Preface (to the Srikara Bhashya, Introduction portion)

THOUGH the existence of Sripatipanditacharya's Bhashya on the Vedanta-Sutras of Badarayana has been long known, it has not so far been available in print. An incomplete Telugu edition was published many years ago but this is the first time the whole text is offered in the Devanagari script. The circumstances under which this edition has been undertaken have been set out at some length in the Introduction that follows and it is needless, therefore, to say anything further on that head here, except to state that it is entirely due to the public spirit and liberality evinced by the Mysore Lingayet Education Fund Association that it has at all been possible. " " The publication of a work of this kind, a well-known. commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras, raises the question whether there is any utility in making ancient works of this kind available to the general public. The criticism has been offered suggesting that there are systems of philosophy which though they have not yet passed away, still drag on their barren life, a fixed monotony of centuries and the specific instances offered are "the schools of Brahmans and Buddhists and Confucians, who have drained off the life-giving words of their ancient masters into labyrinthine canals and stagnant pools. There in the overteemed East is the limbo of unchangeable systems preserved from the fertilizing breath of change by a universal inertia. " That the East has been prolific in producing systems of thought may be admitted, but the suggestion that the systems have proved "stagnant " or have been overtaken by "inertia" cannot, perhaps, be easily demonstrated. Faint echoes of the criticism above referred to have been heard now and again, repeated or reflected, 1 Sir Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (1899), 80. B F

in the remark that commentators in India have been content to build their own systems of thought, profound though up " 66 2 Presidential Address at the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1930. See in this connection Das Gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, I. 63. A similar charge of sterility can be preferred The scoffer may against contemporary Western philosophy. pretend," remarks Professor Wolf, after offering an account of recent and contemporary philosophy, that all these philosophies are little more than the reminiscences of the thought of past ages. He may take to pieces all these philosophical tapestries (from Haeckel to Smuts, ranging from 1834 to 1934) and show that they are mainly a patchwork of scraps derived from Heraclitus or Parmenides, Plato or Aristotle, Descartes or Spinoza, Locke or Liebniz, Kant or Hegel, Schelling or Schopenhauer. And he may reiterate the oft-repeated. charge that there is no progress in philosophy. Such disparagement, however, would be unwarranted, even if we admit some of the points on which it professes to be based. After all, the whole history of civilization is so short that it has been described as a provincial episode' when measured in terms of terrestrial time, to say nothing of cosmic time. And of this' provincial episode', the whole history of philosophy is but a single aspect, which only emerged about twenty-five centuries ago and has been more or less smothered more than half the time. Moreover, the problems of philosophy are peculiarly difficult to answer in a manner that may command general consent. For they do not lend themselves to the kind of empirical verification which secures something like general agreement in the sciences. In fact, as soon as any group of problems becomes amenable to empiri. cal verification, it forsakes its parental philosophic home, and sets up as a separate science. In this way, philosophy always remains the limbo of highly speculative questions, which it is very difficult to answer satisfactorily, but which most intelligent persons find it equally difficult to suppress. And since times do change and we change with them, each age needs at least a re-statement of old problems and old solutions in terms best adapted to its own habits. of thought or speech. An excessive straining after originality, or the appearance of originality, may do more harm than good. A knowledge of the history of one's subject is probably a universal requisite, but especially so in the case of philosophy. For of philosophy it is particularly true that all history is contemporary history." (A. Wolf in An Outline on Modern Knowledge, Chapter XIII, on Recent and Contemporary Philosophy, 589.) What Professor Wolf says. in regard to modern Western philosophy may, ipsissima verba, be said of Indian philosophy.

xi they be, "only as appendages to the Vedas and Upanishads". Remarks like these miss the main point that the Vedas and Upanishads enshrine philosophical thoughts far too fecund to be allowed to rust away. They simply refuse to die. Philosophy is yet philosophy whether it is found in the Vedas or in the Upanishads or even in the mathematical formula in which Spinoza, of all modern philosophers, set it. Philosophy, whether in the East or in the West, has emerged from religion as often as it has entangled itself in its meshes, and the intermingling is not to be regretted if it has helped in the elucidation of truth. Nothing better brings out the justice of this observation than the lines on which Western philosophy itself has developed. To take but one instance, the case of Spinoza, who, perhaps, has most influenced European philosophical and even political thought in modern times. How much of his system, if a system it be, he owed to his Rabbinical masters, how much to the Neo-Platonists and through them to earlier Hindu thinkers and how much again to Descartes ? Then, again, how much did the Christian Platonists of Alexandria and St. Augustine annex of the grand philosophy of religion built up by Plato and Aristotle, and Plotinus, Proclus and the rest of the Neo-Platonists during a period which covered some eight centuries of human thought? And how much of St. Thomas Aquinas is based on the later Platonists? And how much Neo-Platonism itself, as a system of philosophy, which tried to resolve the absolute or God into the incarnation thereof in the Logos, or reason of man, and which aimed at demonstrating the graduated transition from the absolute object to the personality of man, a concretion of European and Hindu philosophy and religion so-called? If philosophy is the science of religions or things in general, if it is properly an attempt to find the absolute in the contingent, the universal in the particular, the eternal in the temporal, the real in the phenomenal, the ideal in the real, or in other words, if it is to discover, as one interprets it, the single principle that possesses within itself the capability of

transition into all existent variety and varieties, which it presupposes can be done not by induction from the transient, but by deduction from the permanent as that spiritually reveals itself in the creating mind, then the philosopher should be a man, to adopt the words of Goethe, who stations himself "in the middle (between the outer and the inner, the upper and the lower), to whom the Highest has descended and the Lowest mounted up, who is the equal and kindly brother of all." Philosophy passes the borderland as often as not of religion in its speculations. And if religion is a craving after responsibility to a Higher Power; a mode of thinking, acting and striving after God; or determining one's spiritual relationship to the unseen World; then philosophy needs must do this. Nor is philosophy mere Science either; it is something more than Science. If Science has for its province the world of phenomena, and deals exclusively with their relations, consequences and sequences; if it can never tell us what a thing really and intrinsically is, but only why it has become so; and if it can only, in other words, refer us to one inscrutable as the ground and explanation of another inscrutable, then philosophy has a function to fulfil and a role to play. Where Science is silent, there steps in Philosophy. No wonder it has been described as "divine wisdom" instilled into and inspiring a thinker's life, irrespective of the sources from which the inspiration is drawn. Religion and philosophy cannot be kept in watertight compartments any more than religion and science can be to-day. If men of $ 46 All good moral philosophy, as was said, is but a handmaid to religion."-Francis Bacon, Proficience and Advancement of Learning, Book II. Religion is the elder sister of philosophy."-W. S. Landor, Imaginary Conversations (David Hume and John Hume). Keats claimed much more for philosophy. He sang: " Philosophy will clip an Angel's wings, Conquer all mysteries by rule and line, Empty the haunted air, the gnomed mine, Unweave a rainbow." -Keats, Lumia, II. -

xiii science can invade philosophy and professing metaphysicians adopt the scientific methods and modes, there is no reason why religion and philosophy should stand divorced from each other, though they should normally function in their respective domains. What is important is that the method pursued should be scientific, for philosophy is a science, if not, indeed, as Bacon has it, the great mother of sciences. There is no need to-day to elaborate this point. But it is necessary to stress the fact that the synthesis offered by Badarayana is not only a scientifically drawn up one but has for its essence a system Schopenhauer went to the other extreme and said, "Philosophy is not science but an art "if so, it must be held to be an art based on principles. Otherwise, reasoning which fills so large a space in philosophy would be without any justification and philosophy entirely restricted to an emotional something which can neither be proved nor disproved. " There is a sharp line of demarcation separating religion and philosophy. The goal of religion is salvation and that of philosophy is truth. Yet even the most abstract type of philosophy contains a religious element, and the greater its development the faster its expansion."-Melamed in Spinoza and Buddha, Introduction, page 19. " Professor A. Wolf has recently remarked that one of the most interesting features of recent and contemporary philosophy is the renewed co-operation between men of science and philosophers". After warning against the possible "dangers" of a hasty swing of the scientific pendulum, he refers to the dangers" lurking in "the unusually friendly relationship which is loudly proclaimed to exist now between Science and the Churches". He suggests that philosophy will be in a healthier condition when it has entirely. ceased to be a handmaid to theology, and pursues its cosmic problems as independently as possible of vested interests" (loc. cit., 589-592). " " An absolute divorce between Philosophy and Theology is suggested by Bertrand Russell when he says: Philosophy cannot itself determine the end of life, but it can free us from the tyranny of prejudice and from distortions due to a narrow view." Pierre Boyle (1647-1706), author of the famous Dictionnaire Historique et Critique, maintains the impossibility of reconciling faith with reason.

