Prasthanatrayi Swaminarayan Bhashyam (Study)

by Sadhu Gyanananddas | 2021 | 123,778 words

This page relates ‘4.4e. Inference in the Bhashyakara’ of the study on the Prasthanatrayi Swaminarayan Bhashyam in Light of Swaminarayan Vachanamrut (Vacanamrita). His 18th-century teachings belong to Vedanta philosophy and were compiled as the Vacanamrita, revolving around the five ontological entities of Jiva, Ishvara, Maya, Aksharabrahman, and Parabrahman. Roughly 200 years later, Bhadreshdas composed a commentary (Bhasya) correlating the principles of Vachanamrut.

4.4e. Inference in the Bhāṣyakāra

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Bhadreśadāsa defines inference as:

anu hetumitiṃ nityaṃ sādhyasya jāyate mitiḥ |
tasmādanumitiḥ proktā pramāṇastha'numānajā ||133

“Always after the knowledge of reason, sādhya is proved. So, the reason or sign is called inference, it is one of the pramāṇas and the knowledge which is attained from it is called inferred knowledge or anumiti.”

The knowledge by inference differs from the knowledge by perception because it is mediate and indirect. The knowledge by inference depends on the perception of the relation of vyāpti. The knowledge by verbal testimony also is indirect. Svāminārāyaṇa accepts reason but rejects bare rationalism which dwindles śraddhā (faith) and spiritual aspirantship (mumukṣutvam). Svāminārāyaṇa accepts knowledge by inference and holds, that knowledge also has credibility.

It is clearly suggested in the Vacanāmṛta. Svāminārāyaṇa illustrates:

“That jīva appears to be in one place; it appears to be as fine as the tip of a spear; it appears to be exceptionally subtle. It appears so because it is concomitant with the buddhi. But when that jīva is known as the illuminator of the body, indriya and antahakarana, their presiding deities and the subjects, it appears to be very vast, and it appears to be pervasive. That is when it is not associated with the buddhi. That jīva is known not by the indriyas, but by inference. For example, on seeing a sword weighing 200 kg, a person can infer, ‘the wielder of this sword must be powerful.’ Similarly, the jīva inspires the body, indriyas, etc., simultaneously; therefore, it must be mighty. This is how the jiva can be known by inference.” (Vacanāmṛta Kāriyānī 1, p. 249)

In the domain of knowledge by sense-perception, reason can help correct distortions and errors; but cannot eliminate the basic facts that cause such distortions or errors. The imitation of knowledge by inference is indicated in Vacanāmṛta that one experiences things only by inference and does not actually see it, then he cannot be said to possess perfect jnāna. Nevertheless, because he has such a firm conviction, he indeed must have experienced some sort of transcendental powers of Parabrahman in the past; if not, he will experience them in the future.^[1]

Importance of Inference

Svāminārāyaṇa is a protagonist both of intellect and intuition, for he always showed his love for intelligent seekers and rated the Parabrahman given intuitive realization of truth as the being highest and veritable.

He mentions,

“This fact can only be understood by one who has a sharp intelligence and a craving for higher happiness; therefore, I like them who has such intelligence.” (Vacanāmṛta Pancālā-1, p. 353)

This means that intuition by itself cannot yield the right knowledge of Parabrahman unless it is blessed by Parabrahman. Publications that concentrate on inference or logic is more frequently adopted in a historical or chronological approach of debate in philosophy. Even in modern times, when rationalism has prevailed everywhere, the logical approach became more significant. The Bhāṣyakāra explicitly demonstrates his perspective on inference and logic. Since being an expert logician, he used a superb variety of logic in the Prasthānatrayī Bhāṣya to refute the opposition: for example in the Brahmasūtras yukteḥ-1/1/18, racnānanupattyadhikaraṇam-2/2/1-2/2/10; Chāndogya-upaniṣad XII 6/2/3; Katha-upaniṣad 1/21, 22; Mundaka-upaniṣad 2/2/1; Taittiriya-upaniṣad 2/7/2; Brhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad 3/9/28. However, he never extolled the way of logic and argumentation to realize the eternal entities. In his commentary, he discusses the subtle line between verbal testimony and inference.

