Nature of Sāmānya (generality of universal)

[Full title: The concept of Sāmānya (1): Nature of Sāmānya]

Sāmānya or generality of universal is regarded as an objective reality and a separate category by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The category of sāmānya is conceived by them to explain the notion of commonness in different objects of a class. It is the basis of the idea of common characters among many individuals. Individuals are different in respect of quality, action etc. For example all individual jars are different entities having different size, shape, colour etc., but they are designated by a common name, jar. This common name presupposes that there is something common in all the individual jars. That common element is called jarhood (ghaṭatva) and this is what is called universal by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. The Buddhists, on the other hand, do not accept the reality of universal. The Buddhists are individualists and they vehemently criticize the theory of universals. The Vaiśeṣikas, on their part, also use all arguments to vindicate the theory of universal and to refute the Buddhist view.

In the early period of the vaiśeṣika school, it was conceived that whatever produced the idea of commonness should be regarded as universal. The etymology of the word sāmānya also establishes this idea. Etymologically sāmānya means the notion of sameness (samanānāṃ bhāvaḥ). But later on, it was realised that all attributes which produce the notion of commonness could not be regarded as universal. Hence, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that sāmānya is that characteristics which is eternal and which exist in all the individuals of a class.

Kaṇāda simply says that sāmānya as also viśeṣa depend upon the intellect for their existence.^[1] He does not assign any objective reality to sāmānya as also to viśeṣa. Praśastapāda describes sāmānya as the cause of the notion of common character in many things.^[2] Śrīdhara defines sāmānya as the cause which generates the knowledge of common character existing in many things which are quite different from one another.^[3] Śrīdhara argued that every object is different from others in respect of colour, size, shape etc. But even then a common name is used to designate these objects (belonging to a class). Hence, the question naturally arises, how without comprehending a common character these different objects can be designated by a common name. Hence, sāmānya or universal is to be accepted as the common cause for the common notion and common expression^[4].

Udayana defines sāmānya with the help of its etymology and says—

samānānām bhāvaḥ svābhāviko’nāgantuko dharmaḥ sāmānyam.

That means sāmānya is the natural and not accidental characteristic of many individuals which gives the idea of commonness.^[5] In his view, sāmānya is eternal, one and exists in many things.^[6] While discussing about the meaning of a word Gautama considers about jāti or genus. He says that genus is that which produces the notion of sameness.^[7] In the view of Vātsyāyana, sāmānya is that which produces similar cognition in respect of different locü and because of which individual objects are not differentiated from one another. It is the cause of assimilation of objects. Vātsyāyana, also maintains some difference between sāmānya and jāti which is not noticed in the Vaiśeṣika works. In his view jāti is that particular sāmānya which establishes non difference of same objects among themselves and difference from other objects.^[8] The same idea is expressed by uddyotakara.^[9]

Thus, it is seen that both the vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas accept sāmānya as the common property which reside in many individuals. This sāmānya must be eternal, otherwise it will not be able to generate the notion of commonness required for attributing a common name to many things past, present and future.

D.N. Shastri rightly observes,

“When the universal was held to be an objective reality, it was also conceived to be eternal. An attribute like ghaṭatva, which subsists as one common factor in all the jars of the universe, was conceived to be all pervading, and because it could not be conceived as being produced or destroyed every time, it was held to be eternal.”^[10]

Śivāditya defines sāmānya in his Saptapadārthī as that which is nitya, one and exists in many things in the relation of inherence^[11]. In the Mitabhāṣiṇī, a commentary of Saptapadārthī, Mādhava argues that if the word anekasamaveta is not given in the definition then it becomes over pervasive to rūpa. Rūpa exists only in one dravya but sāmānya inheres in many dravyas e.g., the gotva, the sāmānya of cow, subsists in all cows. So, the word anekasamaveta is added to the defination. The word nitya is added to the definition to avoid over-pervasion to saṃyoga as saṃyoga is not nitya.

Therefore he says—

bhāvatve sati viśeṣa samavāyetaranniḥsāmanyam sāmānyamiti^[12].

That means sāmānya is positive and different from viśeṣa and samavāya and does not itself possess sāmānya.

Viśvanātha also defines sāmānya in the similar manner. In this view, sāmānya is that which is eternal and which exixts in many things in the relation of sāmānya (nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam)^[13]. He further explains that the adjective eternal is given here to avoid over-pervasion to saṃyoga etc.^[14] Saṃyoga is a quality and hence belongs to two substances in the relation of samavāya (aneka samaveta). But saṃyoga being non-eternal, the over-pervasion to it can be avoided with the term nitya in the definition. Again the adjective aneka is added here to avoid over-pervasion to the dimension of ether etc.^[15] Dimension of ether and time are eternal and belongs to ether etc. in the relation of inherence in ether etc. But as dimension of ether exists in ether only which is one, there will be no over-pervasion of the term aneka is added in the definition. Again atyantābhāva (absolute non-existence) is eternal and belongs to many things. Hence, if the term samaveta is not given in the definition and simply it is said as anekavṛtti (presence in many things), then the definition will be over pervading to atyantābhāva But absolute non-existence is not related with anything in the relation of inherence. Hence the word inherence instead of mere presence is given here.^[16]

Annambhaṭṭa defines sāmānya as that which is eternal, one and exists in many.^[17]

In this definition, there are three terms:

1. eternal (nitya),
2. one (eka) and
3. remaining in many (anekānugata).

