Part 31 - Jagad Vyavaharika Khandanam

Indeed, it is said that the world is true only for purposes of transaction (Vyavaharika).34 If it is asked, "Is it not the highest truth of spiritual knowledge?" the reply is "It is not so". Then, Then, "What is meant by Vyavaharasatyatva, Truth only for purposes of transaction ? Can it be said that it is assumed as existing only for purposes of discussion (vyavahara, i.e., vyavaharamatra gamyatvam) or can it be called Badhita vyavahara gamyatvam, i.e., not true beyond the purpose of vyavahara ? *47 Or is it possessed of any secret contradiction within its three or four folds which is inexplicable (trichatura kakshyabadhyatvam) or is it possessed of statements contradictory to those made in the Vedas (tattvavedaka pramana viruddhattvam) or is it incapable of giving any result, if understood as truth (arthakriya sunya pratiti gocharatvam)? Or is it knowledge useless for obtaining any good result (karana .. 344 Asit when coupled to agre, suggests existed at first". 345 Sveta. Upa., III. 2. 846 Worldly transaction, usage, practical conduct. 347 Badhita vyavahara gamyatvam-literally, opposed to what vyavahara makes suitable.

" 348 387 dosha rahita jnana vishayatvam)? The reply is "It is not the first"; because if Brahman is also assumed as existing for purposes of vyavahara (transaction) only, then it involves an unwarranted stretch beyond the Vedic truth, (it results in ativyaptih); and this results as between guru and sishya to silence and ignorance.³ The very starting point of the Sutra, Athato Brahmajijnasa and the underlying truth of Sruti texts like Sadeva saumya idam agra asit and Satyam jnanam anantam Brahma iti are crippled (ie., prejudiced); like decorating a wall which never existed with pictorial likenesses, everything is reduced to a sophistical argument ending in mere attributive expressions (Pravrittayah sruti sutra phakkikaya abhitti chitrakarmata patachcha sarvapiyam phakkika saviseshavishaya). Nirvisesha (attributelessness), however, can never be thought of by anyone in vyavahara, even for argument's sake. It is incomprehensible to any one even as a matter of vyavahara. Hence the whole argument is impeded. When nothing can or understood, such a vyavuhara deserves no commendation. Throughout Vedanta, nowhere is Nirvi- sesha mentioned and such a thing cannot be assumed. And this helps us conveniently. Even such 49 things will have to be understood as merely argumentative. Then it cannot be the second, viz., Badhita vyavahara gamyatvam, i.e., not true beyond the purpose of vyavahara. Because the ativyapti of Brahman cannot be prevented (i.e., the unwarrantable stretch of Brahman cannot be prevented).35 All this taken together leads. to contradiction (and not to the Truth). Moreover, 948 That is, it ends in the cutting short of discussion (jijnasa). 349 Such things as Nirvisesha, which is not mentioned in the Vedanta-i.e., Vedas and Agamas (ie., Upanishads). Agama means only that which is handed down; that which has come down from time immemorial; traditional doctrine or precept; a sacred writing or scripture; the Vedas. 850 That is, the proposition goes beyond the granted limit of actual truth. The idea is that the argument would lead to something beyond Brahman,

all arguments are limited to mundane existence 351 (and to nothing beyond it). Mere arguments with contradictions (such as these) will not avail to prove whether Brahman is savisesha or otherwise. If so, the characteristics of these contradictory arguments will lead to uselessness (vaiyarthya) 352 and what is aimed at is not gained. Everything thought of in argument leads to unreality (pratibhasika) or to an unwarrantable stretch beyond Brahman (ativyapti). At any rate, any knowledge which extends beyond Brahman is unreal and contradictory and is a perfect embellishment of mere argument (parishkarah sadhuh). What finally results therefrom is a perfect destruction of any kind of knowledge to be derived therefrom about Brahman; the antithetical method of argument leads further to incapability of producing better knowledge afterwards, and also makes one lose whatever true knowledge he previously possessed. And such a knowledge finally leads him to be impressed with the conclusion that there is neither a ghata nor a pata (neither a jug nor a cloth). And finally everything ends in stretching to something beyond Brahman. Such a knowledge we discard (nirakarishyamah). Moreover, granting the truth of the existence of the blueness of the sky, which is the starting point 353 (i.e., foundation) for the argument and holding that Brahman alone is likewise true and nothing else, the means adopted to obtain a knowledge of Brahman in a contradictory manner is just like one mistaking the whiteness in a conchshell for silver, which leads by an unwarranted stretch to a something beyond Brahman, which is unpreventable.35 Cf. Vacha pravritti and vacha nivritti, granted as desired and cancelled as desired. 851 852 Literally, unproductiveness. 353 Prishtha, the word used by Sripati, means back. 354 The argument may be thus set down:-The blueness of the sky is perceived and accepted to be true-in this world of vyavahara. This blueness of the sky is all-pervading. Similarly, the existence of Brahman, who is all-pervading, is accepted as true. This, however, is true only in a limited sense; as much as there