of thought which has for its sheet-anchor scientific thinking. His method is strictly scientific. By the term " method is meant the path by which we arrive at a certain goal; a conscious and orderly way of doing something; a way of planning, organising and ordering one's research and thought. In the West, this problem of "method" was fought and settled, so far as natural science is concerned, some three hundred years ago, after the pioneering of Bacon, Descartes, Galileo, Boyle and others, and the settlement provided a basis on which the enormous scientific advances of ensuing centuries became possible. In social science, no such basic method yet exists. "Method. implies understanding and control. Looseness of thought and language are incompatible with it. If we understand Badarayana aright, entirely from the mould into which he has cast his Sutras, we have to postulate that to him method" seemed all-important; for without it, he could not have controlled the seeming contrariety of thought that had come to prevail in the interpretation of Vedic and Upanishadic texts and the anarchy, as it were, that had been introduced by different schools of thought (shakhas) in matters affecting the vital problems of the Brahman and the atman. That many such schools existed and had their own separate text-books which had been handed down orally from teacher to pupil for countless generations, seems not open to any doubt. A crisis had evidently been reached in philosophical thought and the necessity of controlling interpretation had become obvious. Hence the rigidly scientific manner in which Badarayana applies his mind to the method of samanvaya. Where all the texts should be given credence, scientific method, the method by which agreement can be reached, becomes all-important. He begins to question, not only texts in particular, but also the doctrines educed from them by different schools. He seeks, in a word, a basic understanding, so that chaos which was claiming mastery in the philosophical domain, may be put out of court. In the dialectics employed by him, we see he uses rules and modes of reasoning which help to clarify the philosophical

XV standpoint he wishes to vindicate and lay down in authoritative fashion. The doctrine of samanvaya, which is the science and art of co-ordination, of re-interpretation of mutually opposing texts, and of educing the highest Truth from a consideration of the fundamental teachings of all Vedantic declarations considered collectively, receives in his hands a supremacy that is undisputed. It is no exaggeration to say that of all teachers of ancient times in India, he alone attempts the scientific and methodical approach to the study of Vedic and Upanishadic texts in all their aspects and thus places the method of study itself on a pedestal that is from every point of view unassailable. The actual effect of this methodology was the restoration of order in place of chaos those who came under its mighty influence, tried to keep to it, with the result that thinking was rationalized and kept within the bounds of reason instead of running to The principle of samanvaya still holds the ground and if anything, has had extended scope given to it. Infallibility and unalterability ceased to be drags on philosophy with its increasing application. Philosophy, indeed, came into its own; it, in fact, came to be something more than a mere intellectual creed or a comforting belief. And its effect on religion was that it came to be regarded as something more than a mere system of ritual. It might, indeed, be claimed that Badarayana's method revolutionized philosophical speculation in this country, inasmuch as it found a place under its wide wings not only for the spiritual teachers who stuck to the old order of thinking but also for those seers and seekers after the truth who, while obviously outside the purview of the current schools of thought, had still reckoned themselves to be within their pale by reason of the broadening of the base of philosophical reasoning initiated by him. Intellectualism, cured of its narrow and mechanical outlook, helped to be less destructive than it would otherwise have been. Under the dominating influence of Badarayana's method, we have one all-embracing scientific standpoint, owing allegiance to that which is highest and most exalted in Upanishadic speculation, to

which all schools of thought owe obedience and respect and from which they derive their main sources of inspiration. The unification in method that has resulted has not impeded diversity in thinking, while it has helped to avoid the rise of a number of warring schools differing in their aims and working exclusively by themselves and endeavouring to exclude one another. The differing schools, as they exist to-day, owe a common allegiance to Badarayana, as much because they follow his method of reasoning as for the fact that they have to argue and co-ordinate thought on the basis laid down by him. In him they find a common meeting point and through his method they are making their own contribution to the building up of a philosophical system which can be rightly termed universal. The texts of the Vedas and the Upanishads are there; the doctrines and theories are there imbedded in them; it is only the method of co-ordinating them and interpreting them that is new. Badarayana's great contribution is that he introduces a new method, a new manner of reading the texts, and a new way of interpreting them. With the march of time, changes in view-points should naturally vary. What satisfied one could not satisfy another. The highest expression of any philosophical truth at any given time cannot but be the expression of the highest philosophical consciousness of that time. If that be so, while the older formula may be retained, the frank recognition is inevitable that they are out of date in certain respects and that they ought to be re-interpreted in such a manner as will bring them into conformity with the highest philosophical consciousness of our own time. Badarayana's perception and avowal of this fact is what makes him great in the Indian philosophical field. That is the very reason that we find no complaint against him for the departure he makes. On the other hand, there is a singular unanimity of opinion that his method is the right one and that is the reason why it has won universal approval among his successors. The fact of the matter is that as with Badarayaa, so with us, the measure of our light is always far in excess of the measure of our obedience, though this is

xvii never explicity proclaimed and all the time the legal fiction prevails that no change has been made in the position. It is thus that Badarayana's method has helped to introduce scientific order and research in the study and interpretation of the Vedas and the Upanishads. With its aid, the conclusions of the past are being continuously brought into line with the findings of the present with the result that philosophy has never languished in this country, as the rise of the successive schools of thought bears eloquent witness to; in fact, it has contributed to the building of these living schools of thought, which, whatever may be their defects, have never agreed that the principle of scientific thinking can be set aside with impunity. It is this principle too that has helped to give universality and catholicity to Upanishadic views in the world of to-day. The Sutras are there to elucidate Badarayana's position; for even without the commentators who have, each in his own way and from his own point of view, endeavoured to make known to us what they consider to be his views and opinions, there is enough in them to prove that the attitude assumed by him is demonstrably scientific. And that attitude is one that could only be postulated of one who is strictly scientific in his method. Badarayana provides, in brief, an epitome of the Upanishad doctrine in his work, which accordingly becomes the foundation of the later Vedanta. He shows that Brahman is the first principle of the universe; he proves this by Samanvaya, i.e., "from the agreement" of the Upanishad texts (I. 1. 4); and he proclaims the fundamental proposition that "all the texts of the Vedanta deserve credence", sarva-vedanta pratyayam (III. 3. 1). To Badarayana, the Vedas may be supernatural in origin and he may be held to construct his entire doctrine from them, but it is undoubted that where the meaning of a text is doubtful, he does not hesitate to call in the aid of experience to settle the sense. Inspiration and revelation give way to reason and ratiocination.* One who 4 In this he followed, as a Mimamsa teacher, the Mimamsa rule of interpretation which lays down that when two texts differ,

is in search of the first principle of the universe cannot well It was avoid being fundamentally scientific in his outlook. so with Parmanides; it was so with Plato; and it cannot well be otherwise with Badarayana, who is out to prove that the first principle of the universe is Brahman. The impression he has left on generations of scholars who have read and interpreted him has been this and there is no fear that generations of scholars yet unborn will not be impressed by the self-same fact. He throughout stresses reason rather than authority, re-interpretation rather than the blind acceptance of ancient views because they are ancient and scientific synthesis rather than a conglomerate of what seem mutually destructive texts. The Sutras, indeed, challenge with scientific precision the validity of what appear to have been popular concepts that were still-in Badarayana's time-the source of dangerous confusion to men, even to men learned in the Vedas and the Upanishads. To those trained in the exact sciences and bred up in the atmosphere of the law, where rules of interpretation demand an exactitude in their application that could only be associated with a scientifically trained mind, a study of the Sutras of Badarayana generates the feeling that they are dealing with a philosopher whose first and last concerns are scientific thinking and scientific method. He was a master in his line; he was that because his knowledge was profound and supreme.. His intellectual eminence seems unquestionable from the evidence afforded by the Sutras themselves, quite apart reason must be allowed to prevail in practice. (Yagnavalkya, *.. 21). Manu also stresses reason as the final source of authority. Where no authority is available, Manu says that atma-tushti, that which is in consonance with the reason of the virtuous, shall be allowed to prevail. According to the commentators, reason should prevail not only where a case cannot be decided by any other authority but also in cases where an option is allowed. Manu, indeed, sets down a high place to reason when he lays down the law: Let him adopt the course of action which is deemed right by pure reason" (Manu, VI. 46). 66

" " xix from the form in which they are cast. He reduced his knowledge pertaining to their subject-matter to a system; arranged it and systematised it; and gave it out with full regard to its due bearings and connections. If one who does that cannot be described as possessing a scientific mind and if the method pursued by one such cannot be described as scientific, it is impossible to see who else and what else can be so described. It may be that to some the Sutrasall Sutra literature is like that-seem conundrums but that is a different matter. To those who have had the requisite training to understand them and to follow them in the manner they should be-and all sciences require training to understand and follow them-there can be no question that they bear ample testimony to the greatness of Badarayana as a philosopher. To his philosophic mind, no circumstance, however trifling, was too minute. It was allowed its due weight and if rejected, rejected for right reasons. In him, the art of Sutra making reaches its high water-mark, the very climax of perfection. That is so because his mind was clear; his method perfect; and his matter of supreme value. If any one can be named as deserving of the special title, in the whole Indian field of philosophy, of a master-mind, there is hardly any doubt his name would be the first to be mentioned. And if any one deserved the name of philosopher, it would undoubtedly be he-for he tries in one large sweep, as it were, to account for all the phenomena of the universe by a reference to ultimate causes. is no system of thought, no school of metaphysics, and no department of theoretical knowledge known in his time that is not laid under contribution by him in the making up of his Sutras. If philosophy is the science of all known sciences and if a philosopher is one who subordinates his mind to the strict discipline of scientific principles of thinking and enunciation of matter, the Sutras of Badarayana enshrine such a philosophy and Badarayana himself-whether he wrote the Sutras himself or inspired a school of his own to do it, it does not really There

