Part 36 - Sripati’s Position Defined

This brief review plainly shows that Sripati holds a middle position between Bheda and Abheda and hence his suggestion that we should not push the argument for either Bheda or Abheda to its logical limits. He remarks that some matters are best left out uninquired into-avicharita ramaniyam. Similarly as between those who claim supremacy for Vishnu and those who desire to establish the supremacy of Siva, he, despite the fact that he is a strong upholder of the supremacy of Siva, identifying him as he does with Parabrahman, states that topics of this kind are best left untouched-avicharita ramaniyam. A few examples ought to suffice to illustrate this middle point of view adopted by Sripati :- (1) II. 3. 42. Apicha smaryate. In commenting on this Sutra, Sripati states that jivas are of Sivamsa (Jivanam sivamsatvameva abhidhiyate). He protests against the view of others that the words "Harih 909 This is strictly in conformity with the view of Anandatirtha who quotes Kamanni kamarupyanusancharan eshatsamagayannaste, a text quoted by Sripati in his commentary on IV. 4. 22. The term Bhagavat means glorious " illustrious", etc., an epithet applied to gods, demi-gods and respectable deities. Here it has to be taken to mean Parasiva Brahman. 66 11

Om!" indicate the splendour of Vishnu and that the Vedas establish the supremacy of Vishnu. He holds that these are matters which are best left uninquired into (avicharita ramaniyam). (2) II. 3. 41. Mantravarnat. In commenting on this Sutra, Sripati states that the argument about atmaikya and the suggestion that atma indicates Brahman and not jiva, are matters best left uninquired into. If inquired into, they are bound to end in affirming bheda. Knowledge will show that though they are all one, to our eyes they (Brahman and jiva) look as different from each other. Srutis also declare superabundantly that Brahma and jiva are different. That the jivas are many and eternal is vouched for by numerous texts. Atmaikyatva, which is the view propounded by the Advaitins, is accordingly avicharita ramaniyam. He quotes Sruti texts like Nityo nityanam chetanaschetananam, eko bahunam, yo vidadhati kaman, iti, 010 etc., in support of his view. Sripati suggests that the Advaita argument would fail here if pushed to the full length. (3) II. 3. 40. Amso nanavyapadesadanyathachapi dasakitavaditvamadhiyata eke. In commenting on this Sutra, Sripati strongly urges that bhedabheda is the only acceptable theory-tadeva rama- niyam. Elaborating, he says that we should understand that the jiva is an amsa of the Brahman. Proofs that manifestly demonstrate bheda being too strong for rejection, to urge anything contrary to it, cannot avail. That Parabrahman is the author of creation, that he alone is the controller, that he alone invests all with jnana, that all the rest are separated from him, that he alone wears, as it were, the rest and protects every one and destroys all, and obtaining upasana from all, gives them what is owing to them as the fruits of their action, and grants moksha to those who desire it, and the rest of the purusharthas (dharma, artha and kama) as the Supreme Lord-if all this is granted, jiva and Brahman cannot but be different from each other (Jiva 910 Katha-upanishad , V. 13.

Brahmanor bhedah). The rest, being not visible to the eye, we cannot argue or explain it in any other way-i.e., by way of the Advaita argument. While therefore jagatsrishti, etc., are being proved from authorities by Bhedavadins, to undertake the role of arguing for mithya is not possible. Also, for undertaking to prove that atma svarupa Brahman is akhandaika rasa chinmatra svarupa, there are no authorities available. Further, Parabrahman brings into existence many kinds of creations out of his mind, and establishing them with the aid of akasa and the panchabhutas, entering them as if he were a jiva, and becoming famous with many different names and forms, granting to jivas the experience of bliss and sorrow as they deserve and himself staying in them, untouched, and being the authority for granting to jivas all that they may deserve, separating them from the bonds of family life and granting them moksha-when all this is said of Parabrahman in the Sastras, if we are to reject them all as illusion, as required by the Advaitavadins, then that would be the cry of a mad man (unmatta pralapitatvapatat). So it is impossible to argue out successfully that the jiva is only Brahman under the control of upadhi. (4) II. 3. 50. Pravesa bhedaditichennantarbhavat. | In the course of his comment on this Sutra, Sripati says that the argument that Brahman is only jiva under the control of upadhi (Brahmano upadhivasena jiva iti vadah avicharita ramaniyah), is one best left out without argumentation. Several Sruti texts like Yatova imani bhutani jayante 1911 Gna gnau dvau ajavisanisau itiº12 etc., are decidedly opposed to such a view. Also, in Sutras like Utpattirasambhavat iti, etc., Bhagavan Badarayana has at length conclusively proved that jivas are eternal and are not created afresh. And therefore, in spite of repeated and harassing opposition, the two sets of Sruti texts-bheda and abheda-cannot be brought into harmony. Therefore in consideration of the arguments that the jiva is immortal and is always to enjoy the fruits of his actions (bhoktatva) and that he should work out his life 911 Taittiriya-upanishad , III. 1. 912 Sveta. Upa., I. 9.