Even for those who possess such knowledge, the realization of Brahman is not only impossible but also their trials for the same will have to stretch beyond Brahman. Inasmuch as the blueness of the sky is not altogether real, it should not be said that a knowledge about such a thing is an unwarranted stretch of the principle (atiprasangah). But the nirviseshatva (attributelessness) and the mithyatva (falsity of the existence of the world) both lead to a knowledge which ends in an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman.355 Being rid of the world for mere vyavahara purposes, no lakshana (characteristic) of Brahman remains for argument. To one who wishes to establish nirviseshatva (a Brahma without attributes) in an opposing manner (sapratiyogikanam), we say it is impossible to realize such a Brahman in whom many characteristics are to be found. It would be really impossible to realize the true Brahman if the mere existence of Brahman is granted, holding all that is about him is the result of Adhyasa co-existing with him. The possessing The possessing of such a knowledge cannot lead to the realization of Brahman. Such realization is real silver in a conch-shell, the mere whiteness makes us believe that silver is there, is taking us beyond the actual fact, i.e., ativyapti. Such a result is unpreventable. In order to attain a firm knowledge of Brahman, it is to be understood that the world is real only for the sake of argument and its existence is not real. The character of knowledge relating to Brahman consists in attaining to a condition which is all light and free from darkness. This Light alone is Brahman. There can be nothing found which is attributeless (nirvisesha) in this world. Hence the existence of attributeless things is not true. If attributeless things are to be grasped, one has to go by an unwarranted stretch (ativyapti) beyond Brahman which results in contradiction. - 355 That is, Sripati's argument is that we may grant the blueness of the sky for the sake of illustration and argument and also the existence of silver in the whiteness of the conch-shell for purposes of argument but not the nirviseshatva of Brahman nor the mithyatva of the world-for if these two are granted, then the existence of Brahman will be jeopardised or it will take us to something else beyond and other than Brahman.

accordingly is impracticable. If we accept Brahman by his mere Svarupa as co-existing along with Adhyasa, which cannot completely remove the illusion so as to enable us to realize the true Brahman, it will be impossible to realize such a Brahman. But if Adhyasa, which is the infirmity in the whole theory, is removed so as to keep Brahman without Adhyasa, 356 then the Siddhanta (theory) becomes confused and ends in contradiction. (That is, the realization of such a BrahmanBrahman separate from Adhyasa-is impossible.) Anyhow, accepting that true knowledge leads to the realization of Brahman, throughout the Siddhanta, a Brahman free from Adhyasa is never seen to exist at any time. Therefore such a Siddhanta is impracticable and therefore let us not discuss it any more. Nor can it be the third. For in that case, the realization goes unwarrantedly beyond Brahman. A true knowledge of Brahman cannot be displaced by any doubt or opposition. But a Brahman who is co-existing with Adhyasa is really one who cannot actually be realized and is opposed to true knowledge. In that case, according to the Siddhanta, Brahman becomes not real (pratibhasika) but existing only for appearance. This results in Ativyapti, an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman.557 It is within our experience that illusory thoughts run into our minds which are unrealizable and not true-just as the existence of Gandharvanagara (or Gandharvapuram), the city of the Gandharvas, an imaginary city in the sky, probably the result of some natural phenomena, such as mirage), the 35 In Philosophy, Adhyasa is to attribute or ascribe (falsely) the nature of one thing to another. 857 According to the theory criticized, Brahman cannot exist without Adhyasa. If Brahman cannot exist without Adhyasa, then such a theory cannot help to realize the true Brahman, because the theory goes beyond Brahman. And a knowledge of such a Brahman -unconnected with Adhyasa-cannot be had according to the theory. Accordingly, Brahman exists only in appearance and is not real.

imaginary circle created by a fire-brand (Alata-chakra), and the like, which are actually not in existence. Further, the word kaksha358 employed in the argument is yuktiparah, i.e., a mere intellectual trick (or expedient), kalaparah, i.e., a mere time-serving one; or Viparita - pramaparah, i.e., a mere perverse proof. It cannot, however, be the first; (yuktiparah) in which case the prapancha (world) would appear to be false, which alone would be enough to make the whole argument unreal. That would also become contradictory to the Vedic view that Brahman is nirdosha, i.e., without fault (or defect). Thus the previous intellectual argument is contradicted by the subsequent one. Nor is it the second (i.e., kalaparah); for the long interval of time intervening between the illusory thoughts (Bhramavishaya) ends in unreality (pratibhasike) of the object and in an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (ativyaptih). Nor is it the third (viparita pramaparah); for the contradictory thoughts overlapping the proofs make the realization of Brahman impossible, and thus the whole becomes a contradiction (vyaghatat). The realization of such an object terminates in not attaining it, i.e., proves infructuous. When the hammer is removed from work, there is no ghata; and the intellectual skill employed in the evolution of the three or four folds of intellectual argument (tri-chatura viparitajnana) naturally ends in ativyaptih, i.e., in an unwarranted reach beyond Brahman. The hammer instead of bringing the ghata into existence has helped to make it disappear on account of the employment of contradictory skill and perverted thought.359 358 Kaksha in Logic means objection or reply in argument. Literally, it means a lurking or hiding place. An argument which does not make things plain. The argument of Sankara is described by Sripati as using tri-chatura-kakshayabadhyatvam, ie., three or four folds of objection (or contradiction). 359 The saying is that a hundred strokes by the hammer produces a ghata (a pot) out of earth as a hundred strokes of the chisel make an article of the shapeless wood. Sripati remarks that Sankara has by the use of his intellectual skill and perverse argument made the hammer not produce the pot, but made it disappear.