matter for this purpose-furnishes the best example of such a philosopher.³ 5 It is needless to add that Badarayana (also called Subodhayana and Vyasa) has been reckoned in Hindu literature as a pre-eminent teacher. In the Harivamsa (I. 3), we read: Jayati Parasarasunus Satyavatihridayanandano Vyasah > Yasyasyakamalagalitam vangmayam amrutam jagat pibati n Victory to Vyasa, the heart-endearing son of Parasara and Satyavati! From his lotus-like lips flowed freely the eloquent nectar (of knowledge) for the world to drink from. Ramanuja, in commencing his commentary on the Vedanta Sutras, prays :Parasaryavachassudham upanishad dugdhabdhi madhyoddhritam Samsaragni vidipana vyapagata pranatma sanjivinim · Purvacharya surakshitam bahumati vyaghatadurasthita Manitamtu nijaksharaih sumanaso bhaumah pibantvanvaham || The nectar of the teaching of Parasara's son, which was brought up from the middle of the milk-ocean of the Upanishadswhich restores to life the souls whose vital strength has departed owing to the heat of the fire of transmigratory existence-which was well guarded by the teachers of old-which was obscured by the mutual conflict of manifold opinions-may intelligent men daily enjoy that as it is now presented to them in my words." Vadirajaswamin in commencing his commentary on the Maha bharata, entitled the Lakshabharana (Mangalacharana Slokas 1 and 2), has the following: Vyasayapratimetihasarachanollasaya durvadinam i Trasayasakaraya satsu kritavisvasaya doshadvishe Bhasaya munaramya toyasadrusayasaya masevine Dasayabhayadaya Madhvaguruhridvasaya tubhyam namah Agadhavyasabodhabdhau nigudhah sabdarasayah | ● Na vivechayitum sakyah madrisair mandabuddhibhih Prakrantarthanusarena sikshasunya padasyacha > Artham kathamchidvakshyami tat kshantavyam mahatmabhih I bow down to the incomparable Vyasa who takes delight in composing Ilihasas; who makes vain argumentators tremble and exhaust themselves; who confides in the virtuous; who shuns the evil-minded ; who shines in his beautiful majestic ocean-like receptacle of Wisdom ; who blesses with his grace those who wait on him as his humble >ervants; who ever dwells in the heart of the holy teacher Madhva. In the unfathomable ocean of Vyasa's knowledge are concealed heaps of significant words; people of dull intellects like ourselves are utterly unable to distinguish between them.

xxi Badarayana's survey of the Indian philosophical field of his day results in his conclusions being set down in a series of clear-cut Sutras which are definitely of the decisive type. He looks at the philosophy of his time with the practical mind of a profound reasoner to whom philosophy is not a field for archaological research, but a living thing in the world of his day. With almost amazing knowledge and skill, he unfolds before us the ancient texts co-ordinated in such a logical manner that we see the science of Brahman rise before us in its full-fledged shape. To say that his Sutras are succinctly composed, compact in form and diction, and full of the highest philosophical import is to utter a truism. To say that they reflect a close knowledge of the Vedic and Upanishadic teachings of his time and a capacious yet sensitive mind, is to admit the bare truth. And to say that they represent his conclusions with a directness. that, under a deep passion for order, precision and planning, a deep love for Humanity troubled with vital issues. of Being and Becoming, is to confess the obvious. No more enduring monument can be thought for him than to understand aright his method and his plan as they are laid down for us in his magnificent work. Badarayana is famous for the economy of words practised by him in the evolving of his Sutras. To Badarayana even a letter had a value of its own. He would not use it, if he thought it unnecessary; he could do without it." What we have to more particularly admire in regard to the Sutras is the order which controls them, the choice of Having no teacher to guide us, we explain with great difficulty, by a reference to continuity of thought and agreeably to the context. We therefore pray that the vastly learned will forgive us our shortcomings. " In Chapter X of the Bhagavad-Gita, in which the best of everything is mentioned, Sri Krishna says: Of the sages also I am Vyasa." (X. 37.) 6 16 " a son A saying in Sanskrit goes: A writer rejoices as much in the saving of half a short vowel as he would in the birth of a son being, according to Hindu ideals of life, an absolute necessity for the salvation of a man.

the doctrines and theories selected by him as fundamental to the position assumed by him-for he has by no means exhausted all, though he has hinted at most of them and dealt only with those which are really primal in character and the varied but suggestive argumentation, producing conviction now by starting from causes, now by going back to facts, and now again by referring to texts, but always unassailable, irrefutable, exact and scientific in spirit. He is almost mathematical in his thought, in fact Euclidean in his method. What shall we mention as his special merit-his faculty for constant co-ordination, economy, orderliness, or the force with which he establishes every point? If one adds to or takes from it, he will recognize that he departs thereby from science, thus tending towards error. What is most difficult in each science is to choose and dispose in suitable order the elements from which all the rest may be derived. Whatever the case with others, Badarayana has neither increased his first principles nor diminished them; neither has he abridged his proofs nor has he enlarged them indefinitely. In a treatise of the kind contemplated by him-convenient, catchy, topically arranged texts, easy of remembrance as Euclid's definitions, postulates and axioms-it was necessary to avoid everything superfluous, to combine everything that might be deemed essential, to consider principally, clearly and briefly all that might be held fundamental, to give propositions their most general form for, as a teacher, he should have realized that the detail of teaching particular cases only makes the acquisition of knowledge more difficult. Badarayana's purpose in composing his Sutras cannot have been, by any means, the writing of an encyclopadia of philosophy, which was obviously impossible in the limits he set to himself, but rather to offer to mature thinkers an introduction to the study of the method of reasoning to be adopted generally in regard to the interpretation of texts of the Upanishads, which, in its turn, was to prove a necessary preparation for the science of Brahman as worked out in them. Hence the particular emphasis Badarayana lays on

xxiii formal and logical method as well as the deliberate omission, except by implication, of all practical applications. He has, indeed, helped towards the construction of a logic (Brahma-tarkah) which has proved the best conceivable method of effective inquiry. On an analysis, it would be found to be one which, without breach of continuity, can be applied as much to belief on the one hand as to metaphysics on the other. He primarily aims at the flawless logical derivation of all philosophical propositions from premises stated in advance. Making necessary allowance for undoubted and, in some cases, serious uncertainty of text, it might be broadly remarked that the great historical significance of Badarayanas Sutras consists in the fact that through them the ideal of a flawless logical treatment of Upanishadic texts was first attempted to be transmitted to future times. As to the manner in which Badarayana executed his work, it must be admitted that it is throughout well done, though from our modern standpoint we may think that too much is expected from the student. But we should remember it was not intended for the beginner but for the mature student of the Upanishads. It presumes a close knowledge of and a constant reference to the Vedas, the Upanishads, the Purvamimamsa, the whole of the Sutra literature generally, including the A pastamba, the Gautama and the Nyaya Sutras, the Smritis generally, including Manu and Yagnavalkya, and the Puranas, including the Vishnu-Purana, and the epics, including the doctrines familiarized later by the BhagavadGita, Panini, etc. Details of importance are accordingly omitted, and the uncertainties of the text render more difficult in some places the intentions of Badarayana. But the whole development of ideas is natural, easy and impressive to a degree and makes understanding of the view-point assumed possible, which would have been infinitely more difficult in other circumstances. This is so because Badarayana had before him in one conspectus, as it were, the whole position envisaged by him, from first to last. But it must be confessed, though such a confession cannot mean any reflection

on the author of the Sutras, that his great emphasis on the logical renders it difficult to understand the subjectmatter as a whole, and its internal relations, especially to one who has not had the requisite previous training in the study of the Upanishads. The Sutras will remain for all time the best and if one may assert without claiming over much for them, the only perfect model of logical exactness of principles and of rigorous development of propositions. The science of Brahman as developed by Badarayana in his Sutras may be capable of endless disputation as to what it connotes-that depends on our interpreter-but it cannot be improved upon from the point of view of the technique from which it is built up. If one would like to see how such a science can be constructed and developed to its highest stage from an extremely limited number of simple definitions and propositions, by means of rigorous syllogism, which at no time seeks any aid except what is derivable from the Upanishads and one's own reasoning faculty, one must turn to Badarayana's Sutras. Their universally admired perfection must be set down by the philosophical historian as the natural result of a long criticism which was developed in the constructive. period of Indian philosophy ranging from the Vedic sages to Kapila, to whom the Sankhya system is attributed. Badarayana's method of reasoning has, since his time, left its permanent impress on his successors. After him, began a series of great commentators, who have fully illustrated, despite the differences between them, the real significance of the illustrious Teacher's methods. and principles, by means of which they themselves tried to interpret and conquer the paradoxes concerning the Brahman. The fact that there has been no synthetic movement in the domain of Upanishadic philosophy since his time suggests the obvious inference that Badarayana has not been exhausted by his commentators and commentators on commentators. The make-up of the Sutras has, however, been vigorously assailed by modern Western critics, or rather by critics trained in the Western school of thought. To

