Text 29 (of the Paksata-prakarana on Tattvacintama-nididhiti)

TEXT-29a: na catra prathame yatra siddhyatmakaparamarsanantaram sisadhayisaya utpattikale tatpurus Iyasya kasyapi dharmasya na vinaso, 'nantaram punar anumitih tatra tadutpattisamaye 'pi sa syat, tatpurvakalinanam sarvesam tadrsapurvavarttitvenavirodhitvad iti vacyam. TRANSLATION: One should not argue that; in the first case, where after a confirmatory cognition of the form of

a cognition of probandum (siddhi), at the time of the production of a desire to establish, there is no destruction of any property of a particular person and where after the previous inferential cognition, the inferential cognition arises again, there at the same time of production of the desire to establish also the inferential cognition will arise, because every factor that exists prior to that time is not contradictory as such (=the form of the obstructing factor which is different from that which) exists in the immediately prior moment (of the inferential cognition in its own locus). NOTES: "The first case" (prathame) is the form of obstructing factor of text-28, ie: the form of which is different from that which exists in the immediately prior to the moment of the locus. (svasamanadhikarananuinferential cognition in its own locus. mityavayavahitapurvaksanavrttibhinnatvena). Cf. Gadadhara's commentary, i. e. dvitiyakalpanusaranabijibhutaprathamakalpadosam kathamcid uddhartum asankate. (Gadadhari: 1152, 6 f.). Opponent wants to say that, in this case, to postulate the obstructing factor is not correct, because the inferential cognition arises. TEXT-29b: anavarataparispandamanaparimitapavanadiparamanucetanasamyogasan tanantahpativyaktinam aviratam evoparamat, phalanutpadabalenapi tadrsakalpana sambhavat, karanantarakalpane gauravac ca. anvayavyabhicarasandehasya ca karanatvagrahavirodhitvat. TRANSLATION: The reason is that (1) there will be continuous cessation of the individuals which are falling in the

chain of conjunctions between the numerous atoms (paramanu) of air etc. which are momentarily moving and the soul (cetana); (2) and because it is possible to postulate in that way on the basis of the result not arising%; (3) and also because it will if another ground is postulated, for the doubt of positive concomitance is not contrary to the knowledge lead to cumbersomeness of causality. NOTES: Raghunatha mentions three reasons. (1) The opponent said that there is no destruction of property (dharmasya na vinase) in text-29 a. For this statement, Raghunatha says that there is continuous cessation (uparama) of the conjunction (samyoga) between the atoms (paramanu) and the soul (cetana). Therefore, the opponent's argument is not correct. (2) To postulate the obstructing factor in the form of "which is different from that which exists in the immediately prior to the moment of the inferential cognition in its own locus". (svasamanadhikarananumityavyavahitapurvaksanavrttibhinnatvena) is possible, because the inferential cognition does not arise in this form. (3) To postulate another reason (karana) is not necessary, because the inferential cognition does not arise even without that other reason. other reason. Cf. Bhavananda's commentary, i. e. nanu tadanim anumityutpadavaranaya karanantaram eva kalpyatam yadabhavat tadanim nanumitir ata aha karanantareti. (Tattvacintamani-didhiti-prakasa: 921, 17 f.)