Kanada’s Seven Padarthas

Kanada tries to analyze the things and then lays down the final liberation which follows the right understanding of things. His method is that of generalization. Vaisosika is mainly a study of reality itself in its various aspects. Its enumeration of the 1 six categories, with the seventh (Abhava) added afterwards, is a complete analysis of all existing things. These categories again are not enumerated for a special purpose only, like the sixteen padarthas of Gantema; but they 1. Kanada, Vaisesika Sutra, 1.1.4.

208 resolve the entire universe, as it were, not excepting even the Almighty God, into so many classes. Gautamo treats of knowledge only, but Kanada deals with the wider phenomenon of existence. He divides all the reality into se ven categories, viz., substance (drawya), quality (guna), action or motion (karma), generality (samanya), particularity (viacsa), inherence (samavaya), and nonexistence (abhava). The first six are called bhava padarthas or existent entities and are thus contrasted, in a marked way, with abhava, which amounts to nonexistence. It is to be noted that Kanada did not speak of non-existence as a separate category. One might very well explain the Vaisesika Sutras (9.1.1-10) without assuming that Kanada ves spealding here of absence as a separate category. Prasastapada also did not state whether absence should be considered a separate category. But Fridhara, Udayana, Vyomasiva and sivaditya add the seventh category of non-existence. Evaditya recognizes se ven categories including non-existence in his work 1 entitled 'SaptapaderthI'." sridhere says, "Won-existence has not been mentioned separately, because it depends upon existence, not because it does not exist." Hence abhava 2 1. Sivaditya, Saptapadarthi, Page 10. 2. Sridhara, Nyaya Kandl, Page 7.

209 is as good a category of reality as bhave or being. 1 2 the modern realists like Rusell, Alexander recognize the reality of negation or non-existence. Thus it is clear that Kanada proposed seven categories, though he did not mention abhava separately as it is dependent on bhava. 3 This, however, does not imply that the Nyaya is opposed to the seven ontological categories of Vaisesika. As a matter of fact, eminent writers of the Nyaya school are found to have clearly expressed their approval of the vaisesika ontological scheme and the Vaisesika principle of classifying and labelling the reals. It is admitted by Vatsyayana that besides the twelve prameyas, there are countless other cognizables or reals and that it is possible to classify them all under the seven heads recognized by the Vaisesike. The Mimanhsakas of the Bhatta school recognize five padarthas--substance, generality, quality, activity and non-existence. The Prabhakaras recognize eight--the five bhavas of the Vaissesika system (omitting Videsa) and potency (sakti), similarity (sadraya) and number (samkhya), 1. Rusell, The Analysis of Mind, Pages 275-76. 2. Alexander, Space, Time and Diety, Pages 200-22. Visvanatha, Siddhanta Muktavali, Page 41. 4. Vatsyayana, Nyaya Bhasya, 1.1.9.

210 non-existence not being accepted as a distinct category. The Semkhyas accept two ultimate padarthas: primordial matter (prakrti) and spirit (purusa). Among the Vedantins, the Advaitins maintain that there is one ultimate reality, 1.8., Brahman, and there are only two padarthas--spirit (cit) and non-spirit (aoit), or soul (atman) and non-soul (anatman); the Vigistadvaita school recognizes three-spirit (cit), non-spirit (acit), and God; and the Dvaitins reduce all the padarthas to two main categories--independent and dependent. In most of the syncretist works dealing with the tenets of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, the arguments advanced by the Bhattas as well as the Prabhakaras to establish the existence of potentiality (sakti) as a distinct entity, and the view upheld by the latter school of Mimamsakas that similarity (sadrsya) should be given a distinct place in the list of categories, are refuted. Counter-agents (pratibandheka) counteract the operation of causes and causes turn out to be unavailing. The counteraction that we experience in such cases cannot be explained otherwise than as consisting in the destruction of the causal officecy or sakti as a distinct category must necessarily be recognized. The Naiyayikas urge that counteraction consits merely in the presence of counter-agents, the total

