Qualities (16): Buddhi (Cognition)

Buddhi or cognition or knowledge is included under guṇa by the Vaiśeṣikas and it is said to be the special quality of the self. Gautama maintains that buddhi (cognition) is not different from upalabdhi (apprehension) and jñāna (knowledge).^[1] Hence, knowledge denotes awareness or apprehension of objects. Praśastapāda also maintains that buddhi, upalabdhi, jñāna and pratyaya (judgement) are synonymous.^[2] Buddhi again means manifestation of objects.^[3] All things are manifestated only when they become objects of knowledge. All living beings deal with the objects the world only on the basis of knowledge of some kind. Hence, knowledge is regarded as the basis of the behavior or conduct of a living being.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa takes into note this basic character of knowledge in defining it. He maintains that buddhi is jñāna and defines it as the quality which is the cause of all vyavahāra.^[4] Nyāyabodhinī clarifies that here vyavahāra means employment of words. It means utterance of words for the purpose of communicating ideas. As employment of words is not possible without knowledge, hence knowledge is defined as the cause of such behaviour. Annaṃbhaṭṭa discusses elaborately this definition in his Dīpikā. Thus he says that the word guṇa is added in the definition to avoid over-pervasion to kāla etc. Kāla is regarded by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas as the cause of all. But as kāla is not a quality, so the inclusion of the word guṇa will serve the purpose of excluding kāla from the definition of buddhi. kāla being a substance. The word sarvavyavahāra is used to avoid over-pervasion to rūpa^[5]

If the definition is given only as guṇa, buddhi then this will be overpervasive to all other guṇas like rūpa etc. But rūpa etc. is not vyavahārahetu and as such over-pervasion is avoided.

But even though this definition serves all practical purposes of the concept of knowledge, some defects may be discovered by the opponents in this definition also. This definition will be non-pervasive to nirvikalpapratyakṣa. Hence, in his Dīpikā, Annaṃbhaṭṭa gives a more accurate definition thus: jānāmītyanuvyavasāyagamyajñānatvameva lakṣaṇam.^[6] Hence, the definition of jñāna is the generality of jñānatva which becomes the subject of the consciousness (anuvyavasāya) having the form ‘I am knowing’. To understand this definition of knowledge, we must understand what is anuvyavasāya. This again refers to the question how the knowledge itself is known.

How a knowledge is revealed–regarding this question the Indian philosophers are divided into two broad groups. The Advaita Vedāntins, Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas, Sāṃkhyayoga and Vijñānavādin Bauddhas uphold that knowledge is self-luminous. They say that knowledge is like a lamp which reveals objects and at the same time reveals itself knowledge does not require any other thing to manifest it. It is of the nature of light. It is not the object of any other knowledge.^[7] The Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas on the other hand maintain that knowledge is not self-luminous. It is like the eye which reveals the object but cannot reveal itself. According to the NyāyaVaiśeṣikas, knowledge only reveals objects and anuvyavasāya reveals knowledge.^[8] This is a peculiar doctrine of the Naiyāyikas which is stated in the above definition.

Now, the question is what is anuvyavasāya? According to NyāyaVaiśeṣika, when an object comes in contact with the sense-organ, there is the perceptual knowledge of that object. For example when there is a contact between the eye and a jar (ghaṭa) there arises the knowledge having the form ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ (simple knowledge). The knowledge which takes this vyavasāya as its objects is called anuvyavasāya which is found in the form of ‘I know the jar’ (ghaṭamahaṃ jānāmi).

Athalya and Bodas have made this idea clear thus:

“This cognition (ghaṭajñāna) again being a property of the soul, the Ego becomes ghaṭajñānavān, which when combined with the ever present ahaṃkāra ‘I am’ results into the compound consciousness, ghaṭajñānavānahamasmi or ghaṭamahaṃ jānāmi ‘I know a jar’ . This last consciousness is called anuvyavasāya because it always follows vyavasāya or simple cognition. Hence the cognition “This is a jar (ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ) is said to become the subject matter of the consciousness ‘I know’”.^[9]

Types of Buddhi

According to Praśastapāda, buddhi is divided into two kinds—

1. vidyā (valid knowledge) and
2. avidyā (invalid knowledge).

Valid knowledge has four kinds–perception, inference, recollection and supernormal occult perception. Invalid knowledge has also four kinds–doubt, illusion, indefinite knowledge and dream.^[10]

According to Annaṃbhaṭṭa, buddhi is of two kinds—

1. smṛti (remembrance) and
2. anubhava (apprehension).

