well as in Vedas. There is however this difference. Among them only some and not all are trustworthy and only such utterances that come from these

145 trustworthy people are pramana. The Vedas are all uttered by the greatest apta, Isvara or God, and so every sentence in them is pramana as they all come under the definition aptavakya. Classification of Verbal Testimony The Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas made two divisions of verbal testimony, human and transhuman. Vatsyayana holds verbal knowledge is of two kinds, namely drstartha or that relating to perceptible objects and adrstartha or that relating to imperceptible objects. 131 The first is limited to the ordinary sensible objects of this world, while the second is related to the supersensible objects this world which can not be known by perception. Under the first head we are to include the trustworthy assertions of ordinary persons, the saints and the scriptures. Thus the diagnosis of diseases in a person by a reliable doctor, the evidence given by witnesses in law courts, the scriptural injunctions about certain rites for rainfall, the knowledge of plants that we get from a reliable cultivator are illustrations of drstartha sabda. Adrstartha includes the trustworthy assertions of saints, prophets and the scriptures as they bear on supersensible realities. Thus, the scientist's assertions about atoms, ether, electrons, vitamins etc.the prophets' instructions about virtue and vice, the scriptural texts on God, heaven, freedom etc. are the illustrations of adrstartha sabda. Both these divisions are again sub-divided into two namely, revealed and perspective. Authority may either give information as to the existence of objects or give direction for the performance of some action. 131. sa dvividho drstadrstarthatvat. Nyayasutra 1.1.8.

146 The former indicates revealed and the latter denotes the perspective. The perspective again can be brought under two heads, namely, instinctive and exemplary. The instruction runs like this, "Do this in this way". As for human example "Ram is fed sali rice with ghee and milk porridge." The transhuman example is, "Create paradise by the darsapurnamasa sacrifices by obeying the ,,132 process of the prayaja, avaghata" and the like. The exemplary is meant "Do this like this". As for human instance, "Sita is to be fed in the similar way as Ram is". The transhuman instance is "Rouse divine splendour by the solar sacrifice as by agneya." The Mimamsakas are interested in the transhuman authority of the Vedas and that is because the Vedas give directions for performing the sacrificial rites. The Vedas are eternal, since the words of which they are composed are eternal. The relation of word and its meaning is natural and not produced by convection. In addition to the transhuman Vedic authority, the statement of a reliable man also is accepted by the Bhattas as a valid source of Knowledge. Again, according to the later Naiyayikas there are two kinds of sabda or verbal testimony - namely, vaidika or the scriptural and laukika or the secular. The Vedas are created by God and are, therefore, valid on all points. Vaidika or scriptural testimony is thus perfect and infallible by its very nature. 132. prayaja is a principal ceremony or sacrifice and avaghata means threshing corn by bruising it with a wooden pestle in a mortar of the same material. Pramanaratna pp. 74-75. cf. Studies in Pramanaratna

147 As distinguished from this, laukika or secfular testimony is not all valid. It is the testimony of human beings and may, therefore, be true or false. Of laukika testimony, only that which proceeds from trustworthy persons is valid but not the rest. 133 Thus, it can be said that verbal testimony as a source of knowledge is applied by all human beings in their day-to-day interaction. If one does not believe in the validity of the utterances of one's teachers and experienced persons, one will never be able to learn anything from elder's experiences. It is, of course, true that on many occasions what is learnt from a so-called reliable person turns out to be false, but this fact should not minimize the importance of verbal testimony as a source of learning in human life.