Part 4 - Navya-nyaya history of Paksata

1. UDAYANA ACARYA 2 Udayana (ca. AD 1025-1100) 1 was turning point in the history of Indian philosophy. He belonged to Mithila. Pracinanyaya ended with him. At the same time, Navyanyaya started with him. And Nyaya-Vaisesika isesika school had also developed during his time. This means that he belonged to both old and new Nyaya. He was involved in proving the existence of God in his Atmatattvaviveka, Nyayakusumanjali, and Kiranavali. Many Navyanaiyayikas wrote commentaries these three works. In order to prove the existence of God, Udayana used abstractions and he excluded logical ambiguity. This new method is called the Navyanyaya method, but it was not as developed a style as style as that of Navyanaiyayika, Sasadhara or Manikantha, who came later. Thus D. C. Bhattacharya stated, we can refer to Udayana as to Udayana as a classical 3 Navyanaiyayika. The period of the classical Navyanyaya authors extended from Udayana, i. e. Udayana, Vadi Va gisvara (ca. AD 1140), Sriharsa (ca. AD 1125-50), Varadaraja (ca. AD 1150), Vallabha (ca. AD 1150), Kesava Misra (ca. AD 1150), and Sivaditya (ca. AD 1150). Cf. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 51 ff.), (Chemparathy 1972: 19 ff.), and (Matilal 1977: 71) . 2. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 1 f.). 3. Ibid. 42.

In Udayana's last work Kiranavali, Udayana described paksa as follows: Subject is a property-possessor which is qualified by 4 desired property to be established. 26 He held Vyomasiva's definition of paksa. And he favoured the desire theory of subject (icchapaksa). And in his Kusumanjali and Kiranavali, he described paksa as follows: Subject is a qualifier which is not yet established. 5 This idea is based on the old Nyaya idea. In Navyanyaya theory of paksata, it is possible to establish again if there is a desire to establish. 6 4. pratipadayitum istena dharmena visisto yo dharmi paksah. (Kiranavali: 224). 5. aprasiddhavisesanah paksah. paksah. (Nyaya-kusumanjali: 333 and 466) and (Kiranavali: 29). 6. Cf. text-6, part two, chapter A (Tattvacintamani).

2. SRIHARSA 27 Sriharsa (ca. AD 1125-50) 1 was a Sankara-Advaita Vedanta scholar. He discussed many logical topics in his Khandanakhandakhadya. Therefore, many Navyanyaya scholars, including Raghunatha, commented on the Khandanakhandakhadya. 2 Sriharsa criticizes Udayana very much and Gangesa criticizes Sriharsa. He criticizes four definitions of paksa as follows: (1) Subject is a property-possessor of property which is a doubtful probandum. 3 (2) Subject is a property-possessor of desired property. 4 1. 2. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 46 f.). Vardhamana wrote the Khandanaprakasa, Sahkara Misra I wrote the Anandavardhana, Pragalbha wrote the Darpana, Ragunatha wrote the Didhiti, and so on. Vide (Potter 1983: 248 f.). 3. sandigdhasadhyadharma dharmi paksah. (Gangopadhyay 1984: 156, 11). But (KhKhKh: 381, 31) reads sandigdhasadhyadharmavisisto dharmi paksah. This definition is Kesava Misra's definition which is the same as Gangopadhyay's edition. Vide chapter D, section 4 (Kesava and Svaditya) and (Tarkabhasa: 44). sisadhayisitadharma dharmi. (Gangopadhyay 1984: 155, A. 30). But (KhKhKh: 380, 17 f.) reads sisadhayisitasadhyadharma dharmi. This definition is Jayanta Bhatta's definition which is that sisadhayisitadharmavisisto dharmi paksah. Vide chapter C, section 3 and (Nyayamanjari: 283).

28 (3) Subject is property. 5 a property-possessor of undetermined (4) Subject is a property-possessor of property which is an 6 object of undetermined probans. 7 But he does not state his own definition but just criticizes them. In Sriharsa's period, there were three ideas of subject which has doubtful (sandigdha), desired (sisadhayisita), and undetermined (anavadharita) probandum. The idea of doubtful subject is of Kesava Misra, the idea of desired subject is of Jayanta Bhatta, and the idea of undetermined subject is not identified. Udayana states about unestablished (aprasiddha) subject in the Kusumanjali and the Kiranavali. The undetermined (anavadharita) and the unestablished (aprasiddha) have no different meanings. But Sriharsa does not quote the idea of undetermined subject from Udayana's works but from other scholar's work, because he quotes the definition of subject 8 5. rm anavadharitadharma dhamri paksah. (Gangopadhyay 1984: 155, 33) and (KhKhKh: 380, 19 f.). 6. anavadharitabetuvisayadharma dharmi paksah. (Gangopadhyay: 156, 1) and (KhKhKh: 380, 21). 7. Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyay wrote their detail notes. Vide (Gangopadhyay 1984: 100 ff.). 8. aprasiddhavisesanah paksab. (Nyaya-kusumanjali: 333 and 466) and (Kiranavali: 29). Vide chapter D, section 1 (Udayana Acarya).