non-existence of which is one of the elements 211 constituting the full compliment of the causal apparatus (samagri). Thus they disapprove the recessity for recognizing sakti as a distinct category. Similarity, according to Prabhakaras, does not consist merely in the possession of parts or qualities or features of the same kind as the Naiyayikas urge; but it is revealed in experience as a distinct category. The Naiyayikas contend that a careful analysis of experience would show that similarity consists merely in the possession of 1 parts or qualities or features of the same kind. Undoubtedly it can be said that the various classifications of padarthas, given by Indian systematists, can be likewise reduced to the seven padarthas. We see that substratum (dharmin) is always in the form of a substance (dravya). But the properties (dharmas) residing in a substratum are found, on further analysis, to be of various kinds. Some properties like colour appear to be of the nature of stationary attributes of their substrate. They are called qualities (gmnas). Others, for example, the motion of a body, are of an 1. Udayana, Kirnavall, Page 6; Sivaditya, Sapta Padarthi, Page 10.

212 evanescent nature. They are called movements (kerma)● We, thus, arrive at the first three categories: (1) drawa, (11) guna, (111) korna. Of the numerous objects of our knowledge, some are so similar that they are designated by a common noun, and there must therefore be something common to all individuals of a class. That common thing may be regarded as the universal (samenye), which is the fourth category of the school. In case of atoms of the same class, differentiation of one atom from another was assumed to be due to a special property called visesa residing in the atoms, which is the fifth category of the school. The properties (gune, karma, semonya and visega) cannot exist as independent of a dreva. Therefore, the relation between properties and drewa cannot be an ordinary one, called 'connection' (samyoge), which obtains between two substances that can be comected and separated at will. A sixth category, therefore, in the form of a special relation called 's@mavaya' vas assumed. To these six categories, originally accepted by the school, a seventh one, namely, abhave (non-existence) was added later one Of these seven categories, the first three, i.se, substance, quality and action possess a real objective existence. Kenade calls them 'artha', and declares, in 1. Kanada, Vaisesika Entra, 1.2.7.

: 213 treating of yogic insight, that we can have an intuition 1 of them. The next three, 1.0., generality, particularity and inherence are products of intellectual discrimination (buddhyapeksam). These first six categories have existence (astitva), nameability (abhidheyatva) and 3 knowability (jnoyatva). They are objects of positive notion of beings. They can be known without depending on their counter-entities. They are capable of being expressed by names. They are capable of being know They are not subjective notions but ontological entities. Negation (non-existence) is also an ontological category. It is not mere negation of a substance in thought, but real non-existence of a substance. substance. When When a jam is destroyed, there is a real negation of the jare Aristotle recognizes ten categories: (1) Substance; (2) Quartity; (3) Quality; (4) Relation; (5) Place; (6) Time; (7) Posture; (8) Property; (9) Activity; (10) Passivity. Of these, the last nine are predicable of substance, but substance itself being independent of all attributes, cannot be predicated of anything. Kanada 's categories stand for different kinds of things. They are metaphysical categories. Aristotle's categories are 1. d., 9.1.14. 2. 76 1.2.3. 3. Prasastapada Bhasya, Padarthadharma Sengraha, Page 16.

214 mainly logical. They are mainly predicables or classes of terms which can be used as predicates. Kanada's categories include not only things, but also subjects capable of having things predicated of them. 1 Aristotle's categories are mainly different kinds of predicables. Kanada's categories are mainly different kinds of objects of knowledge. The former are concerned with proposition. The latter are concerned with real objects. Dravya and guna of the Vaisesika correspond to Aristotle's substance and quality. Aristotle's quantity is brought under guna, Relations are of two kinds: external, like conjunction (samyoga), or internal, like inherence. The first is regarded as a quality and the second is made a separate category. The remaining categories fall under relation, while space and time are taken es independent substances. Activity is Karma, while passivity is only the absence of activity. Property may be either general or partionlar. Posture or disposition is a quality. Aristotle does not mention non-existence (abhaya) as he deals only with positive beings. Now we shall deal these seven padarthas in detail so as to enable us to have a clear understanding of each of them. 1. J.N.Sinha, Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Pages 133-34+