XXV say that he is "amibguous" or that he is unintelligible, cryptic or difficult is to confess lack of understanding on our own part. The merit of a Sutra is its flexibility; it should be capable of interpretation and re-interpretation. Where metaphysical speculation is active, no philosophical conception can remain stationary. If it was capable of growth, it was transformed and allowed to grow. This process of re-interpretation was rendered possible in India because of the succession of great seers and philosophers who dominated its life since the Vedic days. The process went on as much, indeed, on the Hindu legal and ritual sides as on the philosophical. No school of thought which makes this right of re-interpretation impossible can hope to survive, much less prove a leader in philosophical speculation. Without it, intellectual growth is impossible; and every limiting of it means the crippling of philosophical development and restricting the study of philosophy to mediocres and traditionalists, which means the ultimate barring of the growth of ideas. On the other hand, if the function of reinterpretation is clearly understood, then the difficulty of understanding the Sutras will largely vanish. The manysidedness (visvato mukhah) that is stressed as one of the prime characteristics of a Sutra means no more than that it should afford full scope for interpretation-scientific, consistent and co-ordinated and not arbitrary, meaningless. and self-destructive. Both the Purva and Uttara Mimamsas deal primarily with the principles of interpretation, which evidently had long been in vogue. Jaimini, the reputed author of the Purva Mimamsa, is mentioned by Badarayana, while Badarayana is himself mentioned by Jaimini. They probably were contemporaries (third century B.C.). Jaimini set down the rules of interpretation to be followed in regard to ritual, while Badarayana laid down those that should regulate the interpretation of conflicting Upanishadic texts. That Jaimini's methodology was capable of a wider application, as much in the ritual as in the philosophical region, was demonstrated by Badarayana. The method itself was much s F

older than Jaimini and Badarayana, being traceable to the Brahmanas but these, among others," perfected it and set them down in their respective domains in authoritative fashion. In Badarayana's hands, the method, perhaps, attained its widest scope and highest perfection, dealing as it did with philosophical speculations enshrined in the Aranyakas and the Upanishads. It was said of Plato that philosophy did not find him noble, it made him so. In the case of Badarayana, it may be said that philosophy found him noble and left him nobler. It was not the path of the passions which led him to philosophy but the patient search after Truth. And that pursuit led him to a conception of Truth which was all-embracing. And if he taught by his example, he but illustrated the great saying that the true Teacher does not teach but only tells. And what is Philosophy to him as gleaned from the Sutras which bear his name? To him, in his calm and serene light, philosophy is not doubt. It is positive, provable and proved knowledge. It is to him a body of methodized essential Truth, whose single aim is the absolute understanding of the Self and its place in the universe-the very highest it is or can attain to. To vary the language, philosophy is to him as thorough a knowledge as can be acquired of man and his nature, his genesis and environment, and his relationship to what surrounds him and to what is above and beyond him. It is, however, something more than mere moral duty done or religious sanction obeyed. It is the perfect life; for, in the perfected understanding which to him is philosophy, he suggests is the only possible satisfaction of human nature. "Know Brahman-Become Brahman. " 7 Badari and Atreya, for instance, are mentioned both by Jaimini and Badarayana in their respective Sutras. Labukayana, Aitasayana, etc., are others named by Jaimini. " 8 Cf. texts of the Upanishads like the following which are the staple food of commentators on Badarayana :-' Brahmavidapnoli param"; Tamevam viditva atimrutyumeti "; Brahmaveda Brahmaiva bhavati"; Yada pasyah pasyate rugmavarnam"; "Mano Brahmetyupasita", etc., which may be rendered thus: He who knows Brahman reaches the Highest "; Having known Him thus " $1 "

xxvii That is the way to perfect life. This theory of philosophy which makes complete knowledge the ideal life, is developed by him in the Sutras as the direct result of his personal experience. The tone that dominates the Sutras shows that they are the work of a person who has passed through the stress of the struggle indicated in them-of choosing between opposing views, of weeding out rejected opinions and of selecting approved doctrines-and attained peace. And here Badarayana touches on the kernel of the problem of Truth. Philosophy had made great progress since the days of the Vedas and the Upanishads. The Vedic speculations-as found in the latest hymns of the Rig-Veda and in the Atharva-Veda-on the origin of the world and on the eternal principle by which it is created and sustained, had undergone great change under the influence of philosophical ideas. The cosmogonic legends of the Yajur-Veda-describing how the creator brings into being all things by means of the omnipotent sacrifice had also been deeply affected by the philosophic thinking that is enshrined for us in the earlier Upanishads. The idealistic turn that philosophy took in both the later hymns of the Vedas and in the earlier Upanishads was not, however, left undisputed. Beside it grew an empirical school, which about 600 B.C., threw out the two great religious systems of Buddhism and Jainism, which though offshoots of Upanishadic thought, were still independent in their outlook. The Upanishads thus gave scope for different schools of thinking with the result that a number of them, which in later times theorists included under the well-known nine systems of thought, had come into existence at least as early as the sixth century B.C. The chaos that had been introduced into the Upanishadic philosophy may thus be imagined until Badarayana, three centuries later, tried " " " he passes beyond Death"; "He knows Brahman, he becomes. He who knows this shines, warms Brahman"; ; Let him meditate on mind as Brahman," etc., etc. (Taittiriya-upanishad , I. 1. ; Sveta. Upa., III. 8; Mundaka-upanishad , III. 2. 9; Ibid., III. 1. 3 ; Chchandogya-upanishad , III. 18. 1, etc.)

to restore order into it. Another three more centuries were required to systematise the resultant teachings in manuals which to-day remain the main repositories of their doctrines. The contrast between the Vedic times, which believed in an universe full of gods and mythical forms and the Sankhya, which postulates the absolute distinction between soul and matter and the twin systems of Vaiseshika and Nyaya which explain the origin of the world from atoms shows vividly the gulf that separated the earlier from the later thought. The spirit of free inquiry, however, was not by any means confined only to the schools of philosophers; there is reason to believe that teachers like Buddha and Mahavira tried to extend it to the masses by the zeal they displayed in the propagation of their ideas. This was inevitable, especially as views of life and religion are deepened and broadened by criticism, reflection and re-thinking. The zeal for critical investigation was, if the Sutras of Badarayana are evidence of anything, intense, and extended to metaphysical problems of every kind, including those concerning life hereafter. The coming of philosophy foreshadowed in the Vedic theogonies and cosmogonies was fully realized. In the systems of philosophy associated with the names of Mahavira and Buddha, the tendency to independent thinking receives its fullest development. The conscious effort is made to understand the meaning of the cosmos; system after system is offered to clear up the riddle of the universe; many are the metaphysicians-some mentioned by Badarayana himself who tried to solve the mysteries of being and becoming; the chief objects of interest were what is man, what is his place in nature and what becomes of him. Teacher after teacher tried to reach definite conclusions on these great questions which have eternally agitated this mundane world by conclusions reached in the metaphysical region. The age-sixth to third century B.C.-was undoubtedly one of enlightenment. It developed individualism. Authority was at a discount. The critical habit of mind, indeed, tended, with the undoubted good it did, to end in intellectual sterility, if not, in practical subjectivism. One

xxix man's opinion was as good as that of another. Scepticism thus reigned supreme in the land. Discipline had lost its sway. But conservatism of the old type was not dead in the land. It found expression in writers like Jaimini, who opposed the new thought and tried to tighten the grip of the ancient order of things. The exponents of the new age were both intrepid and wise. They travelled and propagated their doctrines and attracted attention everywhere. But as their earnestness showed signs of abatement, the desire to merely outshine in debate mastered them. This eventually led to their downfall. But for the time being the set-back that philosophy received was very real. The critical spirit, which philosophy itself had helped to develop, began to affect adversely all metaphysical thinking. Philosophical speculation thus came into temporary disrepute, the more so as no two thinkers seemed disposed to agree on the question of the essence of reality. But this could not and did not, in fact, continue for any length of time. It was soon discovered that while criticism was necessary for developing sound metaphysical conceptions, it had its limits. While the appeal to reason seemed justifiable in itself, it was realized it lost its value if it did not use it in a constructive spirit. The new disputants no doubt brought philosophy from the heavens above to the abodes of men below on the earth and turned the attention from external nature to man himself. But they little saw the universal element in man. They made more of the differences. in human judgments than of the agreements between them. They stressed more the accidental and the subjective elements in human knowledge than the objective, the principles which command universal acceptance. However this may be, their very criticism of knowledge led to a more serious study of the problem of knowledge. This, in fact, forced philosophy to examine the thinking process itself and paved the way for a theory of knowledge. In a word, the new movement awakened thought and challenged philosophy and the life based on it and compelled them to justify

It became imperative to go back to What first principles to build on more secure foundations. is knowledge? What is truth? What is right? What is the cosmos? And what is man's place in it? These are the questions philosophers like Jaimini and Badarayana set themselves to answer.⁹ Badarayana considered it his first duty to address himself to the challenge of the new movement, which, in undermining knowledge, threatened almost the very basis of being, of ethics and of society. To him, philosophical reflection was the most necessary and "practical of duties to be performed, if scepticism was not to rule supreme in the land and nihilism to attain the upper hand in social conduct. He perceived more clearly than any of his contemporaries that the ethical fallacies and philosophical errors of the new movement arose from a gross misconception of the meaning of truth. To him, it was clear that the key to the problem of truth lay in knowledge. If the new movement denied the possibility of knowledge, it was up to him to demonstrate that in knowledge lay the secret it had missed. With this firm conviction and with even firmer faith in the power of human reason to meet the exigencies of the situation, he started on his work. His aim appears to have been as much the construction of a system of philosophy as to fill men's minds with the love of truth, of virtue and of the knowledge which could, in his opinion, enable them to think right, in order that they may live right. His aim was not less practical than speculative; he was as much intent on the correct method of acquiring knowledge as in constructing a theory of such a method. He was as much offering a theory as practising a method, which, by living it himself, he bade others to adopt. A careful analysis of his first four Sutras, on which his whole teaching may be said 9 Jaimini's first Sutra (I. 1. 1) is: Athato Dharmajijnasa, while Badarayana's (I. 1. 1) is: Athato Brahmajijnasa. Jijnasa is literally the desire to know. While Jaimini starts with an enquiry into what is duty, Badarayana begins with an enquiry into what is knowledge, the knowledge of Brahman, the highest knowledge.