29 exactly from Kesava's Tarkabhasa and Jayanta's Nyayamanjari. Therefore, Sriharsa must have quoted the idea of undetermined subject exactly from some scholar's definition. Out of those ideas of subject, Gangesa does not think that the doubtful is necessary, but the desired and the undetermined are necessary. And more, Gangesa thinks of the combinations between the desire (sisadhayisa) and the unestablished cognition (sadhakamana). 9 Sriharsa's strong refutations to the Naiyayikas contributed to form the definition of subjectness of Gangesa. 9. Vide chapter D, section 7 (Gahgesa Upadhyaya).

30 30 3. VARADARAJA MISRA According to Vidyabhusana, Varadaraja (ca. AD 1150) was a native of Andra or Telingana and the Madras Presidency. 1 But D. C. 2 Bhattacharya considered Varadaraja to be a Kasmirian. But Umesha Mishra thought Varadaraja belonged to Mithila. 2 His origin is not known but it is true that he studied in Mithila, because of the follwing facts: He was a famous Mimamsaka. He commented on the Mimamsanayaviveka which was written by Prabhakara Mimamsaka, Bhavanatha Misra, Varadaraja also wrote the Nyaya work, Tarkikaraksa. And he commented on the Nyayakusumanjali, i. e. Nyayakusumanjalibodhani. He explained the reason behind writing the commentary on the Nyayakusumanjali in the beginning of Bodhani as follows: The course of argumentation of Udayana is very abstruse and, therefore, non-Mithila scholars faulter at every step. It is for such persons that this commentary named Kusumanjalibodhani is flourishing (that is, is written). 2 (Trans. is of (Mishra, U. 1966: 189)). 1. (Vidyabhusana 1920: 373). 2. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 134). 3. (Mishra, U. 1966: 207). 4. audayane pathi gahane videsikah pratipadam skhalati lokah, tasya krte krtir esa kusumanjalibodhani jayati. (Nyaya-kusumanjali: 2). According to Umesha Mishra, videsikah means non-Mithilas. Vide (Mishra, U. 1966: 189).

31 Varadaraja said that Udayana's Kusumanjali was difficult to read for people who did not belong to Mithila. This meant read Udayana's work, one required special knowledge of Navyanyaya logic. And the reason why Varadaraja reason why Varadaraja could write a commentary on the Kusumanjali is that he studied in Mithila. We know that Udayana was considered to be a Navyanaiyayika in the age of In the Bodhani, he mentions paksa as follows: Varadharaja. Subject is a property-possessor which has a property which is a doubtful probandum. . . 5 But Vardhamana's paraphrase is different from Varadaraja's, i. e: Subject is a property-possessor which has a property which 6 is desired to be established... 7 In And other commentators, i. e. Megha Thakkura and Rucidatta did not comment on Varadaraja's term "doubtful" (sandigdha) but on Vardamana's term "desire to be established" (sisadhayisa). Gangesa's definition of paksata, doubt is not necessary. But desire is necessary in some cases. 5. pakse sandigdhasadhyadharmavati dharmini... (Nyaya-kusumanjali: 2). 6. pakse sisadhayisitasadhyadharmake dharmini... Ibid. 6. 7. Id.

32 4. KESAVA AND SIVADITYA It is not known whether Kesava Misra (ca. AD 1150) 1 belonged to 2 Mithila. But Umesha Mishra thought Kesava flourished in 3 Mithila. Kesava wrote Tarkabhasa. His definition of paksa is as follows: Subject is a property-possessor of property which is a doubtful probandum. 4 He thought that doubt is necessary to establish the subject. He held the doubtful theory of subject (samsayapaksa). Umesha Mishra held the view that Gahgesa did not refer to Kesava in his Tattvacintamani. But Gangesa criticized Kesava's definition of paksa. Gahgesa's criticism of paksatva was: There, however, "the state of having the property namely, doubtful probandum" is not the subjectness because a doubt 5 cannot be a qualifier. Kesava did not use the word paksatva but paksa. This does not that he did not know the concept of paksatva, because Kesava belonged to the post Udayana Navyanyaya period. Every philosopher was influenced by Udayana. Moreover, 1. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 65). 2. 3. 4. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 64) and (Matilal 1977: 102). (Mishra, U. 1966: 231). sandigdhasadhyadharma dharmi paksah. (Tarkabhasa: 44). 5. tatra na tavat sandigdhasadhyadharmavattvam paksatvam, sandeho hi na visesanam. Cf. text-2 of part two, chapter A (Tattvacintamani)

