Categories in the Nyāya system

Gautama enumerates sixteen Padārthas.

These are:

1. pramāṇa,
2. prameya,
3. saṃśaya,
4. prayojana,
5. dṛṣṭānta,
6. siddhānta,
7. avayava,
8. tarka,
9. nirṇaya,
10. vāda,
11. jalpa,
12. vitaṇḍā,
13. hetvābhāsa,
14. chala,
15. jāti and
16. nigrahasthāna.

Pramāṇa:

Pramāṇa is the instrument or means of valid knowledge. Pramāṇa gives true knowledge. The Nyāya system assigns utmost importance to pramāṇa.

There are four pramāṇas accepted in Nyāyasūtra. These are:

1. pratyakṣa (perception),
2. anumāna (inference),
3. upamāna, (comparison) and
4. śabda (verbal testimony).^[1]

Prameya:

The literal meaning of prameya is the object of valid knowledge. Prameya is known through the pramāṇa.

There are twelve prameyas.^[2] These are:

1. ātmā (self),
2. śarīra (body),
3. indriya (senses),
4. artha (object of senses),
5. buddhi (cognition),
6. manas (mind),
7. pravṛtti (activity),
8. doṣa (fault),
9. pretyabhāva (transmigration),
10. phala (fruit),
11. duḥkha (pain) and
12. apavarga (liberation).

Desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and intelligence are the qualities of ātmā and abide in it. Śarīra is the locus of volition, senses and objects etc. The indriyas are nose, tongue, eye, skin and ear. These senses are produced from elements. Arthas are smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. These are the qualities of the earth. Buddhi (intellect), jñāna (knowledge and upalabdhi (apprehension) are not different from one another. Manas is the internal sense organ. The internal perception like pleasure, pain etc. can be apprehended through it. Manas is one in each body and it is like an atom. Pravṛtti (activity) is vocal, mental and bodily action. Doṣa (fault) causes activity; rāga, dveṣa, moha etc. are the roots of all activities. The meaning of transmigration is rebirth. Rebirth means a series of birth and deaths. Birth is due to the relation of the soul with body, sense-organs, mind etc. It depends upon our karma (action), good or bad. Phala depends upon activity and faults; Duḥkha (pain) is caused from the painful and bitter experience of everybody. Apavarga means absolute freedom from all sufferings.^[3]

Saṃśaya:

Saṃśaya (doubt) means uncertainty. If different conflicting views are found about the same object, then doubt arises in the mind as to which is the reliable view. Gautama defines it as that in which different conflicting judgements arise about the real nature of an object because of the recognition of properties which are common to many things or which are not common to any object or due to contradiction or irregularity of perception and non-perception.^[4] Saṃśaya (doubt) is not an error, not absence of knowledge, it is not sure knowledge.

Saṃśaya is of five types:

1. Due to recognition of common properties,
2. Due to cognition of properties not common,
3. Due to conflicting testimony,
4. Due to irregularity of perception, and
5. Due to irregularity of non-perception.^[5]

Prayojana:

Every one acts according to one’s purpose or aim. One acts either to obtain desirable objects or to reject undesirable ones. Gautama defines it as for which one acts.^[6] For example, a man brings rice for the purpose of food. This is prayojana.

Dṛṣṭānta:

Dṛṣṭānta or example is that about which a well-known person and an ordinary person give the same notion.^[7] It is a very important and useful part of any discussion dṛṣṭānta helps in the clear understanding of something. As for example, in case of the proposition ‘where there is smoka, there is fire’, dṛṣṭānta is the kitchen in which smoke and fire are perceived together by both an ordinary person and a learned person.

Siddhānta (doctrine):

The subject which is established through rule and pramāṇa is called Siddhānta (doctrine). According to Gautama, that is called siddhānta (doctrine) which is established on the authority of any system, on assumption or on implication.^[8] If an opinion is accepted as true after discussion, that is siddhānta (doctrine). As for example, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system there are four pramāṇas, it is a siddhānta (doctrine).

