Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories (Study)

by Diptimani Goswami | 2014 | 61,072 words

This page relates ‘Nyaya Concept of Pramana (Introduction)’ of the study on the Nyaya-Vaisheshika categories with special reference to the Tarkasangraha by Annambhatta. Both Nyaya and Vaisesika are schools of ancient Indian Philosophy, and accepted in their system various padarthas or objects of valid knowledge. This study investigates how the Tarkasamgraha reflects these categories in the combined Nyayavaisesika school.

Nyāya Concept of Pramāṇa (Introduction)

The Nyāya epistemology deals with the conditions of valid knowledge and means of valid knowledge. The reality of the Nyāya depends on the Nyāya theory of knowledge. In the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, pramāṇa is the first category. Valid knowledge is called pramā and the means through which this valid knowledge is arrived at is called pramāṇa. Thus pramāṇa is the means or instrument of valid knowledge. There are differences of opinion regarding the nature of pramāṇa. The Tārkikarakṣā refers to these different views thus: according to the Buddhists pramāṇa is uncontradicted knowledge; according to some, pramāṇa is preventative knowledge which is different from remembrance, others say that pramāṇa gives certain knowledge about an unknown object; others again opine that pramāṇa is invariably accompanied by prameya, some others say that pramāṇa is the invariable cause of pramā.[1]

Gautama has not given any definition of pramāṇa. Vātsyāyana, in his commentary, defines pramāṇa as that which causes cognition or valid knowledge.[2] This definition is actually based on the etymological meaning of the term pramāṇa (pramīyate’neneti pramāṇam).[3] Vācaspati Miśra has also followed his predecessors in defining pramāṇa as the means of knowledge, but he clarifies that pramā is valid knowledge which is different from remembrance.[4] However, this etymological definition of pramāṇa has faced strong objections especially from the Buddhist philosophers. It is Jayanta Bhaṭṭa who has tried to give a comprehensive definition of pramāṇa by refuting the rival views. Jayanta defines pramāṇa as that collocation of conscious and unconscious things which gives rise to the apprehension of objects that is different from error and doubt.[5] The definition given by Vātsyāyana and others has been too wide as this can be applied to both valid and non-valid cognition. Jayanta’s inclusion of the words ‘avyabhicārinī’ and ‘asandigdha’ has avoided this objection. Hence, in Jayanta’s view, pramāṇa is that which produces uncontradicted knowledge that is also free of doubt.

Annaṃbhaṭṭa has followed the definition given by Vātsyāyana and others and defines pramāṇa as the instrument of valid knowledge (pramāyāḥ karaṇamiti pramāṇasāmānyalakṣaṇam).[6] He has discussed pramā and pramāṇa under quality buddhi, as is done by most of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers of syncretic school. He first defines buddhi or knowledge as a quality of the self. Under buddhi, which is divided into smṛti and anubhava, he has discussed about pramā (valid knowledge) and pramāṇa.

Now, as the definition of pramāṇa involves pramā, it is necessary to discuss about it in detail. According to the Naiyāyikas, pramā or valid knowledge is a definite and certain knowledge of an object which is true and presentational in character.[7] According to D.M. Datta, “Pramā is generally defined as a cognition having the two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty (abādhitatva or yathārthatva and anadhigatatva)”.[8] Regarding the characteristic of truth the Naiyāyikas uphold unanimous view. Śivāditya states that it is the experience of the real nature of things.[9] Gaṅgeśa defines pramā as that which informs us of the experience of something in a place where it really exists. In another way, he says, pramā is that which predicates a character of something which is really possessed by it.[10]

According to Gautama, there are four means of valid knowledge or pramā these are:

  1. pratyakṣa (perception),
  2. anumāna (inference),
  3. upamāna (comparison) and
  4. śabda (verbal testimony).[11]

Following Gaṅgeśa, Annaṃbhaṭṭa also defines pramā as the experience of a substantive possessed of a particular attribute which is really possessed by it.[12] Annaṃbhaṭṭa has also clearly said that valid experience (yathārthānubhava) is called pramā in scriptures.[13] He has given the example of pramā as the experience ‘This is a pot’ (ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ). It may be asked here what is the criteria that makes knowledge true (yathārtha). The Naiyāyikas say that a knowledge is true only when it is not contradicted by its object.[14] Vācaspati opines that a knowledge is said to be true when it reveals the object with the nature and attribute possessed by it in spite of all changes of time, place and other conditions.[15] Hence, in the view of the Naiyāyikas, the truth of knowledge consists in its correspondence to objects.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

avisaṃvādivijñānaṃ pramāṇamiti sougatāḥ/ anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam sā smṛteranyeti kecana// ajñātacaratatvārthaniścāyakam athāpare/ prameyavyāptamapare pramāṇamiti manvate// pramāniyatasāmagrīṃ pramāṇaṃ keciducire. Tārkikarakṣā, 5-7

[2]:

upalavdhisādhanāni pramāṇāni. Nyāyabhāṣya, 1.1.2

[3]:

Nyāyavārtika on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.3

[4]:

pramāsādhanaṃ hi pramāṇam,na ca smṛtiḥ pramā. Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.1

[5]:

avyabhicāriṇīmasandigdhamarthopalavdhiṃ vidadhati vodhāvodhasvabhāvā sāmagrī pramāṇam. Nyāyamañjarī, p.71

[7]:

cf. Bijalwan, C. D., Indian Theory of Knowledge, p.39

[8]:

Datta, D.M., Six Ways of Knowing, p. 20

[9]:

tatvānubhava pramā. Saptapadārthī, p. 72

[10]:

yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā, tadvatī tatprakārakānubhavo vā. Tattvacintāmaṇi, p. 437

[11]:

pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.3

[12]:

tadvati tatprakārako’nubhavo yathārthaḥ sa eva prametyucyate. Tarkasaṃgraha, p.23

[13]:

yathārthānubhava eva śāstre prametyucyate. Dīpikā on Ibid

[14]:

arthāvyabhicārītyarthaḥ. Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā, p. 5

[15]:

Ibid., p. 21

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