33 Kesava's 's contemporary Sivaditya used paksatva in his definition. In Gangesa's criticism, whether a logician used the term paksa or paksatva is not important. What is important is that doubt (sandigdha) is not necessary for defining paksa. Sivaditya Misra (ca. AD 1150) 6 who wrote the Saptapadarthi belonged to Mithila. He defined paksatva as: Subjectness is the state of being presented as that having doubtful probandum. 7 In the history of Indian philosophy, Sivaditya was the first to define paksatva. He also favoured the doubtful theory of subject (samsayapaksa). 71). 6. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 64). 7. sandigdhasadhyatvenopattatvam paksatvam. (Saptapadarthi:

5. SASADHARA 34 According to D. C. Bhattacharya, Sasadhara belonged to Mithila. 1 But Prof. B. K. Matilal thinks Sasadhara belonged to Western India and he also thinks that Sasadhara preceded Gangesa (ca. AD 1325) by almost 150 years or more than 100 years, and the NyayaSasadhara's siddhantadipa was written not was written not later than AD 1200. one example of usage of paksata is: Delimitor of subjectness can be the state of being a word 3 . This usage is clearly in the style of Navyanyaya. Moreover, we can see his Navyanyaya style of paksata in lingaparamarsavada 4 and Isvaravada 5 of Nyayasiddhantadipa. Sivaditya defined paksatva, but Sasadhara's usage of paksata is a more developed style. Udayana was the founder of Navyanyaya and Sasadhara established it, 6 but with regard to paksata, Sivaditya was the founder and Gangesa established to define it through the contribution of Sasadhara. 1. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 87-90). 2. Introduction of the Nyayasiddhantadipa and (Matilal 1977: 103). 3. prakrtavicaranukulavivadas padatvasyaiva va paksatavacchedakatvam (Nyayasiddhantadipa: 111, 9 f.). 4. 5. 6. Vide (Nyayasiddhantadipa: 60-64). Vide (Nyayasiddhantadipa: 108-112). (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 1).

6. MANIKANTHA MISRA 35 Manikantha Misra (ca. AD 1300) belonged to Mithila and slightly preceded Gangesa (ca. AD 1325)¹. His Nyayaratna is the first work which contains paksatavada. He wrote another logical work i. e. Nyayacintamani which he himself mentioned in the Nyayaratna. But it is not available now. The definition of paksata given there is: 2 3 (Subjectness is) an absence of supportive evidence which obstructs a doubt, and an absence of rejective evidence. The supportive evidence means a cognition of probandum. And the rejective evidence means a cognition in which there is no probandum. An established cognition in which there is a fire on the mountain, is a supportive evidence. And And a cognition in which there is no fire as in the lake is a rejective evidence. Manikantha, in this definition, did not specify what he meant by absence (abhava). He explained that an He explained that an inferential cognition does not arise when there are both the supportive evidence and the rejective evidence. This explanation implies that inferential cognition will arise, when there is an absence of supportive 5 4 1. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 82). (Nyayaratna: 108 and 220). Cf. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 86). 2. 3. 4. 5. samsayavirodhisadhakabadhakapramanabhavas... (Nyayaratna: 115). Cf. text-4 a and b of Tattvacintamani in this thesis. na ca badhasiddhasadhanayos tatha, tayor eva vidyamanatvat. (Nyayaratna: 115).

36 evidence even if there is the rejective evidence, when there is an absence of rejective evidence even if there is the supportive evidence, or when there are an absence of supportive evidence and an absence of rejective evidence. Gangesa interpreted this absence as absence of both (ubhayabhava) and the two absences 6 (abhavadvaya). And the commentator of Nyayaratna, Nrsimhayajvan followed Gangesa's interpretation. 7 Gangesa considered all 8 possible combinations of absence between supportive evidence (sadhakapramana) and rejective evidence (badhakapramana). These ideas developed into Navyanyaya technical terms i. e. anyatarabhava, ubhayabhava, and visistabhava. But it is not clear whether Manikantha thought of this interpretation of Gangesa or not. Manikantha explains the process of inference as: Thus, when there is a doubt, or when there arises a desire to know, or when there is a compatibility of such an absence of supportive evidence and an absence of rejective evidence, or when there are factors associated with factors associated with the knowledge of pervasion etc., or when there are factors associated with the knowledge of what is intended as subject, let there be 6. 7. Cf. text-4 a and b of Tattvacintamani in this thesis. ubhayabhavasya pratyekasattve 'pi sattvat. napy abhavadvayam tatha, badhakapramanabhavasya vyarthatvat. (Nyayaratna: 115, 24 f.) text-4 a and b of part two, chapter A (Tattvacintamani) 8. Cf. Cf. (Jha, V. N. 1986: 146 ff.).

