4. The Theory of Causality

Causality is the relation between the two events, the cause and effect. The tradition of Indian philosophy put forth different types of cause and effect theories in connection with the origin of the visible world. Ārambhavāda of Nyāyavaiśeṣikas, Saṅghātavāda of Buddhists, Pariṇāma-vāda of Saṅkhyas, Vivartavāda of Vedāntins and Ābhāsavāda of Pratya-bhijñā are some of them.^[1]

In non-dualistic philosophies like Advaita and Pratyabhijñā, the one and only reality is the cause of the visible universe and its diversities. In fact the universe is nothing but the ultimate reality itself in Pratyabhijñā and mere illusion in Advaita. Generally it is considered as mere outer manifestation of the inner being. In Pratyabhijñā and Advaita the becoming of the Supreme Soul as the Jīva or the objective universe is explained using two different terms, viz. Ābhāsa and Vivarta.

1. Ābhāsa in Pratyabhijñā

Ābhāsavāda, is the theory of manifestation or the theory of creation accepted in Pratyabhijñā Philosophy. It is obviously connected with Parameśvara, the Ultimate Reality. It has both ontological and epistemological backgrounds.

Ābhāsa is a technical Sanskrit term used by Kashmir Śaiva philosophers to express the theory of causality. The word is derived from the root bhās (bhāsṛ dīptau), which means ‘to shine’ or ‘to appear’ with the prefix ‘a’ having meanings ‘near to’, ‘as far as’, ‘a little’ and ‘ diminution’. So Ābhāsa is shining forth or shining a little (īṣad bhāsanam), and shining fully.

Abhinavagupta explains this as the shining forth of something:

ābhāsaḥ prakāśanam,^[2]
ābhāsaḥ prakāśamānatā.^[3]

It is nothing but the disclosing of something unknown. It is the knowing of the subject as an object.^[4] It is the external manifestation of the endless internal forms already existed in the universal consciousness Śiva. It is a limiting of a subject into an object.^[5]

Pratyabhijñā philosophy explains the theory of Ābhāsa as the theory of causality. Then the action of manifestation is called Nirmātṛtā.

Utpala says thus:

eṣa cānantaśaktitvādevamābhāsayatyamūn |
bhāvānicchāvaśādeṣā kriyā nirmātṛtāsya sā || ^[6]

This power of action is only endowed with sentient subject and transmuting to cause and effect or subject and object. Utpala rejects the subjectivity and energy of inanimate being.^[7] The world of cause and effect is nothing but the experience of internal and external objects transformation through the power of someone.

Utpala says that there is only one action, which has an inside and outside orderly existence, it belongs to only one, who is capable of his two forms:

kāryakāraṇatāloke sāntarviparivartinaḥ |
ubhayendriyavedyatvaṃ tasya kasyāpi śaktitaḥ ||
evamekā kriyā saiṣā sakramāntarbahisthitiḥ |
ekasyaivobhayākārasahiṣṇorupapāditā || ^[8]

Abhinavagupta has clarified this view in Vimarśinī.^[9] Thus in Pratyabhijñā philosophy, cause of all is Śiva and the objects are also Śiva, who makes this universe within himself with his free will. His internal consciousness is transforming into outside objects which have the true nature of consciousness only. This theory of causality is named as Ābhāsavāda in Pratyabhijñā Philosophy.

In some cases Ābhāsa depends upon immediate sense contact and in other cases as in the case of the blind or in thick darkness that does not depend upon the sense contact. There is no difference in the essential nature of the manifestation of objects figuring in determinate cognitions, referring to the past, present or future objects.

Utpala says thus:

tātkālikākṣasāmakṣyasāpekṣāḥ kevalaṃ kvacit |
ābhāsāḥ anyathānyatra tvandhatamasādiṣu ||
viśeṣorthāvabhāsasya sattāyāṃ na punaḥ kvacit |
vikalpeṣu bhavet bhāvibhavadbhūtārthagāmiṣu || ^[10]

In the Ābhāsas of being and not-being, the externality is merely an attribute.