Furthermore, in the first instance, the intellectual skill used in the three- or four-folded argument (tri-chaturabadhyatve) has brought in a contradiction which establishes avyapti, i.e., inadequate pervasion of the proposition formulated.360 (Brahman is full of jnana and of jyotisvarupa; but when he is to be considered along with Adhyasa, these qualities-jnana and jyotisvarupa-become contradicted, because Adhyasa is ajnana or illusion. Hence avyapti results.) The skill employed in argument, instead of removing ajnana, and establishing jnana and developing it, so as to help in the realization of Brahman, has increased ajnana and thus made it impossible to know the characteristics of Brahman. It is thus: Is Brahman visible or invisible? If it were visible, there is no more falsity about its reality in existence. But if it be invisible, even a thought of accepting it as granted for the sake of vyavahara becomes incomprehensible (that is to say, that even for the sake of vyavahara, the existence of Brahman cannot be granted). For it is impossible to realize (Brahman), because if it is seen, there is no more mithyatva; if it is not seen, Brahman cannot be existing even for the sake of vyavahara. 381 The mere assuming the existence of a thing which is not seen is impossible (dussadhyatva). Nor can avidya be removed, having no opportunity for realizing the object by seeing. The mere idea of existence (vrittih) for the sake of vyavahara leads finally to the failure of the attempt to establish the existence of Brahman and ends in ignorance (ajnanatvat) and futility. The employment of Brahma knowledge cannot bring (one) 300 Avyapti means the non-inclusion or exclusion of a part of the thing defined; one of the three faults of a definition. When a lakshana is predicated of a thing and that lakshana, though it is true, is not actually found on examination in it, there is avyapti. Thus, a Brahmana is possessed of sikha (hair on the head) and sutra (the sacred-thread on his body). When, however, this lakshana is applied. to a Sanyasin, it is found to be otherwise, he being devoid of both, though he is yet a Brahmana. There is avyapti here. 361 Literally, the need for a Brahman even for the sake of vyavahara is removed. Sripati puts Sankara's argument on the horns of a dilemma.

to that condition (Brahmatva). If we accept that a gunja -a red berry with a black dot at its top-appears like fire, the burning property of fire cannot be accepted in it. In order to obtain jnana without any doubt, it is not primarily possible to to use ajnana as the instrument for the purpose. Such jnana which is unable to discriminate between what is the means and what is the thing for which such means should be used proves infructuous (vyaghatat). It is not even capable of recognizing ghata from the knowledge regarding ghata. Ghata and the knowledge relating to ghata are one. Moreover, while correct knowledge is the chief means of realizing Brahman, a mistaken idea of division between Brahman and Brahmaknowledge (jnana) is postulated. There is absolutely no need for the employment of such an argument. Where both (jnana and ajnana) become important, jnana cannot claim superiority over ajnana. Nor can, between jnana and ajnana, jnana stand out as proof (pramanikam). On the whole, in the loss of one's pervasive nature (svavyapakatva) and one's brilliant nature (svaprakasatva), the way of correct knowledge being lost, jnana finally enters nirviseshalva of Brahinan, which is not true. There is no Chinmatra Brahman, 362 because, he is really nonexistent. Everything thus becomes an illusory argument (ajnanatva prasangachcha). Even though jnana is capable of being obtained so as to realize Brahman, Avidya could not be shaken off in order to know oneself in Brahman; because Adhyasa always being in contact with Chit Brahman (intelligence), its non-existence could not be proved, without which Brahman cannot be allpervasive or realizable. Moreover, the double causes of pravritti (manifestation) and nimitta (instrumental or efficient cause as opposed to upadana karana), exhibited in Brahman as his two important characteristics (both of them co-existing without separation), lead to the creation of many 362 Of the Sat, Chit and Ananda folds in Brahman, Chit is referred to here.

different meanings (significances).883 And such meanings when applied to chaitanya in Brahman make the idea of prapancha contradictory to the starting point, i.e., vyavahara satyatva Brahman and end in non-existence (vaiyarthya). Such a non-existent Brahman, who can be seen, is not only a calculated (i.e., deliberate) but also an ineffaceable falsehoodso hard a falsehood 361 that it could not be believed under any circumstances. In trying to establish true knowledge out of jnana and ajnana and in trying to prove that true knowledge will lead to the realization of Brahman, the double method of argument, viz., pravritti (manifestation) and nimitta (efficient cause), was adopted but in the attempt thus made, the chief object (i.e., the realization of Brahman) has been left unrealized, just as between the two objects ghata and pata, the importance of ghata had been lost. However, without having a firm, true knowledge regarding Brahman, the nirviseshatva mode of argument regarding Nirvisesha (attributeless) Brahman has helped to reduce Brahman to void (or emptiness). And all consciousness being different from Brahman, no vyavahara can result. Hence, it (vyavahara) becomes mithya (false). In order to establish true knowledge regarding Brahman and to realize the self-luminous (svaprakasa) character of Brahman, the mithyatva of Brahman must be given up (Brahmanah mithyatvam varjaniyam). To create a bheda which is not in existence (kalpita bhedamadaya) and to argue that the world is only existent for purposes of vyavahara-just as one Devadatta who never existed-and then to finally arrive at a Nirvisesha Brahman, which can never be realized,-such a method (of argument) should be given up (varjaniyam). Just as difference between Brahman and chaitanya is untrue, similarly Brahman without attribute is also untrue, for realization of such a Brahman is of no use (aprayojakam) and 863 The word artha used in the text means object or significance. 864 The words used are mithyatvapadanasya vajralepatvapatachcha, where vajralepa means a kind of very hard cement. Cf. Vajralepa ghatiteva, see Mal., V. 10. For its preparation, see Varahamihira's Brihat Samhita, Chap. 57.