37 the inferential cognition, 9 Manikantha thought that doubt (samsaya) is is the cause of desire (abhimata), the desire is a cause of subjectness (paksata), the subjectness is a cause of pervasion (vyapti), the pervasion is a cause of confirmatory cognition (paramarsa), and the confirmatory cognition is a cause cause of inferential cognition (anumiti). From his idea of the process of inference, we can know that Manikantha held both the theories, such as the doubtful theory of subject (samsayapaksa) and the desire theory of subject (icchapaksa). 9. evam ca samsaye sati va, jijmasayam satyam va, sadhakabadhakapramanabhavalaksanayam yogyatayam satyam va, vyaptijnanadisahakrtasamagrita eva va, paksatvabhimatajnanasahakrtasamagrito vanumityutpattir astu. (Nyayaratna: 115, 5 to 116, 2).

7. GANGESA UPADHYAYA 38 Gangesa belonged to Mithila. He wrote the Tattvacintamani. He was very much influenced by Sasadhara and Manikantha. 1 And, of And, the title Gangesa's famous work Cintamani originates from Manikantha's Nyayacintamani. Gangesa established paksata as a technical term in Navyanyaya. His definition of paksata is algebraic. He criticized the desire theory of subject (icchapaksa), the doubtful theory of sujbect (samsayapaksa), and Manikantha's definition of paksatva. Gangesa created combinations between X and Y by using absence. He interpreted - (X, Y) as (-X, Y), as 2 He (X, Y), and (-X, -Y). Combination of (-X, Y) and (X, Y) is called "absence of both" (ubhayabhava). Combination of (-X, Y), (X, -Y), and (-X, -Y) is called "qualified absence" (visistabhava). And (-X, -Y) is called "alternative absence" (anyatarabhava). applied this idea to the definition of the definition of paksata as follows: The locus of the absence of the supportive evidence accompanied with the absence of the desire to establish, the subject. 3 S Here, the absence (abhava) is a qualified absence (visistabhava). 1. Vide (Matilal 1972: 172), (Vanttanky 1979: 257 ff.), and (Vattanky 1984: 123-29). 2. Cf. (Jha, V. N. 1986: 146 ff.). 3. sisadhayisavirahasahakrtasadhakapramanabhavo yatra sa paksah. With regard to more detailed analysis of Gangesa's definition of paksata, vide text-6 of part two, chapter A (Tattvacintamani).

39 4 In his definition, doubt is not necessary. And absence of rejective evidence (badhakapramana) is also not necessary 5 define subject. He thought that a negative combination of desire and supportive evidence can be subjectness, i. e. a qualified absence (visistabhava) of an absence of desire (sisadhayisaviraha) and a supportive evidence (sadhakapramana) is a paksata. He favoured the desire theory of subject (icchapaksa). His originality in defining paksata, is to employ a qualified absence the definition. 4. tatra na tavat sandigdhasadhyadharmavattvam paksatvam, sandebo bi na visesanam. Text-2 of part two, chapter A (Tattvacintamani). 5. badhakapramanabhavasya vyarthatvat. Text-4 b of part two, chapter A (Tattvacintamani).

40 8. JIVANATHA MISRA After Gangesa, Jivanatha Misra's (ca. AD 1400) definition of paksata is the oldest idea of subjectness which we can know now. Vardhamana followed Gangesa, but in a commentary on the Kusumanjali, his idea of paksata was the same as his father Gangesa's. 1 Jivanatha belonged to Mithila. He was Sahkara 3 2 Misra's uncle. His works are not available now. But we can know his definition of paksata, because Sahkara Misra quoted it in the Upaskara as follows: Subject is a locus which is an absence delimited by a state of being a cognition which obstructs the production of a doubt which is removed by the coming cognition of probandum. 4 Jivanatha did not hold the desire theory of subject but the doubtful theory of subject. Th. 10369 1. sisadhayisavirabasahakrtasadhakapramanabhavavad eva paksatvat. (Nyaya-kusumanjali: 483, 8 f.). 2. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 113 f.). 3. (Kaviraj, G. 1982: 53). But by the reprint by Indian Studies Past & Presant in 1961, p. 40. 4. utpadyasadhyavattanirnayanivartyasamsayotpattipratibandhakamanatvavacchinnabhavo yatra sa paksa... (Upaskara: 486, 3 f.).

9. SANKARA MISRA I 41 Sankara Misra (ca. AD 1425-50) 1 belonged to Mithila. 2 He wrote a commentary on the Tattvacintamani, i. e. Manimayukha. It is clear that he wrote commentary on anumanakhanda, for he himself 99 4 3 mentions that one should see in the Anumanamayukha". But only sabdakhanda is available now and the others are not. And he wrote a commentary on the Vaisesikasutra, i.e. Vaisesikasutropaskara or Upaskara. He defined paksata as paksata as follows: Subject is a locus of an absence of cognition which is a desire to establish and an obstructing factor. 5 This definition is more similar to Manikantha's than Jivanatha's or Gangesa's. He explained this definition as follows: Such a cognition is a supportive evidence and a rejective evidence, because a possessor of an absence of both (ubhayabhava) is a subject. No doubt or desire to establish 1. (Mishra, U. 1966: 324). 2. 3. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 134). tad etad anumanamayukhe drastavyam. (Upaskara: 486, 5 f.). 4. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 136). 5. sisadhayisavirodhipramanabhavo yatra sa tam prati paksab. (Upaskara: 485, 8). 6. Cf. part one, chapter D, section 5 (Manikantha Misra).

