Particularity (visesa)

According to Vaisesika, the true realisation of the Atman, the highest end of Indian philosophy is possible by

259 the right knowledge of each and every category accepted by the system. This is possible only when every object is distinguished from its homogeneous and heterogeneous 1 classes. Everything in this world is differentiated from another on account of different attributes, different qualities and different universals. But in the case of two objects (e.g., two jars) which have not only the same universal but, being quite similar, have the same qualities, the question arises how one of them can be differentiated from the other. The obvious answer is that they are differentiated an account of the difference of their parts. But what about the two atoms of the same class, say of earth, which have the same universal and the same qualities, and which have no parts? How can one atom be differentiated from another of the same class? If they are not differentiated, they will coalesce and form one mass, and the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas will come to an end. The Vaisesika seeks to explain the position by supposing that each atom possesses an ultimate differentiating characteristic called particularity (visesa) by means of which it is distinguished from all other atous. That all atoms are judged as distinct individuals is because each of them has its own 1. Kanada, Vaisesika Sutra, l.1.4.

260 particularity. What is true of atoms is also true of all. Other eternal substances (e.g., akasa, kala, dik, atman and manas), are exactly on the same grounds. Kaneda defines visosa as the ultimate distinguishing feature of an eternal substance, which is known by its discrimination from the other eternal substances. It depends upon the intellect to indicate its existence. Prasastapada also defines particularity as the ultimate distinguishing features of eternal substances. They are called visesas, because they are the causes of the ultimate distinction of their substrates from one 3 another. They are the final distinctive characters of eternal substances. From the definitions of particularity accepted by Kanada and Prasastapada, we may say that Kanada believed the doctrine of viaesa in the sense of particularity or exclusiveness, i.e., visega was an aspect of every object which caused the notion of its exclusion or differentiation from other objects. Though the term 'antya-visesa occurs in the Veisesika-Sutra also, but it is not explained there. The theory of visesa as differentiator of atoms, which is 1. Prasastapada, Padarthadharmasangraha, Pages 321-22. 2. Kanada, Vaisesika-Sutra, 1.2.3., 6. 3. Prasastapada, Padarthadharmasangraha, Page 13. 4. Kanada, Vaisesika Sutra, 1.2.6.

261 the cornerstone of the atomic theory, is not found in the Visesika-Gutras. The atomic theory is usually supposed to be associated with the Vaisesika school. The name of the founder of the school, Kanada, meaning an atom-eater, also seems suggestive of the same. The category visega being intrinsically associated with the atomic theory, it has also been suggested that the name of the system, Vaidesika, might have been derived from it. But this is not probable, because the theory of visesa in that sense, as pointed out above, is not found in the Vaisesika sutras. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the doctrine of visesa, in the sense of particularity or exclusiveness, which along with samanya (the universal) has been accepted as an aspect of every object in the Vaisesika-Sutras, was an important principle of that school. It is possible that the name of the school might have been due to the term 'visesa' used in that sense. Prasastapada makos particularity an objective reality. He restricted the term 'viaega' to the sense of ultimate particulars residing in eternal atoms and other eternal substances. Particularity inheres in each of them, 1 which distinguishes it from the other eternal substances. Particularities are held to be eternal because we cannot conceive of my eternal substance remaining indifferentiated 1. Prasastapada, Padarthadhermasamgraha, Page 321.

from others at any time. Particularity is thus an 262 independent self-sufficient principle of differentiation. It is the unique feature of a single individual, and so its only function is to differentiate (vyawtti). It is ultimate (antya) in the sense that it functions even when every other means of differentiation fails. Thus, Prasastapada introduced the theory that the term visesa is exclusively used in the sense of antya-videsa residing in the atoms and other eternal substmess. In later Nyeya-Vaisesika literature, especially in the manuals like Tarka-bhasa, Nyaya Siddhanta-Mukta vall and Tarka. Samgraha, the idea continued to use the term visesa in the above mentioned sense. This antya-visesa does not belong to the qualities and motions possessed by eternal substances; for, the differentiation in those cases is possible through the help of their own intermediate jatis, namely, suklatva, raktatva, gamantva, etc., and also through the videnas of the form of their substrata. 1 Particularities do not require other particularities to distinguish them from one another, because it would lead to infinite regress. They distinguish themselves 1. Sivaditya, Saptapaderthi, Page 12. 2. Jankinatha, Nyaya-siddhanta-manjari, Page 122.