xxxi to be based, shows this in more simple fashion than a written volume could. In the first, he stresses, as against the prevailing contradictory views and opinions, the need for a knowledge of the Brahman, the highest knowledge, which will open the key to the truth of being and becoming, of cosmos and man, and of here and hereafter. Then, in the second Sutra he answers the question what is Brahman? i.e., he suggests it is that which gives us knowledge of creation, i.e., of the cosmos. In the third, he refers to the source of knowledge, and throws down the hint that Sastra (Scripture) 10 forms the source. Lest you should run away with the idea that the very contradictions he condemns, cannot be the source of knowledge, he lays down in the fourth Sutra the proposition that true knowledge is to be sought in agreement, not in contradiction. Badarayana concedes, as it were, the fact that it is difficult to know the truth. But he suggests, that it can be. Every stray opinion, he says, is not truth. If it is natural to differ, to hold contradictory opinions and to put view against view-it is equally easy to sift these opposing thoughts and clear the ground. It is indeed our duty to clear up our ideas, to grasp the real meaning of the terms we employ, to define definitely our notions and to know precisely what we are trying to interpret or to formulate. We should have reason too, to support our views. We should try to prove our propositions; we should put our views to the test, verify them by the facts we can gather, weigh them scrupulously and impartially, and finally educe the truth. Think before you theorize. The Sankhyas, Nayayikas, Vaiseshikas, Madhyamikas, Charvakas and the rest of them may each " 10 Sastra here means the eternal Veda, not any written text. The source of knowledge is knowledge itself. As Sankara expressively puts it, the origin of a body of scripture possessing the quality of omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself." See Sankara, Brahma-Sutra, I. 1. 3. That is knowledge which helps you to know Brahman; if you know Brahman, you have the means to test Truth itself. The Truth cannot be known by perception alone; the super-sensuous is beyond perception, deduction, inference, I. 1.3.

" It is put forth their own views;¹¹ these may differ from one another; may contradict each other; some of these may even deny truth, or say they know it not, or suggest that one view is as good as another. This, opines Badarayana, is not right. If there is diversity of thought, it is our duty to see whether in the very conflict of opinions that is perceived there may not be agreement, some common ground on which all can stand, some principle to which every school of thought can subscribe or agree. To evolve such universalized propositions was the aim and object of Badarayana. That was the sole purpose of his methodthe method of Samanvaya. If the Socratic method was "an ingenious method of cross-examination to evolve certain generalizations of perfect validity, the Samanvaya method was the double-distillate of a critical method employed to arrive at the indisputable truth. the method of orderly development of ideas, of propositions, of Truth. So skilful is its handling by Badarayana that, if the early commentators are any guide, of what he meant and if the text of his Sutras is any evidence of his his method, the opponents of Truth are soon seen to oppose each other, himself seeming to know no more of the proposition disputed than either or all of them, yet, all the while quietly driving them, as the shepherd does his lost sheep, into his own fold. Such is the force of the Samanvaya irony that we see Badarayana often acting as though he knew less than those whom he makes participants in his discussions. He raises most of the questions when he knows precisely how they stand. No wonder that the disputants saw their notions and theories shaping themselves. before their very eyes into propositions of invulnerable Truth. Badarayana had not learned the art of a Vyasa¹² for nothing. If Badarayana had his chronicler, as Socrates 12 11 These are among the very schools considered, according to the commmentators, by Badarayana in I. 1. 1 to I. 1. 1-4. 1% 61 Literally an arranger. He was called Vyasa, the arranger", because he is supposed to have arranged the Vedas in their present form.

xxxiii had his own in Xenophon to describe his method, we would perhaps have had many a young Euthydemus confessing his ignorance before him. But it is, perhaps, not wholly a misfortune that he had none such, for the Sutras would then have lost their value to us not a little. The very cast of these Sutras shows that before beginning an argument, he set down a proposition or propositions of which the truth had to be generally acknowledged. Thus, he not only laid a sure foundation for his reasoning but also was sure of assent to it from all sides. That is just what might be expected from the expounder of the samanvaya method, a method that made it possible to form one's reasoning on points acknowledged by all who could reason rationally. Tattu samanvayat: That (the Truth) can be reached only by the method of reasoning. The leaders To Badarayana, then, knowledge is possible. Truth, according to him, can be attained; only we must follow the right method. We must define our terms correctly; we must go back to first principles; we must adhere to orderly treatment; and we must see to it that agreement is sought out as between opposing views. Knowledge has to do with the universal and the typical, not with the particular and the accidental. The new Schools failed to realize this fundamental issue, and went wrong. Badarayana set them right and pointed the way to the realization of Truth. In doing this, he did the greatest service to philosophy and to humanity as well. of the new movement failed to note that Truth is manysided; that it will not do for a man to say that what he feels is right is right even for himself, or what he perceives is truth is truth even for himself. They failed to grasp the essential fact that there is such a thing as universal good; a thing that all rational creatures recognize and accept when they come to think the problem out in all its bearings. Badarayana suggests that there is such a thing as the good and the truth, the good or the truth for which all else is good or true, the highest good, the highest truth. Knowledge, he says, is the highest good-knowledge of the

Brahman. That is the knowledge you should seek for, inquire or pursue the highest knowledge. And the highest knowledge is not only true happiness here but also in the hereafter. Hence he starts his work with the famous declaration-Athato Brahmajijnasa: Then therefore the enquiry into Brahman, i.e., an enquiry that will enable you to know the Truth you are desirous of. If you know Brahman, you know the Truth. Badarayana not only laid down the correct method of acquiring knowledge, but he also evolved a theory of such a method. He not only offered a theory but also practised it. He was, in a word, a Socrates and a Plato rolled into one. He taught by his example both the theory and the practice of it. He coupled his theory of knowledge with the ultimate nature of being, and correlated their study by making them interdependent. Knowledge is of little use if it has no reference to reality; and reality is meaningless if it is not based on knowledge. Being has no meaning if it is not related to Becoming; and Becoming is impossible without Being. Badarayana interweaves the ideas of Being and Becoming, the one into the texture of the other; he interlocks the two concepts in a manner that makes his successors wrestle with his text in a hundred ways to distill out his intended meaning. In the later stages, perhaps, some of these exaggerated the dialectical phase of his teaching and revelled in many kinds of subtleties. That was due to the training they had had in other fields of study. There is hardly any doubt that Badarayana himself never intended it, for we have clear indications in the methodology elaborated by him that he was against such hairsplitting. The doctrine of samanvaya limits such a iendency.¹³ 13 Good examples illustrative of this limitation are to be seen in, for instance, Ramanuja's commentary on IV. 3. ; IV. 4. 4; IV. 4. 12. These may be taken as fair but random examples of the method of Samanvaya enunciated by Badarayana. Of course, examples of this kind abound in the comments of the other equally great commentators.

XXXV This apart, Badarayana stands out as the chief reconstructor of the philosophic thought of his age. He gave out the correct method of acquiring knowledge; he outlined a theory of knowledge, and he elaborated a theory of the cosmos. He employed the art of samanvaya to evolve the truth. But for the help he received from it, he would hardly have been able to produce the wonderful synthesis he has presented us with. From first to last, it is conceived in a manner which shows not merely mastery in the art of reasoning but also discloses the theory of the method he employed to reach the Truth. The logical operations which enable him to do this are laid bare before us. Indeed, he lets us into the secret of his logic. There is no mistaking the development of his thought, his reasoning and his objective. The great point about him is he shows not merely how to reason but also how he himself arrives at the conclusions he does. He shows by the method he adopts that the problem of knowledge cannot be solved without understanding the system of harmony and order that marks the cosmos. He leads you on step by step-Sutra by Sutra, if you likeand demonstrates that to know reality is to know Brahman.14 But "knowing" other things is not the same as ' knowing" Brahman. You may "know" the empirical sciences but yet not "know Brahman.15 What is an aid as regards knowledge in the world of sense may prove a snare in regard to knowledge of Brahman. Knowledge of empirical reality may, indeed, become an actual hindrance to the knowledge of Brahman. Sense-perception would not lead you to Brahman. The world of forms, names and works veils the Brahman.10 Amritam satyena channam, the immortal (Brahman) is veiled by the (empirical) reality-the word satyam here signifies the reality of experience.17 The Atman is truth, he should be seen, heard, comprehended, reflected upon" Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , II. 2. 45; The Self that we should search for and endeavour to know." Chchandogya-upanishad , VII. 7. 1. 14" " 15 Chchandogya-upanishad , VII. 1. 2. 16 Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , I. 6. 3. ·་ 1 17 Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , I. 6. 3. Parmenides and Plato affirmed that the knowledge of the world of sense was mere deception.