42 arises when there is the cognition which is the supportive evidence or the rejective evidence. This is why the old logicians define subject as a property-possessor having a property which is a doubtful probandum, or a property possessor having a property which is desired 6 established as a probandum. Sankara Misra explained the absence in the definition of paksata as an absence of both (ubhayabhava). And this cognition (pramana) is the supportive evidence (sadhakapramana) and the rejective evidence (badhakapramana). So we can interpret absence of both (ubhayabhava) between sisadhayisapramana and virodhipramana on the basis of these combinations%3 B (1) When there is a desire to establish (-(-sisadhayisa)) and there is an obstructing factor (+(virodhin)), subjectness arises. (2) When there is no desire to establish (+ (-sisadhayisa)) and there is no obstructing factor (-(virodhin)), subjectness arises. Gangesa did not think that badhakapramana is necessary is necessary to define paksata, but Sankara Misra thought that this cognition is of two kinds, i. e. sadhakapramana and badhakapramana. Sankara Misra held Manikantha's idea of badhakapramana. 6. tadrsam pramanam sadhakam badhakam ca, tadubhayabhavavatah paksatvat. na hi sadhake badhake va pramane sati kasyacit samsayah sisadhayisa va. ata eva sandigdhasadhyadharma dharmi sisadhayisitasadhyadharma dharmi va paksa iti pramcah. (Upaskara: 485, 9 to 486, 2).

10. YAJNAPATI UPADHYAYA 43 Yajnapati Upadhyaya (ca. AD 1410-1470) belonged to Mithila. 2 1 He wrote Tattvac intamaniprabha between AD 1450 and 1460. This Prabha is is the oldest commentary on the Tattvacintamani which we can read now. Gopikamohan Bhattacharya edited anumanakhanda of 3 Prabha. And he also added an analysis of its content there. Dr. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya made a correction of the G. Bhattacharya's edition. 4 5 We can know Yajnapati's two peculiar ideas of paksata Gopikamohan Bhattacharya has mentioned in his book. One is the explanation of Gahgesa's supportive evidence (sadhakamana): Yajapati says that sadhakamana is of two types i. e. a supportive evidence by means of inference and a supportive evidence by 1. (Prabha: 13). 2. ཉ་ (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 162). Yajapati Upadhyaya's Tattvacintamaniprabha (Anumanakhandah). Wien: Der Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1984. 4. "Textual Obsevations on the Vienna Edition of Yajapati Upadhyaya's Tattvacintamaniprabha (Anumanakhanda)" New Horizen of Research in Indology (pp. 108-138). Ed. V. N. Jha. Poona: Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, 1989. 5. (Bhattacharya, G. 1978: 80 f.).

44 00 8 means of something other than inference i. e. perception etc. 6 This idea is criticized by Raghunatha. 7 And the other idea is about desire to infer (anumitsa). Yajapati says that after the first confirmatory cognition, a desire to infer arises, then another confirmatory cognition arises, which indicates remembrance of pervasion, inferential cognition arises. The reason for another confirmatory cognition to arise is that another desire other than previous desire arises. This idea is criticized by Jayadeva Misra. Rucidatta and Raghunatha take up this discussion. 9 6. tatha ca sisadhayisavirabasabakrtasya siddhyanumanatiriktatatsiddhikarananyanyasya, siddhipratyaksadisiddhikarananyanyasya va samanyabhavo yatra sa paksa ity arthah paryavasyati. (Prabha: 100, 24-27). 7. 8. Vide Text-35 of Didhiti. tatra hi prathamam paramarsaivotpadyate, tadanantaram svakaranad anumitsa, taduttaraksanaiva punah smaranalaksanah paramarsah, taduttaraksana eva canumitir iti vinasyadavasthanumitsaprayukta paksata tatra tadanim nirvighnaiva. (Prabha: 101, 30 to 102, 2) = (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 341, 5-7). 9. Vide (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 341) and text-21 and 22. of the Didhiti.

Yajapati states the process of inferential cognition as follows:10 45 First, where probans-ness, a pervasion etc. exist in an inferential cogniton, there is a there is a remembrance which is of a multi-content form. After that moment, a desire to infer arises. After that moment, mind (manasa) accompanied with remembrance of pervasion etc. which is a destroyed condition, i. e. a confirmatory cognition arises. And after that moment, an inferential cognition arises. And at that time, it is easy for desire to infer to arise. But after some confirmatory cognition of a form which is a remembrance etc., when a desire to infer arises, at that time, an inferential cognition arises from a confirmatory cognition which is to be destroyed condition. At that time, because 10. yad va prathamam tatranumit istasadhanatayah prakrtavyaptyades ca samubalambanarupam ekam eva smaranam, ii taduttaraksane 'numitsa, taduttaraksane iii vinasyadavasthavyap tyadismaranasacivyan manasah paramar iv vi taduttaraksane canumitir ity ato 'pi tada tatra sa sulabbeti. yada tu kathamcit smaranadirupaparamarsanantaram anumitsotpadyate tato vinasyadavasthaparamarsad anumitis, tada vinasyadavasthayah