in this world it is unattainable (tadasiddheh).385 Jiva being an indivisible whole, with Brahman, such a start by postulating vyavahara becomes untrue. The annihilated form of mithyatva cannot be stated as belonging to chid-vishaya (worldly matter, i.e., matter only for vyavahara). Thus, we have come to the conclusion that a mode of argument which comprises such a knowledge does not help us towards true realization; nor does it help us towards the reality of the world for the sake of vyavahara. As the argument leads us to conclude that all the component parts being different from each other, on account of their differences in characteristics, 360 there is really no mithyatva (of the prapancha). This leads to the conclusion that the complete divided nature of the three parts (prapancha, jiva and Brahman) proves the satyatva of the prapancha i.e., the reality of the world (prapanchasya satyatvam). This ends in the inverted position that Brahman is false (Brahmano mithyatvam iti viparita vrittih).38 Therefore, this mode of argument has brought us finally to the unpreventable conclusion that the world is real and Brahman is false (prapancha satyatva and Brahma mithyatva). Moreover, does Nirvisesha Brahman really exist or not? In the second case (i.e., if you say that it does not), the Madhyamika (Bauddha) mata is entered on. In the first case (i.e., if you say that Nirvisesha Brahman 865 Sripati here criticises both the Advaita and Dvaita view-points combined. If Advaita with its Nirvisesha Brahman is untrue, so is Dvaita in its position that Brahman and chaitanya (Jiva) are different. Sripati's argument seems. to be that the Advaitin having postulated prapancha for purposes of vyavahara, has had to end in Nescience. He suggests that while the Advaitin has, for vyavahara, to grant the Dvaita position of prapancha being different from Brahman, he has been unable to prove the proposition he started with, viz., a Nirvisesha Brahman, as he has ended in Nescience. 866 888 That is, prapancha, chaitanya (jiva) and Brahman being different from each other. 867 That is, Brahman is proved to be false and prapancha real.

exists), the way in which the argument by means of pravritti and nimitta, which are different from each other, is put forward, leads to the utter futility and contradiction of nirviseshatva. By the mode of argument employed, i.e., by means of pravritti and nimitta, the postulated vyavahara (satyatva) proves certain attributes in Brahman which cannot be avoided. Starting with the assumption that Nirvisesha Brahman exists, the proof brings out a result which is contradictory to that assumption inasmuch as it points out a Savisesha Brahman, and reduces finally the argument to the prattle (or raving) of a mad man (unmatta prala pavat). The word asti (exist) used in the bheda creating argument of pravritti and nimitta, regarding chaitanya (sattayah), in your philosophy (tvanmate) has ended in the conclusion of milhyatva (Nescience). 268 The assumption of the existence of Brahman ends in the nirviseshatva of Brahman and thus makes Brahman non-existent. The skill employed in the argument becomes only useful to prove that the very assumption of Brahman at the starting ends in a contradiction and proves that nothing is existent, because nirvisesha cannot be correlated with the assumption that Brahman exists. If it is said that pravritti and nimitta are not different from each other, then samanadhikarana follows: Nirvisesha and savisesha should then be treated as possessing a common substratum-or as being in the same category. Formerly some ancients 360 treated pravritti and nimitta which indicate bhinna (that is, difference), sometimes as samanadhikarana. Even they arrived at the same conclusion, committing the same fault. In assigning a non-existent dharma to pravritti and nimitta and discussing a Nirvisesha Brahman, the identical absurdity (ayameva doshah) is arrived at. If Brahman does not exist beyond the assumption (anatireke), then samanadhiHere, at this final point, Sripati addresses the Advaita expounder directly by using the word toanmate. 389 There is no clue as to who these ancients were.

karana is destroyed (samanadhikarana haneh). If Brahman exists beyond the assumption (atireke), the siddhanta (conclusion) itself is destroyed.370 From this, the hypothesis of a Nirvisesha Brahman goes without proof; and by its very nature results in contradiction. When the things we ardently seek for are by their very nature impossible of attainment, we should not lay on them an unbearable blame (blemish) and renounce them. By this, according to the Srutis, nirviseshatva is disproved and rendered futile. In such a case, the Srutis which are separated from the differences created by prakriti and pratyaya (radical form and prefixes and suffixes) would result in want of authority. Indeed, does mithya mean being different from Brahman as paramartha or aparamartha (as the highest or the most sublime truth regarding Brahman or the reverse of it)? In the first case, as bhedatva is accepted as true, the opposite cannot be true, because the destruction (nullification) of the siddhanta results therefrom. Nor is it the second; for both the satya (truth) and mithya (untruth) even as to the existence of Brahman will be unpreventable. The causes that go to prove the differences in Brahman will be the causes which go to prove his non-existence. The ghata cannot in its real state claim to be different from Brahman and in its mithya (non-existent) state claim to be one with Brahman. This bhedabheda state itself being mithya (nonexistent), it cannot go without being called faulty (i.e., it would be faulty to postulate that in its real state the ghata is different from Brahman and that in its mithya state it is one with Brahman). The truth of the whole matter is that mutual contradiction and unrectifiable confusion cannot be removed while you only profess to be impartial between bheda and abheda and between jiva and Brahman. Why don't you accept the mithyatva of both of them, jiva and Brahman? 870 Cf. Anandatirtha's Mayavada Khandana, Section relating to atireka and anatireka (Kumbakonam Edn., p. 2),

