The nature of “Kala” (time)

Kala is conceived in the Nyaya-Vaisesika system as an external entity. It is not a subjective form of perception. It is real and objective. It is one, ubiquitous, and eternal substance, which is the statio background against which events happen and from which they derive their chronological order. It possesses no specific physical quality like colour and thus, cannot be en object of external perception. It is neither perceivable internally, for the mind has no jurisdiction over external or non-physical objects independently of a 1. sridhara, Nyaya-kandil, Page 68; Jayanta, Nyaya-Manjari, Page 141. 2. A.B. Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism, Pages 236-37.

324 physical sense-organ. Then, what is the source of our knowledge that kola exists? The Vaige cika answers that the knowledge of kala is arrived at by a series of inferences. First, the notions of priority (paratva) and posteriority (aparat va), of simultaneity (yaugapadya) and succession (ay augapadya), and of quickness and slowness constitute the grounds of inference of the existence of kala. Kala is the 1 efficient cause of these cognitions. Secondly, it is the efficient cause of production, persistence, and 2 destruction of all effects. Thirdly, it is the cause of the notions of moments, hours, day, night, fortnight, month, year and the like. Some deny the reality of kala and trace the variety of cognitions of temporal relations to different circumstances peculiar to each case. But sridhara impugns the validity of this argument. If kala were non-existent, there would be no production. But an entity, which had prior non-existence, is produced. Production implies prior non-existence and posterior existence. Priority and posteriority involve time. Thus production involves the 1. Kanada, Vaise sika Sutra, 2.2.6. Prasastapada Bhasya, Page 63. 2. Ibid., Kaneda, Vaisesika Sutra, 2.2.9. 3. Prasast apeda Bhasya, Page 63.

1 325 existence of time. The Buddhists identify kala with change or action, and deny the reality of kala as distinct from actions. There is no time apart from actions. There is no perception of time at all, but only that of actions. The cognitions of slowness, quickness and the like apprehend actions only. But Jayanta urges that though there is no perception of time apart from actions yet this does not mean that there is no perception of time at all and that actions are always perceived as qualified by time. Time is perceived as a qualification (visasana) of actions, but not as an independent entity. When we perceive succession, simultaneously, quickness, slowness and the like, we do not perceive mere actions, but we perceive another entity, which qualifies these actions, and that is time. A peculiarity in cognitions is due to a peculiarity in their objects. Hence time is distinct from actions (kriya). 3 Though kala is one, it is spoken of as threefold, 1. Sridhara, Nyaya-Kandli, Pages 64-65. 2. Jayanta, Nyaya-Manjarl, Page 136. 3. Ibid.

326 1 1.e., past, present and future owing to the limiting conditions of production, persistence and destruction. Its relation to the limiting conditions is real. The future is indicated by the production of an effect; the present, by its persistence; and the past, by its 2 destruction. Vatsyayana holds the same view that when an action has not yet begun it is future; when an action continues in a substance, it is present, when an action has ceased to exist, it is past. 4 The Madhyamika theory, that there is no present time apart from the past and future, is exmined by Vatayayana. The past is defined as that which precedes the present, and the future as that which succeeds it. But the present has no meaning apart from the past and the future. When the object falls, we have the time taken up by its traversing a certain distance and the time that will be taken up by it in traversing the remaining distance, and there is no intervening distance which the object can be said to traverse at the present time. Space traversed gives the idea of past time, space to be traversed that of the future, and there is no third space 1. Sridhara, Nyaya-KandlI, Page 66. 2. Jayanta, Nyaya-Manjari, Page 139. 3. Vatsyayana, Nyaya Bhasya, 2.1.38. 4. Ibid., 2.1.39-43.

327 1 which could give rise to the present time. But Vatsyayana says that we have the conception of time as past when the action of falling has ceased.... When the same action is going to happen, we have the conception of time as future; and lastly, when the action of the thing is perceived as going on at the time, we have the conception of present time. The object is actually connected with action, the present is the basis of the actual existing connection of the object and the action. Past and future would not be conceivable, 2 if the present time did not exist. Again, perceptions arise in connection with things which are present in time, There cannot be perception, if there is not present time. Hence, the past, the present and the future are independent of one another, and real and objective. They are three forms of one time, 3