46 6/ of the presence of the earlier state of "likely to be destroyed", there arises another inferential cognition, from the confirmatory cognition of the form of that inferential cognition, another inferential cognition arises; this should not be case. Therefore, it is to be noted that a word "desire to establish" stands for the desire to establish without the association of its object. Rucidatta quotes the long sentence of Yajnapati's Prabha exactly in the Prakasa from paramarsotpadanantaram.. 11 to . drastavyam. purvam sattvat tadanumityanantaram tadanumityatmakaparamarsat punar anumityantaram ma bhut. atah svavisayanupabita sisadhayisatraVii sisadhayisapadena vivaksitetivili drastavyam. (Prabha: 102, 3-11)=(Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 341, 5 to 343, 5). Variants: (1). Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani omits ekam. (ii). Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani adds eva ca-. (iii) Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani adds eva. (iv). Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani evanumitir for canumitir. (v). Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani sa for tada. (vi). Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani sulabhaiva for sulabheti. (vii). Prabha and Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani svavisayanupahitatra for svavisayanupahita sisadhayisatra. Vide (Bhattacharya, K. 1989: 118). (viii). Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani -uktam iti for vivaksiteti. 11. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 341 and 343).

47 11. JAYADEVA PAKSADHARA MISRA Jayadeva alias Paksadhara Misra (ca. AD 1435-1500) was 1 Yajnapati's pupil. Jayadeva is a real name and Paksadhara is a nickname which was used after he became famous. He wrote the Tattvacintamanyaloka between AD 1465 and 1475. 2 Jayadeva gives a different answer from his teacher Yajapati regarding the question about why an inferential cognition arises after two or three moments from a confirmatory cognition. Yajnapati thinks that after a confirmatory cognition, there arises another confirmatory cognition, therefore an inferential cognition can arise. 3 But Jayadeva does not think of another confirmatory cognition, but thinks that a desire to establish has a compatibility (yogyata), therefore an inferential cognition can arise. 4 1. (Bhattacharya, D. C. 1958: 124 f. and 163). 2. Ibid. 124. 3. prathamam paramarsa evotpadyate tadanantaram svakaranad anumitsa taduttaraksana eva punah smaranaksanah paramarsas taduttaraksana evanumitir... (Prabha: 101,30 to 102, 1) = (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 341, 5 f.). A. sisadhayisayogyatarupah sisadhayisapadena vivaksitah. tadvirabasahakrtasiddhyabhavas ca lihgadarsanavyaptismaranadivyavahitadvitriksanadasayam sisadhayisayam astiti paksatasattvad anumitih. (Tattvacintamanyaloka: 181, 7 to 182, 1). Cf. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 344, 5 f.)

48 Gopikamohan Bhattacharya says that this idea i. e. anye tu dvitriksana... is not Jayadeva's idea but some Naiyayika prior to Jayadeva, because Narahari and Raghunatha did not mention the name but mentioned atra kecit and anye vadanti respectively. 4 But Jagad isa, 5 Gadadhara, 6 and Dharmarajadhvarin say that it is of Jayadeva's 7. Even if Raghunatha did not mention the name Jayadeva, it cannot be said that it is not of Jayadeva, because Raghunatha does not mention the names in other cases also. For example, Raghunatha says that yat tu sisadhayisa... but it is Vasudeva Sarvabhauma's idea 8 And also, it is difficult to think that this view is of anyone other than Jayadeva in the context of Aloka. Therefore, it is better to think that the anye is Jayadeva. 4. (Bhattacharya, G. 1978: 81). 5. Misramatam aha. (Jagadisi 646) and (Paksata-prakarana: 120). 6. Misramatam aha. (Gadadhari: 1124). 7. 8. Jayadevamatam aha. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 345). Text-25 of Didhiti. But Gadadhara says that it is of Vasudeva Sarvabhauma's, i. e. sarvabhaumasya matam aha. Vide (Gadadhari: 1131).

Jayadeva's definition of paksata is as follows: The absence of objectness, in the probandum, of the inferential cognition collocated with the absence of the objectness of the desire to establish of its own is 9 subjectness. 49 Jayadeva says that a cognition of probandum (siddhi) and a desire to establish (sisadhayisa) must have same locus. And Rucidatta mentions this definition in his Prakasa. 10 9. sviyasisadhayisavisayatvabhavasamanadhikaranasiddhivisayatvabhavah sadhye paksata. (Tattvacintamanyaloka: 184, 2 f.) and (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 348). 10. Id.