The Limitations

Svāminārāyaṇa draws our attention in the Vacanāmṛta: “In this way, through these two philosophies, the nature of Parabrahman was realized by inference. However, is that Parabrahman black or yellow? Is He tall or short? Does He possess a form, or is He formless? That was not realized.” (Vacanāmṛta Vartāl 2, pp. 533-534)

The Bhāṣyakāra also mentions the limitations of the logic:

pramāṇaṃ naiva tarkaḥ syāt tatrā'nugrāhakastu saḥ |
vyabhicārādiśaṅkānāṃ vāraṇaṃ tadanugrahaḥ ||^[2]

“Logic, which is the uttermost part of inference, is actually not considered a means to knowledge, but it helps attain true knowledge of the ultimate realities. Moreover, it is gracious to eradicate the controversy and doubt regarding the ultimate knowledge.”

Inference or reason relies on perception and hence has its own limitation. Reason also is limited by the limits of human experience and one’s ability and insight to go beyond it. How sharp and deep one is able to see correlation and consequences and logical implications determines the success and credibility in the knowledge by reason. Since knowledge by inference reason also is susceptible to errors, and on account of its dependence on perception, it cannot become a sure guide to the knowledge of Parabrahman. Inference or reason also fails to comprehend Parabrahman and his essential nature, because the basis of inference lies in perception or relationship between sign/mark (liṃga) and the bearer of the sign, i.e., the perception of the invariable relationship of concomitance and/or succession between the hetu (reason) and the predicate (sādhya). Thus, the perceptual apprehension, and based on that, the application of universal relation between the two make the inference possible.

Every inference involves subject-object relation. It also suggests the qualified nature on knowable objects. Inference depends on the discriminating activity of the knowing mind. However, the discriminating intellect also has its own limitations. In inference, our reasoning self (intellect) has to function according to the laws of thought and the evidence available to him through perception and verbal testimony.

The Śvetāśvetara Upaniṣad says: ‘naiva ca tasya liṅgam’ (śve. upa. -6/ 9)

“Neither His actions nor His organs of action are visible by māyic indriyas. There is nothing that can be seen which is better than or equal to him. His supreme powers are heard to be numerous. By His own inherent nature, His knowledge and energy work. There is not even a single sign (lingam) of Him by which He can be inferred.”

Therefore, its content and conclusion are always linked with what is empirically perceived. It does not rise above significantly. The sharpness of intelligence and ability of the mind to see a correlation, the necessity to apply vyāpti and infer based on them, are the logical and psychological requirements in knowledge by inference. Parabrahman is not inferable, because as per rules of logic, every inference is based on invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between reason and the middle term.

Exceedingly, all the philosophical arguments based on design and cosmological arguments based on the idea of a series of causes are mostly based on comparisons and similarities observed to exist in the created universe. Usually, they all are analogical arguments. All such arguments presented to prove the existence of Parabrahman are, in fact, not conclusive. They are probabilistic in character. They at the most suggest the possibility of an entity or a substance that may be existing. Parabrahman is the existence of all existences. He is the existence per se. So, Parabrahman is not an object of proof, and instead, he is beyond proof.

He is the omni-immanent, omni-causal, omni-potent, transcendent being, He is the existence of all existences, the being of all beings, and the supreme personality who is the basis of all proofs. Moreover, all arguments are based on inference or hypothesis, which cannot conclusively say anything of the nature and personality of Parabrahman. Along with this, as all proofs for the existence of Parabrahman are founded on his existence, it sounds childish to make attempts to prove his existence. Inference or Reason (tarka) collapses when it attempts to explain the world or the realm of transcendental reality without positing Parabrahman in its center. It also falls when it tries to prove the existence of Parabrahman on the basis of pure reason. No analogical inference nor any hypothetic-deductive argument can ever determine the existence of Parabrahman. Reason is like a double-edged sword. It cuts both ways, and every reason can be refuted by better reason. It can prove or disprove an argument. But, it can neither prove nor disprove Parabrahman’s existence. Therefore, in such matters, as Mimāṃsā suggests, revelation is the best guide. The Mimāṃsā directive, namely- aprāpte hi śāstraṃ arthavat, suggests that what can neither be proved nor disproved by other pramāṇa (means of knowledge) becomes the domain of radiance from revelation. The incompetence of perception and reason to establish the supersensuous truth leads us to realize the need and importance of revelations as a valid source of knowledge. 80

Logic is not Everything

The Bhāṣyakāra’s qualitative analysis in that area provides detailed exegetical phenomena.

