Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)
by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words
This page relates ‘Different types of Causes (karana)’ of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.
Go directly to: Footnotes.
Different types of Causes (kāraṇa)
The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas divide cause into three types. Annaṃbhaṭṭa also says that cause is divided into three kinds.
These are:
- samavāyi-kāraṇa (inherent cause),
- asamavāyi-kāraṇa (non-inherent cause) and
- nimitta-kāraṇa (instrumental or efficient cause).[1]
Samavāyikāraṇatva (inherent causality), asamavāyikāraṇatva (non-inherent causality) and nimittakāraṇatva (efficient causality).[2] The point is that the same thing may sometimes be an inherent cause and at other times efficient cause. Similarly, the same thing may be a non-inherent cause at one point of time, while efficient cause at another. There is no contradiction here. Hence, Viśvanātha, maintains that causality (kāraṇatā) is actually of three types. And as causality is of three types, so the cause is also called as three kinds.[3]
Samavāyi-kāraṇa (Inherent Cause)
Among the three causes, inherent cause (samavāyikāraṇa) is the first and most essential one. It is comparable to the upādānakāraṇa or the material cause of other systems of Indian philosophy. This cause is also called to be the substance in which the effect is produced. Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines samavāyikāraṇ as that in which the effect is produced in the relation of inherence.[4] The substance in which the effect is born being inherently related is called the inherent cause. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas point out that it is only the substance which can be an inherent cause.[5] It is to be noted that the conception of inherent causality has the direct bearing on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of avayava and avayavin. The effect, according to them, is born in its parts and is residing there in the relation of samavāya. For example, the cloth remains in the threads in the relation of inherence and as such the threads are the inherent cause of cloth. Similarly, the colour of the cloth also exists in the relation of inherence and as such the cloth itself is the inherent cause of its colour. This implies that substance itself is the inherent cause of its qualities.
Asamavāyi-kāraṇa (Non-Inherent Cause)
The asamavāyikāraṇa (non-inherent cause) is the second kind of cause. This kind of cause is peculiar to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. It is not found in any other system of philosophy.
In the Śivāditya’s work it is stated that the non-inherent cause is that which has the causal capacity i.e. which is capable of producing the effect and which is very close to the inherent cause.[6] Viśvanātha also states that the cause which is connected with the inherent cause is called asamavāyikāraṇa.[7] He also clearly says how the non-inherent cause is connected with the inherent cause. The non-inherent cause may be connected with the inherent cause in two ways–being connected with the same object as the effect is, or being connected with the same object as the cause is.[8] This very idea is expressed by Annaṃbhaṭṭa in his definition of asamavāyikāraṇa. He defines asamavāyikāraṇa as that which is related with the same object as the effect or as the cause in the relation of samavāya.[9] The example of the first kind is conjunction of the threads which makes the effect, i.e., the cloth. This conjunction of the threads (tantusaṃyoga) is the non-inherent cause, because the conjunction of threads co-inheres in the same object as the effect i.e., the threads. The example of the second kind of non-inherent cause is the colour of the threads which is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the cloth. Here the colour of the threads is connected with the same object, i.e., the threads which is the inherent cause of cloth. Tanturūpa and paṭarūpa are not samānādhikaraṇa because tanturūpa stays in the threads and paṭarūpa resides in the cloth. So, their relation occurs indirectly (paramparāsambandhena). It is explained in the Siddhāntachandrodaya.[10] In this way the non-inherent cause is connected with the inherent cause sometimes directly, through the relation of samavāya and sometimes indirectly in the relation of svasamavāyi-samavāya. Inherent cause is always a quality or an action, never a substance.
Nimitta-kāraṇa (Efficient Cause)
The third kind of cause is nimittakāraṇa (efficient cause). According to Śivāditya this kind of cause is different from both the inherent cause and non-inherent cause.[11] Nimittakāraṇa is known as Sahakārikāraṇa also because, this cause helps the material to become the effect. For example, conscious agents like the potter, weaver etc. potter’s wheel, stick, weaver’s shuttle, loom etc. in the production of pot or cloth are nimittakāraṇas. The same definition is given by Viśvanātha and Annaṃbhaṭṭa. Thus, Annaṃbhaṭṭa says that nimittakāraṇa is that which is different from the both.[12] For example, the shuttle, loom etc. are the efficient causes of cloth.
According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the efficient cause or nimittakāraṇa is divided into two kinds–one is general and the other is special.[13] General cause is those which are common to all effects. General cause is of eight types viz. God’s knowledge, God’s will, space (dik), time (kāla), merit, demerit, prior-non-existence and absence of counteracting factors. These causes are the common causes of all effects. Special causes are innumerable, as these are particular to particular effects.
A serious objection is raised against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation. It is maintained by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that the cause and effects are two different entities. The effect does not pre-exist in its cause. It is a new emergent which was non-existent before its production. This effect is not produced from its cause, but in its cause. The effect like cloth and the cause like threads are two separate entities, different in their essence, but they exist simultaneously in the same space. But this position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas goes against the principle that two material substances cannot occupy the same space. This is the main objection raised against the theory of causation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.
The acceptance of samavāyikāraṇa instead of upādānakāraṇa by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas steers clear the counter arguments of the opponents regarding the part and whole as separate substances which occupy the same space. The substances, the cause substance, i.e., the parts and the effect-substance, i.e., the whole are said to occupy the same space because of samavāya relation.
Shastri points out,
“All the substances from atom to the piece of cloth, occupy the same space. Every subsequent substance being an effect, or (which is the same thing) being an avayavin, resides in the preceding one which is its cause, by samavāya relation”.[14]
That is why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas regard that the effect is produced in the cause and not from the cause. The cloth is born in the threads, and not from the threads.
Footnotes and references:
[1]:
kāraṇaṃ trividhaṃ samavāyyasamavāyinimittabhedāt. / Tarkasaṃgraha, p.26 According to Viśvanātha, causality is of three types, viz.,
[2]:
Bhāṣāpariccheda, p.23
[3]:
cf. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p.95
[4]:
yatsamavetaṃ kāryamutpadyate tatsamavāyikāraṇam. / Tarkasaṃgraha, p.26
[6]:
samavāyikāraṇapratyāsannam avadhṛtasāmarthyam asamavāyikāraṇatvam. Saptapadārthī, p.85
[8]:
Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 74
[9]:
kāryeṇa kāraṇena vā sahaikasminnarthe samavetatvesati yatkāraṇaṃ tadasamavāyikāraṇam. Tarkasaṃgraha, pp.26-27
[10]:
cf. paṭarūpasamavāyikāraṇībhūtapaṭasāmānādhikaraṇyasya sattvāt paraṃparāsaṃbandhena paṭarūpasāmānādhikaraṇyampi sulabhamevetibhāvaḥ paraṃparāsambandhaśca samavāyisamavāyaḥ Vide, Athalye and Bodas (ed.), Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 207
[11]:
ubhayaviparitatvaṃ nimittakāraṇatvam. Saptapadārthī, p.207
[12]:
tadubhayabhinnaṃ kāraṇaṃ nimittakāraṇam, Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 27
[13]:
cf. Athalye and Bodas (ed.), Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 207
[14]:
Shastri, D.N., The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School, p.267