Ordinary Perception (laukika-pratyaksa)

Kinds of Perception 124 Perception has been divided by the Naiyayikas into two broad classes, namely, (1) ordinary perception (laukika pratyaksa) and (11) extraordinary perception (alaukika pratyaksa). This division depends upon the nature of the sense-object-contact which is involved in all perceptions. (1) Ordinary Perception In ordinary perception, there is ordinary intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects It is of two kinds, namely, external (bahya) and internal (manas). External perception is of five kinds, viz., visual perception, auditory perception, tactual perception, gustatory perception, and olfactory perception. The self perceives colour through the visual organs (eyes), sound through the auditory organ (ears), cold and heat through the tactual organ (skin), taste through the gustatory organ (tongue), and smell through the olfactory organ (no se). The self perceives its qualities, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition through the mind (manas), which is the internal organ. The external gengeorgans are physical in nature and are composed of material elements. The mind, which is the internal organ, is not physical in nature. It is not composed of any physical element, like the external senges. It is not

125 limited to the knowledge of any particular class of things or qualities but functions as a central co-ordinating organ in all kinds of knowledge. According to another classification, ordinary perception is of three kinds, namely, (a) nirvikalpaka or indeterminate perception, (b) savikalpaka or determinate perception and (c) pratyabhijna or recognition. This division is based upon the perceptual knowledge which arises from sense-object-contact. There is much difference of opinion among the different systems, as to the emot nature and validity of these three kinds. The Grammarien philosophers hold the view that all perceptions are determinate or svikalpaka, since every perception must be expressed in a verbal proposition and is consequently predicative in its character. The Buddhists and some vedantins are of the view that indeterminate or nirvikalpaka perception alone is valid, while determinate or savikalpaka is false knowledge. Between these two extremes, Minamsa, Samkhya and Nyaya-Vaisesika systems of philosophy accept both indeterminate and determinate perceptions as true knowledge. (a) Indeterminate Perception According to Gautama, that kind of perception which

126 is not associated with a name, is indeterminate perception. Jyanta Bhatte holds that indeterminate perception apprehends generality, substantiality, quality and action, but is devoid of association with a name, while determinate perception apprehends all these characters together with a name. Bhasarvajna defines indeterminate perception as the immediate apprehension of the bare nature of an object just after the intercourse of the object with the senseafter organ. Thms according to the ancient Nyaya, the only difference between the indeterminate and determinate perception is that while the former is not associated with a name, the latter is associated with a name. Indeterminate perception is a judgement without words. There is no definite understanding of the object as this or that kind of object. Indeterminate perception, we may say, resembles the perception of children and dumb persons. But the Navya Nyaya makes the distinction between indeterminate and determinate perception more clear. According to it, the former is the non-judgemental, non-relational cognition of the elements received by the sense-organs, while the latter is the judgemental cognition made of these elements. 1 1. Gautama, Nyaya Sutra, 1.1.4. 2. Jyanta, Nyaya-menjari, Page 99. 3. Bhasarvajna, Nyaya sara, Page 4. .

127 Gangesa, the founder of modern Nyaya, defines indeterminate perception as the non-relational apprehension of an object free from all association of name, genus, 1 and the like. Annam Bhatta holds that the immediate apprehension of an object with its properties without 2 apprehending the relation between them. The distinction between the views of old Nyaya and that of Navya Nyaya, is not due to any difference in the contents of perception, but to the way in which the same contents of experience may be ordered and arranged. The Old Nyaya holds the indetermination perception as the psychological stage, while the Navya Nyaya considers it as a logical stage of perception. We would like to say that indeterminate and determinate perceptions should not be said to be two kinds of perception, but only as two stages in the perceptual process. At the first stage, the knowledge of the object in contact with the sense-organ is inarticulate and vague. At the second stage, it becomes articulate, definite and capable of being described and named. (b) Determinate Perception Determinate perception has been mentioned by Gautama 1. Gengesa, Tattvacintamani, Page 809. 2. Annam Bhatta, Tarka Sangrah Dipika, Page 30.

128 in his definition of perception as vyavasayatmakama, i..., well defined. Determinate perception is relational 2 1 apprehension. There is subject-predicate-relation in it. It involves assimilation, discrimination and association. Bhasarvajna defines determinate perception as the apprehension of an object as qualified by its properties such as substance, quality, action, genus, name and the like. Annam Bhatta defines determinate perception as the apprehension of the relation between the qualified objects objects and its qualifications, viz., name, genus, and the like. Thus we may say that indeterminate is a simple apprehension; and determinate is the predicative judgement of the same object. There cannot be any determinate perception of an object with a previous indeterminate perception of it unless we first know the existence of an object we cannot possibly know it as this or that kind of object. (c) Recognition Recognition gives us the knowledge of an object as existing in the present and as qualified by its relation to the past. According to Vatsyayana, "Recognition is the 1. Gautama, Nyaya Sutra, 1.1.4. 2. Bhaservajna, Nyaya Sara, Page 14. 3. Annam Bhatta, Tarka Samgraha Dipika, Page 30.

129 conscious reference of a past and a present cognition to the same object. I see a jar, recognize it as something that was perceived before, and say 'this is the same jar that I saw 1 The Mimomskas also hold recognition as a kind of ordinary perception, but they do not distinguish it from savikalpaka perception. According to them, recognition is that kind of perception in which the object is determined by the name by which it is called, e.g., 'this is 2 Do admita For the Advaitin, recognition is a perception of the nirvikalpaka kind, since there is no predicate of anything about the perceived object in it, but an assertion of its identity amidst changing conditions. But the Naiyayikas hold recognition as a kind of qualified perception, in which the present object is qualified by a distinct recollection of its past experience.=