Not that it is impossible to arrive at such a conclusion on the basis of the abheda srutis. By the text Sarvam khalvidam Brahma, Brahman as well as the jiva are ever proved. And therefore the existence of prapancha as well as Brahman is true. Is nirvisesha an aid or a hindrance to Brahma knowledge? If it is the second, the Siddhanta falls to the ground. Is Nirvisesha Brahman to be understood as jnana or ajnana? If it is the second, the Siddhanta falls to the ground. If it is the first, then, is Brahman savisesha or nirvisesha? If it is said that Brahman is nirvisesha, then it contradicts (vyaghata) your cherished objective. If it is said that Brahman is savisesha, the Brahman becomes eternal (nityatva). If jnana becomes nitya, the argument also becomes nitya (eternal), i.e., endless. Similarly even Muktas understand that prapancha is eternal. 371 Then, in the Mukti state, when full satisfaction has been attained in vishaya (i.e., worldly affairs), it cannot be said that the prapancha is nirvishaya (i.e., does not pertain to worldly affairs). Then, there will be no state of correct knowledge (jnana). A knowledge (jnana) which describes no object (i.e., nothing), has nothing to support (i.e., no prop or support) and is a contradiction (in terms). A jnana³72 which relates to a past enjoyment (atita jnana) can no more be desired to be had. In the same way, if out of past enjoyment there is some small particle still left out, we cannot without contradiction call such a small particle left over as nirvisesha. Because such a declaration would end in a faulty observation. Therefore to describe things which are within our experience as nirvishaya 373 and nira- sraya³74 is vain, for, in the example "I know this is a ghata which can be stated with firmness, without any doubt by 371 So real is prapancha. > 372 jnana is obtained for realizing Brahman; it is the highest object that can be aimed at; but if that is not to be aimed at, what is the use of that jnana ? 878 Nirvishaya Having no scope or sphere of action; not attached to sensual objects. 874 Nirasraya Without a prop or support,

seeing and handling, it cannot be stated that it (the ghata) is not true and that it (the ghata) does not exist. It is the height of contemptuous folly (dhik) to state that the ghata is just like a flower existing in the sky (gagana kusumavat) which can neither be handled nor obtained and which has merely to be imagined, having no real existence. Further, is Brahman matter (dravya) 375 or otherwise (adravya)? If he is dravya, then he should possess its properties or qualities also. Also he will have to be considered along with time, just as the existence of a pot (ghata), as to when it came to exist, etc., which becomes meaningless. Having an idea involving Time, it may be granted as being Sat. Even though at certain times certain properties (guna) are exhibited yet, he (Brahman) possesses no properties (aguna), which shows an inconsistency. If the existence of guna is permanently granted, then, nirviseshatva becomes foiled. If avidya (illusion) is granted, it is not possible to establish true knowledge. If Brahman is to be considered as adravya (non-matter), Brahman is always co-existent only with dravya. For example, Sruti texts like Sve mahimni iti, contradict the argument. Therefore, as Brahman is always co-existing with dravya, the nirviseshatva becomes broken down (bhangachcha). Therefore, with the argument, conducted at length, in these ways, with all reasons and proofs adduced for contradicting the first and the second kakshas, 376 Brahman, who has no contradiction whatever, becomes contradicted by the remaining two kakshas, i.e., the third and the fourth, and the confusion becomes unpreventable. Hence the argument is one to be discarded (as a remote one). It is not the fourth, because there is no contradiction in the Vedas themselves about the truth and principles 375 Dravya means a thing, substance, object or matter. An elementary substance; the substratum of properties; one of the seven categories of the Vaiseshikas. The dravyas are nine :-prithvi, ap, tejas, vayu, akasa, kala, dik, atman and manas. 876 Cf. Tri-chatura kaksha badhyatva referred to above in detailing the basis of the Advaita argument,

relating to Brahman. As to the real nature of Brahman (tatvadishu) as revealed in the Vedas and as stated in the Srutis, there is no contradiction. The nirvisesha doctrine exhibits the qualities relating to Brahman in a manner contradictory to them (i.e., Vedas and Srutis). Such contradictions not only contradict the Vedic truth, but are also evidently against Sruti texts such as:-Neha nanasti 377 and Yasmindyauh iti, 378 etc. These are gravely contradicted and the argument becomes inconclusive thus, viz., that though there is no prapancha actually, it is only assumed for vyavahara. The thing assumed is an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (atirikta) and it leads into the region of dvaita (dvaita prasangat), though professing that dvaita is false (mithyatva). And those proofs that maintain the dualistic doctrine contradict his (advaitic) own doctrine and establish finally the truth of the dualistic (bheda) doctrine as one to be accepted (angikaryataya) and thus results an unwarranted stretch (ativyapteyascha) beyond Brahman. Further, if it is asked, whether the characteristics of Brahman are in accordance with the principles of the Veda, or different from them, whether the complete attainment of Brahman could be fulfilled or not, the reply is that if it is not fulfilled, it is contradicting the starting point, according to his (adversary's) argument. If it is realized that the starting point of prapanchaka vyavahara breaks down under weight of many Vedic proofs adduced against it, the argument ends in open contradiction. If the world becomes illusory (asatvi), the proofs adduced in support of it (by himself) become contradicted. What was stated at first, viz., that bheda (jiva being different from Brahman) is mithya (false), is itself established as being consonant with truth, contrary to one's own argument. Nor the fifth. While such is the case, your attempt at starting with an argument, professing it to be a Vedic one, to establish to the world Brahmasatyatva, has finally ended 877 Chchandogya-upanishad , VI. 2. 1. 878 Mundaka-upanishad , II, 2. 5,

