Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)

by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words

This page relates ‘Nature of Cause’ of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.

This Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas system defines a cause as that which is an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as that which is an unconditional and invariable consequent of cause. In Nyāyakusumāñjalī, Udayana has stated that cause is an invariable antecedent of an effect.[1]

Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana defines cause in his Bhāṣāpariccheda as,

“Causality is the invariable antecedence of what is not superfluity.”[2]

Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthī points out that a cause is that which produces an effect.[3]

There is some similarity between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of cause and the western view of cause,

“Hume defines a cause as an invariable antecedent. J.S. Mill defines it as an unconditional and invariable antecedent.”[4]

Other Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas give similar definition of cause.

Now these definitions of cause depend on the conceptions of the effect. Hence it is necessary to define effect before going to explain the definition of cause. An effect is defined by Śivāditya as that which has a prior non-existence.[5] It means, an effect does not pre-exist in its cause, i.e.it was non-existent before production. An effect destroys its prior non-existence when it comes into being. A counter-correlative of an antecedent non-existence is what subsequently comes into existence. For example, a jar or a cloth is the counter entity of the prior non-existences of jar or cloth. This definition of effect directly reflects the theory of causation of the NyāyaVaiśeṣika which is known as asatkāryavāda.

The opinion of Annaṃbhaṭṭa about causation is not different from the general view of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system. Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines cause, as that which invariably (niyata) precedes (pūrvavṛtti) the effect (kārya).[6] A cause must be antecedent of its effect, otherwise it will not be a cause. Annaṃbhaṭṭa remarks in his commentary, Dīpikā that pūrvavṛtti is inserted in the definition to exclude kārya itself.[7]

As the definition of cause depends on the understanding of the concept of effect, so Annaṃbhaṭṭa proceeds to define effect first. He says that the effect is the counter-correlative of its own antecedent non-existence.[8] Govardhana Miśra clearly states that before the production of an effect which is not existent in the cause that is its antecedent negation.[9] So, according to Annaṃbhaṭṭa effect has a beginning and is not eternal. Prāgabhāva is not an effect as it has no beginning but an end. Therefore, an effect is stated as the pratiyogi of prāgabhāva.

The definition of cause mentioned above refers to three essential characteristics of a cause. Firstly, it must be an antecedent of the effect (pūrvavṛtti). Secondly, it is invariable, it must invariably precede the effect (niyatapūrvavṛtti), and the last is its unconditionality or necessity, it must unconditionally precede the effect (ananyathāsiddha).

Now, the first condition of antecedence means that it is an immediate antecedent and not a remote one. Otherwise threads of yesterday will also produce cloth today. This also implies that the cause must abide in the substance in which the effect is produced, at the moment immediately preceding that of its origin.[10]

Again all precedent things cannot be necessarily the cause. For example, the potter’s ass which carries the earth required for making the pot, is antecedent of the pot but it does not invariably precede it, because earth can be brought in other way also. In that case pot can be made without the help of ass. So, the word niyata is added to exclude all things which are not invariably precedent.[11]

However, this definition of cause stated by Annaṃbhaṭṭa appears to be deficient as it does not take care of all the condition of causality Annaṃbhaṭṭa was also aware of this deficiency and as such he makes amendment for this in the Dīpikā. He adds another adjective ananyathāsiddhatve sati which means “provided the antecedent thing is not a superfluity.”[12] The adjective ananyathāsiddha is added to the definition because sometimes a non-cause also may be an invariable antecedent of the effect. But whatever is not strictly necessary to explain a phenomenon is a superfluity (ananyathāsiddha). For example the colour of the thread does not contribute to the production of the cloth. Hence, it is anyathāsiddha in respect of the cloth. Similarly the father of the potter is invariably antecedent of the pot, without him the potter cannot be born and without the potter, the pot. But the potter’s father or all his ancestors cannot be regarded as the causes of the pot. Because, a cause is not a remote antecedent of its effect but its immediate antecedent, potter’s father is the antecedent of the pot only by virtue of his being the father of the potter, the real cause. Therefore, to exclude these things the word ananyathāsiddha is added in the definition. This word, ananyathāsiddha excludes all these things which are not immediately connected with the effect though invariably antecedent. The ass, the potter’s father, all his ancestors, the colour of the rod etc. are excluded through this word.

In the Vākyavṛtti, a commentary of Tarkasaṃgraha it is stated that the complete definition of cause is:

niyatāṇyathāsiddhabhinnatve sati kāryāvyavahitapūrvakṣanāvacchinnakāraṇadeśanirūpitādheyatāvaddhāvapratiyo-gitanavacchedakadharmavat kāraṇam.”[13]

To complete the definition of cause the word ananyathāsiddha is essential. Tarkasaṃgraha has not mentioned this word. Annaṃbhaṭṭa adds this adjective in his commentary Dīpikā only. Vākyavṛtti and Siddhāntacandrodaya, the commentaries of Tarkasaṃgraha use the word ananyathāsiddha as the part of the definition. Gobardhana Miśra in his Nyāyabodhinī-tīkā remarks that the word ananyathāsiddha should have been stated in the definition.[14]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

kāryaniyatapūrvabhāvaḥ. Nyāyakusumāñjalī, p. 20

[2]:

anyathāsiddhiśūnyasya niyata pūrvavartitākāraṇatvam bhavet/ Bhāṣāpariccheda, p.23

[3]:

kāryotpādakatvaṃ kāranatvaṃ. Saptapadārthī, p. 85

[4]:

Sarma, Chandradhar, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p. 20

[5]:

prāgabhāvavat kāryam. Saptapadārthī, p. 65

[6]:

kāryaniyatapūrvavṛtti kāraṇam. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 25

[7]:

karye’tivyāptirataḥ pūrvavṛtti. Dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha, p.26

[8]:

kāryam prāgabhāvapratiyogi. Ibid.

[9]:

Nyāyabodhinī on Ibid

[10]:

Dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 7

[11]:

pūravavṛttikāraṇam ityukte rāsabhādau ativyāpti syād atonoyateti. Ibid

[12]:

Athalye and Bodas, Tarkasaṃgraha, p.192

[13]:

Vākyavṛtti on Sarma, Sri Satkari, (ed), Tarkasaṃgraha, p.36

[14]:

… atonanyathāsiddhapadamapi kāraṇalakṣaṇa nivesaniyam. Nyāyabodhinī on Athalye and Bodas, Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 26

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