10 Brahman is the satyasya satyam 18 -the reality of reality. Interpreted with reference to the context, this means that the vital spirits (together with the worlds, Gods, and living creatures, as may be inferred from what precedes) are the reality, and Brahman is their reality. 1 He is the actual reality of the so-called reality. Only of Him is there knowledge, all else is not knowledge. It is only of Him, that a real knowledge is possible. 20 All other knowledgeincluding the four Vedas and the empirical sciencesis "mere name" (nama eva). Narada, who was well versed in such knowledge, finds himself in darkness, from which he is delivered first by the knowledge of Brahman. 21 True knowledge thus is only of Brahman, knowledge that rests upon experience being mere ignorance. Ignorance is the fleeting, knowledge is the eternal: ksharam tu avidya hi amritam tu vidya." Here knowledge is the "eternal" in the sense that it is an object of knowledge. The goal of ignorance is pleasure (preyas), the goal of knowledge is salvation (sreyas). Those in pursuit of the former say "this is the world" (ayam loko), and deluded by the troop of pleasures aimlessly tramp hither and thither like blind men led by comrades blind as they themselves, while the latter direct their attention to gain knowledge, with their gaze on another world. If you desire, then, to know reality, you should know Brahman; if you know Brahman, you know the essence of reality. To know the oneness, the completeness, the comprehensiveness of Brahman is the all-important taskthat is, the task that Badarayana sets himself to in the very first Sutra. What follows is a development of the idea that The Brahman can be known only when the world-order is realized and the method of knowing it is clearly grasped. 18 Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , II. 1. 20. 19 Chchandogya-upanishad , II. 4. 7-9. 20 Chchandogya-upanishad , VI. 1. 3. 21 Chchandogya-upanishad , VII. 26. 2. 22 Sveta. Upa., V. I. Compare with Plato who held the view that only the eternal is an object of knowledge.

xxxvii No wonder that Badarayana before he has finished with the fourth Sutra, has developed in characteristic fashion a universal system that is fully illustrative of his method. The harmony and order that governs the cosmos should guide your understanding of it. That is knowledge that helps you to do this and that is reality that you reach by its aid. the His The Badarayana stressed, as no body did in his time, importance of the problem of knowledge for a correct understanding of the philosophy of Brahman. dialectics is the natural result of his love of truth. form in which he has cast the third Sutra (I. 1. 1) Sastrayonitvat shows he rejects the position that perception can lead to knowledge. 23 No known kind of perception can lead to the Brahman; neither can inference help us in the matter; nor even can the generic way of induction afford any assistance. Propositions based on perception or inference would thus prove fallacious. Hence the dictum in the Sutra that the Brahman is not cognizable by any other means of proof but solely by a reference to the Sastra, which, as has been remarked, stands here not for any written text but for what is the eternal truth in its widest. sense interpreted with the aid of the doctrine of Samanvaya.24 This leads on to the fourth Sutra which lays down the doctrine itself. If perception does not help us to reality, then true knowledge cannot be reached through its aid. What rests on mere feeling, on mere self-persuasion or perception is thus no knowledge. True knowledge, then, can be reached only on reasoning, reasoning that can help to make certainty doubly sure. Such reasoning is attained to by the method of Samanvaya on which is based the art of BrahmaTarka, the logic that helps knowledge to authenticate 23 See Ramanuja's Sri-Bhashya, I. 1. 3. 24 Chchandogya-upanishad , VIII. 1. 5 and VIII. 7. 1-3; "He (the Self) desires. the truth and wills the truth." Compare with Purvamimamsa III. 4. 12 and III. 5. 21. Ramanuja commenting on I. 1. 3 makes the Mimamsaka objector say that the "Sastra has a meaning only. in so far as it relates to what has not been already arrived at".

itself; helps to make it know it is knowledge. 25 It is only love of truth that can lead you to this: you should desire the truth and you should will the truth. The contemplation of the Truth will lead you to the realization of Truth. But the process is the process of reasoning having an all-round regard to every thing relevant. Thus the love of truth is the rockbottom foundation of the doctrine of Samanvaya. It is the love of truth that impels us to jijnasa; this to dialetics; and dialetics to the rejection of perception as a source of knowledge; this leads us from the particular to the general. The method of Samanvaya, then, is made up of two parts: first, putting together of particulars in one idea; and second, in making the idea yield the generalization. Correct reasoning is possible only on this basis. With such reasoning we pass from concept to concept, particularising or generalising, 27 analysing or synthesizing as we proceed. But such reasoning would be of no avail if it did not aim at true knowledge. And true knowledge should have reference to the highest aim of man-the knowledge of the Brahman, knowledge which assures felicity, happiness and final absolution. That is the end of true knowledge; that has connection with the highest aim of man, that is, the highest objective aimed at by him. Knowledge that has no reference to it is not knowledge. Man is thus the measure of all things, of all truth; because there lie hidden in the innermost recesses of his soul certain universal principles, concepts or ideas, 25 He (the Self) desires the truth and wills the truth. Chch. Uba., VIII. I. 1. 5. 26 Cf. "Verily, my dear one, the self has to be seen.... has to be steadily maditated upon." Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , II. 4. 5., "He (the Self) has sought after, He has to be specially desired and known". Chchandogya-upanishad , VIII. 7. 1, etc. 27 Ramanuja has made the acute observation in concluding his commentary on I. 1. 4. that if reasoning-based on Upanishadic texts-does not lead to reality, "then," he says, "although they give rise to the (conceptual) knowledge of the Brahman, there would be (to those passages) no finality in utility."

xxxix which form, as it were, the starting-point of all his knowledge. Such principles or concepts, thus, do not have their origin in sense-experience. Particular circumstances may be the means of bringing to consciousness such a principle or notion, which ab initio has existed in the soul. 28 When the principle or notion has been thus developed, other principles or notions may be deduced from it, and thus we would be enabled to end in reaching certain knowledge. Plato puts forth a similar theory of knowledge but he does not show why the individual soul should implicitly carry with it the principle or notion or how any circumstance can help bring it to its consciousness. Badarayana offers the explanation that because the individual soul is the Brahman itself. Until we reach modern times-the period marked by Spinoza's advent-we do not hear of an explanation in Western philosophy which approximates that of Badarayana. 29 If Badarayana postulates a metaphysical doctrine-the doctrine of the Brahman-for proof of the validity of knowledge, Plato does the same by appealing to his worldview. Plato's world-view is based on his doctrine of ideas, ideas or forms being not mere thoughts in the minds of men or even in the mind of God, for even divine thought is dependent on them. He conceives them as existing in and substantial forms, existing for themselves. They are 3) 66 Cf. Having " ; The one The one God 28 This would seem to follow from the doctrine of the Brahman. See II. 1. 15; for, according to it, it is Brahman itself which constitutes the individual soul; Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of the individual soul in all living bodies. entered into them with living Self" (Chchandogya-upanishad , VI. God hidden within all beings" (Svetasvatara-upanishad , VI. 11); entered in many places"; "That Self hidden in all beings does not shine forth" (Kath. Upa., I. 3. 12); There is no other seer but he"; (Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , III. 3. 23), etc. The many individual souls are the reflection of the one Brahman. They are liable to impurity" because of their limiting adjuncts." " 29 See II. 3. 42, Amsonana vyapadesat, etc. The commentary of Anandatirtha will be found interesting in this connection from the purely dualistic point of view. See his commentary on the whole of the Adhikarana entitled Amsadhikarana.

prior to things and apart from them, independent of them and uninfluenced by the changes to which they are subject. The forms too are numberless, though they constitute a well-ordered world. The idea of the good is the supreme; it is the source of all the rest. Unity therefore includes plurality; in the intelligible or ideal world, as Parmenides said, there is no unity without plurality and no plurality without unity. Plato's universe is thus a logical system of ideas, forming an organic spiritual unity, governed by a universal purpose, the idea of the good. It is accordingly a natural moral whole. Its meaning cannot be grasped by the senses, which perceives only its imperfect and fleeting reflections and never rise to a vision of the perfect and abiding whole. How is the ideal world related to the real? What is meant by the statement that the particular objects in nature are copies of ideas? How can the pure and perfect, changeless principle be responsible for the incomplete and ever changing world of sense? To answer this, Plato develops a philosophy of nature which is redolent of pluralism. According to him, there is another principle, which is everything that idea is not, and to which sensuous existence owes its imperfections. This principle-designated by Aristotle as Platonic "matter "-forms the basis of the phenomenal world. It is, as such, the raw material upon which the forms are somehow impressed. It is perishable, unreal and imperfect-non-being; whatever reality, form, or beauty the perceived world has, it owes to ideas. Plato thus needs such principle besides the idea to account for our world of sense, or nature, which is not a mere illusion of the senses, but an order of a lower rank than the changeless ideal realm. This substratum, untouched by the ideal principle, is conceived of as devoid of all qualities-formless, undefinable, unperceptible. It is non-being, not in the sense of being non-existent but in the sense of having a lower order of existence. The sensible world partakes of a measure of reality or being, in so far as it takes on form. Ideas, thus, are somehow responsible, according to Plato, for all the reality things possess. They owe their being to the

xli 30 presence of ideas, to the participation of the latter in them. At the same time, the substratum-non-being-is responsible for the diversity and imperfection of the many different objects bearing the same name. Non-being is, as Zeller remarks, a second kind of causality, the causality of a blind, irrational necessity. There are thus two principles, mind and matter, of which mind is the true reality, the thing of most worth, that to which everything owes its form and essence, the principle of law and order in the universe. While the other element, matter, is secondary, a dull irrational recalcitrant force, the unwilling slave of mind, which somehow, but imperfectly, takes on the impress of mind. Form is the active cause, matter is the co-operative cause. Since the world of ideas is identical with the good, the non-ideal must be evil. If we had to label this part of the Platonic system, we should call it, with Thilly, dualism.³ Plato makes no attempt to bridge the gulf that exists. between mind and matter. Badarayana, though he also falls back on metaphysics for his explanation, connects the two by his doctrine of Brahman, and makes his philosophy of nature-unlike Plato-a consistent, scientific, logical whole. Unlike Plato, too, Badarayana does not trench on the mythical ground for explaining the origin of nature. Aristotle's reconstruction of Plato's theory was, indeed, intended to remove the inconsistencies inherent in it and to make it scientific and logical.31 But Plato, it must be confessed, at various points, approximates to Upanishadic views. Thus, his theory, that all knowledge is reminiscence, by which he teaches that the soul somehow possesses ideas prior to its contact with the world of experience, that it has viewed such ideas before but has forgotten them, that the imperfect copies of ideas in the world of sense bring back its past, reminding it, as it were, of what it has been before, comes as near as may be to the doctrine of purvapragna, which is imbedded in the doctrine of 30 Frank Thilly, History of Philosophy, 66. Thilly's account is both lucid and critical. 81 Thilly, loc. cit., 75-76. D F

