Nyaya-Vaisheshika (critical and historical study)
by Aruna Rani | 1973 | 97,110 words
This essay studies Nyaya-Vaisheshika—A combination of two of the six orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. The study also discusses in detail the authors of various works and critically analyzes key concepts of Nyaya-Vaisesika. Such Indian philosophies seek the direct realization of the Atman (the self) to attain ultimate freedom and bliss....
Upamana as different from “Analogy”
Since the perception of similarity plays an important part in upamana, it is sometimes held that upamana corresponds to analogy of western logic. But from the Tyaya account of upamana as given above it will appear that 1. Varadaraja, Tarkika-raksa, Page 86. E. Visvanatha, Nyaya Sutra Vitti, 116
176 it does not really correspond to an analogical argument. In analogy we infer one resemblance from other resemblances like this: S is P; P has got a characteristic X; therefore, S also must have X as its characteristic, although it is not already known to us. That is, we expect certain qualities to be present in some objects simply because those qualities are found to be present in other objects which resemble the former in many other aspects. This kind of thinking is quite different from what has been called Upamana in Indian logic. Comparison is not analogy, though both are based on similarity. First, unlike analogy comparison depends upon testimony. Secondly, unlike analogy comparison yields the knowledge of the relation between a name (samina) and an object (samjni). It does not lead to the knowledge of resemblance between things, but to that of the denotation of a word, or to the application of a name to a class of objects. Even the special kind of upamana mentioned by Visvanatha is not a knowledge of resemblance, but is the identification of an object from a given description. Thirdly, unlike analogy, comparison sometimes depends upon dissimilarity. In this way comparison is quite different from analogy.