in the destruction of your argument and in contradiction, and (your) whole labour has been lost-much like the labour that is lost in trying to establish the beauty of a flower hanging in mid-heaven or in representing a pole as a malicious serpent. So you have to retire from gesticulating in the (dialectic) arena. Now, this is the final verdict (abhipraya). Throughout the argument relating to nirvisesha Brahman, the negative prefix ni (in the word nirvisesha) denotes and establishes artha kriya sunyatvam (i.e., void of all realization of object) and artha kriya sunyatva bhava (incapability of expecting any realization of the object). While so, Brahman is proved to be, by an unwarranted stretch, one beyond himself (ativyaptih). Avidya being one never separable from Him (Brahman), the impossibility of realizing Brahman, the yearned object, is proved. And being Himself inseparable from impurity (asuddha), vyavaharitva is not established. When all true knowledge is separated, then, all attributes are gone and there results finally sunyavada samrajya (i.e., the ascendancy of the kingdom of Sunyavada³79 or Nescience). The differentiation (viseshitam) can never exceed the attributes (viseshana) of an object (viseshya). In order to exterminate avidya, the argument employed denotes that it reaches beyond (atirichyate) the characteristics of Brahman, so that it finally goes to an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (ativyaptih). Even if the light of knowledge is obtained, yet the non-destruction of avidya renders the result nugatory-the cause not leading to the desired result. Though the corporeal object is brought to light, the illusion (avidya) regarding the corporeal objects is not removed. Similarly the Self (svatvam), even though without selfishness (svavishayatam vinapi), brings into the light the svarupa of Brahman and removes avidya. This is the declaration of the tattva (truth) (i.e., siddhanta). Moreover, the mere imagining of the existence of the serpent in the rope, which is unreal (pratibhasika), and 379 The doctrine of the non-existence of anything; the doctrine of a Buddhist sect. 26

which makes one to fear and tremble, is a result which can only be described as an unwarranted stretch beyond the truth of the actual existing object, causes and effects. When the existing facts are ignored, as for example, in a ghata mere thoughts about it are unwarranted stretches beyond it (ativyaptih). A multitude of unsettled thoughts (prachaya vyavahita) which arise (utpanneshu) about a thing cannot give a settled idea regarding it. Such unsettled thoughts for that moment mean evidently an unwarranted stretch beyond that object (ativyaptih). No correct result can be realized by such (unsettled) thoughts and action (kriya) taken on such (unsettled) thoughts. Similarly, in svapna (dreams), both good and bad sights are seen with indications for the time being of several actions and results, which finally (in the wakeful state) prove as unwarranted stretches beyond actual reality. As regards the vyavaharika objects, of which knowledge ought to be gained by endeavours and by trying to realize them, the fault is of one's own mind (atmasraya dosha eva). For an untoward result that eventuates by the wearing of a kataka (gold bangle) or a makuta (a crown) or some such thing, cannot be warded off by blaming merely the kataka or the makuta (when actually the result has already been experienced). In the same way what is seen occurs and is experienced in svapna (dreams). Even though they are unwarranted and beyond the stretch of actual facts, yet nothing can be prevented by applying any kind of interruption. While such is the case, in all such cases of illusory knowledge (pratibhasika), where an unwarranted stretch beyond the actual facts is reached, there can be no interruption. Such things cannot fail to occur under such circumstances. While such is the case, in the present instance, your starting at first with the calculated mistake-of imagining for the purpose of vyavahara a serpent in a rope-is but accidental and results in unforeseen consequences (akasmika prasangat). Such a view is again confirmed by the detailed description of the result of actions seen and experienced in svapna (dreams).

