Examination of the first ground

Of these arguments, however, the first one is considered the most important and popular. It has been mentioned in almost all the later works as the standard argument proving the existence of God. Again, this argument has been also very much criticized by the opponents. Udayana has noted the objections and given answers to them.^[1] The main point of the opponents is that God cannot be admitted as an agent because God has no physical body.

The argument as we have already noted is briefly that every effect has an agent. The earth also is an effect and therefore it also must have an agent. But an inference is not possible without concomitance. The concomitance in this case is: whatever is an effect is produced by an agent. This is actually observed in the cases of so many effects, such as, a jar a cloth etc. But the opponents point out that in all such instances it is also found that the agent has a physical body. It is never observed that the agent of a particular effect is without a body. Thus, actually, the concomitance is: every effect has an agent with a physical body. So if there should really be an agent producing the earth etc. he must have a body. But God is not admitted to have a physical body. So God cannot be the agent. Thus there is contradiction with concomitance.

The objection may be put in a different manner also. An agent has always a physical body.^[2] Thus, an invariable rule may be made; whatever is produced by an agent is produced by a body. Negatively, the rule will be whatever is not produced by a body is not produced by an agent. The earth etc. are not produced by someone with a body. So they cannot be produced by an agent. Alternatively, the objection may be put in this way also. When we consider the nature of the concomitance which is the basis of the inference. We have to postulate an agent with a body. Due to various reasons no physical body for God is admitted. Thus, there will be contradiction between concomitance and conclusion.

In answer to these objections Udayana says that the position of the opponent is very weak. Nyāya proposes the inference that the earth etc. have an agent, because they are effects. The opponent on the other hand proposes the inference that God cannot be an agent because of being without a body. In this inference God is offered as the subject. So the question arises whether this subject is something proved or unproved. If the second alternative is accepted, there will obviously be the fallacy of an unproved subject. No inference is possible if the subject itself has no real existence. To avoid the charge, the opponent may accept that the subject is really something proved. But, then the thesis of the opponent will be contradicted. An inference is offered to disprove God. But to justify that inference the existence of God is accepted as proved.^[3]

Moreover, a concomitance is established generally between the production of the effect and the presence of an agent. There is no reference to the specialty of either the effect or the agent. For example, when concomitance is established between smoke and fire they are taken generally. No particular character of smoke or fire is taken into consideration. It is never discussed whether the smoke is black or blue and the fire is red or white. Similarly, it is generally proved that every effect has an agent. The particular nature of the effect or the cause may vary in different cases, but it does not affect the concomitance. On the basis of a general concomitance it is established that earth etc. also must have an agent. So there is no about the existence of an agent. The question of determining the specific nature of the agent comes later. In the case of ordinary effects like a jar, a piece of cloth etc., it is possible to have an agent with a physical body. An agent must be such a person as has direct knowledge of the material and the power to handle it. An ordinary person can handle a lump of clay or a lot of yarns. So in such cases it is enough to admit an ordinary person as an agent. But in the case of earth etc. it is not possible for any ordinary person to know or handle the material, because the materials include many things like atoms etc. which are imperceptible. So the agent in this case must be omniscient and all-powerful. There are also difficulties in admitting a physical body for God. For example, what will be the nature of such a body? Is it eternal or noneternal? It cannot be eternal, because no such body is observed anywhere. If it be noneternal, a question will arise about its cause. In the case of an ordinary person, the body is produced among other things by the merit and demerit resulting from good or bad actions. But God is not characterized by merit or demerit. In that case God will be reduced to an ordinary being and will not be omniscient or all-powerful. Then God cannot be the agent for earth etc. Because of such difficulties God is admitted to do without a body. This absence of a body has nothing to do with being or not being an agent.^[4]

In fact, Udayana says that the position of the opponent cannot be established because there is no argument in favour of it and also, there is no argument which can counter an argument raised against his conclusion. On the contrary, the Nyāya position is firmly established not only by inferences but also logically sound arguments. For example, if the existence of God is not accepted, it will lead to the absurd position that earth etc. in spite of being effects are not produced by an agent. Moreover, there are many scriptural statements which declare that God is there. These statements must be accepted as valid because they are also supported by sound arguments.^[5]

It has been argued to prove God that at the beginning of the creation atoms combine with one another because of the effort of God. This is actually the second argument given by Udayana. The opponent raises an objection against it. Thus it may be said that let the atoms themselves be combined with one another and there is no necessity of any effort of an agent. In answer, Udayana says that in that case the atoms themselves will have to be admitted as conscious, because the power of putting an effort is a property of the conscious. But the atoms cannot be conscious in any way. Even then, the opponent may say that no effort of a conscious agent is necessary. The atoms may move and get conjoined with one another because of adṛṣṭa. The answer to this is that adṛṣṭa cannot produce result only by itself without being assisted by ordinary causes. So even if adṛṣṭa is there, the ordinary cause of movement, namely, the effort of a conscious being has to be accepted. It will lead to an absurd position. It may be argued, for example, that a jar also is produced by adṛṣṭa and there is no necessity of admitting clay or the potter as a cause.^[6]

Footnotes and references:

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[1]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.2.

[2]:

Under Ibid.

[3]:

Ibid.

[4]:

Ibid.

[5]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.3.

[6]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.4.