Nyayakusumanjali of Udayana (study)
by Sri Ramen Bhadra | 2014 | 37,777 words
This page relates ‘Alternative interpretation of the Grounds’ of the study on the Nyayakusumanjali of Udayana, who belonged to the Nyaya-Vaisheshika School of Indian philosophy and lived in the 10th century. The Nyaya-Kusumanjali is primarily concerned with proving the existence of God but also deals with various other important philosophical problems. The book is presented as an encyclopedia of Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrines.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Alternative interpretation of the Grounds
Finally, to satisfy the Mimamsakas Udayana offers some alternative interpretations of the grounds mentioned in the first verse of the fifth stavaka.[1] Thus the first ground “being an effect” is explained as “having intention” (tātparya). A sentence is uttered to express the intention of the speaker. In the Veda there are many sentences expressing different kinds of intention.
There are statements which express injunction. There are also statements which imply that a particular action is good and has to be performed, or a particular action is bad and it is prohibited. All such intentions must belong to the speaker of the Veda. No ordinary person can be such a speaker. Therefore God has to be admitted as the speaker whose intentions are expressed through the Vedic statements.
The second argument is stated as ayojana. In the alternative explanation the word is given a totally different meaning, namely explanation (vyākhyāna).[2] It is observed that the learned persons follow the instruction and advices given in the Vedic statements. The implications of such statements must be explained to the learned by some person. Otherwise nobody will be able to understand the implications and would not be able to perform actions according to them. So there must be a very learned interpreter of the Veda. His knowledge and wisdom must be very great and not like that of any ordinary person. An ordinary person may understand and explain a few Vedic statements, but he will not be able to understand the Veda as a whole. So his explanation will not be dependable and there may be doubt about the validity of the explanation. So an extraordinary interpreter for the Veda is to be admitted, and that is God. Similarly, the ground pratyaya is also explained in a different way.[3] The word means suffixes like the liṅ which express an injunction. In the Veda many statements are found with verbal forms using the liṅ. This injunction must come from a reliable person. In the case of Veda this reliable person can be none other than God. In this context Udayana takes up the question of the exact meaning of a suffix expressing injunction. It is observed that an activity takes place when there is knowledge produced by an injunction (vidhi). This activity is produced by a desire to perform an action. Such a desire again is produced when there is knowledge in the form that it is possible to perform such an action and also, that it is a means for getting what is desired. Injunction therefore means the object of such knowledge, namely, being an action capable of performing and being the means for the desired. This is the view of the older Naiyāyikas. Udayana holds a different view. According to him, the meaning is actually the intention of a reliable person which leads to the inference that this particular action is a means for getting the desired.
Udayana next examines to what exactly does the meaning of injunction belong to.[4] Does it belong to the agent or the object or the instrument or the agent who employs? If it is said that physical action which belongs to the agent is the injunction, there will be at least two problems. First, there will be no activity due to the statement of injunction, namely, “know the self,” because this injunction does not speak of any action which is physical in nature.[5] Secondly, activity will be produced even from the statement “one is going to the village”, because a form of physical action is understood from it. Again, it cannot also be said that an effort (yatna) is injunction, because even when an effort is conveyed by a different verbal form, there is no activity, if there is no knowledge that it is a means for the desire or it is the means for something undesirable. Desire also cannot be injunction, because there will be mutual dependence. The knowledge of the injunction is to be produced by desire itself and again, the desire is to be produced by the knowledge of the desire.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.5.
[2]:
Ibid.
[3]:
Ibid.
[4]:
Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.7.
[5]:
Ibid.