5.5. The Process of Attaining Knowledge

Parabrahman as the witness (sākṣī) resides in the jīva, and the jīva pervades the buddhī (intellect-mind). So, when we say that, -‘the mind (intellect/ buddhi) is the knower, we simply mean that it is the self (jīva) who is the knower, because buddhi in itself is jaḍa (inert) as a product of prakṛti. Hence, it cannot be the real knower. Further, when we say that -‘the self (jīva) is the knower,’ we simply mean that it is not a knower independently by itself, without Parabrahman as the inner self and the provider controller of knowing power (jñānaśakti) to the self (jīva). Therefore, without Parabrahman as the source and support of its cognitional ability, the jīva cannot be called the knower and the agent.

In this manner, when the mental modification (vṛtti) through sense organs goes out to the object and together with senses when the mind and the self (jīva) cooperate and when vṛtti gets modified and assumes the form of that object and returns, and in this way when the form (or the gestalt configuration) of that object penetrates and gets set in the mind, the right knowledge of that object as it actually is, arises. This happens when the sākṣī (the witness), who resides in jīva, but who stands higher that the self (jīva) has confirmed that knowledge (apprehension).

The Vacanāmṛta reveals this fact:

“The buddhi permeates this body from head to toe. As a result, it is concurrently aware of the activities of all of the indriyas. The jīva exists within that buddhi by pervading it. So, the awareness of the buddhi is due to the awareness of the jīva. Correspondingly, since the witness resides within that jīva, the jīva’ s awareness is due to the witness’s awareness.” (Vacanāmṛta Kāriyānī 4, p. 258)

The conviction in knowledge is gained when sākṣī confirms it. The knowledge attained through any pramāṇa (perception, inference, testimony, etc.) becomes innately acceptable or non-acceptable as according to the sanction or denial of the certitude by the sākṣī. The sākṣī stands higher than buddhi and jiva. The sākṣī is the antaryāmī Parabrahman himself. If the certitude-granting sākṣī is rejected, there can be no spiritual knowledge nor a coherent metaphysical thesis.

Herewith Parabrahman, Akṣarabrahman, also resides in the jīva. So, they both are called sākṣī. They dwell in our hearts but no one is capable of distinguishing between their light. In fact, though, they are absolutely distinct from each other, but no one is capable of seeing these distinctions. The only one who receives a divine body composed of divine light by the grace of Parabrahman realizes, ‘This is my self, this is puruṣa, this is Akṣara, and this is Parabrahman who is distinct from all.’ In this way, one can see them separately and their light distinctly.^[1] So, the actual process starts with the indriyas. It associates with the object. Thereafter, the mind and intellect perform their role. As a result, when all three -the indriyas, the mind, and the jīva-combine and indulge in an object, then the vṛitti develops an intense force. Thus, when the vṛtti of the indriyas enter the object, the mind and jīva also go along with the vṛtti; then, the object is seen and fully recognized.^[2]

In the knowledge of substances, the medium dimension is caused by the relation of inherence. In the perception of qualities, actions, etc., which is inherent in substances, it is a cause by the relation of their inherence in its substratum. It is being the substratum of that conjunction of the mind that is the cause of knowledge. Ultimately it brings knowledge to the jiva.

The Bhāṣyakāra reminds us:

“ātmā saṃkalpaviśeṣeṇa manasā jñānaśaktyā sambaddhyate punaśca manovṛttipuraskāreṇendriyeṇa samanaindriyavṛttiścārtheneti grahaṇaprakāraḥ |” )SSS, p.153)

“Ātman with its resolution and with cognitive power combines to the mind, and all these consequently reach to the subject, this is how one attains knowledge.” 114

Again, by commenting on the Bhagavad-Gītā’s śloka, the Bhāṣyakāra confirms the perspective of Svāminārāyaṇa on account of processing the knowledge.

śarīravāṅmanobhiryatkarma prārabhate naraḥ nyāzyaṃ vā viparītaṃ vā pañcaite tasya hetavaḥ ||^[3]

“These are the five causes of all action, whether right or wrong, one performs by thought, word, and deed.”

The Svāminārāyaṇa-bhāṣya explains:

“naro mānavaḥ śarīravāṅmanobhiḥ śarīreṇa vāgādīndriyairmanasā ca saha | saṃyujya nyāzyaṃ vā nyāyā'numoditaṃ viparītaṃ vā anyāzyaṃ vā yad yatkimapi karma prārabhate kurute | tasya karmaṇaḥ ete prāguktāḥ śarīrādayaḥ pañca hetavo kāraṇāni bhavanti || (Bhagavad-Gītā 18/15, p. 345)

“Every action, appropriate or inappropriate, performed by a person, adopt the system in which firstly, the indriya first connects with the object, then mind and ultimately, gets the knowledge of the action he performs.”

The Bhāṣyakāra describes here the process of knowledge which is the most significant findings to emerge from this topic. Therefore, the Svāminārāyaṇa Bhāṣyakāra does not differ from the basic principles of Svāminārāyaṇa.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Vacanamrut Loyā 15

[2]:

Vacanamrut Loyā 10

[3]:

Bhagavad-Gītā 18/15