Pramāṇa (2): Anumāna or Inference

Annaṃbhaṭṭa states in his work that Anumāna (inference) is the

instrumental cause of inferential knowledge (anumiti).^[1] There are two parts in the word Anumāna viz. anu meaning after and māna meaning knowledge. Hence, the literal meaning of Anumāna is that it is a knowledge (māna) which originates after (anu) other knowledge.^[2] Anumiti depends upon parāmarśa and it is the resulting judgement. Therefore, Anumiti is said to be knowledge which is produced from parāmarśa.^[3]

Annaṃbhaṭṭa defines parāmarśa as the knowledge of pakṣadharmatā which is characterized by the invariable concomitance.^[4] In inference, there are three terms, viz., pakṣa, sādhya and hetu. The pakṣa is the subject in connection with which something is sought to be established which is suspected but not definitely known to be present in it.^[5] Sādhya is the object of inference, i.e., which is sought to be established by inference. The third term is called the hetu (reason) or liṅga (sign) or sādhana. It is the ground of inference as through it something is sought to be established. In western logic these terms are called the minor, major and middle term. The stock example of inference as given by the Indian logicians is: The hill has fire, because it has smoke. Here the hill is the pakṣa or the minor term, fire is the sādhya or the major term and smoke is the hetu or middle term. Pakṣadharmatā is the knowledge that the middle exists in the minor. When this knowledge is characterized by vyāpti or invariable concomitance, then that is called parāmarśa or liṅgaparāmarśa.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa says that invariable concomitance is the certainty of co-existence like, wherever there is smoke there is fire.^[6] In the Dīpikā he again says the Distinguishing characteristic mark of invariable concomitance is the invariability of concomitance. Concomitance is co-existence of smoka and fire in one and the same substratum; its certainty is niyama. The fuller definition of vyāpti is: the quality of being co-existent in the same substratum with the thing to be proved which does not become the counter entity of its own absolute negation that co-exists with reason in the same substratum.^[7]

According to Viśvanātha invariable concomitance is described as the absence of relation of the reason to anything other than what has the thing to be inferred.^[8] In another way he defines vyāpti as the co-existence of the reason with the thing to be inferred which must not be the counter positive of any non-existence that may abide in things having the reason, is called invariable concomitance.^[9]

Śivāditya states vyāpti in his Saptapadārthī as the relation in which the thing can be inferred, which exists together with the mark qualified through the absence of any external event.^[10]

Jadunath Sinha maintains in his Indian Philosophy that vyāpti is the logical ground of anumāna. Vācaspati, Jayanta, Udayana and Varadarāja discuss vyāpti as invariable (niyata), unconditional (anaupādhika), natural (svābhāvika) relation between the hetu and sādhya.^[11]

Kinds of Anumāna

Gautama divides anumāna into three kinds–

1. pūrvavat,
2. śeṣavat and
3. sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.^[12]

The first two types of anumāna are based on causation and the last one is on mere co-existence. It is called pūrvavat inference, when there is inference of the unperceived effect from a perceived cause. For example, when future rain is inferred from dark clouds in the sky it is pūrvavat inference. When past rain is inferred from the swift muddy flooded water of a river, that is called śeṣavat inference. That is called sāmānyatodṛṣṭānumāna, when inference is depended on uniformity of coexistence e.g. when one infers cloven hoofs of an animal by its horns.^[13]

Annaṃbhaṭṭa accepts two kinds of anumāna in his work–svārtha (for oneself) and parārtha (for another). Etymologically svārtha means which is intended for oneself and parārtha is that which is for another.^[14] In the first case, a person himself infers something after perceiving the liṃga and remembering its concomitance with the sāddhya. Here the person reaches to the conclusion only for himself.

Parārthānumāna consists of five members. These are:

1. pratijñā,
2. hetu,
3. udāharaṇa,
4. upanaya and
5. nigamana.^[15]

It depends upon svārthānumāna because one man cannot satisfy another if he is not satisfied himself.^[16]

Praśastapāda also says:

pañcāvayavena vākyena svaniścitārthapratipādanaṃ parārthānumānam.

Parārthānumāna is that where by means of five members syllogism something is established which has been already inferred by oneself. The first member of the syllogism is pratijñā which denotes the proposition set down for establishing something. The second is hetu or reason and it expresses the cause for the establishment of the pratijñā. The third is udāharaṇa. It shows the universal concomitance together with an example. The fourth is upanaya or the application. The declaration of mark accompanied by the invariable concomitance of the thing to prove is the application. The fifth is nigamana or conclusion.

The declaration of the subject along with the thing to be proved and reason is the conclusion.^[17]

As for example:

(i) The mountain is fiery (pratijñā);
(ii) Because it has smoke (hetu);
(iii) Whatever has smoke is fiery. For example, a kitchen (udāharaṇa);
(iv) The mountain has smoke which is invariably concomitant with fire. (upanaya);
(v) Hence, the mountain is fiery (nigamana)

According to Annaṃbhaṭṭa, consideration of the consideration of the mark (liṅgaparāmarśa) alone is the special cause of inferential knowledge for oneself as well as for others. Therefore, consideration of the mark is inference.^[18]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

anumitikaraṇamanumānam. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 34

[2]:

Sharma, C.D., A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p.197

[3]:

parāmarśajanyaṃ jñānamanumiti. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 34

[4]:

vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñānaṃ parāmarśa. Ibid., p. 34

[5]:

sandigdhasādhyavān pakṣaḥ. Tarkasaṃgraha, p.43

[6]:

yatra yatra dhūmastatra tatrāgniriti sāhacaryaniyamo vyāptiḥ. Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 34

[7]:

Dīpikā on Ibid.

[8]:

vyāptiḥ sādhyavadanyasminnasambandha udāhṛtaḥ/ Bhāṣāpariccheda, p. 109

[9]:

athavā hetumanniṣṭhavirahāpratiyoginā/ sādhyena hetoraikādhikaraṇyaṃ vyāptirucyate// Ibid., p.111

[10]:

vyāptiśca vyāpakasya vyāpyādhikaraṇa upādhyabhāvavisiṣṭaḥ sambandhaḥ. Saptapadārthī, p. 74

[11]:

Sinha, Jadunath, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p.522

[12]:

atha tatpūrvakaṃ “trividhamanumānaṃ pūrvavaccheṣa-vatsāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ ca. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.5

[13]:

Sharma, C.D., A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p.198

[14]:

svasya parasya vā arthaḥ prayojanaṃ yasmāt tat. Vide., Tarkasaṃgraha, p. 251

[15]:

pratijñahetudāharaṇopanayanigamanāni pañcāvayavāḥ. Ibid., p. 38

[16]:

Vide., Ibid., p.251

[17]:

Praśastapādabhāṣyam, p. 558

[18]:

svārthānumitiparārthānumityorliṅgaparāmarśa eva karaṇam Tarkasaṃgraha, p.39