Nature of the Individual Self (Jivatman)

In India, soul is generally accepted as an eternal and permanent principle. All orthodox schools agree that soul is essentially pure and that in its pure form, it is never affected by any kind of worldly impurities. There 2. sheng 3. 150.

382 is, however, no universal agreement among the different schools of Indian philosophy regarding the noumenat (a ground of phenomena that is unknowable by the senses but is conceivable by reason) character of the Atman. The Carvakas adopt the materialistic conception of the self. They hold that the self is the living body with the attribute of consciousness. The Bauddhas reduce the self to a stream of thought or a series of cognitions. Like some empiricists and sensationists, they admit only the empirical self. The Advaita Vedanta takes the self as one, unchanging and self-shining intelligence (svaprakasa Caitanya), which is neither a subject nor an object, neither the 'I' nor the 'me The Nyaya-Waisesika, however, adopts the realistic view of the self. According to this joint school, the self is a unique substance, to which all cognitions, feelings, and conations belong as its attributes. It is unconscious in itself. Consciousnes is not the essence of the self. It is an adventitious quality of it. All cognitions or conscious states arise in the self when it is related to the manas, and the manas is related to the senses, and the senses come in contact with the external objects. The term 'consciousness (Jnana) in this joint system, is synonymous with intellect (buddhi) and

383 2 1 apprehension(upalabdhi). But the Sankhya and the Yoga apprehension(upalabdhi). regard buddhi as an unconscious modification of Prakyti, the root-evolent, in which the conscious self (purusa) is reflected. When buddhi catches the reflection of the self, it is intelligized, as it were, and appears to be conscious. But in the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, buddhi is apprehension or consciousness of objects. It is not an unconscious substance; it is the quality of the self. This non-recognition of the identity between self and consciousness constitutes an important feature of Nyaya-Veisesika realism. This is due to the fact that the Nyaya-Veisesika philosophy has recognized from the very beginning a distinction and not 'tadetma' between the thing and its quality or essence. 'Jar' as a substance is different from its red colour as well es *jerness' which is its essence; and both of them are related to it by the relation of inherence. The self as knower is also the substance in which the essence Atmatva inheres. It is only when the soul comes in contact with the body and mind that qualities like knowledge, desire, aversion, pleasure and pain arise in it. Thus, in Nyaya-Vaisesika system, consciousness is a quality of the self. The self is not identical with the organism, the 1. Gantema, Nyaya Sutra, 1.1.15; Prasastapada, Bhasya, Page 171. 2. Isvarkrisana, Sankhya Karika, 22-23.

384 sense-organs, or the manas as the Carvakas hold. As we have seen, consciousness is the quality of the self. Since consciousness is a quality, it requires a substance to support it. The body cannot be the substrate of consciousness, since it is not found in the dead body. If consciousness were a property of the body, it would exist in the various parts of the body and its material constituents. If consciousness is a property of body then it must be capable of being perceived by others 2 1 also. The material causes of the body are unconscious, so the body must be unconscious. Again, the body is contimally becoming new. The body of childhood is not the same as the body of the youth, and the body that one has in his old age is different from the body that he had in his childhood. If consciousness is a quality of the body, then it also will change constantly and, therefore, there will be intermittent breaks in the continuity of conscious life, which in turn will impair memory. The sense-organs also are not the substrates of consciousness. Even when they are destroyed, there is a recollection of objects perceived through them in the past❤ Further, they are the instruments of knowledge, recollection 1. Kapila, Samchya Sutra, 3, 20-21. 2. Vatsyayana, Nyaya-Bhasya, 3.2.18. 3. Vetsyayene, Nyaya-Bhasya, 3.2.18.