50 12. RUCIDATTA MISRA 2 Rucidatta Misra (ca. AD 1450-1510)¹ was Jayadeva's pupil. His commentary on the Tattvacintamani i. e. Tattvacintamaniprakasa was edited by Dr. Ramanuja Tatacharya. Rucidatta presents six combinations as follows: 3 1) 2) paramarsa/anumitsa/siddhi paramarsa/siddhi/anumitsa 3) siddhi/paramarsa/anumitsa 4) siddhi/anumitsa/paramars 5) 6) anumitsa/paramarsa/siddhi anumitsa/siddhi/paramarsa The third and the fourth cases are of paksata, because siddhi is destroyed in the third moment. But (1), (2), (5), and (6) are not 1. 2. (Bhattacharya, G. 1978: 4). (Kaviraj 1982: 49) and by the Indian Studies Past & Present ed., p. 37. 3. Tattvacintamani of Ganges opadhyaya with Prakasa of Rucidatta Misra and Nyayasikhamani on Prakasa of Ramakrsnadhvarin. Volume I, Pratyaksakhanda. Ed. N. S. Ramajuja Tatacharya. Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 1973. And Tattvacintamani of Gangesopadhyaya with Prakasa of Rucidatta Misra and Tarkacudamani on Prakasa of Dharmarajadhvarin. Volume II, Anumanakhanda part I. Ed. N. S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. Tirupati: Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, 1982.

51 the cases of paksata, because siddhi continues to the third moment in the first and the second cases, and anumitsa is destroyed in the third moment in the fifth and the sixth cases. 4 And Rucidatta says that for the paksata to arise, particular factors such as linga, paksa, sadhya, anumitsa etc. are required. For example, it is impossible to infer other than fire i. e. light etc. by means of a desire to infer a fire. To infer a fire one 4. evam yatranumitsanantaram siddhyanugunavisayantarasafcarah tadavyavahitottaraksana eva smaranalaksanah paramarsas tatranumitir na syat. na cestapattih, paramarsavyavahitapurvasamaye vinasyadavasthanumitsasattvena ekaksanantaritayam tasyam anumityutpadah, lingaparamarsadina dvitriksanantaritayam tasyam anumityanutpada ity atra manabhavat. svavyaparibbutena vyavadhanasyobhayatrapi tulyatvat. tasmat yadi vyavahitayam api sisadhayisayam anumityutpado 'bhyupeyate tada yavat ksananantaram anumityabhava'ubhayasiddhih tavat ksananantaritatvenanutpadakalo visesaniya iti eva vaya yuktam utpasyamah. na caivam anumitsanantaram pratyaks Ikrte visaye tadgrimaksanotpannaparamarsenanumitijananapattih, tanmate istapatteh. pratyaksanantarotpannayam dvitriksanavyavahitayam tasyam anumitya bhavayam, na tu pratyaksanantarotpannayam dvitriksanavyavahitayam tasyam ity atra niyamakabhavad iti. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 344 f.).

52 5 should have a desire to infer a fire. These views are discussed by Raghunatha in more detail Rucidatta cites many sentences from Yajnapati's Prabha and Jayaveda's Aloka directly in his Prakasa. He has quoted exactly without changing the original form. He cites a long passage from 7 Yajapati's Prabha. That is about a theory of another confirmatory cognition arising and the process of inferential cognition. And Rucidatta cites mainly five portions from Jayadeva's Aloka. The first is about God's desire (isvarasisadhayisa or bhagavad-iccha). 8 The second is a criticism against emergence of another confirmatory cognition theory by Yajnapati. The third point states that a desire to establish 9 5. na caivam dhumena vahnyanumitsayam alokadinapi tadanumityapattib, yanumitir yatrotpadyate tadgoracanumitsaya vivaksitatvat. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 347). And vastuto vyadhikaranaya anyakalinayas ca tasyas tada tatpuruse viraha eveti tam adayatiprasahgabhavat tallihgakatatpaksakatats adhyakanumitigoraca sa vivaksaniya. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 350). 6. Text-26 ff. of Didhiti. 7. paramarsotpadanantaram... iti drastatyam. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 341, 5 to 343, 5) = prathamam paramarsa.. amarsa ... iti drastavyam. (Prabha: 101, 30 to 102, 11). 8. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 338 f.) = (Tattvacintamanyaloka: 173). 9. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 344, 2-8) = (Tattvacintamanyaloka: 180, 3 to 182, 3).

53 (sisadhayisa) does not me an a desire of a cognition of probandum (siddhi-iccha). The fourth is about Jayadeva's definition of paksata. 11 10 And the fifth point deals with some logician's idea about the qualified absence (visista-abhava) not being the subjectness and considers this idea to be incorrect. 12 10. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 346, 1-4) = (Tattvacintamanyaloka: 182, 4-10). 11. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani 348, 8 f.) = (Tattvacintamanyaloka: 184, 2 f.). 12. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Tarkacudamani: 350, 6-9) = (Tattvacintamanyaloka: 184, 12 ff.).