Nor can it be the sixth; that is, Brahman cannot be mere light of knowledge free from any cause or fault. Because in examples derived from the conch-shell (sukti) throwing the light of silver, in which it is mere illusion, Brahman becomes ativyaptih (an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman). In regard to objects about which almost all people have an ascertained knowledge, even though such things are away from their senses of sight, yet it cannot be said that the characteristics of such things are in any way contradictory to those actually pertaining to them. 381 In texts like Yato va imani bhutani jayante 1380 Atmana akasassambhutah³st | Yasmin dyauh pritivi 382 | iti, which refer to the creation of the creatures of the world and the birth of akasa by Atman, etc., which objects are perceivable only by mental wisdom, it is not possible exactly to say what their characteristics are. Then, the Srutis, which are responsible for mentioning avidya as being the root of all ignorance, state that avidya cannot bring into existence the actual knowledge of Truth for realizing Brahman. Therefore Brahman becomes ativyaptih (Brahmani ativyapteh). That is, avidya is something beyond Brahman. (That is, you are going beyond the Srutis in attributing a power to avidya which the Srutis do not predicate for it though you are bringing in the Srutis to support it. There is ativyapti here.) Therefore it cannot be said that by such proofs Brahman can be realized after being freed from the illusory knowledge of Maya co-existing with him. Maya It cannot be said of the Upanishads that the root of ignorance (avidya) has taken its origin in them or that avidya is in Brahman. Those proofs cannot be expected to support such a view. The Sruti text Athata adeso neti neti Nasadasin nosadasit tadanim 1383 PurupurastanTaitt. Upa , III. 1. 382 Mundaka-upanishad , II. 2. 5. 381 Taittiriya-upanishad , II. 1. 888 Rig Veda, X. 129. 1. This text is quoted by Anandatirtha in his comment on II. 1. 18, Asadvyapadesat neti chenna dharmantarena vakyaseshat,

nasannasannasadasat 1384 iti, contradicts even whatever was assumed to be as true of Brahman. By describing Brahman in the terms used in the Sruti (texts) and interpreting them in a different manner, and describing the world (prapancha) in contradiction to them (Sruti texts), you are belittling them (kinchitkaram). While Brahman possesses all the characteristics mentioned in the Sruti (texts) in a real form, you have interpreted them to show an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman (ativyapteh). It is not possible to say that the arguments used are in one continued form along the path of right knowledge (jnana prakaratva). Even the knowledge about a pot (ghata) according to your argument, goes beyond the attributes of correct knowledge (avyaptih) about it, and the attributes are not rightly applicable. Even though Brahman is possessed of sadrupa (good characteristics), you have in some manner (prakaratvat) interpreted a world consisting in Brahman (Brahmani prapanchah) in the form of an illusion (jnana prakaratvachcha) thereby concluding that Brahman only is true and that the world is a mere illusory (adhyastatvam) appearance in Brahman just as ghata is seen by the eye and taken to be true by its fashioned appearance and that Brahman is really attributeless (vishaya viseshanam iti), which is neither right nor true (na yuktam). For this very reason, all the attributes mentioned (in the Upanishads) become useless (vaiyarthyat). The statement that it (prapancha) exists only in appearance and not real (pratibhasike) is only intended by you to make the all-pervading character of Brahman void of truth (vyapti varanachcha). Therefore, the statement that the visva (world) is true only for the purposes of vyavahara is in clear contradiction to Sruti, yukti and anubhava 385 and hence is called an 384 Anandatirtha, in his Mayavadakhandana, quotes this text to prove that the Advaita conclusion regarding Brahman being neither sat nor asat nor sadasat and being one inexpressible or having no characteristics-is nothing but sunya. 385 Literally means Veda, reasoning and experience.

argument of concealed Buddhism and Mayavada (Prachchanna Bauddha Mayavada). And this is the conclusion of Srauta Saiva Siddhanta (publicly) declared to the sound of a bell-metal bell (ghanta-ghoshah). Moreover, in the grand texts (mahavakyeshu) of Tattvamasi, etc., no aikya with nirvisesha Brahman is taught (upadisyate). The words tat and tvam 386 in the mahavakya teach in the sense of (paratvat) savisesha jiva-Brahma (i.e., jiva and Brahman possessing qualities). In texts like Tad aikshata bahusyam 1387 iti, the words tat, etc., denote clearly Paramesvara Brahman with attributes (savisesha) by whom the creation of the world was effected. If you say that everything is covered in knowledge inseparable from Maya (Mayavidyavachchinna) and that no aikyatva can be brought about between jiva and Isvara, who are respectively of little-knowing and all-knowing nature, being far wide from each other as a cow and a dog; and pursue the doctrine further by employing the jahal and ajahal lakshana modes of argument, sometimes vetoing and sometimes agreeing with the texts of the Sruti and finally saying that "He is Devadatta" who appears as the result of the upadhi of Maya (Mayavidyopadhih), the destruction of which upadhi created by Mayavidya will result in the realization of Brahman, who should be understood to be free from all attributes (Nirviseshah)-if you ask us to admit the existence of such a Brahman, then, we say, we do not accept such a doctrine; because by your own argument you have arrived at a conclusion that is either an unwarranted stretch beyond Brahman or which ends in anything but Brahman (i.e., in Nescience). For texts like Brahma veda Brahmaiva bhavati 1388 Brahmakamo 386 Cf. Aitadatmya midam sarvam tat satyam sa atma tattvamasi Svetaketo, where the words tat and tram are used in terms of jiva and Brahman, with their respective attributes. The text is from the Chchandogya Upanishad, VI. 1. 8. 887 Chch. Uta., VI. 2. 3. Mundaka-upanishad , III. 2. 9.