Avayava (members of a syllogism):

According to Gautama, avayavas are:

1. pratijñā (proposition),
2. hetu (reason),
3. udāharaṇa (example),
4. upanaya (application) and
5. nigamana (conclusion).^[9]

That is called pratijñā (proposition) which is declared to be established^[10], e.g., sound is non-eternal–it is a pratijñā that is called hetu (reason)^[11] which is the reason for establishing the proposition through the similarity of the example. Udāharaṇa is a well-known instance, which is possessed of the quality invariably present in the reason.^[12] Upanaya is the winding up depending upon the example of what is to be established as that or not that.^[13] When the proposition is reexpressed after mentioning the reason, it is known as nigamana.^[14]

Tarka (confutation):

It is a way of certain conclusion through exposing the unreasonable opposite arguments. Valid knowledge is attainable by the tarka, it may be called to be an aid. In the Nyāyasūtra, tarka (confutation) is said to be that which is stated for the real knowledge of a thing, which is unknown by showing the absurdity of all opposite characters.^[15]

Nirṇaya (Ascertainment):

By rejecting the opposite arguments establishment of the self-opinion is called nirṇaya. Nirṇaya is the last result of tarka. Nirṇaya is a certain knowledge about anything. It is stated in the Nyāyasūtra that nirṇaya is the establishment of something by stating two opposite sides.^[16]

Vāda (discussion):

Vāda is one type of discussion which is conducted with the help of pramāṇas and tarka. This discussion establishes a new theory. In this discussion, both the parties–the exponent (vādi) and the opponent (prativādi) try to establish their own opinion and refuse the opposite. This discussion is called vāda. Gautama says that vāda (discussion) means the establishment of one from the two opposite points, discussing it by five members which is protected by the right knowledge.^[17]

Jalpa (Wrangling):

Jalpa is wrangling in which both the parties try to establish their own position without rule and regulation. They state unjustifiable arguments and reasons with full confidence to show their truth. Sometimes lawyers use this process. In the Nyāyasūtra jalpa is stated to be that in which to defend or attack of proposition through quibbles, futilities and other processes.^[18]

Vitaṇḍā (Cavil):

Valueless tarka is known as vitaṇḍā. It is also called to be a kind of debate in which the opponent does not try to establish his own opinion but only tries to refute the exponent’s view. In this vitaṇḍā each party–exponent or opponent–tries to win through refuting the other’s opinion. It is found in the Nyāyasūtra, that is called vitaṇḍā in which one does not try to determine his own opinion but attacks the opposite.^[19]

Hetvābhāsa (Fallacy):

Hetvābhāsa is that which is not a real hetu or reason of an inference, but appear as the hetu. According to Gautama those are known as hetvābhāsas (fallacies) of a reason which are erratic, contradictory, and same to the question, unproved and mistimed.^[20]

Chala (Quibble):

Chala is a kind of playing upon words, ideas and metaphors. One says a sentence in a certain meaning, but the opponent changes the meaning of the sentence to show it as fallacious. It is known as chala. Gautama says that chala is the opposition to a statement by the assumption of an alternative meaning.^[21]

Jāti (Futility):

Jāti means unfair sentence which is stated based on false analogy. In the Nyāyasūtra, Gautama defines that it is known as jāti in which objection is founded on mere similarity or dissimilarity.^[22] As for example: one infers that sound is non-eternal as it is an effect like the pot. But other one gives an objection that sound is eternal, as it is spiritual like the sky. Here the objection is a kind of jāti, because there is no necessary relation between the spiritual and the eternal.