It does not constitute their vital nature and so they always exist internally:

bhāvābhāvāvabhāsānāṃ bāhyatopādhiriṣyate |
nātmā sattā tatasteṣāmāntarāṇāṃ satāṃ sadā || ^[11]

Always Ābhāsas exist inside in the form of pure consciousness and the outside existence is because of Māyā.

Utpala says:

cinmayatve'vabhāsānāmantareva sthitiḥ sadā |
māyayā bhāsamānānāṃ bāhyatvādbahirapyasau || ^[12]

For these two types, i.e. the Āntara (internal) and Bāhya (external), the substratum is only one Śiva or Maheśvara. His free will acts an important role. Bhāskarakaṇṭha says that He, the Deva, has the nature of play, and the play is nothing but Svātantrya: devo hi krīḍāśīla ucyate, krīḍā eva ca svātantryam |^[13] Maheśvara externalizing the internal beings through his free will.

He is like a Yogi and depend nothing for manifestation. Utpala says:

cidātmaiva hi devo'ntaḥsthitamicchāvaśādbahiḥ |
yogīva nirupādānamarthajātaṃ prakāśayet || ^[14]

In this context Abhinava says that His Svātantrya is nothing but his consciousness indicated by the word Deva.^[15] Svātanrya is the real nature of Maheśvara which depends nothing. It belongs in the group of Bliss, Affluence and Consciousness, which are his characters.

Abhinavagupta says in Vimarśinī that the independence itself is the bliss, sovereignty and consciousness:

anyanirapekṣatā eva paramārthataḥ ānandaḥ, aiśvaryam, svātantryam, caitanyam |^[16]

Maheśvara by his power of sovereignty adopts the form of an individual being.

K.C.Pandey opines that this philosophy indebted to Pāṇini to apply the word Svātantrya as the chief power of Maheśvara, as Pāṇini uses the word Svatantra as an inseparable adjective denoting the chief characteristic of the actor or subject or agent:

svatantraḥ kartā |^[17]

2. Vivarta in Advaita

Vivartavāda is a type of Satkāryavāda, a theory which holds that the effect pre-exists in the cause before the creation. In Sāṅkhya, this production theory is Pariṇāmavāda, while in Advaita Vedānta it is Vivartavāda. For Advaitins the universe has an illusory character. At a time Brahman is the material cause and the locus of the illusory universe.^[18] Here the cause alone is real and the effect is neither real nor unreal, but an indefinable one. As the effect of Brahman, the universe is superimposed on Brahman like the superimposition of a snake on the rope or silver on the shell. This superimposition is due to the ignorance of the locus.

Vivarta is the technical term used by Advaita Vedāntins to connote the causal theory. The term is derived from the root vṛtu (vartane to exist, to be; bhāsarthe to shine; varaṇe to hide, to receive or to depend) with the prefix vi and literally means that changing, revolving, transforming, shining, depending etc.^[19] It seems that the concept Vivarta can be explained in all these meanings.

In Vedāntaparibhāṣā Vivarta is defined as a process in which the effect has a dissimilar entity from the material cause:

vivarto nāma upādānaviṣamasattākakāryāpattiḥ |^[20]

A snake is superimposed on a rope by the individual.

The commentary of Brahmasūtra gives another definition for Vivarta.

atattvato'nyathābhāvo vivartaḥ |^[21]

Sadānanda has given the same definition for Vivarta in his Vedāntasāra.

atattvato'nyathābhāvo vivarta ityudīritaḥ |^[22]

Appayya-dīkṣita’s view is:

kāraṇalakṣaṇo'nyathābhāvaḥ pariṇāmaḥ tadvilakṣaṇo vivartaḥ |^[23]

Vidyāraṇya defined Vivarta thus:

avasthantarāpattirekasya pariṇāmitā syāt kṣīraṃ dadhi mṛdgumbhaḥ suvarṇaṃ maṇḍalaṃ yathā avasthabhānaṃ tu vivarto rajjusarpavat |^[24]

The above definitions have root in Śaṅkara’s construction of Vivartavāda. According to Śaṅkara, the cause Brahman is not another from the superimposed universe.

