1. The Four Pramanas (iii) Comparison or Upamana

Upamana as an independent source of valid knowledge is admitted by Mimamsa, Vedanta and Nyaya, systems of thought. But the upholders of upamana are in different opinions. There is the divergence of opinion regarding the nature of resultant knowledge through upamana. The Purvamimamsakas and the Advaita Vedantins are on one side and the Naiyayikas on the other. Purvamimamsakas hold that the resultant knowledge pertains to the similarity which the remembered object bears to the directly perceived one. There is however a minor difference between the two schools of Mimamsa. According to Prabhakara, similarity (sadrsya) which is the object of comparison is an independent category not reducible to substance, quality, action and universal etc. But according to Kumarila, it is 107. The Epistemology of the Prabhakara school of Purva Mimamsa pp. 73-74.

133 nothing but an assemblage of common features. The Advaita Vedanta view is of course, identical with that of the Bhattas. According to the Naiyayikas it is the knowledge that a certain words denote a certain class of objects. 108 Mimamsakas both Prabhakara and Bhatta follow Sabara regarding upamana. According to Sabara, upamana is the similarity which brings about 109 the cognition of an object not in contact with the senses. Kumarila defines it as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object (e.g. a cow) with an object (e.g. a wild cow) perceived This is the meaning the cow which was perceived by me in the past in a town is similar to this wild cow 110 perceived in a forest at present. The Prabhakaras define comparison as the knowledge of similarity as subsisting in an object not in contact with the sense- organs brought about by the perception of similarity in some other object which is perceived by the senses. For example, a person who perceives a wild cow in a forest, perceives its similarity with the cow and then knows the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow. 111 108. 109. Upamana in Indian philosophy Intro. p. ix. upamanamapi sadrsyasannikrste 'rthe buddhimutpadayati. Shabara-bhasya p. 37 under MSu. 1.1.5. 110. tasmadyat smaryate tatsyat sadrsyena visesitam/ prameyamupamanasya sadrsyam va tadanvitam// Slokavartika upamana, 37. 111. sadrsyadarsanotham jnanam sadrsyavisayamupamanam. Prakarana-pancika p.267.

134 Knowledge by comparison is distinct from that by perception, since we cognise something which in not in contact with the senses by remembrance, since at the time the gavaya was seen the cow was not seen, from inference, since none of the factors necessary for inference is present. The views of the Naiyayikas and the Mimamsakas are different fundamentally on the nature of comparison. According to Naiyayikas, comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word. 112 The Mimamsakas refute this account of comparison. They point out that the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word is derived by verbal authority and not by comparison. According to Gautama, upamana is the means by which we gain the knowledge of a thing through its similarity to another thing previously wellknown. Hearing that a gavaya is like a cow, we infer that the animal which we 113 find to be like a cow is the gavaya. Two factors are involved in an argument by comparison. They are (1) the knowledge of the object to be known, and (2) the perception of similarity. While the ancient Naiyayikas regarded the former as the principal cause of the new knowledge, the modern Naiyayikas attach more importance to the perception of similarity. 112. 113. upamitikaranamupamanam, samjnasamjnisambandhajnanamumitih. Tarkasamgraha 65. a. Nyayasutra 1.1.6. b. prasiddhavastusadharmyat aprasiddhasya sadhanam, upamanam samakhyatam yatha gaur gavayastatha. Saddarsana-samuccaya 23. 114. sadrsyajnanam. Tarkasamgraha 65.

135 Kesava Misra's View Kesava Misra also accepts this view regarding upamana. According to 115 him Knowledge through comparison is that which is gained by the similarity of one thing to a known thing like a cow, when this similarity is aided by the recollection of a assertion made by some knowing person to that effect. For example, an urban man who does not know what the word gavaya means, hears from a forester that 'gavaya is an animal similar to the cow. Afterwards he happens to go to a forest where he sees some animal similar to the cow. If at that time he recollects the words of the forester, he gains the knowledge that the animal in front of him is what is called gavaya, which is similar to the cow. According to Kesava Misra this knowledge is upamana and it is the instrument of the cognition upamiti. Upamiti is the grasp of the relation between the word gavaya and the thing denoted by it. upamana is not ascertained by other pramanas, perception and inference, it is a separate pramana. 115. atidesavakyarthasmaranasahakrtam gosadrsyavisistapindajnanamupamanam. Tarkabhasa p.119.