That knowledge is known as smṛti which is produced from mental impressions only.^[11] He explains in the Dīpikā that the word mātra is used in the definition to avoid over-pervasion to pratyabhijñā. He also clarifies that here saṃskāra means bhāvanā. Pratyabhijñā or recognition is also produced by saṃskāra. But in case of recognition only saṃskāra is not the cause, but the perception of the object is also a cause there. Hence, by including the word mātra (only), over-pervasion to recognition can be avoided. The word jñāna is added in the definition to avoid overpervasion to the destruction of saṃskāra.^[12] According to the Naiyāyikas, any destruction has its counter-correlate (pratiyogi) as its cause. Hence, destruction of saṃskāra is produced by saṃskāra itself. The inclusion of the word’knowledge’ in the definition will steer clear this over-pervasion, because destruction of saṃskāra is not a knowledge. If the term saṃskāramātrajanya is not given in the definition, then it will be over-pervasive to perception etc. For perception etc. is also knowledge. Hence, the adjective is added here with knowledge.^[13]

Anubhava is that knowledge which is other than remembrance.^[14] Thus it is a presentative knowledge. Anubhava is again divided into valid (yathārtha) and non-valid (ayathārtha). Valid knowledge is called pramā and the non-valid knowledge is called apramā. Now, we have discussed about the nature and varieties of pramā in the second chapter of the present dissertation. Hence, here we shall give a very brief outline of only apramā.

Apramā

Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines apramā as that apprehension of thing as possessing that attribute which does not exist there.^[15] That means non-valid knowledge is that which does not correspond to its object, for example, the knowledge of silver in a conch-shell. Non-valid apprehension is of three types, viz., saṃśaya (doubt), viparyaya (error) and tarka (hypothetical argument).^[16]

Doubt is defined as the cognition of various conflictive properties in the same object.^[17] In it the mind takes note of different alternate characteristics of some given object. The alternatives which the mind notices in the same object in case of doubt are called koṭis. There may be two or more koṭis in different instances of doubt. In doubt there are three characteristics. Firstly, the knowledge must be of more than one property. Secondly, there properties must be irreconcilable with one another. Thirdly, these contradictory properties must be apprehended in the same thing. The knowledge in the form of ‘Is it a post or a man’ is an example of doubt.^[18]

Error is defined as false apprehension (mithyājñāna).^[19] Error is the opposite of valid knowledge. Erroneous knowledge is the cognition of an object as possessing certain characteristics which do not belong to it. The knowledge of a conch-shell as silver, of a rope as a snake are examples of error. In these cases there is the cognition of an object as different from the real object. In case of error the definition of apramā as tadabhāvatī tatprakārako anubhava rightly applies. In error an attribute is referred not to its own locus but to that of another locus. For example, in case of the cognition of silver on a conch-shell the generality of silverness is referred to the locus conch-shell which is wrong.

Tarka or hypothetical argument is defined as the deduction of a vyāpaka (wider thing) by the wrong hypothesis of a narrow one (vyāpya). This is apprehended thus: if there be no fire, there would be no smoke.^[20]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

budhiḥ upalabdhirjñānamityanarthāntaram. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.15

[2]:

buddhirupalabdhirjñānaṃ pratyaya iti paryayaḥ. Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 136

[3]:

arthaprakāśo buddhiḥ. Tarkabhāṣā. p.452

[4]:

sarvavyavahāraheturbuddhirjñānam. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 21

[5]:

rūpadāvativyāptivāraṇāy sarvavyavahāra. cf. Gopa, Judhisthir, Ibid., p. 65

[6]:

Dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 22

[7]:

The Epistemology of the Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, p.12

[8]:

Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 107

[9]:

Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 174

[10]:

Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya, pp. 136-137

[11]:

saṃskāramātra janyaṃ jñānam smṛti. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 22

[12]:

saṃskāradhvaṃse’tivyāptivāraṇāya jñānam. Dīpikā on Ibid

[13]:

ghaṭādipratyakṣe’tivyāptivāraṇāya saṃskāramātrajanyam. Ibid

[14]:

tadbhinnaṃ jñānamanubhavah. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 22

[15]:

tadabhāvavati tatprakārako’nubhavo’yathārthaḥ. Ibid., p.23

[16]:

Ibid., p. 56

[17]:

ekasmindharmiṇi viruddhanānādharmavaisiṣṭyāvagāhi jñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ. Ibid., p. 56

[18]:

Ibid

[19]:

mithyājñānaṃ viparyayaḥ. Ibid

[20]:

vyāpyāropeṇa vyāpakāropastarkaḥ. Ibid