Conditions of Annulment of Universal

[Full title: The concept of Sāmānya (2): Conditions of Annulment of Universal]

Though the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas regard sāmānya as common character of a class, they also point out some conditions which cause annulment of the universal (jātibādhakas). These conditions prevent a common quality from becoming a true universal. Udayana has enumerated six conditions for annulment of universal. The later exponents of this school accept this six and explain them elaborately. Annaṃbhaṭṭa has not mentioned about the jātibādhakas in his work. But considering the importance of these conditions we, propose to give a brief account of these jātibādhakas.

The six jātibādhakas enumerated by Udayana are: oneness of the individual, equality of extension, cross division, infinite regress, abandonment of nature and absence of relation.^[1]

vyakterabhedastulyatvaṃ saṃkaro’thānavasthitiḥ/
rūpaśanirasambandho jātibādhaka saṃgrahaḥ//^[2]

The first condition for annulment of sāmānya is oneness of the individual This means that if there is only one individual which is the substratum of a common character, then that character is not a jāti. ether, time, space etc. are one. So, ākaśatva, kālatva, diktva etc..are not universals these abide in one individuals only.^[3]

The second jātibādhaka is co-extensiveness or equality of extension. If two common characters remain in the same individuals, then they are not treated as two different universal, but the same universal. Ghaṭatva which is the common character of jars and kalasatva which is the common character of pitchers are not two different universals, as jar and pitcher are not different. Thus this condition does not prevent a jāti, but it prevents only differences in jātis.^[4]

The third condition of annulment of universal is saṃkara or cross division. It is more important from the point of view of the external reality of universals.

“Annulment of universals on account of cross division means that if there are two generalizing attributes the sphere of one of which crosses that of the other, such attributes will not constitute a universal.”^[5]

For example bhūtatva and mūrtatva are partially co-extensive and partially not co-extensive. Bhūtatva is the universal which resides in five elements, viz., earth, water, fire, air and ether. The universal mūrtatva resides in the first four elements and manas. Hence, bhūtatva and mūrtatva are both common to the first four elements. But so far as ether and manas are concerned, one of the two attributes is co-existent with the non-existence of the other. Thus, bhūtatva exists in ether where mūrtatva does not exist and mūrtatva exists in manas where bhūtatva does not exist. When two such attributes are found involving cross-division, both of them will not constitute a universal. This implies that there can be no two universals which are common in some spheres and exclusive of one another in some other locus.^[6]

The fourth condition of annulment of sāmānya is anavasthā, i.e., infinite regress. Sāmānya or jāti is devoid of a jāti, since that would involve infinite regress. If a jāti, is accepted to inhere a jāti, , the second jāti, also would require another jāti, and so on ad infinitum. Hence, a jāti, regarded as devoid of another jāti.^[7]

No jāti, is accepted to exist in a viśeṣa as that involves abandonment of its nature particularity differentiates all eternal substances from one another. The nature of particularity is self-differentiating (svato vyāvartaka), i.e, it is differentiated by itself. But if a universal is supposed to exist in particularity, then that universal will serve the purpose of differentiating it form others and in that case the real nature of particularity will be contradicted. Hence, there cannot be any universal in particularity.^[8]

The last condition prevents samavāyatva and abhāvatva being jāti. Where there is no relation of inherence between the generality and its substratum, there can be no jāti. Inherence is not related with any in the relation of inherence. Hence, there can be no jāti in inherence. Similarly, there cannot be any jāti in abhāva or non-existence as non-existence is not related with anything in the relation of inherence.^[9]

In this way the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas enumerate these six conditions as counteracting a jāti. It is also found that sāmānya cannot exist in the last four padārthas, i.e., sāmānya, viśeṣa, samavāya and abhāva.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Kiraṇāvālī, p.33

[2]:

Ibid.

[3]:

cf. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 60

[4]:

cf. Ibid

[5]:

The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School, p. 324

[6]:

cf. Ibid.

[7]:

cf. Ibid.

[8]:

cf. Ibid.

[9]:

cf. Ibid.