for attaining jnana and that Isvara should be his inner being and his controller (antaryami and niyamaka) and no enjoyer of any part of the fruit of his actions, it is decided that the jiva is not Isvara (Jivakrita karmasiddheshtanishta phala bhoktrutvam nesvarasyeti nirniyate). (5) II. 4. 18. Vaiseshyattu tadvadasastadvadah. Commenting on this Sutra, Sripati says that it is not possible to accept the Advaita theory that postulates the identity of the jiva with Isvara. The statement of the Advaitins that during creation Isvara entered the visvasrishti in the form of jiva is also not reasonable. Because this theory is obviously contradicted by numerous Sruti and Smriti texts. Invented statements like the one that an elephant is a horse and that the jiva is Isvara are impossible of proof. It happens that bimba and pratibimba are found in the identical place; but they are different from each other. Sruti texts like Yato va imani bhutani jayante,913 etc., prove clearly that the jiva sarira in its chetana and achetana form, during creation and destruction, is within the control of and subordinate to Parabrahman and that it has no independent power whatever. In the Sruti text, Pradhana kshetragna patir gunesah samsara mokshasthiti bandhahetuh, it is declared that Paramesvara is the overlord (kartru) above all the jivas, having in his control grace and punishment (tirodhananugraha). And thus it is concluded that Parasiva Brahman grants to all those bhaktas in their final release all happiness and Sivatva, according to the Bhramara kitanyaya in the nirabhara form (Nirabharataya) having freed the jivas from all This is worldly bondage, the result of previous births. the gist of the whole of the Vedanta as understood from the Dvaitadvaita siddhanta point of view. (6) II. 1. 14. Tadananyatvamarambhana sabdadibhyah. Cause and effect are closely connected; effect indicates cause. In this lies ananyatva, i.e., without another; not relating to another; having no other resource left. There 914 Sveta. Upa., IV. 16. 913 Taittiriya-upanishad , III. 1.

can be no effect without a cause for it being found. To know that there is nothing beyond cause and effect, is to know ananyatva. The Kanada doctrine that there is something beyond cause and effect is not maintainable. Rajju and sarpa are not connected with each other as cause and effect. Karya and karana are not likewise ananya. Similarly jiva and Brahman, from the effect of upadhi, are described as different from each other. But as there is nothing beyond Brahman which can be described as real, it would be attributing upadhi to Parasiva. But cause and effect (karya and karana) cannot be described as being one and the same. If we are to presume Avidya in Brahman, then darkness and light will have been spoken of as being existent in the same place which is contradictory. Then we will be compelled to attribute agnatva to Brahman himself. This is opposed to the Sastras. If we accept that chaitanya is without a second (advitiya), this also will be opposed to the Sastras. Following the Sruti text, Yathornanabhih srijyate grihyatecha,15 just as the spider which is the cause, weaves the delicate web which is the effect and thus shows the effect, Paramesvara, as the cause (karanarupa), creates the chidachidatmaka srishti and in Pralaya he again drags the whole of it into himself. In this way, Paramesvara, by his creation, care and dissolution of chidachidatmaka prapancha, demonstrates the doctrine of karya karana ananyatva.