Brahmavedanam kuryat Divyam paramjyotirupam sampadya svena rupena abhinishpadyate 1389 Siva eko dhyayah sivamkarah sarvam anyat parityajya 1390 Dhyatva munirgachchati bhutayonim samastasakshim tamasah parastat 1391 Sraddha bhakti dhyana yogadavehi 1392 iti, teach clearly that Sivatva could be obtained by the jiva by duly meditating upon Paramesvara and praying to Him agreeably to the Bhramara-kita nyaya, the kita being transformed into the bhramara through constant meditation of him. 393 Texts like Esha hi eva sadhu karma karayati | iti, proclaim that Paramesvara is capable of getting done all good deeds and conferring all the four states of mukti in addition to granting the privilege of residence in the same heaven with himself (i.e., Kailasa). Moreover, Sruti texts like those beginning with (the words) Tadaikshata bahusyam 1304 iti, are contradicted by your mode of argument and the meaning of the Sruti text Ekavignanena sarvavijnanam, etc., 395 is totally shattered to pieces by you. Besides, according to your doctrine, meditation on Paramesvara will not end in the realization of sakshatkara 300 of Paramesvara, because your maxim yad drisyam tan nasyam (whatever you see by the eye that is destroyable-and not real) leads to nishprayojana-utter futility of all objects, and attaining nothing as the result of dhyana (meditation) and renders it useless; and exhibits Parasiva Brahman who shines resplendently in his all-knowing and other qualities. (sarvagnatvadi) and his six kinds of characteristics, exhibited in expressions such as Siva, Sarva, Sankara, Anandajnana, Ananta, etc., powerless, and makes his name a term convertible into hasta, kara, pani and other 889 Chchandogya-upanishad , VIII. 3. 4. 890 300 Atharvasiras. 891 Kaivalya Upa. 302 Kaivalya Upa. 398 Chchandogya-upanishad 894 Chchandogya-upanishad , VI. 2. 895 Chchandogya-upanishad , VI. 1. 4. 396 Literally, direct perception, apprehension or knowledge.

terms and makes him inexplicable and also exhibits jiva, who is entitled to be considered as the indivisible part of that all-knowing svarupa of Paramasiva (akhandajnana svarupa Paramasiva) as being both separate and one with him. But if one asks whether jiva is different from the akhandajnana svarupa Parasiva Brahma or one with him, it is not the first. For a world composed of (material objects such as) ghata (pot), pata (cloth) and the like which shine as clear objects by the (aid of the) rays of the Sun, cannot be said to be shining by the internal light of the jiva (sva³97 svabhasaka prabhakara) that perceives it. For it is the urge caused by Paramasiva which brought to him the knowledge of the object so perceived. Nor can it be the second. It cannot be said that the mere eyes as the organ of sight have realized the sight of it. Or, if it be said that jiva being separated from real knowledge, could acquire the knowledge of the object by experience of sight, we say it is not so. How can it be possible for it to get at a knowledge by its own exertions? Then could it have the power in itself both to lower itself and raise itself (utkrishta and apakrishta)? Not the first; for it is against Sruti, yukti and anubhava. Nor could it be the second; for meditation as aforesaid is incapable of giving realization on account of its own fault. Nor is it the third, for, according to Sruti texts like Gna gnau dvau ajavisanisau 1398 Pradhana kshetrapatir gunesah ³ Isanassarva vidyanam Isvarassarva bhutanam 1400 iti, etc., a great contradiction will ensue as it is opposed to the Sruti, yukti and and anubhava. The actual realization (sakshatkara) will become impossible, even though the light of knowledge is as clear and effulgent as the light of the Sun (Prabhakara) shining in the middle of the sky. And, therefore, if you say that by the knowledge derived from meditation and worship and prayers that 397 Sva here means jiva. 398 Sveta. Upa., I. 9. 399 Sveta. Upa., VI. 16. 400 Maha-upanishad , 29.

If Brahman could be realized, according to your own argument, it is not possible. But just as the Sun is to the sky, the eyes are to the body for the purpose of realizing Brahman. And there can be no contradiction if the soul of the jiva, which has attained purification by the diksha (initiation) administered by the guru (guru diksha suddha jivasya), obtains sakshatkara (i.e., direct realization) of Paramesvara through his direct grace (anugraha). not, Sruti texts like Gnatva Sivam santim atyantameti Brahmavid Brahmaiva bhavati | 102 Eshonuratma chetasa veditavyah 1403 iti and hundreds of other similar texts will be rendered useless. Otherwise, in this world, there would be no more such a thing as the imparting of instruction by a guru to a Sishya. Therefore, what has been formerly said, is the declared meaning of all the Vedas and the Vedanta. This is our conclusion (siddhanta). 401 Now, it should not be said-says Sripati-that the first four Sutras have given the full purport of the whole work entitled the Brahma-Sutra consisting of four chapters and that it is unnecessary to consider the remaining Sutras of the work. If it is suggested that a consideration of the remaining Sutras is not necessary, then, the reply is that it is not so. The first four Sutras, in Sripati's opinion, define in the main Brahma lakshana. In order to bring home clearly and at length the lakshana of Brahman, Bhagavan Badarayana primarily explains in the Sutras that follow that the sanka (doubt) of ativyapti cannot, under any circumstances, exist in regard to Brahman. In commenting on the Sutras immediately following, Sripati not only seeks to reaffirm the proposition that the Brahman under discussion is Mahesvara himself but also refutes the Dvaita and the Visishtadvaita standpoints and Sankara's doctrine of Jaganmithyatva. A very brief reference to these points ought to suffice, in view of the consideration already given to the last of these topics. 401 Sveta. Upa., IV. 14. 402 Mundaka-upanishad , III. 2. 9. 403 Mundaka-upanishad , III. 1. 9.