There is no other thing apart from the ultimate cause:

kāryamākāśādikaṃ bahuprapañcaṃ jagat, kāraṇaṃ parabrahma tasmātkāraṇātparamārthato'nanyatvam vyatirekeṇābhāvaḥ kāryasyāvagamyate |^[25]

The Bhāṣyas of Brahmasūtras [bhāve copalabdheḥ, sattvāccāvarasya, yukteḥ śabdāntarācca]^[26] gave stress in non-difference of the cause and effect:

itaśca kāraṇādananyatvaṃ kāryasya yatkāraṇaṃ bhāva eva kāraṇasya kāryamupalabhyate || ^[27]

itaśca kāraṇātkāryasyānanyatvaṃ, yatkāraṇaṃ pragutpatteḥ kāraṇātmanaiva kāraṇe sattvamavarakālīnasya kāryasya śrūyate ||

yukteśca pragutpatteḥ kāryasya sattvamananyatvaṃ ca kāraṇādavagamyate, śabdāntarācca |

The effects pot, chain, etc. have only the difference in the name only:

nāmadheyamātraṃ hyetadanṛtaṃ mṛttiketyeva satyamiti (2.1.14).

It is clear that the Vivartavāda of Śaṅkara is a form of Satkāryavāda and an extension from that of Sāṅkhyas and so similar to the Ābhāsavāda.

3. Ābhāsavāda and Vivartavāda -The two Ontological Theories

Ābhāsavāda and Vivartavāda are two ontological theories which justify the one and only reality, the Supreme Self. According to Pratyabhijñā Abhāsa is a process by which everything gets a real entity.^[28] Ābhāsavāda is more realistic, because it admits all universal beings also as real and at the same time it is an idealistic attitude also like that of Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism. Considering the individual selves, in both theories manifestation takes place without any difference in the manifested and the manifestable. Advaita Vedānta put forward the Vivartavāda as an ontological theory in order to justify the non-dual reality of the Brahman rather than to describe the illusoriness of the world. They are to establish that absolutely immutable Brahman stands changeless even in the middle of changes.

Ābhāsavāda also is accepted by the Advaita Vedāntins. Śaṅkara has used the word Ābhāsa^[29] in several times almost in the same sense that is used in the Pratyabhijñā system. Sureśvara, the disciple of Śaṅkara, highlighted this as a theory.^[30] According to Vedāntins this Ābhāsa is neither unreal nor real like Māyā.^[31] K.C. Pandey remarked about Ābhāsa which is suited for both systems.

He says thus,

“It is real because it is a manifestation of the All-inclusive Universal Consciousness or self exactly as a creation of a Yogin is a manifestation of an individual self. But it is ideal, because it is nothing but an experience of the self and has its being in the self exactly as our own ideas have theirs within us.”^[32]

All philosophical thoughts rise from a world view having an ontological basis. The Ābhāsavāda of Pratyabhijñā and the Vivartavāda of Advaita also include in this category, which agree the all-inclusiveness of the Supreme Self. There is no difference between subject and object, in other words both are same.

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

ārambhavādaḥ kaṇabhakṣapakṣaḥ saṃghātavādastu bhadantapakṣaḥ | sāṃkhyādipakṣaḥ pariṇāmavādaḥ vedāntapakṣastu vivartavādaḥ || Samkṣepaśārīraka, 2.63.

[2]:

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśini, Bhāskarī, Part I, p. 86.

[3]:

Ibid., p. 126.

[4]:

prakāśātmā parameśvaraḥ svātmānaṃ jñātrekarūpatvāt ajñeyamapi jñeyīkaroti | Ibid., p. 167f.

[5]:

nirābhāsāt pūrṇāt | Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśini, Bhāskarī, Part I, p. 3. Here Bhāskarakaṇtha explains that the non-dual Śiva, who is indifferent from his Śakti and so who has no Ābhāsas, alone is Pūrṇa.

[6]:

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā, 2.6.1.

[7]:

jaḍasya tu na sā śaktiḥ | Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā, 2.4.2. Utpala also denies the instrumentality of the inanimate things. (Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā, 2.4.8) Abhinavagupta states here that there is nothing inanimate beyond the conscious being. Parameśvara himself is the inanimate things like seed and sprouts: tataḥ parameśvara eva bījabhūmijalābhāsasāhityenāṅkurātmanā bhāsate | Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśini, Bhāskarī, Part I, p. 164.