54 13. VASUDEVA SARVABHAUMA Vasudeva Sarvabhauma (ca. AD 1430-1540) was founder of Bengal school. 1 He was a famous as teacher of Raghunatha. Vasudeva wrote a commentary on the anumanakhanda of Tattvacintamani i. e. Anumanaman ipariksa or Tattvac intamanisaravali. His definition of paksata is as folows: 2 (Paksata is) an absence of that a cognition of probandum which exists in the absence of desire to establish and which is based on a chief qualifier of the same object which has absence of the state of being the same cognition of probandum which is based on chief qualifier of the same object which has caused inferential cognition in the moment immediately after a moment of its own locus which exists in 2 an absence of a desire to establish. The inferential cognition does not arise where there is the siddhi without sisadhayisa at the time of immediately after the siddhi, because that siddhi operates as obstructing factor (pratibandhaka). But, in this case, it is possible to 1. 2. 3. (Bhattacharya, G. 1978: 19) and (Prabha: 13). Ms. No. 33086, Saraswati Bhavan Library, Varanasi. sisadhayisavirahanistasvadhikaranaksanavyavahitottaraksanavartiprakrtanumitikasamanavisayaprakarakasamanasiddhitvabhavavatsamanavisayaprakarakasiddhir eva sisadhayisavirahavisistayas tasyabhavasya vivaksitatvat. (Bhattacharya, G. 1978: 82).

55 arise the inferential cognition after two or three moments the cognition of probandum which has no desire to infer, because that cognition of probandum cannot operate as obstructing factor, for that cognition of probandum is disappeared when the inferential cognition arises. That is to say, when there are no desire nor congition of probadnum, inferential cognition can arise in Gahgesa's definition. Therefore, Vasudeva thinks that the inferential cognition can arise even there is a cognition of probandum without desire to establish in the other case than 3 immediately after moment the cognition of probandum. 3. Vide text-23 of Didhiti.

14. RAGHUNATHA SIROMANI Raghunatha Siromani (ca. AD 1475-1550) was a pupil of Vasudeva Sarvabhauma. He wrote four independent works 2 1 3 and seven commentaries. One of them is a commentary on the Tattvacintamani, i. e. Tattvacintamanididhiti. After Raghunatha, many Navyanaiyayikas commented on the Didhiti rather than Jayadeva's Aloka. Raghunatha did not express his own definition of paksata but he explained all the possibilities of interpretation of Gangesa's definition of paksata. Raghunatha cites the views of Yajapati, Jayadeva, and Sarvabhauma. Though Rucidatta quotes exactly from them, Raghunatha does not quote exactly or directly from their texts but arranges them more precisely. The Didhiti is much more systematic than the Prabha, the Aloka, and the Prakasa. 1. (Ingalls 1951: 9). 2. The Akhyatavada, the Nanvada, the Padarthatattvanirupana, and Malimucaviveka. And, may be, the Advaitesvaravada and the Niyojyanvayanirupana are also written by Raghunatha. Cf. (Wada 1990: 24 f.). 3. The commentaries on the Tattvacintamani, on the Atmatattvaviveka, on the Kiranavaliprakasa, on the Khandanakhandakhadya, on the Nyayalilavati prakasa, on the Nyayalilavati, and on the Nyayakusumafjali. Most of his commentaries are called the Didhiti. cf. (Wada 1990: 24 f.). 56

57 4 Raghunatha developed Gahgesa's idea of subjectness. Gahgesa thinks that the determinative factors of subject (paksa) are the combinations between the cognition of probandum (siddhi) and the desire to establish (sisadhayisa). But Raghunatha thinks that the determinative factors of subject are not the combinations between the cognition of probandum and the desire to establish but the combination between the obstructing factor (pratibandhaka or virodhin) and the cause (karana or hetu) or the stimulating factor (uttejaka) of the inferential cognition, because, in some cases, the cognition of probandum cannot obstruct the emergence of inferential cognition and the desire to establish can obstruct the emrgence of inferential cognition. That is Raghunatha's original idea of subjectness (paksata). 5 There is a strange point in the paksataprakarana. That is, Raghunatha did not criticize the Prabhakara's view in the ending of paksataprakarana and the section ended. It means that the view of the Prabhakara school on subjectness came to be widly 6 Raghunatha thought the relation of "some thing accepted. established and not to be separated" (ayutasiddha) (samavaya) and the Prabhakara school thought of as inherence the self 4. Vide part one, chapter D, section 7 (Gangesa Upadhyaya) and part two, chapter A (Tattvacintamani). 5. Vide part two, chapter B (Tattvac intamanididhiti). 6. Vide text-54 of TCD.

linking relation (svarupasambandha). This is the main point of discussion. Therefore, Gangesa does not discuss this problem in the subjectness section but in the inherence section (samavayavada). 7 7. (Tattvacintamani-prakasa with Nyayasikhamani: 648 and 683). 58