In the context of Brahmasūtra-2/1/11^[3], his compass of vision reflects the entire building of Svāminārāyaṇa’s philosophy as far as epistemology is concerned:

“athāpyatra tarko viśeṣo vicāryaḥ | tārkikapuruṣakālasthalādibhedenāpi tarkāṇāṃ svotkṛṣṭatarkaviśeṣeṇa dūṣyatvaṃ prekṣāvatāṃ pratītisiddhameveti na te śāśvatasiddhāne pramāṇapadavīmutsahante | samānapuruṣotthāpitatarkā api kālabhedena tattadiṣaya vimarśaprakarṣādinā tatpuruṣotthāpitena svottarakālīnatarkaviśeṣeṇa khala hanyamānā dṛśyante | kiñca tarko hi buddhidharmaḥ | tasyāścā'kṣarapuruṣottamādidivyatattvebhyaḥ kaniṣṭhatvaṃ cātraivottaratra vakṣyate |” (Brahmasūtra 2/1/11, pp.165-166).

“We should now ponder upon the nature of logic. Logic used by any logician cannot be venerated as an ultimate truth because due to time, place, and the changing nature of a human, it also changes. Even when a logician proves something according to his logic, tomorrow, he may find another logic that can refute his own logic. Actually, logic is an attribute of intellect, which is māyic and far lower than Akṣara and Puruṣottama.”

In his extensive commentary on Brahmasūtras-2/1/11, the Bhāṣyakāra strongly refutes the logic in the way to realize Parabrahman.

puruṣadhīvaicitryāt tarkā vinaṣṭapratiṣṭhā mithovyāghātakāścopalabhyante | (Brahmasūtra 2/1/11, pp. 165-166)

“Due to the unstable nature of the buddhi of a human, logic not only lost its splendor, but every new logic always goes against the first one, this leads to disaster in any established principle based on logic.”

He further defends the primacy of verbal testimony and inductive expression. In particular, he argues in some detail about the limits and defects of rational induction when employed independently of scripture to prove Brahman’s creatorship. He firstly draws upon the basic reasoning used by the Nyāya school of Indian logic to deduce such creatorship. Their syllogism takes the form: All effects have an agent; the world (comprising of sprouts, etc.) is an effect; therefore, it must have an agent. The Bhāṣyakāra then analytically dismantles each technical constituent of the argument and rejoins a series of counterarguments before issuing a warning: an overenthusiastic application of reasoning or confidence in one’s intellect can blind one from seeing one’s own limitation of fallacious argumentation, leaving one empty of higher, more subtle truths.

The Bhāṣyakāra adds that adeptness in argumentation alone is inadequate, simply because the divine, not-this-worldly, and sensorially imperceptible Parabrahman can never become the subject of reason alone–just as the ears can never grasp the visual beauty of a rose and the eyes fail to apprehend the sweet classical music. Besides, all instances of inference are predicated on perception, and the senses’ limitations have already been well-founded. In this sequence, the Katha Upaniṣad, for example, amenably states that the highest knowledge is beyond suppositional reasoning (atarkyam)' (2/8) and thus not fully comprehendible by the intellect alone.

The very next verse begins:

“naiṣā tarkeṇa matirāpaneyā’ (Katha-upaniṣad 2/9) iti”

“Nor can this knowledge be grasped by argumentation.”

As the Bhāṣyakāra affords some extra elaboration on this topic, he once more alerts that reasoning left to its own devices can be dangerous because, after all, argumentation is a skill. A strong argument can always be ruined by a stronger argument. So, there is no telling which incisive piece of logic might be superseded by a yet more rational objector or by the same thinker at a different time or place. Such contestations and disputes are endless and ultimately meaningless, he asserts, for this is not the way to decide or judge established principles (siddhānta). Besides, the reasoning is designated as a quality of the intellect (buddhi), which the Katha Upaniṣad later concedes is inferior to the self, Akṣarabrahman, and Parabrahman (Katha-upaniṣad 3/10-11).