Nigrahasthāna (Ground of defeat):

The meaning of nigrahasthāna is a ground of defeat in debate. Such defeat has two grounds, one is misunderstanding and the other is want of understanding. If in a debate, one party misunderstands his own statement and other party’s statement, that party must be defeated, that is known as nigrahasthāna. Gautama defines it as that in which an occasion is arranged for defeat when one misunderstands or does not understand.^[23]

These are the sixteen padārthas accepted by Gautama in his fundamental work of Nyāya philosophy. The later commentators accept these sixteen categories in their works and explain them accordingly. Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyabhāṣya has justified the gradual order of these categories enumerated by Gautama. Viśvanātha also supports this in his Nyāyasūtravṛtti.

Vidyabhusana points out,

“The categories are, according to the commentaries on the Nyāyasūtra, supposed to represent stages in the course of a debate between a disputant and his respondent. The first of the categories is (1) Pramāṇa, which signifies the means of knowledge and the second is (2) Prameya, which refers to the objects of knowledge. These two categories, which constitute the basis of a debate, supply the thesis or case which a disputant is to prove.”

^[24] It thus appears that the sixteen categories of Nyāyasūtra are the topics dealt in the course of a debate.

Dasgupta opines that:

“It is probable that the Nyāya philosophy arose in an atmosphere of continued disputes and debates; as a consequence of this we find here many terms related to debates which we do not notice in any other system of Indian philosophy. These are tarka, nirṇaya, vāda, jalpa, vitaṇḍā, hetvābhāsa, chala, jāti and nigrahasthāna.”^[25]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.3

[2]:

ātmāśarīrendriyārthavuddhimanaḥpravṛttidoṣapretyabhāvaphala-duḥkhāpavargāstu prameyam Ibid., 1.1.9

[3]:

Ibid., 1.1.10-22

[4]:

samānanekadharmopapattervipratipatterupalavdhyanupalabdhivyavasthātaśca viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ saṃśayaḥ. Ibid, 1.1.23

[5]:

Nyāyabhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.23

[6]:

yamarthamadhikṛtya pravartate tat prayojanam. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.24

[7]:

laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṃ yasminnarthe vuddhisāmyaṃ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ. Ibid., 1.1.25

[8]:

tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasaṃsthitiḥ siddhāntaḥ. Ibid., 1.1.26

[9]:

pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāni avayavāḥ. Ibid., 1.1.32

[10]:

sādhyanirdesaḥ pratijñā. Ibid., 1.1.33

[11]:

udāharaṇasādharmyātsādhyasādhanaṃ hetuḥ. Ibid., 1.1.34

[12]:

sādhyasādharmyāttaddharmmabhāvī dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam. Ibid., 1.1.36

[13]:

udāharaṇāpekṣastathetyupasaṃhāro na tatheti vā sādhyasya upanayaḥ. Ibid., 1.1.38

[14]:

hetvapadeśātpratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṃ nigamanam. Ibid., 1.1.39

[15]:

avijñātatatve’rthe kāraṇopapatitastatvajñānārthamūhaḥ tarkaḥ. Ibid., 1.1.40

[16]:

vimṛśyapakṣapratipakṣābhyāmarthāvadhāraṇaṃ nirṇayaḥ. Ibid, 1.1.41

[17]:

pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhassiddhāntaviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ. Ibid., 1.2.1

[18]:

yathoktopapannaśchalajātinigrahasthānasādhanopālambho jalpaḥ. Ibid., 1.2.2

[19]:

svapratipakṣasthāpanāhīno vitaṇḍā. Ibid., 1.2.3

[20]:

savyabhicāraviruddhaprakaraṇasamasādhyasamātītakālā hetvābhāsāḥ. Ibid., 1.2.4

[21]:

aviśeṣe vā kiñcitsādharmyādekacchalaprasaṅgaḥ. Ibid., 1.2.17

[22]:

sādharmyavaidharmyayāṃ pratyavasthānaṃ jātiḥ. Ibid., 1.2.18

[23]:

vipratipattirapratipattiśca nigrahasthānam. Ibid., 1.2.19

[24]:

Vidyabhusana, S.C., A History of Indian Logic, p. 52

[25]:

Dasgupta, S.N., A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 360