Similarly Plato's explanation of how the pure rational soul happens to unite with a body, is, apart from the mythical parts of it, based to some extent on the doctrine of transmigration, derived through Pythagorean sources. But here too, his theory of knowledge is overburdened by his mythical ideas and it is found unequal to the demands made on it. To Badarayana, then, sense-perception is no source of knowledge. The truth is beyond it. And to reach it, he stresses the art of Samanvaya reasoning. Within its framework, he combines and transforms the teachings of the philosophers who thought before him and during his own. times. With the Sankhyas he agrees that being is plural; with Patanjali, that mind is the means of salvation; with Jaimini, that knowledge is uncreated and eternal; with the Vedantists that being is one and indivisible and like a mirage unperceivable; with the Nayayikas, that perception, inference and deduction are means of knowledge, though not exclusively so; with the Vaiseshikas, that a strict classification of ideas is necessary for knowledge; with the Charvakas, that matter is real; with the Bauddhas, that the universe of (appearances) is momentarily fluxional; with the Jainas, that continued existence cannot be disputed; with nearly all rational thinkers, that the world is governed by harmony and order. Whether he owed anything to his predcessors or not, 3³ there can be no question that his system represents the high water-mark of Upanishadic interpretation of his time and a crown of glory to his reasoning powers. 33 Whatever the case with the classical tradition of Christian philosophy, which passes among Roman Catholic 82 Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , IV. 4. 2-6; III. 2. 13. The chief text of the doctrine of transmigratian is Chchandogya-upanishad , V. 3-10, which may be compared with Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , VI. 2. 33 Deussen thinks he did. He says: "It was undoubtedly on the foundation of older and earlier works that Badarayana formally undertook an epitome of Upanishad doctrine in the Brahmasutras ; the four.dation of the later Vedanta." See Philosophy of the Upanishads, 27.

xliii scholars as philosophia perennis, the perennial philosophy which Dean Inge, in his latest lectures, 34 speaks of as not merely the only possible Christian philosophy but is the only system which will be found ultimately satisfying, philosophical writers in India have given the widest vent to their views and critiques of existing or extinct systems of thought in a manner which, if it is not putting it too high, has wrung admiration from Western scholars. Commentators on synthetic philosophy of the kind evolved by Badarayana have filled a useful role and have helped to advance, not retard, the progress of philosophy in India. But for the tradition created by them, we would have lost not only a Sankara, a Ramanuja and an Anandatirtha but a whole host of others who have modelled themselves on them and their predecessors. The best part of their thinking-hard and fruitful thinking too it is-is in their commentaries and if they endeavoured to separate and stress the elements combined by synthetists like Badarayana to build up their particular theories, why independence of thought in the realm of philosophy should be killed, or why dogma and religious creed should clog the wheels of their thought, or why indeed there should result the "universal inertia" so impressively urged on us, it is impossible to perceive. It would be just as correct to say that St. Thomas Aquinas, perhaps the greatest theologian the Western Church has known, because he wrote a commentary on Proclus' De Causis, despite the fact he was quite unaware of what he had done, impeded the march of scholastic philosophy, though his voluminous writings constitute, with those of his rival Duns Scotus, the high watermark of scholastic philosophy and the watershed of its divergence into the philosophico-speculative thought on the one hand and the ethico-practical (or realism) of modern times on the other. The truth of the matter is that until recently men in the West had not recognized that knowledge is "a 84 34 W. R. Inge, God and the Astronomers, containing the Warburton Lectures, 1931-1933, (1933), Preface vii.

world whose margin fades for ever and for ever as we move". They had believed that truth was something definite, which might be grasped by the aid of a clear head, diligence and a sound method. Hence the tone of confidence that breathes through their inquiries; and hence too the completeness they aimed at. This tone of confidence and this aim at completeness have both died out, the first because it has been perceived that there is no ground for it and the second because completeness is unattainable. "The time has passed," as Pollock himself observes, "when systems of philosophy could be regarded as final and absolute · Science has for good and all abandoned the dream of finality. The discoverer well knows that his discovery while it brings new certainty and new power over things, will also throw open a new series of questions."35 But the work done by the pioneers and later inquirers-the products of their thought-have proved valuable in many ways undreamt of by them, their first fashioners, and long after their original use had become obsolete. Though their systems may have proved inadequate or defective as a whole, they have helped to enrich the world of ideas in a manner and to an extent which cannot be over-estimated. If no system is to be entirely true, it ought to be equally clear that no system can be entirely original. Each must in great measure be the re-combination of elements supplied by its predecessors. To this rule, the Indian commentators are no exception. Many of their leading ideas may-as they themselves frankly acknowledge-be traced to earlier thinkers and in the last resort to those great sages who contributed to the making up of the Upanishads and the Vedas. Still, we need not deny originality to the later thinkers any more than we can to the earlier. The writers of glosses and commentaries have had a useful role to fill. As Professor Alexander has pointed out, in his lecture on Spinoza and Time, a commentary must be and is historically true and as such marks the exact extent of the teacher whose work is expounded by the commentator. A gloss is widely different; 35 Sir Frederick Pollock, loc. cit., 76-77.

xlv if it deals with the subject-matter of a work in an unhistorical manner, it seeks to recognize the real greatness and spirit of a writer and endeavours to appreciate it by asking "not what he said himself but what he may lead In the philosophical field, this is the very method that fructifies thought and helps to advance originality. The text may be there, but the glossator is not more concerned with it than with his gloss. A great man need not be followed slavishly and may be more honoured by divergence than by obedience. That is the line of advance that has marked the work of Indian glossators on Badarayana's text and the various commentators who have tried to elucidate him for centuries. To say that thought has not advanced during the period covered by them or that philosophical teaching has proved to be sterile is to deny patent facts and to own ignorance of the many works that have come down to us which tangibly demonstrate how philosophical thought has kept pace with the march of time in this country. Of the commentator Sripatipanditacharya, whose work we are dealing with here, the reader will find all that can be gathered about his life and work in the Introduction that follows. He lived, from the data so far available, about 1400 A.D., and his view-point is summed up in the term Dvaitadvaita, unity in duality. This conception of Reality goes back to a period long anterior to the composition of the Brahma-Sutras, as it is imbedded in them. A long line of commentators have either adopted it or criticised it. Sankara criticizes one such theory attributed to Bhartriprapancha, said to have been a commentator on the BrahmaSutras and the Upanishads, who is not mentioned by name but alluded to in his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (V. 1. 1). Bhaskara and Yadavaprakasa are others of the same persuasion criticized by Ramanuja in his commentary on the Brahma-Sutras (II. 1. 15). These and others are dealt with in detail in the Introduction. The two leading exponents of the Purva-Mimamsa, Prabhakara and Kumarila, took opposite views in this

connection. Kumarila, in discussing causation, urges the reality of non-existence, thus postulating the co-existence of existence and non-existence. Everything, to him, has two aspects: its own existence as regards its self; and its non-existence as regards anything else. Both are real; otherwise, it would be impossible to differentiate things. Prabhakara denies reality to non-existence. According to Kumarila, in the one case, there is actual and in the other, mental perception.30 Similarly, rejecting both the Sunyavada and the Nyaya views as to the difference of the whole from its parts, Kumarila takes the middle view that a whole may be, in one sense, different from its constituent parts.37 The whole being indivisible, the idea of its relation to its constituent parts in whole or in part is a question which can arise only in respect of the constituent parts, and would be meaningless as applied to the whole. This theory has been sometimes described as Bhedabheda and sometimes, again, as Samuchchayavada, 38 differentiating it from Vivartavada 36 Slokavartika, 473-492. 37 Slokavartika, 632-634; also A. B. Keith, The Karma limamsa, Chap. III, 44-60. 38 The idea underlying the term Holism of General Smuts would seem to be correctly conveyed by the Sanskrit term Samuchchayavada, the doctrine of the whole, from Samuchchaya-collection, assemblage, aggregation, mass, etc. It is interesting to note in this connection that the word whole was formerly hole, hool, the w being erroneously attached to the word. It has been derived from AngloSaxon, hal, whole, sound, safe and Gothic hails, healthy, sound, whole. The term Samuchchayavada, which may be literally transated the doctrine of the whole, is evidently derived from the figure of speech of the same name, Samuchchaya, which is defined by the Kavyaprakasa as joining together of two or more things independent of each other, but connected in idea with reference to some common action. (See Kavyaprakasa, 10, karikas 115-116.) In the Upanishads, holism may be said to be well summed up in the Brihadaranyaka text Om Purnamadah purnamidam purnat purnamudachyate purnasya purnamadaya purnamevavasishyate which may be thus translated: Om, That (Brahman) is Whole, and this (Universe) is Whole. The Whole proceeds from the Whole. (Then) taking the Whole of the Whole, it remains as the Whole (Brahman) alone. It may be