[8]:

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā, 2.6.4-5.

[9]:

yataḥ saṃvidrūpādāntarāt prabhṛti indriyagocaratayā bahiṣparyantatayā sthitirābhāsanarūpā, tata eva vedyātmaka-karmāliṅganena sakramā tāvadupapannā, kartṛkarmaikāśrayatādātmyācca ekā | sa caika āśrayaḥ saṃvidrūpatvena svacchandasvatantratvābhyāmubhayamapyantarbahirūpaṃ sahata iti | Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśini, Bhāskarī, Part II, p. 159-160.

[10]:

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā, 1.8.1-2.

[11]:

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā, 1.8.5.

[12]:

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā, 1.8.7.

[13]:

Bhāskarī, Part I, p. 229.

[14]:

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-kārikā, 1.5.7.

[15]:

tasya ca svātantryameva devaśabdanirdiṣṭaṃ cidrūpatvaṃ iti | Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśini, Bhāskarī, Part I, p. 229.

[16]:

Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vimarśini, Bhāskarī, Part I, p. 255.

[17]:

Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini, 1.4.54, Pandey, K.C., op.cit., p. 327.

[18]:

prakṛtiścopādānakāraṇaṃ ca brahmābhyupagantavyaṃ, nimittakāraṇaṃ ca, na kevalaṃ nimittakāraṇameva | Brahmasūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya, 1.4.23.

[19]:

The Sanskrit root vṛtu is seen in Bhvādigaṇa (vartane to exist, to be), in Curādigaṇa (bhāsarthe to shine) and in Divādigaṇa (varaṇe to hide, to receive or to depend).

[20]:

Dharmarājādhvarīndra, Vedāntaparibhāṣā, p. 141.

[21]:

Kalpataruparimala Commentary on Brahmasūtra, 1.2.21.

[22]:

Vedāntasāra, p. 121.

[23]:

Siddhāntaleśasaṅgraha, p. 58.

[24]:

Pañcadasī, 13.8.9.

[25]:

Brahmasūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya, 2.1.14.

[26]:

Brahmasūtra, 2.1. 15, 16 &18.

[27]:

Brahmasūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya, 2.1.15, 16 &18. 106

[28]:

jaḍānāṃ ābhāsamānataiva sattāsiddhiḥ sā ca ābhāsātmataiva | tataśca bodhamātram ekamātramevātra tattvam | Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā-vṛtti, 1.5.4.

[29]:

jīvo hi devatāyā ābhāsamātram | …… acintyānantaśaktimatya devatāyā buddhyādisambandhaḥ caitanyābhāsaḥ devatāsvarūpavivekāgrahaṇanimittaḥ sukhī duḥkhī mūḍha ityadyanekavikalpapratyayahetuḥ | Chāndogyopaniṣad-śāṅkara-bhāṣya, 6.3.2; In the commentary of the Sūtra, ābhāsa eva ca, Śaṅkara states thus: ābhāsa eva caiṣa jīvaḥ parasyātmano jalasūryakādivatpratipattavyaḥ | Brahmasūtra-śāṅkara-bhāṣya, 2.3.50.

[30]:

According to Sureśvara (9^th cent. CE), whose school of thought is called as Vārttikaprasthāna, the world and Jīvas or individual souls are Ābhāsas or appearances of Brahman. By the ignorance of the consciousness (Cidābhāsa) Jīva is acting as Kartā, Bhoktā, Pramātā etc. For details vide Markandeyasastry, Dr.C., ‘ Ābhāsavādaḥ ekam pariśīlanam’, Sarasvatisusama, No. 1-4, Sampurna-nanda Sanskrit University, 1986-87, pp. 281-287.

[31]:

Vidyāraṇya, a fourteenth century Vedāntin, upholds the theory of Ābhāsa. īṣadbhāsanamābhāsaḥ pratibimbaṃ tathāvidhaḥ | bimbalakṣaṇahīnaḥ san bimbavat bhāsate hi saḥ || Pañcadaśī, 8.32.

[32]:

Pandey K.C., Abhinavagupta -A Historical and Philosophical Study, p. 320.