385 and cannot be the knowing agents. It is the self who 1 controls them, and synthesises their contributions. It is the self that confers unity on the various kinds of apprehensions. The eye cannot hear sounds nor could the ear see visions, and the consciousness that I who am seeing a thing now also have heard of it, will not be possible if the soul were not different from and beyond the sonses. Again, being only products of matter, the sense-organs cannot have consciousness as their property. The manos also cannot be the substrate of consciousness. Mind is an atomic internal organ. If the consciousness had been a property of the mind, then it would also have been atomic and, therefore, nonperceptible in nature, which really is not true. If consciousness is a quality of mind, then the simultaneous cognition of things such as yogis have would be inexplicable. 2 Thus, the self cannot be identified with the body, senses, and the mind, since it is present even when the 3 body is lost, the senses are cut off and manas is quieted down. All these belong to the object side, and can never 1. Vatsyayana, Nyaya-Bhasya, 3.1.1. 2. Thin., 3.2.19. 3. Presastapaida, Bhasya, Page 69.

be the subject while self is subject. 1 The self is not a stream of consciousness as the Buddhists hold. It is not a series of momentary No 386 cognitions, for then memory becomes inexplicable. member of a mere series of cognitions oan, like a bead of the rosary, know what has preceded it or what will succeed it. It is not a mind-body-complex. It is permanent substance in which consciousness inheres. The self is the inherent cause of consciousness, though it is produced by a collocation of condition. The self is not transcendental consciousness beyond the distinction of subject and object, as the Advaita Vedanta holds. There is no such thing as pure intelligence unrelated to some subject and object. Intelligence cannot subsist without a certain locus. Hence the self is not intelligence as such, but a substance having intelligence its attribute. The self is not mere consciousness or knowledge, but a knower, an ego or the 'I', and also an enjoyer. The self is the perceiver of all, the experiencer of all pleasures and pains, and the knower of all things. Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and cognition are all qualities of the self. The 2 1. Uddyotakara, Nyaya-Vartika, 3.2.19. 2 2. Vatsyayana, Nyaya-Bhasya, i●l.9-11.

387 substance to which these qualities belong cannot be made up of parts, for it is an assumption of the MyBy a- Vaise sika that compound substances are destructible while simple ones are eternal. The soul is partless and eternal. It is simple. Therefore, it is indestructible. It has neither origin nor end. It is neither created nor destroyed by God. The self is all-pervading. It cannot have a limited magnitude, since what is limited has parts and is, therefore, des tructible. It is not atomic as Rimanuja holds. If it were atomio, it could not have consciousness in connection with the whole body, and could not perceive its qualities, since qualities of atomic substances are imperceptible. It cannot be of intermediate magnitude. It cannot be larger or maller than the body. If it were so, it could not Occupy the body and pervade it. It cannot be co-extensiv with the body as the Jainas hold. If it were so, it would be too small for the body which grows and develops. Again, human soul could not transmigrate into an ant's body or an elephant's body. Hence the self is all-pervading. But it cannot apprehend many things simultaneously owing to the atomic nature of the mind, which is its internal organ. Each has one manas which persists throughout its empirical life. It is separated from the manas in the state of liberation. The soul is an eternal entity which is from time to

388 time commected with a body suitable to its desert. The unseen power in the soul (adrsta) generated by actions done in the previous birth organizes a body for the self, appropriate to it. The organism assumed by the transmigration of soul is a fit medium for the maturation of merit and demerit acquired by it in the previous birth. The soul transmigrates into a body fit for the experiences it has to undergo. Pre-existence and future life are not so much proved as assumed. The new-born infant's desire for milk is due to experience in the previous birth. His pleasures and pains also are due to the same cause. His smiles and cries are not mere reflex actions. They are conscious actions determined by experience in the previous 1 birth. If there is no pre-existence, there is gain of urmerited fruit. If there is If there is no future life, there is loss of merited action. Inequalities in the present birth are ascribed to merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) sequired in the previous birth. Actions done in the present birth will be rewarded and punished in the future birth. Pre-existence and future life are based on these ethical considerations. The self persists as a simple, eternal substance in the midst of a cycle of births and deaths. 1. Vatsyayena, Nyaya-Bhasya, 3.1.19-22. 2. Ibid., 4.1.10.

389 Its association with body is called birth. Its separation from body is called death.