Thus, it is useless if not perilous and ridiculously arrogant venture to attempt to grasp the knowledge of a supremely divine entity by that which is still fettered by māyā. In conclusion, the Bhāṣyakāra asks: how can there be any other reliable means of knowing that which is not fully perceptible to human senses and graspable by human intellect? Therefore, rather than perception or inference, divinely spoken or divinely inspired words constituting scripture are reliable sources to form an accurate understanding of Parabrahman. Among all the sources of knowledge, scripture (text) is thus the principal knowledge-source (paramapramāṇa) and Parabrahman is, simply, understandable by scripture alone (śāstraikagamya).^[4] However, while the above places reasoned argumentation in its proper epistemological position, it need not be totally abandoned in order to defer to scriptural authority.

In the same comment on Katha-upaniṣad-2/9, the Bhāṣyakāra makes the decisive difference between correct reasoning (sattarka) and incorrect reasoning (dustarka):

1. “brahmasvarūpagurūpadiṣṭasacchāstrasiddhāntavacanānuguṇastarka sattarkaḥ”

2. “dustarkastu tadviparītaḥ kubuddhilyato gurūpadiṣṭaśāstrasiddhāntavacanānanuguṇa ucchṛṅkhalaḥ pramāṇānanugrāhakaḥ”

The former is that which is informed by and undergirded by śraddhā, which he describes in Brahmasūtra-2/1/11. Second, as paramount faith in the Brahmasvarūpa Guru and the śāstra and siddhānta. Conversely, incorrect reasoning is that which is uncommitted to and independent of scripture and Guru. Reason alone may be blind, but associated with faith, it is able to explore the broad contours of philosophical and spiritual reflection reliably. Faith gives it direction, leading to fruitful culmination.

Thus, reason, can be counted as a valuable tool in understanding revelation when properly grounded in and guided by scripture and the Guru. It is not necessarily good in discovering new ideas brings loss in the principles. For there always be traced to revelation but exploring those ideas excavating from them deeper truths that had been a severe loss for centuries. This is what is meant by reason, providing insight as it opens one to fresh, deeper, richer understandings of revelation.

As said in the Siddhānta Śuddha:

tatrā'nugrāhakastu saḥ |^[5]

Obviously, to confirm and consolidate what has already been learned from the scripture and to refute claims contradictory to it, reason can help undoubtedly. Early on, in the Brahmasūtra-Svāminārāyaṇa-Bhāṣya, an objection is raised about the inquiry into 'Brahman'. The question is this: if śāstra (scripture) is the supreme authority of Brāhmic knowledge, it is futile, then, to debate upon it because now there is no room for doubt and therefore there are no doubts to dispel.

The Bhāṣyakāra discards that idea, asserting realistically that doubts are dispelled; it is useful and even necessary to test and necessary to test and consolidate what one knows, just as one shakes a peg that has been freshly hammered into the ground.^[6] Being the tarkaprasthana, the Brahmasūtra testifies the faithful employment of reasoned argumentation to harmonize meanings, clarify ambiguous content, refute contradictory interpretations and rebut objections. Reason thus serves to strengthen and simplify that which has already been established by scripture. This is all to defend and embolden faith. The Bhāṣyakāra too defends his interpretations in the Svāminārāyaṇa-Bhāṣya as being Śrutiyuktisammatā, that is, in agreement with both revelation and reasoning: Ratiocination is still permissible and profitable when deployed on the basis of scripture. Therefore, applying reasoned reflection is not in contradistinction to the concept of Śrutiyuktisammatā, insofar as it is in consonance with and submission to revelation. Indeed, reason often works in the service of revelation, bolstering its authority and justifying its precedence.^[7] In the same way, this all debate and enunciation, the Bhāṣyakāra elaborates in the Brahmasūtras-1/1/3 and Katha-upaniṣad-2/9 as well.