1 from one another. Through their own nature, they cause differentiation and do not require the help of another visesa over it. Thus they perform a double functione Firstly, they distinguish the eternal substance from other eternal substances, and secondly, they distinguish themselves from other particularities. 263 There cannot be any class-character (Jeti) like 'Visesatva' common to all particularities, for a particularity of such a class-character will be distinguishable by means of that character from things by means of that character from things of other classes and thus forfeit its own self-differentiated nature. Moreover, particularities sharing a common class-character, like the individuals of any other class, can only be differentiated from one another through some individual characteristic or distinctive feature of each of the me But in that case, again, particularities will cease to be self_differentiated reals. They exist in single substances only. They are devoid of generality. They do not exist through inherence of Being in them, which is a generality. divaditya supports this view as: "Videga en entity inhering in a single substance, and devoid 1. Prasastapada Bhasya, Pages 321.22. Aan 2. Udayana, Kirnavall, Page 25. 3. Thide

1 264 of a community." 2 The Neo-Naiyayikas headed by Raghunatha Siromani deny the logical necessity of acknowledging particularity as a distinct category. They hold that if particulars can distinguish themselves from other particularities without the aid of other particularities, then atoms themselves may distinguish themselves from other atoms without particularities inhering in them. The Vedantins and the Mimemsakas, Kumerila and Prabhakara also do not accept particularity as an independent category. They ask how one particular visesa is differentiated from another visega. To this Prasastapada replies: "Cognition caused through the agency of a thing relates to things other then itself. For instance, a lamp causes the cognition of a jar, etc., but the cognition of a lamp is never brought about by another lamp. Just as the flesh of a cow and that of a horse are unclean by themselves and their contact defiles other things also, similarly, in the cases of visesas, differentiation being their nature, they are differentiated by themselves, and by their contact atoms are also differentiated. Moreover, Prasastapada believes that yogins are 1. Sivaditya, Sapta-padarthi, Page 40. 2. Raghunatha-Siromani, Padartha-tattva-nirupana, 2. Raghunatha Pages 30-31. 3. Prasastapada, Padarthadharmasangraha, Page 322.

265 able to perceive the ultimate particularity (visesa) of the simple 1 substances. It may be argued that the yogins can 2 Just as distinguish them from one another by dint of their merits born of meditation without the aid of their particularities. But this argument is invalid. they cannot perceive a white thing as non-white, and recognize a thing never perceived before by dint of their own merits, so they cannot distinguish the atoms of the same kind from one another by dint of them without the aid of particularities. If they could distinguish them from one another without particularities inhering in them, their perceptions would be invalid. The Veisesika system advocates realistic pluralism. It recognizes the category of visessa as an independent category to emphasize the individuality of eternal substances. Visega according to Vaidesika, is a distinct type of real and cannot be brought under any other category. It is not substance, because it is not the substratum of quality; nor is it quality or action, for it does not participate in a universal. It is manifestly not a relation and so cannot be identified with sama vays. Each particularity inheres only in one eternal substance and is, therefore, not a universal, which is supposed to be related to many

266 individuals (substances, qualities or actions). Mutual non-existence cannot serve the purpose of visesa. Mutual non-existence exists in two entities, which have dissimilarities. There is a mutual non-existence of cloth and a jar in each other. But particularities exist in two eternal substances, which have similar qualities, and distinguish them from each other. So mutual nonexistence cannot serve the purpose of particularities. Therefore, the existence of particularities must be admitted to account for the ultimate distinction of eternal substances. "Particularities are the ultimate distinguishing characters of the atoms of the same form, quality and motion, and of the released souls, and of the internal organs (manas) by which the yogins distinguish them from one another