xlvii so is and Parinamavada. The Vivartavada postulates the doctrine that the visible world is illusory and that Brahman alone is the real entity, the unreal or illusory appearance being caused by avidya or human error. As a serpent (sarpa) is a vivarta of a rope (rajju), the world a vivarta of the real entity Brahman, the illusion being removed by true knowledge (vidya). The Parinamavada postulates the transformation of the Brahman into the names and forms of the phenomenal world. The Samuchchyavada endeavours to combine the Bheda and Abheda views on the analogy of the serpent and its coils and the sun and its radiance. The doctrine of Dvaitadvaita as propounded by Sripatipanditacharya will be found to possess this fundamental merit that it tries to combine harmoniously the opposing views of Dvaita and Advaita. How this combination is reached will be better added that there are as many theories of holism as there are schools of philosophy in India, for each school has its own special theory of holism. See Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , V. 1. 1, which reiterates what is enunciated in I. 4. 10. With this text may be usefully compared Kath. Upa., IV. 10. See also the commentaries of Sankara on Brihadaranyaka-upanishad , V. 1. 1 and the commentaries of Anandatirtha as well on the same text. By "holism" General Smuts means a tendency to the formation of systematic wholes, each of which is more than the bare sum of its component parts. A whole is not a mere aggregate of parts but has a certain structure in virtue of which it has greater potentialities than a mere aggregate of similar parts could have. Smuts suggests that this tendency to whole-making is traceable in all types of reality, and is the ground of what has been called creative or emergent evolution, which is inconsistent with bare mechanism. He also contends that modern science supports holism". Matter conceived as a system of electric charges, organisms consisting of multitudinous cells. Mind and Personality are examples of the "holistic" structure of matter propounded by him. The summum bonum of holistic philosophy is free and harmonious self-realization. The holistic nisus of the universe is regarded as a guarantee that the ideals of Well-being, of Truth, Beauty and Goodness are firmly rooted in the nature of things, and are likely to be realised eventually. (See Holism and Evolution; for a succinct summary of the theory see A. Wolf's chapter on Recent and Contemporary Philosophy in An Outline of Modern Knowledge, 588-589.) "

A appreciated from a study of the text of the commentary itself in the original, though the main points of the argument will be found set out in the Introduction. Sripatipanditacharya's chief merit consists in thinking a thought through to the uttermost end. He presents his theory to the final conclusion, with a conviction in its potency that is as impressive as it is suggestive. He was the systematiser of a very ancient world-concept, a concept that has had very wide vogue, both in the East and in the West. brief reference to Western exponents of the Bhedabheda theory-or a theory akin to it or containing many of its cardinal elements-will be found in the Introduction. The reader will, perhaps, realize even from this altogether inadequate treatment of a large subject, how the theory has had attracted to itself some of the ablest philosophical thinkers the world has so far known. Among these, in the West alone, are-to name only a few-Spinoza, Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Lotze, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, Bosanquet, Croce, Royce, James Ward, Sorley, Taylor, Lossky, Husserl, Bergson, James, Alexander, L. T. Hobhouse, Whitehead, etc. The bare mention of these names ought to suffice to indicate the importance of the theory which our commentator deals with. A word of explanation may, perhaps, be added in regard to the mode of presentation adopted in the Introduction. It is primarily an exposition. But it also attempts to be critical. Exposition in a sense involves interpretation, and interpretation merges imperceptibly sometimes into comparison and at others into criticism from the opposite points of view. Early training has induced a personal preference to what is called the historical method, that is, treating things historically. This is no mere academic penchant but a necessity when one has to deal with a writer of the type and character of Sripatipanditacharya. Learned and profound, he is ever ready to throw a challenge to his adversaries. Not only that; his frequent references to previous writers, his astounding knowledge of the epics and Puranas and his consummate skill in getting over what seem

xlix moot points render necessary a mode of treatment that would help to elucidate rather than cloud the points at issue. It has been impossible to fix his date without a variety of historical research which has necessitated a certain deviation from the subject-matter of his great work. It will be found, however, that the historical part is strictly limited to the collation of the requisite data for elucidating the position of Sripatipanditacharya among the great commentators on the Vedanta-Sutras. The views of the leading commentators, besides Sankara, Ramanuja and Anandatirtha, have also been set down as gleaned from their own works entirely in the view that they may prove helpful from a comparative standpoint. The theories of Sankara, Ramanuja and Anandatirtha which are frequently adverted to by Sripatipanditacharya are summarised as propounded by Sripatipanditacharya himself and not by themselves. A statement of their doctrines according to themselves is not attempted here except to a limited extent, for that would carry the purpose of this work beyond its legitimate sphere. Readers will, it is hoped, bear this fact in mind in judging the position assumed in the Introduction. What is the attitude of Sripatipanditacharya to his predecessors? This question is discussed at more than one point in the Introduction, and it is needless to say more than to observe that while he steers clear of both Sankara and Anandatirtha, while he is highly critical of Ramanuja and while he writes approvingly within limits of Srikantha, he is tenacious to a degree of his own position. He adopts a middle course, avoiding extreme positions and is accordingly able to outline a philosophy which, in its essence, is universal. In discussing the viewpoint of Sripatipanditacharya, occasion has been taken to go into the relationship of the so-called Eastern and Western systems of philosophy. The subject is too vast to be dealt with at any length in a special work of this nature, but it was felt necessary that the tendencies of modern criticism in this regard should be made known. How far Neo-Platonic thought influenced

the making up of Western philosophy in general and how far it helped to mould Christian philosophy in particular during the earlier centuries of the Christian era are questions of vast import to students of Indian philosophy as they indicate, at any rate to some small extent, the influence that Upanishadic thought has exerted on both philosophy and religion in the West during the ages they were in the making. The space devoted to the discussion of these topics, including the sources of the system of Spinoza, perhaps the greatest name in Western philosophical thought, will, it is hoped, be not deemed altogether wasted, especially as they tread a ground not hitherto familiar at least to Indian scholars. Philosophical truths, whether propounded in the East or in the West, know no bounds and the fact that the East has influenced the West more than the West has the East in this connection, does not mean that the East has little to learn from the West in the domain of philosophy. If modern trends of thought indicate anything, they show that the East and the West have yet to learn a great deal from each other in this as in other fields of study. I have been unsuccessful in obtaining a copy of the Vritti on the Bhashya referred to in the Introduction (see page 3). I much regret this and can only express the hope that Mr. Kundakuri Balasurya Prasadarow Garu will himself make it available to the public at no distant date. The work is published in two volumes, the first being devoted to the Introduction and the second to the Text, with the Appendices. In translating passages, clearness has been preferred to elegance. Philosophical terms have been rendered on an uniform basis, all attempts at subtlety being avoided. Well-known philosophical terms have, however, been retained. The use of Sanskrit terms and phrases which have acquired a definite significance, has more than mere utility to commend it. While it is difficult to find exact English equivalents for them, their frequent use is likely in the long run to popularize Indian thought in the West.

Footnotes have been given chiefly with a view to elucidate the text or the Sruti passage quoted. li The editing of this work has had to be carried out under difficulties, chief among which must be stated to be the want, in Bangalore, of an up-to-date and well-equipped library for the use of scholars interested in Oriental literature. It is undoubted that scholars will find much to criticise in it. It is, however, earnestly hoped that they will view with some indulgence its shortcomings, whatever they may be, especially because neither time nor trouble has been stinted in its production. The main object aimed at has been to give an adequate exposition in understandable English of Sripati's view, so that those who desire may be enabled not only to appreciate it at its full value, but also to judge, in the fulness of time, the validity of any particular interpretation to which they may be personally inclined. As Dr. Thibaut has suggested, this question-the question as to what the Sutras really teach-is a critical, and not a philosophical one. And if it is to be solved at all, it can only be, as he adds, when the entire body of the Sutras has been submitted to a detailed investigation "with the help to be derived from the study of all the existing commentaries". The present attempt is to facilitate the realization of this much-to-be-desired objective. Apart from those who are either commentators on commentators or mere glossators, there are at least ten well-known leading commentators, whose commentaries deserve to be made available to scholars for solving the problem of the true meaning of the Sutras which stand coupled with the illustrious name of Badarayana. It is to be hoped that this attempt will be made and that scholars with adequate equipment will be forthcoming to undertake it, while a discerning public will find the means to support such a very laudable venture. In conclusion, I must record my thanks to Pandit S. Venkata Rao, who has proved himself highly useful in getting up the text of the work and in passing it through the Press. He has also helped in the checking of references

and in a variety of other ways which it would be difficult to pass over lightly. I feel I must also express my deep sense of gratitude to Sir K. P. Puttanna Chetty, Kt., C.I.E., the President of the Mysore Lingayet Education Fund Association, for the warm and continued personal interest he has evinced in connection with the publication of this work. To him is justly due the credit of its publication in its present form to a wider world. To him accordingly are due the thanks of the reader for any enlightenment he may derive from it. BANGALORE, 30 th June 1935-S C. HAYAVADANA RAO.