(i) Firstly, it is said that sāmānya is eternal as it has no creation and destruction. Though sāmānya exists in its substrates, it is different from its substrates. The substrates of sāmānya are produced and destroyed, but sāmānya is neither produced nor destroyed. If, on the other hand, sāmānya is accepted as non-eternal, then for each individual, say a ghaṭa, a separate universal ghaṭatva has to be accepted. This will lead to cumbrousness of arguments. Moreover, in that case, notion of assimilation will not be there as there are different sāmānyas in different individuals. However, if it is accepted that ghaṭatva etc. are produced, then the question naturally arises when and from what cause ghaṭatva is produced. If it is said that ghaṭatva is produced at the moment of the production of a particular ghaṭa, then it will also be accepted that ghaṭatva is produced from the same caused aggregates from which the ghaṭa is produced. But this is impossible, since one causal aggregate can produce one effect only. Again if it is said that ghaṭatva is produced at the next moment of the production of ghaṭa then there will be no ghaṭatva in the ghaṭa at the first moment.^[18]

(ii) Sāmānya is one for all its substrates as a class. The substrata of an universal are different, but there exists only one Universal in these different substrates. Gotva, which is the universal of cow is one, though it exists in all the cows of past, present and future. Hence, it must be accepted that ghaṭatva is not produced. Any positive ting, which is devoid of production, must be devoid of destruction. Hence, sāmānya is eternal.

(iii) Sāmānya exists in many objects (anekānugata). Annaṃbhaṭṭa has pointed out in the Dīpikā that sāmānya remains in its substrate in the relation of inherence (samaveta)^[19] Hence, there is no difference of view between Annaṃbhaṭṭa and other

Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas so far as the relation of sāmānya with its substrate is concerned like Viśvanātha, Annaṃbhaṭṭa also points out that the word nitya is added in the definition to avoid over pervasion to saṃyoga^[20] etc. The adjective aneka is added to avoid overpervasion to the dimension of atom etc. The term anekasamaveta is to be given in the definition instead of anekānugata in order to avoid over-pervasion to atyantābhāva. The atyantābhāva of ghaṭa is eternal and remains in many ghaṭas. But it does not remains in the relation of inherence (asamaveta)^[21] Hence, the correct definition of sāmānya is nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

sāmānyaṃ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam. Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 1.2.3

[2]:

sattāsāmānyaṃ paramanuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya, p.276

[3]:

anekavṛttitve sati yadekadvivahuṣvātmasvarūpānugamapratyayakāraṇaṃ tat sāmānyamiti, Nayāyakaṇḍalī, p.743

[4]:

pindaṃ pindaṃ prati sāmānyāpekṣaṃ yathā bhavati, tathā jñānotpattou satyaṃ yo’bhyāsapratyayastena yaḥ saṃskāro jānitaḥ, tasmādatitasya jñānapravandhasya jñānjaprava-āhashya… tat sāmānyam. Ibid., pp. 743-744

[5]:

samānānāṃ bhāvaḥ svābhāviko’nāgantuko bahūnām dharmaḥ sāmānyam Kiranāvatī, p. 22

[6]:

Ibid.

[7]:

samānaprasavātmikā jāti. Nyāyasūtra, 2.2.71

[8]:

Nyāyabhāṣya on Ibid.

[9]:

Nyāyavārtika on 2.2.69

[10]:

The Philosophy of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Its Conflict with the Buddhist Dignāga School, p. 320

[11]:

sāmānyaṃ nityamekamanekasamavetam. Saptapadārthī, p.50

[12]:

Mitabhāṣiṇī on Ibid.

[13]:

nityatve satyanekasamavetatvam. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p.36

[14]:

Ibid

[15]:

nityatve sati samavetatvaṃ gaganaparimāṇādīnāmapyastyata uktamaneketi. Ibid

[16]:

nityatve satyanekavṛttitvamatyantābhāve’pyastyato vṛttitva sāmānyaṃ vihāya samavetatvamityuktam. Ibid

[17]:

nityamekamanekānugataṃ sāmānyam Tarkasaṃgraha, p.60

[18]:

cf. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 55

[19]:

anugatatvaṃ samavetatva. Dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgrah, p.61

[20]:

saṃyogādāvativyāptivāraṇāya nityamiti. Ibid

[21]:

Ibid